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Abstract 
This thesis argues that international human rights law (IHRL), as represented by 
a selection of universal and regional human rights treaties, provides an 
important normative framework within which maritime security operations 
(MSOs) are to be conducted. MSOs are mounted by States to deal with a 
spectrum of maritime security threats, and comprise a range of activities of a 
nature potentially to affect or engage individual rights. These activities include 
the use of force, deprivation of liberty, the rescue of those in distress at sea, 
and transfer or expulsion to other States. In addition, the aim of a MSO may 
amount to a potential infringement of individual freedoms, such as in the case of 
the policing of protest at sea. 
Before examining the substantive rights that may be engaged through these 
activities, the thesis first considers the applicability of IHRL to MSOs conducted 
both within areas of the sea that are part of a State’s territory, as well as those 
that are not. It concludes that, notwithstanding differences between the treaties 
concerned, and some remaining areas of controversy, a plausible argument can 
be made for the applicability of IHRL to most of the activities that comprise 
MSOs, wherever they are conducted. 
An examination of substantive IHRL rules and norms then reveals that a range 
of rights are engaged in the course of MSOs. These include the right to life, the 
right to liberty and security of the person, the freedoms of expression and 
assembly, as well as the principle of non-refoulement. Although MSOs are 
subject to obligations under other bodies of law including, most notably, the law 
of the sea, IHRL provides a framework of regulation that is more comprehensive 
both in its breadth and in its detail. Although courts have sometimes recognised 
the unique features of the maritime domain when applying IHRL rules and 
norms to MSOs, it is demonstrated that their application can raise significant 
additional challenges in practice. 
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1. Introduction 
This thesis concerns the application of international human rights law (IHRL) to 
maritime security operations (MSOs). In order to frame the subsequent 
discussion, this introductory chapter begins with a section explaining several 
key concepts, beginning with a discussion of what is meant by the term 
‘maritime security’, before turning to an examination of MSOs themselves. The 
chapter provides a short survey of relevant practice, before situating MSOs in 
international law by considering, briefly, where MSOs find their basis in, and 
how they are regulated by, bodies of international law other than IHRL. The 
chapter then proceeds to introduce IHRL, explaining its origins, before setting 
out its key sources and describing important principles concerning its content 
and application. The section on key concepts concludes by considering, in 
outline, how IHRL applies in the maritime domain. The second section then sets 
out the methodology adopted for the subsequent enquiry. 
1.1. Key concepts 
1.1.1. Maritime security 
The term ‘maritime security’, at least in the sense in which it is currently used, is 
an expression of relatively recent origins. Before the end of the Cold War it was 
used, if at all, ‘primarily in reference to sea control over maritime areas in the 
context of the superpower confrontation, that is to say in a naval context.’1 
Today, the term is used differently and, arguably, not entirely consistently. 
Indeed, it has been described as a ‘buzzword’ without ‘definite meaning’.2 This, 
however, is an exaggeration. 
While a ‘universally acceptable definition’ may well prove elusive,3 there are 
consistent themes that run through the language used to describe and explain 
what is meant by maritime security. The UK National Strategy for Maritime 
Security (UK National Strategy) defines it as, ‘The advancement and protection 
of the UK’s national interests, at home and abroad, through the active 
                                            
1 Basil Germond, ‘The Geopolitical Dimension of Maritime Security’ (2015) 54 
Marine Policy 137, 138. 
2 Christian Bueger, ‘What is Maritime Security?’ (2015) 53 Marine Policy 159, 
163. 
3 ibid 163. 
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management of risks and opportunities in and from the maritime domain, in 
order to strengthen and extend the UK’s prosperity, security and resilience and 
to help shape a stable world.’4 NATO refers to ‘the maintenance of a secure and 
safe maritime environment’.5 Similarly, the United States’ National Strategy for 
Maritime Security (US National Strategy) states that, ‘The safety and economic 
security of the United States depends upon the secure use of the world’s 
oceans.’6 It goes on to explain that  
The oceans, much of which are global commons under no State's 
jurisdiction, offer all nations, even landlocked States, a network of sea-
lanes or highways that is of enormous importance to their security and 
prosperity. … 
In today’s economy, the oceans have increased importance, allowing all 
countries to participate in the global marketplace. More than 80 percent of 
the world’s trade travels by water and forges a global maritime link. About 
half the world’s trade by value, and 90 percent of the general cargo, are 
transported in containers. …7 
According to these definitions, maritime security is concerned with the 
maintenance of good order at sea, and the protection of States’ and other 
                                            
4 HM Government, The UK National Strategy for Maritime Security (May 2014) 
(UK National Strategy) 15. The UK National Strategy goes on to define five ‘UK 
Maritime Security Objectives’: ‘1. To promote a secure international maritime 
domain and uphold international maritime norms; 2. To develop the maritime 
governance capacity and capabilities of states in areas of strategic maritime 
importance; 3. To protect the UK and the Overseas Territories, their citizens 
and economies by supporting the safety and security of ports and o shore 
installations and Red Ensign Group (REG)-flagged passenger and cargo ships; 
4. To assure the security of vital maritime trade and energy transportation 
routes within the UK Marine Zone, regionally and internationally. 5. To protect 
the resources and population of the UK and the Overseas Territories from illegal 
and dangerous activity, including serious organised crime and terrorism.’ ibid 18 
(citations omitted). 
5  NATO, ‘Alliance Maritime Strategy’ (18 March 2011) <www.nato.int/cps/ 
en/natohq/official_texts_75615.htm> accessed 10 May 2018 (Alliance Maritime 
Strategy) para 14. 
6 US Government, ‘The National Strategy for Maritime Security’ (September 
2005) (US National Strategy) 1. 
7 ibid 1–2. 
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actors’ interests from threats arising in, or from, the maritime domain,8 including 
threats to the lawful use of the oceans for trade.9 
Maritime security is often explained with reference to particular specified threats 
or risks. Those identified in the US National Strategy are: nation-state threats, 
especially the use of the oceans to facilitate the deployment in the United 
States of a weapon of mass destruction (WMD);10 terrorist threats, including the 
use of the maritime environment to facilitate terrorist networks as well as to 
launch attacks directly on the United States;11 transnational crime and piracy;12 
environmental destruction; 13  and illegal seaborne immigration. 14  The UK 
National Strategy envisages a changing set of risks, with those identified when 
the document was first published being:  
• Terrorism affecting the UK and its maritime interests, including 
attacks against cargo or passenger ships;  
• Disruption to vital maritime trade routes as a result of war, criminality, 
piracy or changes in international norms; 
• Attack on UK maritime infrastructure or shipping, including cyber 
attack; 
• The transportation of illegal items by sea, including weapons of mass 
destruction, controlled drugs and arms; 
• People smuggling and human trafficking.15 
Others often cited include illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing, as well as 
maritime accidents or disasters.16 
Defining maritime security in this way has been criticised as incoherent, 
amounting to little more than a ‘laundry list’ of contemporary issues.17 Certainly, 
                                            
8 See, for example, Germond, (n 1) 137, 138. See also UK Ministry of Defence, 
‘British Maritime Doctrine’ (JDP 0-10, August 2011) (British Maritime Doctrine) 
235. 
9 See also British Maritime Doctrine (n 8) p238; Chris Trelawny, ‘Maritime 
Security Beyond Military Operations’ (2013) 158(1) The RUSI J 48, 48. 
10 US National Strategy (n 6) 3–4. 
11 ibid 4–5. 
12 ibid 5. 
13 ibid 6. 
14 ibid 6. 
15 UK National Strategy (n 4) 19. 
16 See, for example, Germond (n 1) 138; Bueger (n 2) 159. 
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perceived threats to maritime security are inherently subjective, reflecting the 
particular interests and priorities of each State or actor. Such threats also 
change over time, at least with respect to their scale, and therefore the priority 
they are afforded. Nevertheless, it is difficult to detach the concept of maritime 
security from an understanding of those things that threaten it, at least if the 
term is to have any practical value. Consequently, while it may be that ‘no 
international consensus over the definition of maritime security has emerged’,18 
it is hard to conceive of a preferable alternative approach. 
1.1.2. Maritime security operations 
Maritime security is to be achieved in various ways. The UK National Strategy 
divides these into three broadly-defined ‘tasks’: to ‘exert [the UK’s] levers of 
influence to uphold and strengthen the rules-based international system which 
governs the maritime domain, and which underpins our national security and 
prosperity’; ‘to strengthen our protection against known threats, improving 
security and reducing vulnerabilities’; and ‘[w]here we have identified activities 
which may be illegal, or which may threaten our national interests…to respond 
in a timely, precise and intelligent manner.’19 The latter two tasks, to ‘protect’ 
and to ‘respond’, both involve the deployment of naval or law-enforcement 
assets. As the UK National Strategy explains, ‘The “protect” task includes…the 
deployment of Royal Navy units to enforce international maritime law and 
protect UK merchant shipping’.20 The ‘respond’ task includes the use of ‘law 
enforcement assets to police the UK’s borders, to prevent the trafficking of 
illegal goods and to protect our economic resources, as well as a range of 
military capabilities that can, as a last resort, use lethal force to protect our 
people, economy, infrastructure, territory and way of life from seaborne 
threats.’21 Such use of maritime assets to contribute to maritime security by 
upholding the rule of law at sea defines what is usually meant by the term 
‘maritime security operations’.22 
                                                                                                                                
17 Bueger (n 2) 159–160. 
18 Bueger (n 2) 160 (citations omitted). 
19 UK National Strategy (n 4) 23. 
20 ibid. 
21 ibid. 
22  See, for example, Royal Netherlands Navy, ‘Fundamentals of Maritime 
Operations: Netherlands Maritime Military Doctrine’ (2014) (Netherlands 
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Just as the concept of maritime security is often defined with reference to 
specific threats, MSOs are generally discussed with reference to examples of 
operations mounted to counter those threats. According to UK naval doctrine, 
MSOs ‘span a wide range of operations from defence (short of war-fighting) 
through to security to development and relieving human suffering by utilising the 
full spectrum of maritime forces and their attributes.’23 These operations include 
those conducted against threats such as ‘piracy, slavery, people smuggling, 
illegal immigration, drug smuggling, arms smuggling, terrorism and the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; as well the protection of the 
maritime environment, including fisheries.’ 24  US doctrine similarly cites, as 
examples of MSOs, ‘missions to counter maritime-related terrorism, weapons 
proliferation, transnational crime, piracy, environmental destruction, and illegal 
seaborne immigration.’25 MSOs also include ‘assisting mariners in distress, 
participating in security cooperation operations with allies and partners, sharing 
situational awareness, and conducting maritime interception and law 
enforcement operations’.26 
While encompassing a broad range of operations, MSOs often involve the 
interception, by a State’s ships, of vessels suspected to be engaging in activity 
that is somehow threatening maritime security.27 These activities are referred to 
as ‘maritime interception operations’ (MIO),28 or, alternatively, as ‘maritime 
interdiction operations’,29  and involve ‘efforts to monitor, query, and board 
                                                                                                                                
Maritime Military Doctrine) para 12.1 (‘[MSO] are designed to protect interests in 
the maritime domain against breaches of the (international) rule of law. MSO 
consist of all activities targeting civil actors who violate agreements regarding 
the use of the sea, such as international treaties and UN Security Council 
resolutions. The purpose of MSO is law enforcement; national maritime forces 
function here as a national or international police force.’) 
23 British Maritime Doctrine (n 8) 234. 
24 ibid. 
25  US Joint Chiefs of Staff, ‘Command and Control for Joint Maritime 
Operations’ (JP 3-32, 7 August 2013) (JP 3-32) I-4. 
26 ibid I-4. 
27 See, for example, Netherlands Maritime Military Doctrine (n 22) para 12.1. 
28 This is the term used by the US. JP 3-32 (n 25) IV-20. 
29 See, for example, Netherlands Maritime Military Doctrine (n 22) para 12.4. 
NATO refers instead to ‘maritime interdiction missions’. Alliance Maritime 
Strategy (n 5) para 15. 
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merchant vessels’.30 While they may be employed in order to counter a broad, 
arguably unbounded, set of maritime security threats, MIO have clearly-defined 
characteristics with respect to their execution. Dutch doctrine, for example, 
identifies four activities that constitute MIO: ‘intelligence and picture 
compilation’, in which a range of means are employed to understand the 
patterns of shipping in a particular area, and to identify vessels suspected of 
violating the law; ‘query’, in which vessels are engaged by radio or other means 
of communication in order to gather information about their activities and 
intentions; ‘boarding’, in which individuals deployed from a naval or coastguard 
vessel embark in a suspect vessel to conduct an inspection of its 
documentation and/or search of its cargo, crew, or passengers; and ‘diversion’, 
in which a suspect vessel is compelled to alter its planned route, sometimes to 
a specific port in order to facilitate further inspection.31 
The practice of boarding is worthy of particular attention. As will be shown, it is 
in the context of boarding, and the actions ancillary to it, that some of the most 
prominent human rights issues are engaged. While much of the material 
describing how boarding is conducted at the tactical level is either classified or 
withheld for official use only, Dutch doctrine contains a helpful, publicly 
available, account.32 Given Netherlands’ membership of NATO, its practice can 
be considered broadly representative, at least among NATO nations. What 
follows, therefore, is a broad overview, intended to provide an outline upon 
which subsequent chapters will build in describing the practice relevant to each 
individual topic under discussion. 
Boarding operations are divided into three types depending on the level of 
resistance the vessel to be boarded is displaying or is expected to display. An 
‘unopposed boarding’ is one in which the vessel is cooperative, and no 
resistance is therefore expected. A ‘non-cooperative boarding’ is one in which 
the vessel does not cooperate with the boarding, but no active resistance is 
anticipated. Finally, an ‘opposed boarding’ is one in which active resistance is 
                                            
30 JP 3-32 (n 25) IV-20. MIO are sometimes considered to encompass wartime 
activities, such as the enforcement of blockades, which are outside the normal 
definition of MSO. See, for example, Netherlands Maritime Military Doctrine (n 
22) 341. 
31 Netherlands Maritime Military Doctrine (n 22) 342–43. 
32 ibid 349–54. 
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expected, including the use of weapons or other measures posing a physical 
danger to personnel conducting the boarding.33 This categorisation will dictate 
the size and nature of forces employed. Under Dutch doctrine, for example, an 
opposed boarding can only be conducted by, or with the assistance of, special 
operations forces.34 The type of boarding will also determine the level of force, if 
any, likely to be required to conduct the boarding. 
In conducting the boarding, the first step is to prepare the target vessel, so far 
as is possible, to receive the boarding party. This involves directing the vessel 
to stop or to adopt a particular course and speed to facilitate boarding. If the 
vessel is not cooperative, force may be required to persuade it to comply. Such 
use of force will follow an established, escalatory, sequence until compliance is 
achieved. First, warning shots will be fired, often across the vessel’s bow, but, in 
any case, carefully aimed so as not to hit it. Next, ‘non-disabling fire’ will be 
directed against parts of the vessel that do not affect its ability to float and 
manoeuvre, such as areas of the superstructure above the waterline. Finally, 
‘disabling fire’ will be aimed at parts of the ship essential to its operation, such 
as its engine or steering gear.35 Once the vessel is prepared, a security team 
will be inserted by helicopter or boat to ensure that it is safe for the remainder 
the boarding party to embark. At that point, the boarding party will conduct 
whatever activity is required to fulfil the objective of the operation, usually 
involving an inspection of the vessel, together with its documentation, its cargo 
and its crew.36 Depending on the outcome of that inspection, subsequent action 
may include the seizure of the vessel or its cargo, and/or the arrest and 
detention of members of its crew. Seized goods may be subject to adjudication 
or, in some cases, destroyed. Detained individuals may be prosecuted, either 
by the interdicting State, or by another into whose custody they have been 
transferred.37  
                                            
33 ibid 349–50. 
34  ibid 350. Special operations forces are specialised teams trained and 
equipped to perform a variety of particular tasks, including providing the 
‘specialist striking power in MSO’. ibid 279. 
35 ibid 351–52. In the case of an opposed boarding, these steps may be omitted 
in favour of a surprise, ‘takedown operation’, achieved through insertion of 
specialised forces by other means. ibid 352. 
36 ibid 352. 
37 ibid 353. 
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Summarising this, a generic interdiction can be broken into a number of steps, 
for example: 
1. The interdicting State becomes aware of a vessel that it wishes to 
investigate. 
2. A ship sent to interdict the vessel makes contact with the vessel (e.g. 
by radio), instructing it to stop and submit to investigation. 
3. If the vessel does not comply, the interdicting ship may use a series 
of escalating measures, including the use of warning shots, non-
disabling fire and disabling fire, to compel the vessel to follow its 
instructions. 
4. The interdicting ship may send a boarding party to the vessel, which 
may or may not cooperate with the boarding. The boarding party 
conducts an investigation, potentially including searches of the 
vessel and its crew, and potentially including the use of force to 
compel compliance with its directions. 
5. The interdicting ship takes control of the interdicted vessel and its 
crew. 
6. The boarding party may detain individuals and hold them on the 
vessel. 
7. Individuals from the vessel, including detainees and others such as, 
for example, irregular migrants or freed slaves, may be transferred to 
the interdicting ship. 
8. The vessel may be towed or escorted to another location, such as a 
port of the interdicting State. 
Although MSOs include a wider range of activities than just interdictions, and 
interdictions do not necessarily follow a rigid script, this sequence will be 
referred to in the analysis at various points throughout the thesis. It is 
particularly pertinent to the issue of extraterritorial applicability, which, as will be 
shown, often depends on the level of control being exercised over individuals at 
a particular point in time. 
1.1.3. Maritime security operations in international law 
Although the focus of this thesis is the application of IHRL to MSOs, a 
significant thread relates to the interaction between IHRL and other relevant 
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bodies of international law. In any case, an understanding of other international 
law rules and norms is important context in which to understand the operation of 
IHRL. There are two broad aspects to this: first, the role of other bodies of 
international law in providing the legal basis for MSOs;38 and, second, their role, 
to some extent, in regulating how MSOs are to be conducted. 
1.1.3.1. Bases for MSOs in international law 
With 168 parties,39 as well as being widely considered to be, in large part, 
reflective of customary international law,40 the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)41 has been described as the ‘“constitution” for 
the world’s oceans.’42 As such, it provides the underlying legal framework within 
which States’ activities in the maritime domain, including MSOs, are conducted. 
Central to this framework are the rules that determine the circumstances in 
which States may exercise jurisdiction over vessels.43 These provisions often 
provide the legal basis, in whole or in part, for MSOs. 
Jurisdiction over vessels under the UNCLOS regime is considered throughout 
this thesis, particularly in Chapters Two and Three. In broad terms, however, 
                                            
38  See, generally, Rob McLaughlin, ‘Authorizations for Maritime Law 
Enforcement Operations’ (2017) 98(2) Intl Rev of the Red Cross 465. 
39 As of 27 June 2018. ‘Status of Treaties’ (United Nations Treaty Collection) 
<https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXI
-6&chapter=21&Temp=mtdsg3&clang=_en> accessed 27 June 2018. 
40 See, for example, R R Churchill and A V Lowe, The Law of the Sea 
(Manchester UP 1999) 17–18 (‘Indeed, at least the broad principles of many of 
the innovations made by the 1982 Convention, such as the establishment of 
rights to 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), had passed into 
customary law some years before the Convention itself entered into force.’); 
James Kraska, ‘Broken Taillight at Sea: the Peacetime International Law of 
Visit, Board, Search and Seizure’ (2010) 16(1) Ocean & Coastal L J 1, 10. 
Notably, given its status as a non-party to UNCLOS, the long-standing position 
of the United States is that, with the exception of Part XI, which deals with the 
international seabed area, UNCLOS reflects customary law. President Ronald 
Reagan, ‘Statement on United States Ocean Policy’ (10 March 1983) 19 
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 383. Statement of the President.  
41 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (adopted 10 December 
1982, entered into force 16 November 1994) 1833 UNTS 397 (UNCLOS). 
42 Kraska (n 40) 10. Importantly, particularly noting the scope for disagreement 
as to the customary status of UNCLOS, it replicates a number of provisions 
found in earlier instruments, including the High Seas Convention and Territorial 
Sea Convention, to which non-UNCLOS States may be party. 
43  On jurisdiction over vessels, generally, see Douglas Guilfoyle, Shipping 
Interdiction and the Law of the Sea (CUP 2009) 7–10. 
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the applicable rules depend, to a great extent, on the physical location of the 
vessel over which jurisdiction is to be asserted. The oceans are divided into a 
number of zones defined by distance from a coastal State.44 Within each, the 
coastal State is entitled to exercise jurisdiction over vessels in certain 
prescribed situations; 45  those rights differ from zone to zone, generally 
diminishing with distance from the coastal State’s shores. Otherwise, absent 
any rights as a coastal State, the general rule is that exclusive jurisdiction is 
enjoyed by a vessel’s flag State.46 Except where permitted by another rule of 
international law, interference with a foreign-flagged ship amounts to a violation 
of the prohibition on the use of force, as set out in Article 2(4) of the UN 
Charter.47 
In international waters, the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag State is subject to 
several important exceptions, notably where a right of visit with respect to a 
vessel that is suspected of engaging in piracy, unauthorised broadcasting or 
slavery.48 In addition, any State may exercise its jurisdiction on board a vessel 
that is stateless, or that can be assimilated as such because it flies, for 
convenience, more than one flag.49 Furthermore, a vessel’s flag State may 
grant another State permission to exercise jurisdiction over it, either under a 
standing arrangement,50 or on a case-by-case basis.51 
The jurisdictional regime set out in UNCLOS is subject to ‘other rules of 
international law’.52 Pre-eminent amongst these are the rules contained in the 
                                            
44 See below ss 2.1, 3.3.3. 
45 McLaughlin (n 38) 478–79. 
46 UNCLOS (n 41) art 92(1) (‘Ships shall sail under the flag of one State only 
and, save in exceptional cases expressly provided for in international treaties or 
in this Convention, shall be subject to its exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas. 
A ship may not change its flag during a voyage or while in a port of call, save in 
the case of a real transfer of ownership or change of registry.’) 
47 Guilfoyle, Shipping Interdiction and the Law of the Sea (n 43) 272–77. 
Guilfoyle argues convincingly that this conclusion precludes interdiction ‘even 
as a countermeasure following another state’s unlawful conduct at sea.’ ibid 
277. 
48 UNCLOS (n 41) art 110(1)(a)–(c). See also McLaughlin (n 38) 483–87. 
49 UNCLOS (n 41) arts 92(2), 110(1)(d)–(e). 
50 McLaughlin (n 38) 476–77 
51 ibid 473–76. 
52 UNCLOS (n 41) arts 2(1), 21(1), 34(2), 58(3), 87(1), 138, 293(1). 
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Charter of the United Nations,53 obligations arising from which take precedence 
over those contained in any other international agreement to which a State may 
be party.54 In particular, where the UN Security Council determines that there 
exists a ‘threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression’, it may 
take action ‘to maintain international peace and security.’55 Such measures may 
or may not involve the use of armed force, and examples of each are set out in 
the Charter. Non-forceful measures include ‘may include complete or partial 
interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, 
and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic 
relations.’56 Forceful measures ‘may include demonstrations, blockade, and 
other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.’57 
These powers have been used in practice, for example, to permit States to take 
action to suppress armed robbery in Somalia’s territorial sea,58 as well as to 
create powers to enforce various arms embargoes.59 
Another important rule of international law to which the UNCLOS regime may 
be subject is the right of States to use force in self-defence, a customary 
international law right recognised in Article 51 of the UN Charter. According to 
the right of self-defence, a State is permitted to use necessary and 
proportionate force, including otherwise prohibited forceful measures against 
foreign-flagged ships.60 It arises, however, only where a State is subject to an 
armed attack, although the exact contours of this requirement are the subject of 
substantial and ongoing debate, not least with respect to whether there is a 
                                            
53 Charter of the United Nations (signed 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 
October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI (UN Charter). 
54 ibid art 103. 
55 ibid art 39. 
56 ibid art 41. 
57 ibid art 42. 
58 See, for example, UNSC Res 1846 (2 December 2008) UN Doc S/RES/1846 
para 10. This is one of a lengthy series of such authorisations. Robin Geiß and 
Anna Petrig, Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea (OUP 2011) 70–84. 
59 See, for example, UNSC Res 2182 (24 October 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2182 
paras 11–22. This UNSCR authorises actions in connection with the arms 
embargo (and charcoal ban) on Somalia. See also McLaughlin (n 38) 480–83. 
60  Efthymios Papastavridis, Interception of Vessels on the High Seas: 
Contemporary Challenges to the Legal Order of the Oceans (Hart 2013) 149–
54; McLaughlin (n 38) 477–78. 
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right to use force in anticipation of an imminent armed attack. 61  Without 
addressing it in detail, the debate concerns the question whether, and in what 
circumstances, the right to use force in self-defence arises before an armed 
attack actually manifests itself. This is important in the present context because 
of the likelihood that MSOs conducted on the basis of self-defence will most 
plausibly be justified on account of the suspected future use of a vessel or its 
cargo, or the suspected future actions of individuals being carried on board.62 
For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that where self-defence is relied 
upon as the basis for MSOs, the legitimacy of that basis may be subject to 
particular controversy. 
1.1.3.2. The regulation of MSOs in the law of the sea and other bodies of 
international law 
Aside from providing a legal basis for MSOs, bodies of international law other 
than IHRL also contain rules that regulate the conduct of MSOs, in that they 
contain obligations applicable during their execution. An important potential 
example is the law of armed conflict. However, as noted explicitly in UK 
doctrine,63 and as can be gathered from the typical tasks listed above, MSOs 
are generally considered to comprise peacetime activities. While there is no 
reason in theory why MSOs could not be conducted during, or even give rise to 
the existence of, an armed conflict, the present enquiry will assume a 
peacetime context. Suffice it to note, however, that the application of the law of 
armed conflict would engage particularly complex, and still unresolved, 
questions concerning the interaction between that body of law and IHRL.64 
Several other bodies of international law may contain rules applicable to 
particular aspects of MSOs. For example, refugee law contains non-refoulement 
provisions that may, in some circumstances, apply to States in their treatment of 
individuals during the course of MSOs.65 Most relevant to this thesis, however, 
                                            
61 See, for example, Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence (6th 
edn, CUP 2017) 222–35; 170–75, Christine Gray, International Law and the 
Use of Force (4th edn, OUP 2018) 248–56. 
62 See, for example, Papastavridis (n 60) 150. 
63 British Maritime Doctrine (n 8) 234. 
64 See, for example, Marko Milanovic, Extraterritorial Application of Human 
Rights Treaties: Law, Principles, and Policy (OUP 2011) 229–61. 
65 See below s 7.2.2. 
 21 
is the regulation of MSOs in the law of the sea, which contains rules, found in 
either treaty or custom, that provide a degree of regulation for certain activities 
undertaken in the course of MSOs. For example, Article 110 UNCLOS contains 
a right, in certain prescribed circumstances, for warships and other authorized 
government vessels to visit a ship in order to verify its right to fly its flag.66 
Further to this right, Article 110(2) goes on to specify the procedure that must 
be followed, namely to ‘send a boat under the command of an officer to the 
suspected ship. If suspicion remains after the documents have been checked, it 
may proceed to a further examination on board the ship, which must be carried 
out with all possible consideration.’ Nevertheless, UNCLOS contains significant 
gaps with respect to the regulation of MSOs. It is, for example, silent on the 
degree of force, if any, that may be used to enforce the right of visit contained in 
Article 110.67 The thesis returns to the question of authorisation and regulation 
under UNCLOS as a pervasive issue throughout. 
1.1.4. International human rights law 
IHRL is obviously central to this thesis. As will be explained, the focus of the 
analysis is on the application of a number of specific treaties to MSOs: the 
International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR);68 the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR);69 the American Convention on Human 
Rights (ACHR); 70  the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(ACHPR);71 and the Convention Against Torture (CAT).72 This section puts 
these instruments in to historical and legal context, as well as introducing the 
institutions principally responsible for supervising their application. It also 
discusses IHRL more widely, including law found outside treaties, in order both 
                                            
66 UNCLOS (n 41) art 110(2). 
67 See below ch 4. 
68 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 
1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR). 
69 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
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70 American Convention on Human Rights: ‘Pact of San José, Costa Rica’ 
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to situate the treaties on which the thesis concentrates, as well as to help 
explain the rationale for that focus. 
1.1.4.1. Historical context 
Although the body of IHRL, as we recognise it today, and with which this thesis 
is primarily concerned, emerged during the period following the Second World 
War,73 its origins are much older. Certain rights of individuals had, for several 
centuries, been recognised and protected in domestic law. 74  On the 
international plane, while a State’s treatment of its own citizens had generally 
been considered a matter for that State alone,75 various treaty provisions did 
address discrete issues that we would now recognise as relating to human 
rights.76 Then, during the inter-war period, momentum began to grow towards 
bringing about the recognition of a comprehensive catalogue of fundamental 
rights.77 Initiatives included the Institut de Droit International’s ‘Declaration of 
the International Rights of Man’,78 which set out rights to life, liberty and 
property, as well as freedoms of religion and language, all of which were to be 
afforded without distinction as to nationality, sex, race, language or religion. 
During the Second World War, the Allied Powers presented the lines of conflict 
as being drawn between different value systems. 79  In January 1941, US 
President Franklin D Roosevelt proposed in a speech to Congress ‘four 
freedoms’ that were to be secured everywhere in the world: the ‘freedom of 
speech and expression’; the ‘freedom of every person to worship God in his 
own way’; the ‘freedom from want’; and the ‘freedom from fear’.80 Later the 
same year, Roosevelt and UK Prime Minister Winston Churchill adopted the 
‘Atlantic Charter’, affirming, amongst other provisions, what today would be 
                                            
73  Ed Bates, ‘History’ in Daniel Moeckli, Sangeeta Shah and Sandesh 
Sivakumaran (eds), International Human Rights Law (2nd edn, OUP 2014) 28–
31; Walter Kälin and Jörg Künzli, The Law of International Human Rights 
Protection (OUP 2009) 13–14. 
74 Bates (n 73) 16–23; Kälin and Künzli (n 73) 4–6. 
75 Bates (n 73) 23–28. 
76 William A Schabas, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: The Travaux 
Préparatoires, vol 1 (CUP 2013) lxxii. 
77 ibid lxxiii. 
78 Reproduced in George A Finch, 'The International Rights of Man' (1941) 35 
AJIL 662, 663–4. 
79 Schabas (n 76) lxxiii–lxxv. 
80 Reproduced in United States Congressional Record (1941) vol 87, pt 1. 
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recognised as a right of self-determination.81 Subsequently, in 1942, thirty-six 
States, including the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia and China, 
signed the ‘Declaration of the United Nations’, setting out a commitment to 
‘preserve human rights’ and provide a ‘decent life, liberty, independence, and 
religious freedom’.82 
In due course, the notion that human rights should be protected internationally 
was reflected in the drafting of the UN Charter. While there was resistance to 
the inclusion of the sort of language used in the Declaration of the International 
Rights of Man and in the Atlantic Charter,83 reference was made to human 
rights throughout the UN Charter, most notably in Article 1(3), which states the 
purposes of the UN as including ‘promoting and encouraging respect for human 
rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, 
language, or religion…’. Admittedly, none of the references to human rights in 
the UN Charter ask much, in concrete terms, of either member States or the UN 
itself.84 Furthermore, any practical effect was tempered through the inclusion, in 
Article 2(7), of a clause generally reserving ‘matters which are essentially within 
the domestic jurisdiction of any state’ to the State concerned.85 Nevertheless, 
the references to human rights in the UN Charter at least placed them on the 
international agenda. 
One specific requirement of the UN Charter was the creation, under Article 68, 
of a commission ‘for the promotion of human rights’. The body that was created, 
the Commission on Human Rights, was tasked with the preparation of an 
‘international bill of rights’, which it ultimately achieved in two distinct stages. 
First, it prepared the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),86 which 
was adopted by UN General Assembly resolution on 10 December 1948. 
Second, it drafted two corresponding treaties, the ICCPR and the International 
                                            
81 ‘The Atlantic Charter’ (1946–47) UNYB 2. 
82 ‘The Declaration by United Nations’ (1946–47) UNYB 1. 
83 Schabas (n 76) lxxv–lxxvi. 
84 Bates (n 73) 30. 
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Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),87 which entered 
into force on 23 March and 3 January 1976 respectively. 
The UDHR was drafted during an intense period of activity between the 
Commission’s first session in early 1947 and the adoption of the final document 
by the General Assembly in 1948.88 Its status as something less than a treaty 
permitted both its rapid adoption and the broad sweep of its provisions. 
Spanning both civil and political rights (e.g. the right to life89 and the freedoms 
of expression90 and assembly91) and economic, social and cultural rights (e.g. 
the rights to work92  and education93 ), the UDHR set the agenda for the 
subsequent Covenants and for the post-war international human rights project 
more generally. 
1.1.4.2. The universal system 
At the international level, a number of treaties protect either particular rights or 
the rights of particular categories of people.94 Generally, each instrument makes 
provision for a body that has responsibility for monitoring and enforcing 
compliance with the relevant substantive provisions. None of these bodies is 
judicial in the strict sense, the mechanisms for enforcement instead being 
weaker in character, most commonly centred on the submission and 
consideration of reports submitted periodically by States Parties. Some 
instruments make provision for individuals to petition the relevant treaty body 
directly, although acceptance of such mechanisms is usually optional for 
States.95 
The full range of rights and categories of people protected at the international 
level is very broad. Consequently, only a selection of instruments is of potential 
                                            
87 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 
December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3 (ICESCR). 
88 Schabas (n 76) lxxxiii–cxi. 
89 UDHR (n 86) art 3. 
90 ibid art 19. 
91 ibid art 20. 
92 ibid art 23. 
93 ibid art 26. 
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significance in the conduct of MSOs. Of particular importance is the ICCPR, 
which, alongside the ICESCR, protects, in treaty form, the rights set out in the 
UDHR. However, it is the ICCPR that contains rights likely to be engaged 
directly in the course of MSOs. Such rights include the right to life;96 the 
prohibition of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment;97 the right to liberty and security of the person, including the 
prohibition of arbitrary arrest or detention;98 the right to a fair trial; 99 and the 
freedoms of expression and assembly.100 
In contrast to the UDHR, the rights contained in the ICCPR are framed in 
considerable detail as to their scope, reflecting the latter instrument’s treaty 
status. Notably, it sets out the circumstances in which rights may be limited, as 
well as limiting the applicability of the instrument, as a whole. Under Article 2(1), 
States ‘undertake to respect and to ensure to all individuals within [their] 
territory and subject to [their] jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present 
Covenant…’. As the discussion in Chapter Three explains, the meaning of this 
phrase in the context of the extraterritorial applicability of the ICCPR has been 
especially controversial.101 
Monitoring compliance with the ICCPR is primarily the responsibility of the 
Human Rights Committee HRC,102 composed of eighteen members nominated 
and elected by States Parties. 103  The HRC participates in three distinct 
procedures. First, it considers and makes ‘general comments’ upon periodic 
reports submitted by States Parties ‘on the measures they have adopted which 
give effect to the rights recognized herein and on the progress made in the 
enjoyment of those rights…’.104 Second, it participates in an optional inter-State 
communication procedure. 105  Under this, the Committee provides its good 
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102 On the HRC, and treaty bodies generally, see Nigel S Rodley, ‘The Role and 
Impact of Treaty Bodies’ in Dinah Shelton (ed), The Oxford Handbook of 
International Human Rights Law (OUP 2013). 
103 ICCPR (n 68) arts 28–39. 
104 ibid art 40. 
105 ibid art 41. 
 26 
offices in order to address allegations by one State Party of the failure by 
another to fulfil its obligations under the Covenant. The Committee is not 
empowered to reach any conclusion as to the merits of the communication, its 
role being limited essentially to facilitating conciliation between the States 
Parties. Finally, under the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, 106  the 
Committee is empowered to consider complaints submitted by individuals 
subject to the jurisdiction of a State Party to the Optional Protocol, ‘who claim to 
be victims of a violation by that State Party of any of the rights set forth in the 
Covenant.’107 It may, subject to various admissibility criteria,108 examine such 
complaints to reach ‘views’ upon them.109 While these views are not binding in a 
strict legal sense, the Committee itself considers them authoritative 
interpretations of the Covenant and, as such, subject to the general principle 
that treaty obligations be honoured in good faith.110 
As well as being contained in the ICCPR, the prohibition of torture and other 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment is also the subject of a 
separate convention, the CAT. The provisions contained in the CAT are far 
more detailed than those in the ICCPR and are, in some ways, broader in their 
scope of application. Under the CAT, State parties are required to ‘take effective 
legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture in 
any territory under [their] jurisdiction.’111 Each is required to criminalise acts of 
torture ‘committed in any territory under its jurisdiction or on board a ship or 
aircraft registered in that State’112 as well as ‘[w]hen the alleged offender is a 
national of that State’. 113  Importantly, the latter requirement is engaged 
wherever the alleged act of torture takes place. In addition, a State Party may 
criminalise torture on the basis of then passive personality principle, i.e., ‘[w]hen 
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the victim is a national of that State…’.114 State Parties are also required to 
either extradite or establish jurisdiction over any person alleged to have 
committed an act of torture who is present in any territory under its 
jurisdiction.115 
The protection under the CAT for acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment not amounting to torture is lesser (or at least less specific) than 
that for acts of torture.116 States parties are required to prevent such acts in any 
territory under their jurisdiction and must, for example, conduct investigations 
into credible allegations. However, under the CAT there is no express 
requirement to either prosecute or extradite individuals alleged to be 
responsible for acts not amounting to torture. 
The implementation of the CAT is the responsibility of the Committee against 
Torture. As in the case of the Human Rights Committee, the Committee against 
Torture considers periodic reports submitted by States Parties 117  and 
participates in both an optional inter-State communication procedure118 and an 
optional individual complaint procedure.119 In addition, the Committee against 
Torture is empowered to conduct an ‘inquiry’ in the event that it ‘receives 
reliable information which appears to it to contain well-founded indications that 
torture is being systematically practised in the territory of a State Party…’.120 
Such proceedings are confidential, with the findings being transmitted only to 
the State Party concerned, whose cooperation is to be sought throughout but is 
not required. Following consultation with the State Party, the Committee may 
choose to include a ‘summary account’ of the proceedings in its annual report. 
1.1.4.3. Regional systems 
Regional systems, in contrast to the universal system, tend to have more robust 
systems of enforcement. The various systems are not uniform in this regard, 
although obvious trends and similarities can be identified. Most began with an 
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instrument supervised by a ‘commission’, empowered to consider complaints 
submitted either by States Parties or individuals. Some such commissions were, 
or have since been, supplemented, or superseded, by courts. While the findings 
of commissions have been, and remain, highly influential in the development of 
the law, it is the binding judgments of the regional courts that represent the 
high-water mark in the enforcement of international human rights law. While 
commissions may generally make and communicate their findings on a 
particular matter, their conclusions ultimately have no binding force. The courts, 
on the other hand, may give binding judgments, either in cases where States 
have failed to act on the findings of the relevant commission, or where a case 
has been submitted to a court directly. 
The ECHR, which entered into force in 1953 under the auspices of the Council 
of Europe, is the earliest of the treaties purporting to set out a catalogue of 
human rights. 121  Chiefly focused on civil and political rights, it has been 
extended into the realm of economic, social and cultural rights through 
subsequent Protocols. In terms of its importance in relation to the conduct of 
MSOs, it includes rights that correspond to each of those identified in the 
ICCPR as being most relevant, namely the right to life;122 the prohibition of 
torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment;123 the right to liberty 
and security;124 the right to a fair trial;125 and the freedoms of expression and 
assembly.126 However, the ECHR rights are expressed in different terms than in 
the equivalent ICCPR provisions and, as a result, some substantive differences 
exist in their scope and content. 
Like the ICCPR, the ECHR is limited in the scope of its application, albeit in 
slightly different terms. Under Article 1, States Parties ‘shall secure to everyone 
within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in [the] Convention.’ As 
discussed in Chapter Three, the meaning of this provision, particularly in 
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relation to the extraterritorial application of the ECHR has been and remains 
deeply controversial. 
The original text of the ECHR provided for the creation of both a European 
Commission of Human Rights127 and a European Court of Human Rights.128 
The Commission was empowered to receive allegations of breaches of the 
Convention by any State Party129 or, optionally, from individuals, organisations 
or groups claiming to be victims of the breach.130 Allegations were subject to 
examination and, potentially, investigation, with an initial aim of reaching a 
friendly settlement.131 In contrast to the equivalent procedure of, e.g., the HRC, 
if a friendly settlement was not reached, then the Commission was required in 
its report to ‘state its opinion as to whether the facts found disclose a 
breach…’.132 
The jurisdiction of the Court was initially optional133 and confined to matters 
referred to it by States Parties or the Commission.134 It had authority to deal 
with ‘all cases concerning the interpretation and application of the present 
Convention…’135 and to reach final,136 binding judgments.137 
The Commission/Court system was replaced in 1998 by a single Court.138 
Under the current system alleged breaches may be referred directly to the Court 
by States Parties139 and, significantly, by individual, organisations and groups 
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claiming to be victims.140 The Court’s judgments are, as before, both final141 and 
binding.142 
The American system for the protection of human rights dates back to 1948 and 
the creation of the Organization of American States (OAS).143 Alongside the 
Charter of the Organization of American States144 the American Declaration of 
the Rights and Duties of Man was also adopted.145 This predated the UDHR by 
just a few months and covers similar ground, encompassing both civil and 
political rights as well as economic, social and cultural rights. While not intended 
to be legally binding, the Declaration has subsequently been held by the 
institutions of the American human rights system to be a source of legal 
obligations for OAS member states, notwithstanding the controversy of this 
position.146 
A smaller grouping of states,147 not including the United States, are also party to 
the later ACHR. The ACHR, which entered into force in 1978, consists almost 
entirely of civil and political rights. As for the ECHR, the ACHR includes rights 
that correspond to those identified in the ICCPR as being of most relevance to 
the conduct of MSOs, namely the right to life; 148  the right to humane 
treatment;149 the right to personal liberty;150 right to a fair trial; 151  and the 
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freedoms of expression and assembly.152 However, as for the ECHR, the rights 
are framed using language unique, at least in part, to the ACHR. 
The scope of application of the ACHR is limited, albeit in slightly different terms 
to either the ICCPR or ECHR. Under Article 1, States Parties ‘undertake to 
respect the rights and freedoms recognized herein and to ensure to all persons 
subject to their jurisdiction the free and full exercise of the those rights and 
freedoms…’. As with the other instruments, the precise contours of this 
provision remain controversial.153 
The American system includes two distinct institutions. First, there is the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), which is as an organ of the 
OAS, in relation to which its ‘principle function [is] to promote the observance 
and protection of human rights and to serve as a consultative organ of the 
[OAS] in these matters.’154 As such, it maintains a limited oversight role in 
relation to the implementation of human rights standards by all members of the 
OAS, including those that are not States Parties to the American Charter.155 For 
States parties to the American Charter, the IACHR may consider allegations of 
violations of the Charter received from individuals, organisations and groups.156 
In addition, it has an optional jurisdiction to receive inter-State complaints.157 
While the principle aim is to reach a friendly settlement,158 the IACHR is 
empowered to communicate its conclusions to the State(s) concerned159 and 
may choose, in due course, to publish the report.160 
The second institution in the American system is the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights (IACtHR), which considers cases submitted either by either the 
IACHR or States parties to the ACHR,161 for whom the jurisdiction of the Court 
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is optional.162 Allegations must have been submitted and considered by the 
IACHR before the Court may exercise its jurisdiction. When the Court considers 
an admissible case, its judgment is both final163 and binding.164 The IACtHR has 
generated a considerable jurisprudence of its own; however, it has not yet dealt 
with as wide a range of issues as the IACHR or, indeed, the ECtHR. As a result, 
the decisions and views of the IACHR remain of significant relevance in the 
American system. 
The African system has its roots in the Organization of African Unity, which was 
succeeded in 2002 by the African Union.165 The main instrument is the ACHPR, 
which entered into force in 1986 and includes the main civil and political rights 
familiar from the ICCPR and other regional instruments. In addition, the ACHPR 
includes a number of rights intended specifically to protect the rights, including 
economic, social and cultural rights, of ‘peoples’ (as opposed to individuals).166 
However, of particular relevance to the conduct of MSOs, the ACHPR includes 
the right to life and integrity of the person;167 the right to the respect of the 
dignity inherent in a human being, including the prohibition of torture and cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment;168  the right to liberty and 
security of the person; 169  the right to a fair trial; 170  and the freedoms of 
expression and assembly.171 In contrast to the ICCPR, ECHR and ACHR, the 
ACHPR does not contain an express provision limiting its applicability. 
As in the American system, the African system includes two protective 
institutions. The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights has a 
function similar to its equivalent in the American system. As well as considering 
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periodic reports submitted by States Parties,172 it is empowered to consider 
allegations of violations of the ACHPR submitted both by States Parties173 and 
by individuals or other entities. 174  The Commission’s findings will be 
communicated to the State(s) concerned,175 but remain confidential until a 
decision is made to publish them by the Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government.176  Common with other systems, the African Commission has 
published a number of General Comments and other soft law instruments 
intended to help guide States in their application of the ACHPR. 
The Commission was the only institution created under the ACHPR itself. 
However, by virtue of a Protocol that came into force in 2004,177 there now 
exists, in addition, an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, although 
the intention is that its functions will transfer to a combined African Court of 
Justice and Human Rights, of which one section will deal with human rights.178 
The Court has jurisdiction to hear cases submitted by the Commission, by 
African Intergovernmental Organizations, as well as by those States Parties that 
have one of three specified links to a case.179 Optionally, States Parties may 
also permit individuals and non-governmental organisations direct access to the 
Court. 180  The Court’s judgments are final 181  and binding. 182  However, the 
relatively limited jurisprudence generated so far by the African Court means that 
a great deal of reliance must still be placed on the views of the African 
Commission. 
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1.1.4.4. Judicial dialogue between different systems 
As is clear from the discussion above, the same substantive norm may be 
protected under several different IHRL treaties, subject to protection by different 
courts and treaty bodies. In light of this, there may be justified concern about 
fragmentation in the application of the same norm across different systems. 
Indeed, there is nothing in law to bind institutions within one system to decisions 
taken within another. As a result, it is not inevitable that the application of 
different instruments—as understood by different institutions—will necessarily 
be the same in dealing with the same issue. This can be seen, to some extent, 
in the differing ways in which different systems have approached the question 
of extraterritorial applicability, as discussed in Chapter Three. Nevertheless, 
more generally, ‘judicial dialogue’ between systems has ensured a high degree 
of coherence in the development of the law, and the avoidance of 
fragmentation.183 The same phenomenon has been observed, to some extent, 
between human rights tribunals and domestic courts.184 
Because of this judicial dialogue, where gaps exist in the practice relating to a 
particular right under one system, it is legitimate to look to practice under others 
for guidance as to how the law in the former might develop. This is particularly 
pertinent with respect to a relatively young system, such as the African system, 
which has relied upon the richer jurisprudence of its much older European and 
American counterparts as it establishes itself.185 It is also relevant in situations 
in which one system has considered a very specific issue, such as the 
application of a particular right in novel circumstances. Where that is the case, 
the decision will provide useful guidance as to how the same situation will be 
dealt with under other systems, so long as it is compatible with the relevant 
wider practice. In light of these considerations, subject to contrary indications, 
this thesis assumes coherency in the application and development of the law. 
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Where, therefore, a particular court has applied a particular right directly to 
conduct comprising part of a MSO, that decision will generally be relied upon as 
an indication as to how the right would be applied in the same circumstances 
under the other systems. 
1.1.4.5. The nature of human rights obligations 
With some exceptions,186 obligations contained in IHRL instruments are framed 
in broad terms. Generally, States must ‘respect’ the substantive rights and 
‘ensure’ their application to individuals.187 However, this has been translated 
into concrete duties not only to respect substantive rights, but also to protect 
individuals from violations of rights and to fulfil them.188 
The duty to respect is primarily negative, in that States generally must not 
violate substantive rights. The duty to protect, on the other hand, is essentially 
positive, requiring States to take reasonable action to protect individuals from 
the interference with their rights by third parties. Similarly, the duty to fulfil 
requires that States take positive action to give effect to rights. For example, 
some rights (such as the right to a fair trial) can only be fully realised through 
legislative implementation. Likewise, fulfilling prohibitive rights (such as the 
prohibition on torture) requires enactment of legislation providing for the 
criminalisation and punishment of the prohibited act. More broadly, rights will 
only be fulfilled if there exists a mechanism for victims of breaches to seek a 
remedy. 
1.1.4.6. Limitations and derogations 
The majority of human rights are not absolute. Only a very limited range 
including, for example, the prohibitions of torture and slavery are framed without 
caveat or limitation. The remainder are limited in a number of different ways. 
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Limitations can be set out in express or general terms, as illustrated by the 
different approaches to framing the right to life. Article 6(1) ICCPR states that 
‘Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by 
law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.’ At the regional level, both 
the ACHR189 and ACHPR190 follow the ICCPR in limiting the prohibition to only 
the arbitrary deprivation of life. The ECHR, however, takes a different approach, 
setting out the limitations on the right to life in express and apparently 
exhaustive terms.191 
Rights may also be limited in general terms through the use of a clause similar 
to that which limits the right to respect for private and family life under the 
ECHR. According to Article 8(2): 
There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of 
this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in 
a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or 
the economic wellbeing of the country, for the prevention of disorder or 
crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others.  
Equivalent provisions are found in other instruments and follow a distinctive 
formula. First, limitations to rights must be prescribed by law, rather than 
through arbitrary exercise of executive power. Second, rights must be limited 
only in order to achieve one of the legitimate objectives listed. Third, limitations 
must be necessary in a democratic society and, as such, be proportionate to the 
legitimate objective that is to be achieved.192 
As well as limiting particular rights, IHRL instruments generally permit States 
Parties to suspend certain obligations in exceptional circumstances. The exact 
provisions vary between instruments, but common characteristics can be 
identified.193 First, not all rights are derogable. Those such as the prohibitions of 
torture and slavery must be respected in all circumstances. Second, derogation 
is permitted only in a very narrowly defined range of circumstances, related 
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invariably to the existence of a state of national emergency. For example, under 
the ECHR, derogation is permitted only ‘[i]n time of war or other public 
emergency threating the life of the nation…’.194 Third, derogations are generally 
permitted only so long as such an emergency continues to exist. However, 
although MSOs may engage a number of derogable rights, this possibility is not 
considered further in this thesis. 
1.1.4.7. Non-treaty sources of human rights law 
As noted above, and explained in more detail below, this thesis will focus on the 
application of a specific selection of IHRL treaties. However, to explain that 
decision, and to place the thesis in context, this subsection outlines the complex 
area of non-treaty IHRL, before briefly examining the particularly uncertain 
matter of spatial applicability. 
The subject of human rights presents a challenge to the traditional conception 
of customary international law, which is identified with reference to the twin 
requirements of State practice and opinio juris,195 the latter explained by the ICJ 
as ‘a belief that [a particular] practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of 
a rule of law requiring it.’196 With regards to the first element, it is necessary that 
the relevant practice of States, ‘including that of States whose interests are 
specially affected, should have been both extensive and virtually uniform’, 
occurring ‘in such a way as to show a general recognition that a rule of law or 
legal obligation is involved.’197 It is not always necessary for the practice to have 
occurred over a long period of time,198 and ‘virtual uniformity’ does not mean 
that there can have been no inconsistent State conduct. What is important is 
that ‘the conduct of States should, in general, be consistent with such rules, and 
that instances of State conduct inconsistent with a given rule should generally 
                                            
194 ECHR (n 69) art 15. 
195 Hugh Thirlway, The Sources of International Law (OUP 2014) 56–62. 
196North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; 
Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands) (Merits) [1969] ICJ Rep 3 [77]. 
197 ibid [74]. 
198 ibid. 
 38 
have been treated as breaches of that rule, not as indications of the recognition 
of a new rule.’199 
The process of identifying customary law is typically inductive,200 recognizing 
rules that have been ‘carefully hammered out on the anvil of actual, tangible 
interaction among States’.201 Human rights norms do not lend themselves easily 
to such a process. By their nature, human rights manifest themselves first and 
foremost through the interaction between States and individuals, rather than 
between States. According to the traditional view, individuals are not subjects of 
international law and their interactions with States therefore cannot directly 
amount to State practice.202 As a result, there is much reduced potential for the 
sort of inter-State interaction traditionally required for the creation of customary 
law.203 This presents a challenge for those who advocate for a broad catalogue 
of human rights that have attained customary status. While the ends sought 
might be (to some) laudable—the elevation in status of human rights above and 
beyond the realm of mere treaty law—the law imposes significant obstacles. 
Recognizing the difficulty in reconciling the available evidence with the 
traditional requirements of customary law, some have argued that binding non-
treaty human rights norms are derived from a novel source of international law 
not dependent on State consent.204 Henkin, for example, suggested that there 
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instead exists a ‘non-conventional’ law of human rights derived from the content 
of liberal national constitutions. Such law, he argued, ‘is not based on consent: 
at least, it does not honor or accept dissent, and it binds particular states 
regardless of their objection.’205 However, while they might make for effective 
rhetoric, this and other radical theories are ultimately unconvincing as 
statements of the law.206 
Some have looked to other, established, sources of international law. Simma 
and Alston, for whom the evidence supporting a broad body of customary 
human rights law is irreconcilable with the traditional requirements of State 
practice and opinio juris,207 proposed instead that human rights norms be 
recognized as ‘general principles of law recognized by civilized nations’.208 
While such general principles are more commonly thought to originate in 
domestic legal systems,209 Simma and Alston argue that the concept can be 
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expanded to embrace substantive principles identified directly from 
pronouncements of States at the international level. 210  As long as such 
principles are given ‘sufficient expression in legal form’, 211  a requirement 
apparently satisfied in this context by evidence similar to that used in the 
modern approach to customary law, discussed below, no State practice need 
be demonstrated. According to this reasoning, non-treaty human rights norms 
can be identified using the same evidence proposed as supporting a body of 
customary human rights law, but without the methodological difficulties.212 
While some human rights norms probably do have the status of general 
principles on account of their prevalence in domestic legal systems, such as 
certain due process rights,213 Simma and Alston’s broader proposition has not 
won significant support.214 Thirlway questions whether the material that Simma 
and Alston rely upon to derive a wide-ranging human rights law based on 
general principles really satisfies their own criteria.215 While such material—
declarations, resolutions etc.—often purports to deal with matters of law, it is not 
usually legally binding in character and there must be doubt, therefore, whether 
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it amounts to ‘sufficient expression in legal form’. More fundamentally, Simma 
and Alston fail to provide sufficient evidence to prove that it is to general 
principles, rather than customary law, that courts in fact turn to identify non-
treaty human rights law. They rely on the failure of the ICJ to state explicitly its 
reliance on customary international law when identifying non-treaty human 
rights law.216 However, the most that can be said is that the ICJ has avoided 
identifying the sources on which it has relied using the language contained in 
the ICJ Statute. While the ICJ has not referred explicitly to customary 
international law as a source of human rights norms, it has not referred explicitly 
to general principles of law either, at least not clearly in the sense of Article 
38(1)(c) of the ICJ Statute. 217  Furthermore, domestic courts do refer to 
customary human rights law.218 Therefore, while Simma and Alston’s theory 
would, if correct, sidestep some difficult issues relating to the identification of 
customary human rights norms, it does not amount to a convincing alternative. 
For those arguing for an expansive body of customary human rights law, a 
common notion is that human rights norms are, or ought to be, subject to a 
‘modern’ approach.219 The meaning of ‘modern’ varies according to the writer, 
although it can usually be assumed to imply some dilution of the traditional 
requirements of State practice and opinio juris. In contrast to the inductive 
traditional method, those adopting a modern approach usually look instead to 
deduction, by which it is meant that custom is deduced from ‘general 
statements of rules, rather than particular instances of practice.’220 However, 
this explanation is arguably the result of a misunderstanding of the deductive 
method and a misreading of the ICJ’s jurisprudence on this methodological 
point.221 More convincing is the argument that a broader range of evidence 
                                            
216 Simma and Alston (n 201) 105–6. 
217 Thirlway (n 195) 181. 
218 Lillich (n 214) 17–18. 
219  The terms ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ are here used according to the 
meanings ascribed to them in Anthea Roberts, ‘Traditional and Modern 
Approaches to Customary International Law: A Reconciliation’ (2001) 95 AJIL 
757, 758–59. 
220 ibid 758. 
221 Talmon (n 200) 429–34. Talmon makes clear that deductive reasoning is, 
and has been for a long time, a legitimate method for avoiding a non liquet in 
situations where the inductive approach for some reason fails, such as where 
there is insufficient State practice; where the practice is too disparate; where 
opinio juris cannot be established; and where practice and opinio juris are in 
 42 
ought to be accepted as proof of State practice and opinio juris than is usually 
the case. Such evidence potentially includes multilateral treaties; resolutions of 
the United Nations General Assembly; national constitutions; and other 
declarations from which States’ attitude to human rights norms can be 
inferred.222 However, the theory underpinning the acceptance of these unusual 
types of evidence is controversial, and has been the subject of ongoing 
discourse and debate.223 Even if the approach is valid, it is problematic in that it 
can be deployed to support widely differing positions. 
For example, it is often argued that the UDHR, in its entirety, reflects customary 
law, a proposition with a long pedigree, dating back as far the Declaration’s 
adoption.224 It appears in numerous declarations, national constitutions and 
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customary status, States must ‘refuse to acquiesce in a breach of the norm, but 
on the contrary actively seek to reverse the effects of the breach.’ From what he 
considers to be the absence of such enforcement, he concludes that ‘labelling 
such norms rules of customary law would appear to be a contradiction in terms.’ 
Arthur M Weisburd, ‘The Effect of Treaties and Other Formal International Acts 
on the Customary Law of Human Rights’ (1996) 25 Georgia J of Intl & 
Comparative L 99, 103. 
224 Simma and Alston (n 203) 84; Schabas (n 76) cxix. An alternative argument 
for binding nature of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is through its 
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scholarly works. 225  For example, in 1968, the Final Act of the Tehran 
International Conference on Human Rights stated that the UDHR represents ‘a 
common understanding of the people of the world concerning the inalienable 
rights of all members of the human family and constitutes an obligation for the 
members of the international community’.226 The notion also enjoys a degree of 
support in the jurisprudence of the ICJ.227 For example in the Iran Hostages 
case, the Court referred to ‘fundamental principles enunciated in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights.’ 228  Yet, the view that the UDHR can be 
considered reflective of customary law, in its entirety, remains in the minority.229 
Such simplistic invocations of the UDHR fail to differentiate between different 
rights and to assess States’ attitude and practice to each individually. As 
Hannum concludes, ‘Unless one wishes to interpret the proposed customary 
international law norm as merely expressing general agreement with the 
desirability of the principles in the Declaration, it would appear difficult to make 
                                                                                                                                
‘authoritative interpretation’ of the obligations under Articles 55 and 56 of the 
United Nations Charter. This argument was championed, in particular, by Sohn. 
Louis B Sohn, ‘The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of 
Individuals Rather than States’ (1982) 32 American U L Rev 1, 16–17. See also 
Thirlway (n 195) 179. However, it is an idea dating back to the period of the 
UDHR’s drafting. Schabas (n 76) cxix. Under Article 55, ‘the United Nations 
shall promote . . . universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or 
religion.’ Under Article 56, members of the United Nations ‘pledge to take joint 
and separate action in co-operation with the [UN] for the achievement of the 
purposes set forth in Article 55.’ Given the origins and subject matter of the 
UDHR, the argument does make sense as a matter of treaty law in the 
interpretation of the phrase ‘human rights and fundamental freedoms’. Sohn, 
however, takes the argument further to assert that ‘[t]he Declaration, as an 
authoritative listing of human rights, has become a basic component of 
international customary law, binding on all states, not only members of the 
United Nations.’ Sohn (n 224) 17. This, arguably, takes the point too far. It does 
not necessarily follow from the UDHR’s suggested importance with respect to 
Article 55 that the UDHR must necessarily have become customary law in its 
own right. Thirlway (n 195) 179. 
225 For a detailed survey see Hurst Hannum, ‘The Status of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights in National and International Law’ (1996) 25 
Georgia J of Intl & Comparative L 287, 317–35. 
226 ‘Final Act of the International Conference on Human Rights, Teheran’ (13 
May 1968) UN Doc A/CONF.32/41, 3. 
227 Hannum (n 225) 335–39. 
228 Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran 
(United States of America v Iran) (Merits) [1980] ICJ Rep 3, 42. 
229 This was the conclusion of Hannum in 1996 and remains, in the view of the 
author, the case today. Hannum (n 225) 340; Kälin and Künzli (n 73) 71. 
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the case that states recognize an international legal obligation to guarantee e.g. 
periodic holidays with pay, full equality of rights upon dissolution of a marriage, 
or protection against unemployment.’230 
Ultimately, even if a liberal approach is taken to the process of identifying 
customary law, what is needed is a detailed examination of each right to 
determine the strength of the case for its being considered customary in nature. 
Such an assessment should consider all of the relevant evidence and not dwell 
on sweeping generalisations. While it is plausible that the UDHR could become 
reflective of customary law in its entirety, that conclusion should be based on 
more detailed evidence than simple invocations of the instrument as a whole. 
However, when such an exercise is carried out, the result is usually a core of 
rights for which a sound case may be made for their customary status, together 
with a penumbra of those that may exist as treaty norms elsewhere, or not as 
legal norms at all.231 
An influential analysis, particularly in the United States, is that which is set out 
by the American Law Institute in its Restatement of the Law Third of the Foreign 
Relations Law of the United States. According to the Restatement ‘[a] state 
violates international law if, as a matter of state policy, it practices, encourages 
or condones (a) genocide, (b) slavery or slave trade, (c) the murder or causing 
the disappearance of individuals, (d) torture or other cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading treatment or punishment, (e) prolonged arbitrary detention, (f) 
systematic racial discrimination, or (g) a consistent pattern of gross violations of 
internationally recognized human rights.’232 While the evidence presented in 
support of the Restatement’s conclusions is of a non-traditional nature—largely 
treaties, declarations, national constitutions and domestic Court decisions—
individual rights are considered on a case-by-case basis. As a result, it at least 
manifests a degree of rigour and, by virtue of its relatively conservative 
                                            
230 Hannum (n 225) 340 (citations omitted). 
231 ibid 340–51. 
232 American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law Third, Restatement of the 
Law, The Foreign Relations Law of the United States (American Law Institute 
Publishers 1987) vol 2 para 702. To illustrate the ALI’s approach, the prohibition 
on torture is supported by reference to the UDHR; to several universal and 
regional human rights treaties; to national constitutions; to the judgments of 
domestic courts; and to the jurisprudence of the ECtHR. 
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approach, establishes a core of relatively uncontroversial rights.233 Some may 
not necessarily agree on the detail of its conclusions; Meron, for example, 
would have added certain due process guarantees, the right of self-
determination and the obligation to treat detainees humanely,234 but its basic 
premise seems sound. 
As well as the enduring controversies surrounding methodology and the 
ultimate scope of customary (or other non-treaty) human rights law, a common 
feature of all these analyses is the broad terms in which they state their 
conclusions. As typified by the Restatement, each approach generally yields 
only a list of rights framed in terms similar to that of the UDHR—simply a ‘right 
to X’ or a ‘prohibition of Y’. While alternative methods may result in different 
lists, they go into no greater detail as to what each particular right entails. This 
is perhaps unsurprising since the evidence relied upon to identify customary 
human rights law typically is similarly vague. If a customary norm is rooted in a 
broadly framed principle then, without concrete State practice from which to 
identify more detailed parameters, that is all that the customary rule can be 
based on.  
Summarising this complex situation, although certain rights are arguably well-
evidenced, and may, on close analysis, give rise to concrete obligations on the 
part of States, non-treaty IHRL appears, on the whole, to comprise a poorly 
defined set of rights with uncertain content. Furthermore, however clearly (or 
not) non-treaty IHRL is defined, the ability for it to be relied upon in practice is 
inevitably limited in comparison with treaty-based IHRL. There is no defined 
complaint procedure according to which non-treaty IHRL rights can be enforced; 
and, even though they may be recognised and applied by courts and other 
tribunals, as for other rules of international law, this depends upon the 
availability of a right of recourse to the body in question. Moreover, unless a 
State’s domestic courts recognise non-treaty IHRL, the potential for individuals 
to complain of violations is likely to be very limited indeed. Therefore, although 
there are examples, including some within the topic under examination, where 
courts and tribunals have applied (or considered as applicable) non-treaty IHRL 
norms, the availability of direct enforcement mechanisms, together with the 
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certainty of the rules themselves, affords treaty-based IHRL a particular 
relevance. 
Notwithstanding these issues, a conceivable reason for seeking to rely on non-
treaty IHRL might be the argument that they, or a significant subset, necessarily 
apply extraterritorially. As explained in Chapter Three, this is a controversial 
issue with respect to the IHRL treaties under consideration and, with even the 
most liberal interpretation of the treaty provisions in question, there are 
situations in which they do not apply. As a result, the proposition that the same 
rights are protected by custom, without the same limitations, is undoubtedly 
attractive. In the view of the present author, however, this view is unconvincing, 
although it is admittedly an area that has received little attention. 
Such consideration as there has been has tended to consider the extraterritorial 
application of customary human rights law as a whole, or at least according to 
broad categorisations. Lubell argues that ‘the fact that all states are obligated to 
strive towards universal protection [of fundamental human rights] clearly 
indicates that they should not be taking steps in the opposite direction by 
violating human rights in other countries.’235 Lubell’s argument rests on the 
assumption that customary human rights—at least those within his 
contemplation—are owed erga omnes, and that it necessarily follows from this 
that there is no spatial limit to their applicability. He argues that ‘if state A is to 
have a vested interest in state B’s protection of human rights within state B, it 
cannot at the same time be allowed to send agents into state B and commit the 
same violations for which it could be admonishing state B were it to commit 
them itself.’ Even if correct, this analysis is limited only to those rights that 
properly can be considered as being owed erga omnes; and, even then, it could 
only make sense with respect to negative obligations.236 
There are, it is submitted, two fundamental problems with broad propositions as 
to the extraterritorial applicability of customary human rights law. First, such 
arguments take customary human rights law to be a homogenous whole, 
                                            
235 Noam Lubell, Extraterritorial Use of Force Against Non-State Actors (OUP, 
2010) 234. 
236 Lubell concedes that ‘States…are limited legally and practically in their 
power and authority to take positive actions in the territory of other states.’ ibid 
234. 
 47 
susceptible to large-scale arguments of principle in determining questions such 
as its extraterritorial applicability. Such an approach is symptomatic of a 
detachment, explained above, from the established rules of customary law 
formation. Despite suggestion to the contrary, customary human rights law is 
not subject to its own special rules of formation. While it necessarily draws on 
non-traditional sources—treaties, UN General Assembly resolutions, etc.—it 
must still ultimately conform to the established requirements of custom. The 
reliance on non-traditional sources does, however, mean that the customary 
status of a human rights norm can be difficult to determine. For example, where 
the evidence for a norm relies in large part on its inclusion in a number of widely 
ratified treaties, it is hard to differentiate between a State’s conduct pursuant to 
its treaty obligations and that which is accompanied by genuine opinio juris 
such as to demonstrate the existence of a customary norm. Nonetheless, 
proper analysis must be conducted to understand whether a particular norm 
has achieved customary status. 
Second, they assume that it is enough to consider rights broadly framed—the 
right to life, for example. Yet it means little to identify that there is a particular 
customary right, without also identifying what that rights entails—the specific 
duties and obligations, including the rules of application, that describe how the 
right is actually manifested in law. These detailed rules must also be identified 
according to the established requirements of custom—State practice and opinio 
juris. While it will be relevant to consider the express content of treaty 
provisions, as well as the related practice of courts and treaty bodies, a 
customary right will not necessarily track the corresponding right under treaty 
law. Not only is human rights law too fragmented for this to be the case—the 
right to life, for example, carries different obligations under different treaty 
regimes237—but it is the practice of States, and not directly that of courts or 
treaty bodies, that creates custom. 
Turning specifically to the question of extraterritorial application, it may be that 
certain customary human rights norms have an existence wholly independent of 
equivalent treaty rules, particular where the treaty merely reflects a pre-existing 
customary rule, which may have a broader application than the treaty. However, 
                                            
237 Note, for example, the different formulations for the right to life contained in 
art 2 ECHR and art 6 ICCPR. 
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more generally, as Milanovic notes, ‘it does not seem at all possible to 
disentangle the territorial limitations of human rights as prescribed in treaties 
from any customary substantive rules of human rights law. In other words, it is 
quite unlikely that states have assumed more extensive obligations under 
customary human rights law than they have done under treaty law.’238 What this 
means, is that if the formation of a customary norm is evidenced—in whole or in 
part—by the treaty provisions protecting it, then the spatial scope of those treaty 
provisions must be taken into account when considering the spatial scope of 
application of the associated customary norm. Furthermore, decisions of Courts 
and treaty bodies in interpreting the spatial scope of application of treaty rules 
cannot be assumed to apply necessarily to corresponding customary rules. It 
may also be that only some aspects of a particular customary right—i.e. a 
subset of obligations—will apply extraterritorially and, even if a particular 
obligation does apply extraterritorially, it remains to be determined whether 
there are criteria that further restrain such application. The ultimate point is that 
a detailed enquiry must be conducted, and a broad assumption as to the 
extraterritorial applicability of customary IHRL is, it is submitted, misplaced. 
1.1.5. Human rights in the maritime domain 
Human rights are manifested in the maritime domain in a number of different 
ways. First, some human rights norms have arguably been incorporated directly 
into the law of the sea; or, to put it another way, some law of the sea rules might 
reasonably be described as reflecting, human rights norms. For example, 
Oxman asserts that UNCLOS ‘is not ordinarily considered a human rights 
instrument. With few exceptions, its role in advancing human rights is not 
obvious or direct. But neither is it negligible.’ 239  Specifically, Oxman cites 
provisions of UNCLOS as contributing to: the rule of law, through its limitation 
on powers such as universal jurisdiction over acts of piracy;240 community 
rights, including its provisions on the international seabed area, and protection 
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239 Bernard H Oxman, ‘Human Rights and the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea’ (1998) 36 Columbia J of Transnational L 399, 401. See also 
Tullio Treves, ‘Human Rights and the Law of the Sea’ (2010) 28 Berkeley J of 
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of the environment and cultural heritage;241 distributive justice through, for 
example, its protection of the rights of geographically disadvantaged States;242 
the protection of life at sea through the duty to rescue;243 property rights;244 
rights related to communication; 245  and individual rights of liberty and 
procedural due process.246 As this thesis will demonstrate, however, the law of 
the sea includes only a sparse selection of norms protected by IHRL treaties, 
not least those engaged in the course of MSOs. 
Second, courts and tribunals have interpreted the law of the sea in light of 
human rights norms. For example, as noted above, a significant lacuna in the 
law of the sea, at least in treaty law, is the absence of rules governing the use 
of force during the interdiction of vessels. The resolution of this issue by the 
International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) illustrates the influence, if 
not incorporation, of human rights norms. In M/V Saiga No. 2, discussed in 
detail in Chapter Four, the Tribunal referred to general international law to 
address the gap in UNCLOS, noting that, ‘Considerations of humanity must 
apply in the law of the sea, as they do in other areas of international law.’247 
While the Tribunal did not refer specifically to human rights law, the requirement 
it identified, ‘that the use of force must be avoided as far as possible and, where 
force is unavoidable, it must not go beyond what is reasonable and necessary 
in the circumstances’,248 arguably reflects human rights norms. More explicitly, 
the arbitral tribunal convened under UNCLOS in the Arctic Sunrise case, 
considered in detail in Chapter Eight, determined that  
in relation to the interpretation and application of the Convention, the 
Tribunal may, therefore, pursuant to Article 293, have regard to the extent 
necessary to rules of customary international law, including international 
human rights standards, not incompatible with the Convention, in order to 
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assist in the interpretation and application of the Convention’s provisions 
that authorise the arrest or detention of a vessel and persons.249 
As explained above, however, uncertainty as to the scope and content of 
customary IHRL, together with the limited options for seeking recourse for 
alleged violations, particularly by individuals, means that the impact of IHRL 
incorporated by these means may be limited. 
Finally, obligations arising under IHRL treaties may be applied directly to 
activities in the maritime domain, including the conduct of MSOs. This is, in 
some cases, a relatively uncontroversial proposition. That MSOs involve 
activities, such as detention and the use of force, that are of a nature to engage 
human rights obligations is unarguable. In numerous instances, discussed in 
detail in subsequent chapters, courts and monitoring bodies have applied IHRL 
rules to particular aspects of MSOs. For example, to cite one particularly 
prominent decision, the ECtHR in 2010 ruled in the case of Medvedyev v 
France that ECHR provisions relating to detention applied to individuals 
detained at sea in a French warship following the interdiction of their vessel.250 
The application of IHRL to MSOs has received some attention in the literature, 
both in general terms, 251  and with respect to specific issues. Particularly 
prominent has been consideration of the applicability of IHRL norms to the 
detention, transfer and prosecution of suspected pirates.252 
The extent to which treaty-based IHRL regulates MSOs remains controversial, 
however. In particular, and as will be explained in Chapter Three and expanded 
upon throughout this thesis, the threshold issue of extraterritorial applicability is 
both contentious and of fundamental importance. A narrow conception of the 
extraterritorial applicability of IHRL would exclude its application to a substantial 
class of MSOs that occur seaward of States’ territorial waters. Conversely, a 
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broad understanding of extraterritorial applicability, such as this thesis will argue 
best reflects the law, brings many aspects of the execution of MSOs within the 
scope of IHRL. Resolving this pivotal issue involves both an understanding of 
the underlying law, and a detailed analysis of its application to specific 
situations encountered in the course of MSOs. 
Beyond the question of applicability of IHRL, practice relating to its application 
in the maritime in general, and to MSOs in particular, remains relatively sparse 
in comparison to that which exists with respect to other contexts. While IHRL 
may apply to activities that comprise MSOs, how it does so must be considered 
in light of factors unique to the maritime environment. The limited practice that 
exists with respect to the application of IHRL directly to MSOs provides 
important, though incomplete, insight. At least as important, however, is the 
translation to the maritime of principles that are already well-established in other 
contexts. 
1.2. Methodology 
This thesis is concerned primarily with the last of the three ways, set out above, 
in which IHRL may apply in the maritime domain, namely the direct application 
of obligations arising under IHRL treaties. Although IHRL norms may be applied 
in the other ways described, treaty-based IHRL operates as a clearly defined 
set of rules, enforceable through (relatively) accessible mechanisms. Its 
applicability, or otherwise, to a State activity, such as MSOs, is therefore of 
specific interest and importance. While customary law may also contain human 
rights norms, as the discussion above explained, both their content and scope 
of application are likely to be unclear, and avenues for enforcement may be 
limited. Furthermore, to the extent that the content of customary IHRL can be 
determined, according to the ‘modern approach’ explained above, it is likely to 
reflect norms found in treaty-based IHRL. 
This thesis argues that treaty-based IHRL (referred to hereafter simply as IHRL) 
provides an important normative framework within which MSOs are to be 
conducted, both within and beyond States’ maritime territories. It is argued that, 
although the extraterritorial applicability of IHRL is often complex and 
controversial, human rights obligations will almost invariably be engaged by the 
activities that constitute MSOs, albeit that some differences admittedly may 
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arise between those that are conducted within and beyond a State’s territory. 
These obligations are to be met above and beyond those contained elsewhere 
in international law, particularly the law of the sea. Even where human rights 
principles can be argued to have already been reflected in the application of 
those other bodies of law, as is the case with respect to the use of force under 
the law of the sea, the obligations engaged by virtue of the direct application of 
IHRL are substantially broader in scope and greater in depth. 
Nevertheless, IHRL does not operate in isolation; as this thesis demonstrates, 
its relationship with the law of the sea is particularly important. From one 
perspective, IHRL provides the normative framework in which MSO activities 
permitted by the law of the sea are to be conducted, either through the direct 
application of IHRL, or through the influence of IHRL on the development of law 
of the sea rules. From the opposite perspective, the law of the sea provides the 
basis for the lawful limitation of human rights in the course of MSOs. 
Understanding these relationships is of fundamental importance in 
understanding the application of IHRL to MSOs. 
With respect to research methodology, this is a doctrinal study,253 concerned 
primarily with IHRL. To the extent that other bodies of law are relevant as 
comparators, or through their links to IHRL, they are also considered to the 
extent necessary. However, even within IHRL, a wide range of instruments, 
containing a very wide range of rights and obligations, may be relevant. As a 
result, a degree of selectivity is therefore necessary in order to prevent the 
analysis from becoming unwieldy. For this reason, the thesis focuses on four 
key instruments: the ICCPR, ECHR, ACHR and ACHPR. The ICCPR is of 
particular importance because it contains a comprehensive set of rights 
applicable to MSOs, because it is so widely adopted and because it is 
supported by considerable relevant practice, albeit non-judicial in character. 
The others represent the most important regional treaties, each containing a 
comprehensive set of rights, and each subject to a sophisticated enforcement 
mechanism that includes recourse to a court established for the purpose. Of 
these, the ECHR is of special interest because it has the richest jurisprudence, 
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including a number of important cases that have applied ECHR provisions 
directly to MSOs. In addition to the four treaties that contain catalogues of 
rights, the CAT is also considered in the particular circumstances where it is 
relevant. 
Of the many rights protected under these instruments, the thesis considers only 
those that are particularly likely to be engaged in the course of MSOs, and 
concentrates its analysis on situations where the application of IHRL is most 
novel and/or contentious. For example, it is relatively uncontroversial that 
certain IHRL rules prohibit torture and other forms of ill-treatment with respect to 
individuals detained on board a ship flagged to the State in question. Therefore, 
while of undoubted importance in a practical sense, the thesis mentions this 
area only briefly. In contrast, the application of IHRL to the use of force in the 
course of MSOs is both important, involving conduct central to the execution of 
many MSOs, and controversial; hence it is subject to detailed analysis. 
Selectivity is also necessary in determining the aspects of each right to be 
considered in detail. Each of the rights considered in the course of the thesis 
may be subject to considerable practice and academic discourse, which cannot 
possibly be reflected in full within the limits of this thesis. The law is therefore 
explained and analysed to the detail necessary to support the central argument, 
without necessarily setting out every aspect of each right under examination.  
With these points in mind, the thesis addresses a series of questions related to 
the core argument set out above: 
• What are the activities undertaken in the course of MSOs that are most 
likely to engage IHRL obligations? 
• How are those activities regulated by other bodies of international law, 
especially the law of the sea? 
• In what circumstances can IHRL apply to those activities, if at all? 
• What are the relevant IHRL rules and norms, and how do they apply to 
the specific activities that comprise MSOs? 
• How does the regulation of MSOs by IHRL compare to its regulation by 
other bodies of law, and what are the links between the different legal 
regimes? 
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The third of these questions, relating to the applicability of IHRL to the activities 
that comprise MSOs, is a critical threshold issue. If IHRL applies to MSOs only 
in very limited circumstances, depending, for example, on the physical location 
in which a particular MSO occurs, then the importance of IHRL as a normative 
framework for MSOs would be significantly diminished. Understanding the 
applicability of IHRL to MSOs is important, therefore, both in defining the 
contours of the normative framework provided by IHRL, as well as to appreciate 
how significant that normative framework is to the practical execution of MSOs. 
The first two of the following chapters therefore focus on the question of 
applicability; Chapter Two is concerned with the applicability of IHRL to MSOs 
within a State’s territory, while Chapter Three considers the more controversial 
issue of extraterritorial applicability. The aim of these chapters, particularly 
Chapter Three, is to establish the principles according to which specific IHRL 
rules will apply to particular activities that comprise MSOs. Later chapters then 
draw on the framework thereby established in order to inform the detailed 
analysis of particular IHRL rules and norms contained in the remainder of the 
thesis. 
Having addressed the question of applicability, each subsequent chapter 
addresses a particular aspect of MSOs: the use of force; deprivation of liberty; 
rescue; non-refoulement; and the policing of protest. These have been selected 
as areas in which the conduct of MSOs is particularly likely to engage IHRL 
obligations. While they are not exhaustive in enumerating all of the areas in 
which IHRL might apply to MSOs, they represent what are submitted to be the 
areas of most relevance and adequate, at least, to prove the importance of the 
normative framework provided by IHRL. 
The structure of these chapters varies in order to best deal with the issues at 
hand. In outline, each presents relevant practice concerning the execution of 
MSOs to the extent necessary to illustrate the topic under consideration, 
drawing, for example, on official sources or the facts of cases on point.254 The 
analysis then continues with an explanation of how the particular activities 
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involved find their legal basis in, or are subject to regulation by, other bodies of 
international law, especially the law of the sea. 
Each chapter then turns to IHRL, drawing first, to the extent necessary, on the 
analysis contained in Chapters Two and Three to address the applicability of 
IHRL in the context of the specific activities concerned. Next, the relevant IHRL 
norms and rules are explained, before an examination of how they apply in the 
context of MSOs. This is achieved both through analysis of case law, where 
available, that deals directly with the application of the rules in question to 
MSOs, as well as through inductive reasoning to extrapolate from their 
application in other contexts. The aim of this analysis is, for each aspect of 
MSOs under examination, an account of how the activities concerned are 
regulated by IHRL. The conclusion of each chapter includes an assessment of 
how the normative framework provided by IHRL relates to other relevant bodies 
of international law. This includes consideration both of the role that IHRL plays 
in regulating MSOs, above and beyond that which exists elsewhere in the law, 
as well as of the linkages between IHRL and other legal regimes. These 
conclusions are drawn together in a final chapter, which seeks to answer the 
questions set out above and to explain how those answers prove the core 
thesis. 
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2. The Applicability of International Human Rights Law to Maritime 
Security Operations Conducted in a State’s Territory 
2.1. Introduction 
Before examining how substantive International Human Rights Law (IHRL) 
norms apply to maritime security operations (MSOs), it is essential first to 
understand the applicability of the IHRL treaties under consideration in a 
maritime context and, in particular, to MSOs. This is a key threshold issue of 
substantial complexity. MSOs can take place both in areas over which the 
sovereignty of the coastal State extends (i.e. internal waters, the territorial sea 
and archipelagic waters)1 as well as beyond: in the contiguous zone; in a 
State’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ); and on the high seas, including in 
areas above the continental shelf.2 A full account of the applicability of IHRL to 
MSOs therefore requires an understanding of which of these areas are 
considered to be within a State’s territory, and which are not, as well as analysis 
of how and when the criteria determining applicability, either territorially or 
extraterritorially, are met in the context of MSOs. To address these questions, 
this and the following chapter consider, in turn, the territorial and extraterritorial 
applicability of the IHRL treaties under consideration to MSOs. 
As this chapter explains, the applicability of IHRL treaties, in general, within the 
territory of States parties is uncontroversial. Furthermore, the whole of a treaty 
                                            
1 Art 2(1) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea states that, 
‘The sovereignty of a coastal State extends, beyond its land territory and 
internal waters and, in the case of an archipelagic State, its archipelagic waters, 
to an adjacent belt of sea, described as the territorial sea.’ Under art 3, ‘[e]very 
State has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not 
exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured from baselines determined in 
accordance with this Convention.’ Internal waters are defined as those 
landward of the same baselines (art 7) and archipelagic waters are those within 
archipelagic baselines established according to art 47. United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (adopted 10 December 1982, entered into 
force 16 November 1994) 1833 UNTS 397 (UNCLOS). 
2 The high seas are defined as ‘all parts of the sea that are not included in the 
exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a 
State, or in the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State.’ ibid art 86. For 
discussion of the contiguous zone, EEZ and continental shelf, see below s 
3.3.3. 
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will usually apply at all times and throughout the territory in question.3 However, 
there is a surprising paucity of analysis as to how—indeed whether—this 
translates to the territorial sea, as well as internal and archipelagic waters. 
Although some writers state that human rights treaties apply throughout these 
areas, 4  a detailed explanation for this conclusion is generally lacking. 
Furthermore, as will be discussed in this section, while the practice of courts 
and treaty bodies does not contradict this position, the issue has not been 
considered directly and in detail. 
This chapter begins by considering the territorial application of IHRL treaties in 
general. It begins with the observation that treaties are presumed to apply 
throughout the entire territory of each State party, but that presumption can be 
displaced either explicitly or implicitly by the terms of the treaty in question. 
Most, but not all, of the IHRL treaties under consideration contain express terms 
defining the spatial scope of their applicability. While applicability is, for most 
such treaties, predicated on the existence of a State party’s jurisdiction over the 
individual whose rights are in issue, such jurisdiction is normally exercised 
throughout the State’s territory. Even where a State is prevented from 
exercising its jurisdiction within its territory by de facto obstacles, such as the 
presence of an occupying force or a conflicting rule of the law of State immunity, 
there is practice to suggest that IHRL treaties continue to apply, although the 
State’s required conduct is modified by those circumstances. Consequently, the 
presumption of territorial applicability is not normally displaced, even in cases 
where applicability depends on a jurisdictional link. 
Having established the territorial applicability, in general, of the IHRL treaties 
under consideration, the section proceeds to consider how this applies to the 
maritime domain. It is first explained that a State’s territory is generally 
understood to include any internal or archipelagic waters, as well as the 
territorial sea. However, it is nevertheless noted that the applicability of the 
                                            
3 This is in contrast to the extraterritorial applicability of IHRL treaties, at least so 
far as it depends on the exercise of authority and control over individuals, in 
which case obligations may be ‘divided and tailored’ to the circumstances. See 
below s 3.3.2. 
4 See, for example, John E Noyes, ‘The Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone’ in 
Donald R Rothwell and others (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the Law of the 
Sea (OUP 2015) 104. 
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IHRL treaties under consideration in these areas has not been the subject of 
detailed analysis by courts or treaty bodies. The section therefore proceeds to 
consider whether there are any special features of a State’s maritime territory 
such as might displace the presumption of the applicability throughout them. 
Having considered various rules of the law of the sea that can limit the exercise 
of a coastal State’s jurisdiction in its maritime territory, it is argued, drawing 
upon analogous practice in other contexts, that each of the IHRL treaties under 
consideration is likely to apply throughout a State’s maritime territory, although 
the obligations they entail may, in some circumstances, be modified by 
conflicting law of the sea rules. 
2.2. The territorial application of human rights treaties generally 
The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) provides a starting 
point for understanding treaties’ spatial scope of application. According to 
Article 29, ‘Unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise 
established, a treaty is binding upon each party in respect of its entire territory.’5 
The law of treaties therefore provides two rebuttable presumptions: first, a treaty 
extends at least to the territory of each State party; and, second, where a treaty 
applies to the territory of a State party, it will apply to its entire territory. 
Nevertheless, it is clear from Article 29 VCLT that these presumptions can be 
rebutted, either expressly or by implication. It follows, therefore, that for each 
treaty under consideration, it must be considered whether these presumptions 
are, indeed, displaced. 
Human rights treaties usually contain clauses intended to define their scope of 
application. For the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR),6 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)7  and American 
Convention on Human Rights (ACHR).8 a single clause governs the application 
                                            
5 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (concluded 23 May 1969, entered 
into force 27 January 1980) 1155 UNTS 332 (1969 Vienna Convention) art 29. 
6 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 
1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR) art 2(1). 
7 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(European Convention on Human Rights, as amended) (ECHR) art 1. 
8 American Convention on Human Rights: ‘Pact of San José, Costa Rica’ 
(signed 22 November 1969, entered into force 18 July 1978) 1144 UNTS 144 
(ACHR) art 1(1). 
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of the instrument as a whole. The Convention Against Torture (CAT), 9 
meanwhile, adopts a different approach, whereby individual provisions are 
subject to various, differing, application clauses. Other treaties, including the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), 10  contain no 
provision setting out in express terms their scope of application, and therefore 
nothing on their face to displace the application of Article 29 VCLT. The 
following paragraphs consider the consequences of these different approaches. 
The ECHR and ACHR are very similar in this regard. Article 1 ECHR states 
that, ‘The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their 
jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in…this Convention.’ Its applicability 
depends, therefore, on what it means to be within the ‘jurisdiction’ of a State 
party. As discussed below in connection with the extraterritorial applicability of 
human rights treaties, jurisdiction in this context is not limited to the meaning 
ascribed to the term in general international law.11 Nevertheless, the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has relied on classical conceptions of 
jurisdiction in identifying a baseline territorial scope of application. For example, 
in Banković, the Grand Chamber interpreted the term according to its ordinary 
meaning, leading to the conclusion that ‘the jurisdictional competence of a State 
is primarily territorial.’12 Consequently, it found ‘that Article 1 of the Convention 
must be considered to reflect this ordinary and essentially territorial notion of 
jurisdiction’.13 While the ECtHR has latterly taken a broader approach to the 
extraterritorial application of the ECHR than that taken in Banković,14 it has 
consistently maintained that, ‘A State’s jurisdictional competence under Article 1 
is primarily territorial’ and that, ‘Jurisdiction is presumed to be exercised 
normally throughout the State’s territory’.15 
                                            
9  Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (adopted 10 December 1984, entered into force 26 
June 1987) 1465 UNTS 113 (CAT) 
10 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (adopted 27 June 1981, 
entered into force 21 October 1986) (1982) 21 ILM 58. 
11 See below s 3.2.2. 
12 Banković and Others v Belgium and Others ECHR 2001–XII 333 [59]. 
13 Ibid [61]. 
14 See below s 3.2.2. 
15 Al-Skeini and Others v the United Kingdom ECHR 2011 [131]. 
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Notwithstanding its general applicability throughout the entirety of a State’s 
territory, the ECHR contains a specific exception to this rule that is unique 
amongst the instruments under consideration.16 This is the ‘colonial clause’ 
contained in Article 56, according to which a State party may elect whether or 
not to extend the Convention to ‘all or any of the territories for whose 
international relations it is responsible.’ 17  This provision serves a specific 
purpose in allowing States to disapply the Convention with respect to particular 
overseas territories or federated States.18 The language of Article 56 clearly 
refers to territories, as in distinct entities, rather than to territory in general; 
hence, it does not permit a State to disapply the ECHR within an arbitrarily 
defined area. Where a declaration under Article 56 is made, the result will be 
that the ECHR will no longer apply to the ‘entire territory’ of the State party and, 
in that very limited sense only, such a declaration rebuts the contrary 
presumption contained in Article 27 VCLT. However, it does not affect the 
application of the ECHR throughout the entirety of the remaining territory. 
Turning to the ACHR, Article 1(1) states that, ‘The States Parties to this 
Convention undertake to respect the rights and freedoms recognized herein 
and to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free and full exercise 
of those rights and freedoms’. This text is essentially the same as Article 1 
ECHR. Therefore, as for the ECHR, the applicability of the ACHR turns on what 
it means to be within a State’s jurisdiction. The practice of the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights in interpreting the meaning of ‘jurisdiction’ in this 
particular respect has broadly mirrored that of the ECtHR, requiring each State 
party to the ACHR ‘to respect the rights of all persons within its territory’ as well 
as, in some circumstances, extraterritorially. 19  In contrast to the ECHR, 
however, the absence of a ‘colonial clause’ in the ACHR denies States parties 
the option to foreclose the ACHR’s application throughout their overseas 
territories. 
                                            
16  Though common in other European human rights instruments. Marko 
Milanovic, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties: Law, Principles, 
and Policy (OUP 2011) 14–15. 
17 ECHR (n 7) art 56(1). 
18 Milanovic (n 16) 13–14. 
19 Franklin Guillermo Aisalla Molina v Ecuador, Case IP-02, Report No 112/10, 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.140 Doc 10 
(2010) [91]. 
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In contrast to the ECHR and ACHR, the spatial scope of application of the 
ICCPR is defined with reference to ‘territory’, as well as ‘jurisdiction’. The 
relevant provision is Article 2(1), which states that: 
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to 
ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the 
rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, 
such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, property, birth or other status. 
The meaning of the phrase that controls the application of the ICCPR, ‘within its 
territory and subject to its jurisdiction’, has been, and remains, controversial.20 
The debate, which has arisen in connection with the extraterritorial applicability 
of the ICCPR, can be reduced to the question whether the two requirements—
of being within a State’s territory, and of being subject to its jurisdiction—are to 
be construed disjunctively or conjunctively. This debate is of pivotal importance 
to the extraterritorial applicability of the ICCPR, and is therefore discussed in 
that context in detail in Chapter Three.21 However, it is largely incidental to the 
question of the ICCPR’s territorial applicability. 
If a disjunctive construction is preferred, such that the ICCPR applies both to 
individuals within a State’s territory, as well as to those subject to its jurisdiction, 
then the treaty must apply at least to the territory of each State party. If, on the 
other hand, Article 2(1) is read conjunctively to restrict the ICCPR’s application 
to those individuals who are both within a State’s territory as well as being 
subject to its jurisdiction, the ICCPR’s applicability within a State’s territory is 
limited to individuals within that State’s jurisdiction. However, the same analysis 
would apply to the meaning of the term ‘jurisdiction’ in this context as it does to 
that term’s meaning in the ECHR and ACHR. If, consistent with the practice of 
the European and American systems, a State’s jurisdiction is considered 
normally to be exercised throughout its territory, it follows that the reference to 
jurisdiction does nothing to further limit the ICCPR’s territorial applicability.  
The CAT adopts yet another approach, whereby individual provisions contain 
clauses limiting or defining their scope of application. Not all of these are the 
                                            
20 See, for example, Karen da Costa, The Extraterritorial Application of Selected 
Human Rights Treaties (Martinus Nijhoff 2013) 1–14. 
21 See below s 3.2.1.2. 
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same in form or effect, particularly with respect to potential extraterritorial 
applicability, which, as discussed in Chapter Three,22 is subject to continued 
debate. However, in relation to territorial applicability, the situation is more 
straightforward. Where an individual alleged to have committed an offence of 
torture is located in its territory, a State Party must either ‘establish its 
jurisdiction over’ the alleged offence or extradite the suspect.23 The obligation to 
‘take such measures as are necessary to establish its jurisdiction’ over offences 
of torture also applies ‘in any territory under [a State party’s] jurisdiction’.24 
Similarly, most of the other duties and obligations under CAT are owed by a 
State party only ‘in any territory under its jurisdiction’.25 This is the case with 
respect to the key obligations for a State Party to prevent, under article 2(1), 
torture and, under article 16(1), other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment. While the application of certain provisions only to 
territory under the jurisdiction of a State leaves open the possibility that a State 
may exercise jurisdiction over territory other than its own, it is uncontroversial 
that the territory under the jurisdiction of a State normally includes, at least, that 
State’s own territory. 
Turning, finally, to the ACHPR, there is, as noted above, nothing on its face to 
displace the presumptions contained in Article 29 VCLT. Furthermore, there is 
nothing from which a limitation to its territorial applicability can plausibly be 
inferred. Therefore, although the issue has not been addressed directly by the 
African Commission or African Court, it is a safe assumption that the ACHPR 
normally applies throughout the territories of States parties.26 
Each of the instruments under consideration usually applies, therefore, 
throughout a State’s territory, although the precise basis for this conclusion 
varies between instruments. In the case of the ECHR, the existence of the 
colonial clause provides a clear exception to this rule. More broadly, however, 
                                            
22 See below s 3.2.1.4. 
23 CAT (n 9) art 5(2). 
24 ibid art 5(1). The formulation ‘any territory under its jurisdiction’ also allows for 
extraterritorial applicability under certain circumstances. See below s 3.2.1.1. 
25 CAT (n 9) arts 2(1), 11–13, 16. 
26 This appears to be the assumption made in the literature. See, for example, 
Frans Viljoen, ‘Communications under the African Charter: Procedure and 
Admissibility’ in Malcolm Evans and Rachel Murray (eds), The African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights (2nd edn, CUP 2008) 107. 
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the question arises whether there are circumstances in which these instruments 
cease to apply territorially. The dependence on, or at least reference to, the 
exercise of jurisdiction, in the ECHR, ACHR, ICCPR and CAT, begs the 
question whether there are circumstances in which a State no longer exercises 
jurisdiction such that the instrument in question would no longer apply. This 
might be argued to be the case where a State, as a matter of fact, is no longer 
able to exercise effective control over part of its territory, a possibility 
considered by the ECtHR in Loizidou v Turkey, which concerned Turkey’s 
occupation of northern Cyprus.27 The Court acknowledged that Turkey was 
exercising effective control over the region, rather than the government of the 
Republic of Cyprus; as a result, the Turkish authorities were responsible not just 
for the acts of its own occupying forces, but also for those of the local 
administration.28 
However, even where the ECtHR has recognised the de facto inability of the 
territorial State fully to discharge its obligations under the ECHR, it has still 
required from it those measures that were within its power to take.29 In relation 
to the loss of effective control by Moldova over an area established by 
separatists as the Moldovan Republic of Transdniestra, the ECtHR held: 
…that where a Contracting State is prevented from exercising its authority 
over the whole of its territory by a constraining de facto situation, such as 
obtains when a separatist regime is set up, whether or not this is 
accompanied by military occupation by another State, it does not thereby 
cease to have jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention 
over that part of its territory temporarily subject to a local authority 
sustained by rebel forces or by another State. 
Nevertheless, such a factual situation reduces the scope of that 
jurisdiction in that the undertaking given by the State under Article 1 must 
be considered by the Court only in the light of the Contracting State’s 
positive obligations towards persons within its territory. The State in 
question must endeavour, with all the legal and diplomatic means 
available to it vis-à-vis foreign States and international organisations, to 
                                            
27 Loizidou v Turkey (Preliminary Objections) Series A no 310 (ECtHR). 
28 ibid [59]–[64]; Cyprus v Turkey ECHR 2001-IV 1 [76]–[81]. 
29 Da Costa (n 20) 169–70. See also Kjetil Mujezinović Larsen, ‘“Territorial Non-
Application” of the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2009) 78 Nordic J 
of Intl L 73, 85–87. Larsen notes that this possibility was not considered in the 
cases concerning the Turkish occupation of Cyprus, in which the complaint was 
made only against Turkey. 
 
64 
continue to guarantee the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms defined in 
the Convention.30 
The passage above makes clear that the inability to exercise authority over 
territory does not mean that the ECHR ceases to apply; instead, the State’s 
obligations are modified in the light of practical difficulties in meeting them. In 
the same and similar situations, including the situation in Transdniestra, the 
Human Rights Committee (HRC) has likewise considered the ICCPR to apply, 
but, recognizing the difficulty States have faced in meeting their obligations, has 
required them only to do what they can within the scope of their effective 
power.31 However, it is important to distinguish a situation where a State is 
prevented from exercising effective control over part of its territory as a result of 
occupation or insurrection from situations where a State chooses not to do so. 
There is no suggestion that the State’s choice not to govern a region of its 
territory, or its inability to do so due to insufficiency of resources, effectively 
relieves it of its obligations. 
Notably, the ECtHR has taken an analogous approach in situations where a 
State is prevented from fulfilling its obligations under the ECHR because of a 
conflicting obligation to respect the immunity of individuals or premises.32 In 
such circumstances, it is clear that the ECHR still applies, although the conduct 
required of the State by virtue of its obligations under the Convention is 
modified in light of the relevant rules of immunity, which are applied as 
                                            
30 Ilasçu and Others v Moldova and Russia ECHR 2004-VII 179 [333]. 
31 UN Human Rights Committee, ‘Consideration of Reports Submitted by States 
Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant, Concluding Observations of the 
Human Rights Committee: Republic of Moldova’ (4 November 2009) UN Doc 
CCPR/C/MDA/CO/2 para 5 (‘The Committee takes note of the State party’s 
information that its inability to exercise effective control over the territory of 
Transdniestria continues to impede the implementation of the Covenant in that 
region. It notes, however, the State party’s continuing obligation to ensure 
respect for the rights recognised in the Covenant in relation to the population of 
Transdniestria within the limits of its effective power.’) For discussion and other 
examples of the HRC’s practice, see Sarah Joseph and Melissa Castan, The 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Cases, Materials and 
Commentary (3rd edn, OUP 2013) 100–01. 
32 On the law of diplomatic immunity from enforcement, see, for example, Hazel 
Fox and Philippa Webb, The Law of State Immunity (3rd edn, OUP 2015) 597–
98. 
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restrictions or limitations to the rights in question.33 Reviewing its own practice 
in Jones and Others v the United Kingdom, the Court concluded that 
recognition of immunity could amount to a lawful limitation on a right otherwise 
to be enjoyed, recognising that, ‘The grant of sovereign immunity to a State in 
civil proceedings pursues the legitimate aim of complying with international law 
to promote comity and good relations between States through the respect of 
another State’s sovereignty’. 34  In deciding whether the pursuit of such a 
legitimate aim amounted to a proportionate limitation on a right otherwise to be 
enjoyed, the Court said that ‘the need to interpret the Convention so far as 
possible in harmony with other rules of international law of which it forms part, 
including those relating to the grant of State immunity, has led to the Court to 
conclude that measures taken by a State which reflect generally recognised 
rules of public international law on State immunity cannot in principle be 
regarded as imposing a disproportionate restriction on the right of access to a 
court as embodied in [the right to a fair trial].’35 
The ECtHR’s position with respect to State immunity, along with both its, and 
the HRC’s, approaches to the loss of effective control over an area, disclose a 
tendency to avoid the conclusion that a human rights treaty entirely ceases to 
apply in an area or situation where a State is prevented from exercising aspects 
of its jurisdiction. Furthermore, although the jurisprudence set out above is 
authoritative only within each respective human rights system, the same 
reasoning could be applied to the other instruments under consideration. 
Indeed, the suggestion that human rights treaties do cease entirely to apply in 
such circumstances would arguably run counter to the object and purpose of 
human rights treaties generally. Consequently, while the ability of a State to 
exercise its jurisdiction throughout its territory may be limited in its ability to 
assert its authority, this does not necessarily mean that the instrument will 
cease to apply, but rather that the content of the relevant obligations may be 
modified or attenuated in light of the prevailing circumstances. 
                                            
33 See further William A Schabas, The European Convention on Human Rights: 
A Commentary (OUP 2015) 100. 
34 Jones and Others v the United Kingdom ECHR 2014 [188]. 
35 ibid [189].
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2.3. The territorial application of human rights treaties in the maritime 
domain 
Having considered the territorial application, generally, of the human rights 
treaties under consideration, the next step is to understand how this applies in 
the maritime environment and, consequently, to the conduct of MSOs. Two 
questions are key to this. First, recalling the conclusion reached above that 
human rights treaties normally apply through the entire territory of each State 
party, which, if any, maritime areas are included within a State’s territory? 
Second, are there any features of the maritime areas within a State’s territory 
that might rebut the presumption that human rights treaties apply within them? 
Turning to the first of these questions, according to Article 2(1) UNCLOS, ‘The 
sovereignty of a coastal State extends, beyond its land territory and internal 
waters and, in the case of an archipelagic State, its archipelagic waters, to an 
adjacent belt of sea, described as the territorial sea.’ The Territorial Sea 
Convention likewise contains an equivalent provision, albeit omitting reference 
to archipelagic waters.36 Sovereignty in this context is generally understood to 
mean territorial sovereignty, by which it is meant that the sovereignty of a State 
over its internal waters, archipelagic waters and territorial sea arises from the 
inclusion of those maritime zones in the State’s territory. 37  Thus, in its 
commentary to the draft of what became Article 29 VCLT, the International Law 
Commission (ILC) states that the entire territory of a State includes ‘all the land 
and appurtenant territorial waters and air space which constitute the territory of 
the State’.38 This can be contrasted with the situation in the contiguous zone, 
                                            
36 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (adopted 29 April 
1958, entered into force 29 April 1958) 516 UNTS 206 art 1(1). 
37  See, for example, James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public 
International Law (8th edn, OUP 2012) 203; Malcolm N Shaw, International Law 
(7th edn, CUP 2014) 352; Lindy S Johnson, Coastal State Regulation of 
International Shipping (Oceana Publications 2004) 489–92. Guilfoyle questions 
this argument, noting that, ‘While sovereignty certainly follows from a state’s 
possession of territory, the exercise of sovereignty or sovereign rights over a 
space or object does not make it territory.’ Douglas Guilfoyle, Shipping 
Interdiction and the Law of the Sea (CUP 2009) 226. While this statement is 
undoubtedly correct in itself, the weight of opinion suggests that, in the case of 
internal waters, archipelagic waters and the territorial sea, sovereignty does, 
indeed, reflect their status as territory. 
38 International Law Commission, ‘Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with 
Commentaries’ [1966] 2 United Nations YB of the Intl L Commission 187 (Draft 
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exclusive economic zone and the waters seaward of territorial waters that lie 
over the continental shelf ; these are all areas in which areas the coastal State 
enjoys only certain limited sovereign rights and are not part of its territory.39 
Therefore, with respect to the presumption that treaties apply to the entire 
territory of a State, the area in question includes a State’s internal waters, 
territorial sea and archipelagic waters, but not any of the other maritime zones 
seaward of the territorial sea.40 
The second question is less straightforward, not least because the applicability 
of human rights instruments in a State’s internal waters, archipelagic waters and 
territorial sea has not been the subject of detailed consideration by courts or 
treaty bodies. Nevertheless, limited practice in the ECtHR is arguably consistent 
with the proposition that human rights treaties apply in the territorial sea and, a 
fortiori, in internal and archipelagic waters. In Women on Waves and Others v 
Portugal, a Portuguese warship blocked a chartered ship from entering the 
Portuguese territorial sea in order to prevent the ship being used as a base for 
the promotion of reproductive rights.41 Although without addressing the question 
directly, the ECtHR proceeded on the basis that the ECHR was applicable in 
the circumstances, as evidenced by its conclusion that Portugal’s actions 
amounted to a violation of the protestors’ freedom of expression, protected 
under article 10 of the ECHR. Similarly, in Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping 
Lines v Turkey,42 the ECtHR found that there had been a breach of the right to 
peaceful enjoyment of property, protected under Article 1 of Protocol 1 to the 
                                                                                                                                
Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries), 213. While ‘territorial 
waters’ is not a term recognised in the law of the sea, it can most plausibly be 
understood as including both a State’s internal waters (including any 
archipelagic waters) and its territorial sea. Syméon Karagiannis, ‘Article 29 
Convention of 1969’ in Olivier Corten and Pierre Klein (eds), The Vienna 
Conventions on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary (OUP 2011) 752.  
39 Karagiannis (n 38) 753–54. See also Crawford (n 37) 205. 
40 Noyes (n 4) 104; Anthony Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (3rd edn, 
CUP 2013) 178 (though noting that Aust does not refer explicitly to archipelagic 
waters). 
41 Women on Waves and Others v Portugal App No 31276/05 (ECtHR, 3 
February 2009). 
42 Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines v Turkey ECHR 2007-V 327. 
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ECHR,43 in relation to the seizure of a vessel by the Turkish authorities in 
Turkish territorial waters. 
Unfortunately, in neither Women on Waves and Others v Portugal nor Islamic 
Republic of Iran Shipping Lines v Turkey did the ECtHR make clear the basis 
on which it considered the ECHR as applying ratione loci. Indeed, in neither 
case does it appear to have been in issue. Furthermore, as will be discussed 
below in connection with extraterritorial application, there are alternative bases 
on which it could have applied, namely the authority and control being 
exercised by the ships in question in each case.44 Therefore, while there is 
nothing in either case to suggest that the ECHR does not apply throughout the 
territorial sea, the paucity of practice concerning the territorial applicability of 
human rights instruments to the territorial sea (or internal and archipelagic 
waters) and the absence of any detailed examination of the question at all, 
leaves the issue open to further analysis. 
It is therefore necessary to consider any features unique to a State’s maritime 
territory, as distinct from its land territory, that might arguably limit the 
jurisdiction of a State, such that the territorial applicability of some or all human 
rights treaties, particularly those that make explicit reference to their applicability 
to those only within their jurisdiction, might be called into question. Potential 
such limitations to territorial jurisdiction over the territorial sea and internal or 
archipelagic waters might be found in the coastal State’s obligation to respect 
the rights of innocent passage, transit passage and archipelagic sea lanes 
passage. Considering the first of these, ships of all States enjoy a right to 
continuous and expeditious passage through the territorial sea and archipelagic 
waters of any coastal State.45 A right of innocent passage also exists in those 
internal waters that are created by drawing straight baselines in accordance 
with Article 7 UNCLOS.46 So long as a ship’s passage is innocent, meaning that 
                                            
43 Protocol 1 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms (adopted 20 March 1952, entered into force 18 
May 1954) ETS 9 (ECHR Protocol 1) art 1. Rights protected under the Protocol 
are subject to the same applicability provisions as those contained in the ECHR 
itself. ibid art 5. 
44 See below s 3.3.4. 
45 UNCLOS (n 1) arts 17, 52. 
46 ibid 8(2). The provision in question refers to ‘a right of innocent passage as 
provided in this Convention’ existing in such circumstances. However, whereas 
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‘it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State’ and 
is conducted ‘in conformity with [UNCLOS] and other rules of international 
law’,47 the jurisdiction of the coastal State is modified with respect to the ship in 
a number of ways. 
Most importantly, the coastal State may not hamper the innocent passage of a 
Ship, except as provided for by UNCLOS.48 In particular, while the coastal State 
generally enjoys legislative jurisdiction,49 its enforcement jurisdiction is limited.50 
Although it may exercise its criminal jurisdiction on board a foreign ship passing 
through its territorial sea after having left its internal waters,51 it may not do so in 
relation to a crime that has been committed before a ship enters its territorial 
sea and where the ship does not enter internal waters.52 Where a crime is 
committed on board a ship while it is passing through the territorial sea (without 
entering internal waters), a coastal State ‘should not’ exercise its criminal 
jurisdiction except in particular, enumerated, circumstances. 53  This latter 
                                                                                                                                
art 52 specifies that the whole of the innocent passage regime set out in s 3 
applies mutatis mutandis to archipelagic waters, art 8(2) is not so explicit in 
relation to the special category of internal waters. It is nevertheless submitted 
that the right of innocent passage ‘provided in this Convention’ must refer to the 
entirety of s 3. 
47 ibid art 19(1). Art 19(2) further enumerates a range of activities that would be 
considered to be prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal 
State. According to art 18, passage refers to the continuous and expeditious 
navigation of the maritime zone in question. ibid art 18. 
48 ibid art 24(1). 
49 UNCLOS sets out the scope of legislative jurisdiction of a coastal State with 
respect to innocent passage itself. ibid arts 21, 26. It also provides that 
legislation should be non-discriminatory and should not ‘have the practical 
effect of denying or impairing the right of innocent passage’. ibid art 24(1). 
Beyond this, it can be inferred from the sovereignty of the coastal State over the 
waters in question that, as a matter of law, it enjoys general legislative 
jurisdiction. R R Churchill and A V Lowe, The Law of the Sea (Manchester UP 
1999) 95. 
50 UNCLOS (n 1) arts 27–28.  
51 ibid art 27(2). 
52 ibid art 27(5). 
53 ibid art 27(1) (emphasis added). These circumstances are: 
(a) if the consequences of the crime extend to the coastal State;  
(b) if the crime is of a kind to disturb the peace of the country or the good 
order of the territorial sea;  
(c) if the assistance of the local authorities has been requested by the 
master of the ship or by a diplomatic agent or consular officer of the flag 
State; or 
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provision, however, is generally considered to be a matter of comity rather than 
law.54 
In the exercise of civil jurisdiction, a coastal State ‘may not levy execution 
against or arrest [a] ship’ passing through its territorial sea, without having 
entered its internal waters, except ‘in respect of obligations or liabilities 
assumed or incurred by the ship itself in the course or for the purpose of its 
voyage through the waters of the coastal State.’55 In addition, it should not, 
again as a matter of comity, ‘stop or divert a foreign ship passing through the 
territorial sea for the purpose of exercising civil jurisdiction in relation to a 
person on board the ship.’56 
In addition to the innocent passage regime, a right of transit passage exists in 
‘straits used for international navigation between one part of the high seas or an 
exclusive economic zone and another part of the high seas or an exclusive 
economic zone.’57 The provisions comprising the transit passage regime also 
apply mutatis mutandis to archipelagic sea lanes passage,58 which applies in 
specific routes through archipelagic waters and the adjacent territorial sea,59 
such routes being either designated by the archipelagic State, or following 
normal routes of international navigation.60  
Ships in transit passage or archipelagic sea lanes passage must proceed 
without delay and must refrain both from the threat or use of force against the 
                                                                                                                                
(d) if such measures are necessary for the suppression of illicit traffic in 
narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances. 
54 Churchill and Lowe (n 49) 98, Noyes (n 4) 100–01, Lindy S Johnson, Coastal 
State Regulation of International Shipping (Oceana Publications 2004) 82 fn 
283. Art 27 UNCLOS essentially replicates art 19 of the Convention on the 
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, on the drafting of which see Gerald 
Fitzmaurice, ‘Some Results of the Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea’ 
(1959) 8 Intl & Comparative L Q 73, 104. 
55 UNCLOS (n 1) arts 28(2), 28(3). 
56 ibid art 28(1). The same considerations arise with respect to the meaning of 
the language used in art 28 as arise with respect to art 27, specifically the 
hortatory nature of the words ‘should not’. As for art 27, art 28 essentially 
replicates its equivalent provision in the Territorial Sea Convention, art 20, on 
the drafting of which see Fitzmaurice (n 54) 107. 
57 UNCLOS (n 1) art 37. 
58 ibid art 54. 
59 ibid art 53(1). 
60 ibid art 53(12). 
 
71 
coastal State, as well from activities that are not ‘incident to their normal modes 
of continuous and expeditious transit.’ 61  A vessel in breach of the transit 
passage or archipelagic sea lanes passage regimes loses the associated 
protection from coastal State jurisdiction.62 However, so long as a ship complies 
with these requirements, the right of the coastal State to exercise jurisdiction is 
limited only to specific matters enumerated in Article 42:  
(a) the safety of navigation and the regulation of maritime traffic . . . 
(b) the prevention, reduction and control of pollution . . . 
(c) with respect to fishing vessels, the prevention of fishing, including the 
stowage of fishing gear; 
(d) the loading or unloading of any commodity, currency or person in 
contravention of the customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and 
regulations of States bordering straits.63  
The transit passage regime does not contain additional provisions, equivalent to 
those relating to innocent passage, that deal with the exercise of criminal and 
civil jurisdiction. It is therefore understood that Article 42 sets out in its entirety 
the scope of the coastal State’s authority with respect to a vessel in transit or 
archipelagic sea lanes passage. As a result, ‘coastal State jurisdiction over 
ships in transit [and archipelagic sea lanes] passage is considerably narrower 
than is jurisdiction over ships in innocent passage’. 64  Furthermore, while 
innocent passage can, in most circumstances, be temporarily suspended, no 
such right exists with respect to transit or archipelagic sea lanes passage.65 
From this brief survey, it is clear that the innocent, transit and archipelagic sea 
lanes passage regimes interfere with the exercise of jurisdiction by the coastal 
State over vessels conforming to each respective regime. The extent to which 
this is the case differs between them; coastal State jurisdiction is affected less 
by the innocent passage regime than the transit passage and archipelagic sea 
lanes passage regimes. Nevertheless, these limitations on coastal State 
                                            
61 ibid art 29(1). 
62 Churchill and Lowe (n 49) 107. Such activities would almost certainly be in 
breach of the requirements of innocent passage too. 
63 UNCLOS (n 1) art 42.  
64 Churchill and Lowe (n 49) 108. 
65 UNCLOS (n 1) art 44. 
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jurisdiction over its territorial sea, and internal and archipelagic waters, raise the 
question whether they affect the territorial applicability of human rights 
instruments that depend on the existence of jurisdiction over a particular area. 
This situation can be compared to the other circumstances, discussed above, 
where States’ jurisdiction, or their ability to enforce it, is limited by a State’s loss 
of effective control over a part of its territory or where its enforcement 
jurisdiction is limited by a rule of State immunity, and most closely to the latter. 
As in that case, the passage regimes impose restrictions on enforcement 
jurisdiction with respect to specific individuals or entities (ships, in the case of 
the passage regimes), without affecting any other aspects of a State’s 
jurisdiction over the area in question. This is in contrast to the loss of effective 
control over an area, where the factual situation interferes with the State’s ability 
to enforce its jurisdiction over the area as a whole. 
In both cases, however, the practice of the ECtHR and, with respect to loss of 
effective control over territory, the HRC too, indicates that the relevant human 
rights treaties continue to apply, but that a State’s concrete obligations may be 
modified in light of the particular circumstances. As noted above, while other 
Courts and treaty bodies are not formally bound by this approach, it is likely to 
be highly persuasive. By analogy, therefore, it seems unlikely that the limitations 
placed upon a State’s ability to enforce its jurisdiction under the passage 
regimes would lead to a human rights treaty being judged by them not to apply 
at all in a State’s maritime territory. Instead, tracking the ECtHR’s treatment of 
the State immunity issue, it is likely that the law of the sea’s prohibition of any 
action that would normally be required of a State pursuant to its human rights 
treaty obligations, would be evaluated under the framework of limitations or 
restrictions to the right in questions. While, under this approach, it would not be 
inevitable that such limitation or restriction imposed by the law of the sea would 
necessarily be considered lawful, this is no different from the situation as it 
pertains to State immunity. 
2.4. Conclusion 
Notwithstanding the paucity of practice on the specific point, the analysis set out 
above supports the conclusion that the territorial applicability of the human 
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rights treaties under consideration, whether or not contingent on the existence 
of jurisdiction, extends throughout States’ territorial seas, and internal and 
archipelagic waters. This follows from the application of the presumption, 
confirmed through practice, that human rights treaties generally apply 
throughout a State’s territory, which includes those particular maritime zones. 
While a State’s ability to enforce its jurisdiction may be limited by particular rules 
of the law of the sea, it seems unlikely that this would displace the presumption 
of applicability. 
Application of human rights treaties on a territorial basis generally implies the 
application of the full range of rights contained within each treaty, although 
obligations under the law of the sea may act as limitations or restrictions to 
particular rules. Considering the relevance of these conclusions specifically to 
the conduct of MSOs, a State’s human rights treaty obligations are likely apply 
to operations conducted throughout its maritime territory. In contrast to many 
situations, discussed below, in which human rights treaties apply 
extraterritorially, the application of human rights treaties to MSOs in a State’s 
maritime territory does not depend on particular action taken by a State’s 
agents. As a result, a State’s human rights treaty obligations are likely to apply 
at all stages of an MSO conducted in its territorial sea, or internal and 
archipelagic waters. 
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3. The Applicability of International Human Rights Law to Maritime 
Security Operations Conducted Outside a State’s Territory 
3.1. Introduction 
Maritime Security Operations (MSOs) may be conducted throughout the 
maritime domain, including in areas beyond a State’s maritime territory. 
However, the extraterritorial application of international human rights law (IHRL) 
treaties, has been a subject of considerable controversy.1 As will be explained, 
IHRL treaties usually apply with respect to an individual who is within the 
jurisdiction of a State; however, the term ‘jurisdiction’ in this context is 
understood to be broader than its usual meaning in international law. 
Furthermore, the situation differs between treaties, with both the relevant 
provisions and subsequent practice differing and diverging in some important 
respects. While it is generally, though not universally, accepted that each of the 
treaties under consideration is capable of extraterritorial application, the 
circumstances in which this will be the case may differ. 
Translating the extraterritorial applicability of IHRL treaties, in general, to the 
maritime domain, adds a further layer of complexity. Nevertheless, the handful 
of reported cases that have dealt directly with the extraterritorial application of 
IHRL treaties in the maritime environment, including on the high seas, indicate 
that they are capable of being applied in a range of such situations.2 Indeed, 
noting that the broad applicability of IHRL to MSOs is a key premise underlying 
this thesis, the following statement of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) reflects the principles underlying the approach it is submitted ought to 
be taken: 
the special nature of the maritime environment relied upon by the 
Government in the instant case cannot justify an area outside the law 
where ships’ crews are covered by no legal system capable of affording 
                                            
1  See, for example, Milanovic, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights 
Treaties: Law, Principles, and Policy (OUP 2011) 1–2; Karen da Costa, The 
Extraterritorial Application of Selected Human Rights Treaties (Martinus Nijhoff 
2013) 1–4. In some circumstances the matter is more settled. For example, the 
scope of application of a State’s IHRL obligations is generally accepted as 
extending extraterritorially to vessels bearing its flag. See below s 3.3.2. 
2 See, in particular, Medvedyev and Others v France ECHR 2010; Hirsi Jamaa 
and Others v Italy ECHR 2012. 
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them enjoyment of the rights and guarantees protected by the Convention 
which the States have undertaken to secure to everyone within their 
jurisdiction, any more than it can provide offenders with a “safe haven”.3 
However, the depth and detail of this jurisprudence is arguably insufficient 
either to draw clear conclusions or to plot all of the relevant legal contours and 
limits. Instead, a comprehensive understanding requires not only an 
examination of the limited maritime practice, but also consideration of the 
general principles established by the wider jurisprudence on extraterritorial 
application, and how these translate to the maritime environment. 
This chapter is divided into two sections: the law, principles and practice 
concerning the extraterritorial application of IHRL treaties in general; and the 
application of this to the conduct of MSOs in particular. The first subsection 
begins with the observation that the law of treaties contains no presumption for 
or against the extraterritorial application of treaties in question. Considering, 
therefore, the terms of the IHRL treaties in question, it is explained that each 
contains slightly different provision with respect to its applicability. Of note, 
under the Convention Against Torture (CAT),4 different obligations are made 
subject to different provisions for their applicability, some of which are very 
narrow or specific in their scope. However, with respect to the other IHRL 
treaties under consideration, it is explained that they are all capable of 
extraterritorial application, and that this depends, or can be persuasively argued 
to depend, on the question whether the individual whose rights are in question 
is within the ‘jurisdiction’ of the State concerned.  
The term ‘jurisdiction’ has been interpreted differently between the different 
treaties under consideration, although it has consistently been understood more 
broadly than according to its usual meaning under international law. Although 
familiar situations of extraterritorial de jure jurisdiction have, in some instances, 
been recognised as sufficient, the extraterritorial applicability of the IHRL 
treaties under consideration more typically depends on the de facto exercise of 
power: either the effective control over an area, or the exercise by State agents 
                                            
3 Medvedyev (n 2) [81]. The ECtHR subsequently referred to this passage, 
seemingly with approval, in Hirsi Jamaa (n 2) [178]. 
4  Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (adopted 10 December 1984, entered into force 26 
June 1987) 1465 UNTS 113 (CAT). 
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of authority and control over an individual.5 However, beyond these broad 
principles, the practice relating to the different treaties under consideration 
diverges in some important respects. 
The practice of the ECtHR and Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
(IACHR) in applying the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)6 and 
American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR),7 respectively, is informative 
both as to how IHRL treaties, in general, can be applied extraterritorially, as well 
as to the differences of approach that can arise. Surveying each in turn, it is 
explained that the ECtHR’s jurisprudence is particularly complex; although it 
has been clarified in recent years by a restatement of the law in Al-Skeini,8 
significant issues remain. Most notably, while the ECtHR has now recognised 
that extraterritorial application can arise through State agent authority and 
control, in addition to effective control over an area, this arguably does not 
apply to the use, by State agents, of extraterritorial force (and possibly other 
‘instantaneous acts’) without an additional contextual element, such as the 
exercise of ‘public powers’ by the State agents in question. On the other hand, 
the IACHR has generally not relied on effective control over an area, but has 
instead applied the ACHR more liberally on the basis of State agent authority 
and control. Indeed, it has done so specifically on the basis of the use of force 
by State agents both in another State’s territory and in international airspace. 
The second section proceeds to apply these principles to the conduct of 
extraterritorial MSOs. It begins by considering the special situation in which a 
State conducts an MSO involving a vessel flying that State’s own flag. This well-
established example of de jure jurisdiction is referred to as an express basis for 
the application of some provisions of the CAT and has been cited and used as 
                                            
5 State agents mean those whose actions, which amount to the exercise of 
authority and control are attributable to the State. The question of attribution in 
this regard is not usually an issue where MSOs are conducted by a State’s 
armed forces or other government agencies. However, for discussion of the 
relevant law in the circumstances in which attribution is in doubt, see below s 
6.3.1. 
6 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(European Convention on Human Rights, as amended) (ECHR). 
7 American Convention on Human Rights: ‘Pact of San José, Costa Rica’ 
(signed 22 November 1969, entered into force 18 July 1978) 1144 UNTS 144 
(ACHR). 
8 Al-Skeini and Others v the United Kingdom ECHR 2011 (Al-Skeini, ECtHR). 
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the basis for the extraterritorial application of the ECHR. Next, the section 
considers whether there are situations in which IHRL treaties may apply to an 
extraterritorial MSO through effective control of an area; although well-
established in the land context, particularly with respect to the ECHR, it is 
explained that the principles do not transfer easily to the maritime. While some 
such circumstances can tentatively be suggested, it is unlikely to be a 
significant basis for the extraterritorial application of IHRL treaties to MSOs in 
practice. 
Finally, the section considers the extraterritorial application of IHRL treaties to 
MSOs through State agent authority and control. As is explained, applicability 
on this basis depends on the particular act undertaken by the State agent 
towards the individual (or individuals) concerned; and, on account of differences 
in the practice relating to the different treaties under consideration, the 
sufficiency of a particular act may differ between them. The chapter therefore 
breaks down MSOs to consider the different stages of activity and assess 
whether extraterritorial IHRL treaty obligations are likely to be engaged at each. 
Although the case can be made more strongly for some aspects of MSOs than 
others, and more strongly for some treaties than others, an argument is 
advanced for the engagement of a broad range of treaty obligations across 
most of the acts that comprise MSOs. 
3.2. The law, principles and practice relating to the extraterritorial 
application of IHRL treaties 
3.2.1. Normative framework 
As discussed in Chapter Two, Article 29 of the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties (VCLT) contains a rebuttable presumption that treaties are ‘binding 
on each party throughout its entire territory.’9  However, while important in 
understanding the territorial application of treaties, Article 29 does not imply any 
presumption either for or against the application of a treaty beyond a State’s 
                                            
9 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (concluded 23 May 1969, entered 
into force 27 January 1980) 1155 UNTS 332 (1969 Vienna Convention) art 29. 
See above s 2.2. 
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territory.10 Indeed, the stated intention of the International Law Commission at 
the time of drafting the future Article 29 was not to deal with the question of 
extraterritorial application.11 Instead, the main motivation behind the provision 
was to create a presumption in favour of including the entirety of a State’s 
territory—especially its overseas territories as well as its ‘metropolitan’ 
territory—within the scope of application of treaties to which it is party.12 As a 
result, the law of treaties provides no general answer to the question of the 
extraterritorial application of treaties,13 including those concerning human rights. 
Consequently, it is necessary to consider the terms of a treaty, itself, in order to 
understand its extraterritorial applicability. 
3.2.1.1. ECHR and ACHR 
Considering, first, those treaties that contain an express applicability provision, 
Article 1 ECHR applies the instrument to ‘everyone within [a State party’s] 
jurisdiction’, while Article 1(1) ACHR refers, in the same context, to ‘all persons 
subject to a State party’s jurisdiction’. Therefore, as for their territorial 
applicability, the extraterritorial applicability of the ECHR and ACHR turns on 
what it means to be within (or subject to) the ‘jurisdiction’ of a State party. The 
interpretation of this term, in the context of these particular instruments and with 
respect to human rights treaties more generally, is discussed in detail below. 
3.2.1.2. ICCPR 
A State’s obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) apply to ‘to all individuals within its territory and subject to its 
                                            
10 Milanovic (n 1) 10; Syméon Karagiannis, ‘Article 29 Convention of 1969’ in 
Olivier Corten and Pierre Klein (eds), The Vienna Conventions on the Law of 
Treaties: A Commentary (OUP 2011) 757. 
11 International Law Commission, ‘Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with 
Commentaries’ [1966] 2 United Nations YB of the Intl L Commission 187, 213–
14. 
12 Milanovic (n 1) 10. The presumption in favour of the inclusion of overseas 
territories within the scope of application of treaties is the reason for the 
inclusion of ‘colonial clauses’ in many instruments, including some human rights 
treaties, such as the ECHR (art 56). Colonial clauses reverse the presumption 
as to the inclusion of a State’s overseas territories within the scope of 
application of treaties to which a State is party. On the complexities associated 
with such clauses, see Karagiannis (n 10) 740–45. 
13 Milanovic (n 1) 10. 
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jurisdiction’.14 In contrast to the ECHR and ACHR, the applicability of the 
ICCPR is therefore defined with reference to ‘territory’, as well as ‘jurisdiction’. 
However, the meaning of the operative phrase ‘within its territory and subject to 
its jurisdiction’ is controversial, the argument ultimately concerning the question 
whether it is to be construed disjunctively or conjunctively. The former 
interpretation reflects the position of the Human Rights Committee (HRC), 
according to which ‘States Parties are required by Article 2, paragraph 1, to 
respect and to ensure the Covenant rights to all persons who may be within 
their territory and to all persons subject to their jurisdiction.’15 Similarly, in its 
Wall Advisory Opinion, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) acknowledged 
the two possible interpretations,16 but concluded that ‘the [ICCPR] is applicable 
in respect of acts done by a State in the exercise of its jurisdiction outside its 
own territory.’ 17  This position was subsequently reaffirmed in the Armed 
Activities case, quoting the earlier decision verbatim.18 
There is, therefore, strong support for the proposition that the ICCPR applies to 
those subject to a State’s jurisdiction, even where they are outside that State’s 
territory. However, despite the stated position of the HRC, and its affirmation 
twice by the ICJ, there are still States that argue for a conjunctive reading of 
Article 2(1) ICCPR. Most prominent among these is the United States,19 which 
in its combined Second and Third Reports to the HRC, stated its view that 
obligations under the ICCPR ‘apply only within the territory of the State Party.’20 
It maintained this position in its Fourth Report, the most recent, although it did 
                                            
14 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Ratification Instrument of 
the United States of America (deposited 8 June 1992, with effect from 8 
September 1992) 1676 UNTS 543 (ICCPR) art 2(1). 
15 UN Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment No 31’ (26 May 2004) UN 
Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 13 (HRC General Comment 31), para 10. 
16 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall (Advisory Opinion) [2004] 
ICJ Rep 136 [108]. 
17 Ibid [111]. 
18 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the 
Congo v Uganda) (Merits) [2005] ICJ Rep 168 [216]. 
19  Beth Van Schaack, ‘The United States' Position on the Extraterritorial 
Application of Human Rights Obligations: Now is the Time for Change’ (2014) 
90 Intl L Studies 20, 53–61.  
20 UN Human Rights Committee, ‘Consideration of Reports Submitted by States 
Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant, Third Periodic Reports of States 
Parties Due in 2003: United States of America’ (28 November 2005) UN Doc 
CCPR/C/USA/3 (Consideration of US Third Periodic Report), 109. 
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state that it was ‘aware of the jurisprudence of the [ICJ]…as well as positions 
taken by other States Parties.’21 A similar view is also held by Israel, for which 
the issue has been of particular significance in relation to the occupied 
territories.22 Israel’s position, ‘in line with basic principles of treaty interpretation 
[is] that the Convention, which is territorially bound, does not apply, nor was it 
intended to apply, to areas beyond a state’s national territory.’23 
The position of the US is particularly deserving of analysis, notwithstanding the 
weight of institutional and judicial opinion against it, not only because of the 
extent of the United States’ extraterritorial military activity, including MSOs, but 
also due to the detail in which it has set out its argument. Its position, as 
articulated in its combined Second and Third Reports, is that the language of 
Article 2(1) is sufficiently clear—applying the ICCPR to individuals who are both 
within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction—not to require recourse to other 
tools of treaty interpretation.24 However, the United States considers that if 
reference were to be made to the travaux préparatoires then this would also 
support its position.25 In particular, the United States makes the point that the 
addition of the language ‘within its territory and’ was made at the insistence of 
the United States, with the clear intention that it would serve as an additional 
requirement over and above the requirement that a person be within a State’s 
jurisdiction. In particular, it asserts that the choice of the conjunction ‘and’ was 
                                            
21 UN Human Rights Committee, ‘Consideration of Reports Submitted by States 
Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant, Fourth Periodic Report: United States 
of America’ (22 May 2012) UN Doc CCPR/C/USA/4, para 505. The extent to 
which the contrary view is acknowledged in some quarters within the United 
States is illustrated by the leaked 2004 memorandum from Harold Koh, then 
U.S. State Department Legal Advisor, conveying his opinion that the ICCPR 
has, in some circumstances, extraterritorial effect. Harold Hongju Koh, 
‘Memorandum Opinion on the Geographic Scope of the Convention Against 
Torture’ (21 January 2013). For discussion, see Milanovic M, ‘Harold Koh’s 
Legal Opinions on the US Position on the Extraterritorial Application of Human 
Rights Treaties’ (EJIL Talk!, 7 March 2014) <https://www.ejiltalk.org/harold-
kohs-legal-opinions-on-the-us-position-on-the-extraterritorial-application-of-
human-rights-treaties/#more-10495> accessed 7 July 2018. 
22 Van Schaack (n 19) 23 fn 9. 
23 UN Human Rights Committee, ‘Consideration of Reports Submitted by States 
Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant Pursuant to the Optional Reporting 
Procedure, Fourth Periodic Reports of States Parties Due in 2013: Israel’ (14 
October 2013) UN Doc CCPR/C/ISR/4 para 48. 
24 Consideration of US Third Periodic Report (n 20) 109. 
25 ibid 109–11. 
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deliberate and the alternative word ‘or’, which would have unambiguously 
supported a disjunctive interpretation, was rejected during negotiations. 
The position of the United States is arguably too simplistic in a number of 
respects.26 First, it is incorrect in its assertion that the language in Article 2(1) is 
necessarily unambiguous. While the conjunctive construction argued for by the 
United States probably reflects a more natural reading, it does not do undue 
violence to the language to construe it disjunctively.27 Indeed, were Article 2(1) 
to be truly unambiguous, there would have been no need for the United States 
to further explain its meaning, which it has done by rephrasing the provision as 
‘both within the territory of a State Party and subject to that State Party’s 
sovereign authority.’28  
Second, the United States’ position fails to reflect the requirement that terms be 
given their ordinary meaning ‘in their context and in the light of [the treaty’s] 
object and purpose.’29 It is difficult to reconcile the object and purpose of the 
ICCPR, reflected in the references in its preamble to the promotion of ‘universal 
respect for, and observance of, human rights and freedoms’ and the ‘inherent 
dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human 
family’, with a reading of Article 2(1) that would permit a State party to treat 
individuals subject to its jurisdiction overseas in a way that would be prohibited 
in its own territory.30 Arguably, therefore, the interpretation that accords best 
with the ICCPR’s object and purpose is the disjunctive one. At the very least, 
the dissonance between a conjunctive construction and the apparent object and 
purpose is arguably sufficient at least to justify reference to supplementary 
means of interpretation, including the travaux préparatoires.31 
                                            
26 Da Costa (n 1) 69–72. 
27 Milanovic notes that the United States has elsewhere adopted a disjunctive 
reading of a similarly ambiguous phrase. Milanovic (n 1) 223. 
28 Consideration of US Third Periodic Report (n 20) 109. Of course, the United 
States might argue that its gloss merely emphasises the claimed meaning. 
29 1969 Vienna Convention (n 9) art 31(1). This, together with the explanation 
provided in the remainder of art 31, is the ‘general rule of interpretation’. 
30 Milanovic (n 1) 223. This was an argument adopted by the ICJ in its Wall 
Advisory Opinion. Wall (Advisory Opinion) (n 16) [109]. 
31 According to art 32 of the 1969 Vienna Convention, ‘Recourse may be had to 
supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the 
treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the mean 
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Third, the travaux préparatoires are, however, at best, inconclusive. Having 
considered the records in detail, Da Costa notes that the long and complex 
negotiations relating to Article 2(1) do not lend themselves to a simple 
conclusion.32 While it is correct that the insertion of the words ‘within its territory’ 
was originally intended by the United States to act as an additional requirement, 
over and above the exercise of jurisdiction, it seems that this was done to avoid 
situations where the ICCPR might create obligations that States would be 
unable to fulfil. In particular, the United States was concerned about situations 
in which States lacked legislative competence with respect to individuals over 
whom it might, in fact, exercise a degree of jurisdiction, for example with respect 
to some instances of military occupation, and where the nationals of a State are 
situated in the territory of another.33 This is different from the question whether 
the additional words should be construed so as not to prohibit States acting 
abroad in a manner contrary to the ICCPR. That particular consequence does 
not necessarily follow and, indeed, does not appear to have been considered.34 
Finally, 35  it has been argued that the position of the United States is 
undermined by its failure to make clear its position with respect to Article 2(1), 
                                                                                                                                
resulting from the [general rule of interpretation], or to determine the meaning 
when the interpretation according to [the general rule of interpretation]: (a) 
Leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or (b) Leads to a result which is 
manifestly absurd or unreasonable.’ 1969 Vienna Convention (n 9) art 32. 
32 Da Costa (n 1) 20–41. 
33 ibid 27. 
34 Ibid 71. 
35 Another, less convincing argument has been advanced by da Costa. She 
argues that a conjunctive interpretation would fall foul of the ‘principle of 
effectiveness’, according to which words within treaties should be interpreted so 
as to have effect. If a person is within the territory of a State then, so it is 
argued, they must be within its jurisdiction, in which case the reference to 
‘jurisdiction’ adds nothing and therefore has no effect. However, a similar 
criticism might be levelled at a disjunctive reading: if a person within a State’s 
territory is necessarily subject to its jurisdiction, then the reference to territory as 
an additional basis for application arguably adds nothing. ibid 70–71. Milanovic 
counters this latter argument by suggesting that the disjunctive reading means 
that a State may be required to meet certain ICCPR obligations even where it 
no longer exercises effective control over its own territory; i.e. the ICCPR 
applies to territory in which a State no longer has jurisdiction. Milanovic (n 1) 
226. Understood this way, the disjunctive reading does not fall foul of the 
principle of effectiveness. However, a related explanation might be given for the 
conjunctive interpretation: the reference to both territory and jurisdiction could 
be argued to exclude individuals who are within the territory of a State but 
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by means of an understanding, on its ratification of the ICCPR in 1992.36 By this 
time, although the ICJ was yet to pronounce on the issue, the HRC had already 
applied the Convention extraterritorially in its comments, something that should 
have been apparent to the United States. While there was no obligation on the 
United States to state its interpretation—particularly if it considered that the 
language of the treaty to have been sufficiently clear—it is surprising that such 
an important point of disagreement with the practice of the relevant treaty body 
was not made clear. This is particularly so given the detail and extent of the 
reservations and declarations that the United States did make to the ICCPR.37 
Ultimately, the arguments for a disjunctive interpretation of Article 2(1) have to 
be weighed against what is undeniably the more natural, conjunctive, reading of 
the text itself. There is considerable force to the assertion that the disjunctive 
reading is the more consistent with the apparent object and purpose of the 
ICCPR, and the travaux préparatoires are insufficiently clear to indicate 
decisively otherwise. However, the most important point relates not to the merits 
of a particular approach to treaty interpretation, but rather to the fact that the 
disjunctive reading has the unambiguous endorsement of the HRC and, more 
importantly, the ICJ. Even if States continue to disagree with the conclusions of 
the HRC and ICJ, their conduct will still fall to be judged by those institutions 
according to their settled views—and, given the influence of their positions, by 
other bodies too—that is, according to the disjunctive reading. Therefore, while 
noting the contrary position of some States, it makes sense to proceed on the 
basis that the disjunctive reading is to be preferred. 
According to the disjunctive reading of the ICCPR, its spatial scope of 
application has both a clear territorial component and a clear extraterritorial 
                                                                                                                                
nevertheless fall outside its jurisdiction due to, for example, a loss of effective 
control. In sum, it is submitted that the principle of effectiveness does little to 
advance the argument either way. 
36 Van Schaack (n 19) 30–31. The same argument can be made with respect to 
Israel, which ratified the ICCPR only one year earlier, in 1991, again without 
stating its understanding as to the meaning of art 2(1). International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, Ratification Instrument of Israel (deposited 2 
October 1991, with effect from 3 January 1992) 1651 UNTS 566. 
37 The United States stated five reservations, five understandings and four 
declarations on ratification of the ICCPR. International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, Ratification Instrument of the United States of America 
(deposited 8 June 1992, with effect from 8 September 1992) 1676 UNTS 543. 
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component. The ICCPR applies both in the territory of a State party and to 
persons subject to its jurisdiction. However, both limbs require further 
elaboration. Chapter 2 considered the first of these: what amounts to the 
territory of a State, particularly in the maritime domain? This chapter proceeds 
to address the second: while the ICCPR might be capable of extraterritorial 
effect, what does it means to be subject to a State’s jurisdiction? It is on this 
question that the extraterritorial scope of application of the ICCPR depends, 
mirroring the criteria for applicability, generally, under the ECHR and ACHR.  
3.2.1.3. ACHPR 
The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR),38 in contrast to 
the ICCPR, ECHR and ACHR, is an example of a human rights treaty 
containing no express applicability clause. As set out above, Article 29 VCLT 
creates a presumption that treaties apply to the whole of the territory of States 
parties, but says nothing about any possible extraterritorial effect. It therefore 
falls to other rules of treaty interpretation to determine whether the ACHPR 
applies, either in whole or part, outside the territory of States Parties. 
Similar arguments can be made with respect to the object and purpose of the 
ACHPR as are made to argue for a disjunctive reading of Article 2(1) ICCPR.39 
According to the preamble of the ACHPR, States parties are ‘[f]irmly convinced 
of their duty to promote and protect human and peoples’ rights and freedoms’. If 
the purpose of the treaty is the promotion and protection of human rights—
framed without geographical limit—then it would surely undermine that purpose 
if adherence to the standards set out in the ACHPR were to be limited in all 
cases only to the territory of States Parties. Plainly, the extent to which a State 
may promote and protect human rights overseas is limited by its competence to 
act outside its borders. However, as is argued in relation to the ICCPR, it would 
run counter to the purpose of the treaty if a State Party were not to be 
prohibited from acting contrary to human rights standards abroad, whilst 
agreeing to a prohibition of precisely the same conduct in its own territory.40 
                                            
38 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (adopted 27 June 1981, 
entered into force 21 October 1986) (1982) 21 ILM 58 (ACHPR). 
39 See above s 3.2.1.2. 
40 See above s.3.2.1.2. 
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The text of the ACHPR is also arguably incompatible with a strictly territorial 
application, given that some provisions do have, by implication, an 
extraterritorial ‘dimension’.41 For example, Article 12(2) contains a right for 
individuals to return to their country of origin. Clearly, from the perspective of 
the country of origin, such a right must, by definition, be fulfilled with respect to 
an individual outside its territory (even if that person is at the border). There is 
also an extraterritorial dimension to Article 23, which provides for ‘the right to 
national and international peace and security’, something which cannot 
plausibly be described as a solely domestic matter. While these are tightly 
constrained situations from which it is difficult to draw broad conclusions, they 
are at least inconsistent with a solely territorial scope of application for the 
ACHPR as a whole. 
There has been only very limited practice on the part of the institutions 
supervising the ACHPR—the African Commission and African Court—in 
addressing its extraterritorial application. However, what limited practice there is 
does appear to recognise some degree of extraterritorial effect.42 Most notably, 
in the case of Democratic Republic of Congo v Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda,43 
neither the Commission nor the respondent States Parties challenged the 
assertion that the ACHPR could be engaged with respect to the treatment by 
several States Parties of the inhabitants of DRC in the course of their 
occupation of the latter State. As well as being an instance of extraterritorial 
application, this would also fit the test of obligations arising as a result of State 
Parties exercising ‘effective control’ over areas outside their own territory,44 a 
test familiar from the practice relating to the ECHR.45 
                                            
41 Takele Soboka Bulto, ‘Patching the “Legal Black Hole”: the Extraterritorial 
Reach of States’ Human Rights Duties in the African Human Rights System’ 
(2011) 27 South African J on Human Rights 249, 259–60. 
42  ibid 260–63; Viljoen F, ‘Communications under the African Charter: 
Procedure and Admissibility’ in Malcolm Evans and Rachel Murray (eds), The 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (2nd edn, CUP 2008) 107–08. 
43 African Union, Executive Council, ‘Twentieth Activity Report of the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (25–29 June 2006) EX.CL/279 
(IX) 111. 
44 Sarah Joseph and Adam Fletcher, ‘Scope of Application’ in Daniel Moeckli, 
Sangeeta Shah and Sandesh Sivakumaran (eds), International Human Rights 
Law (2nd edn, OUP 2014), 132. 
45 See below s 3.2.2. 
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The African Commission has also referred to the extraterritorial applicability of 
the ACHPR in soft law documents. In its Principles and Guidelines on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights while Countering Terrorism in Africa, citing the decision in 
Democratic Republic of Congo v Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda, it states that 
‘States are bound by their human rights obligations while conducting 
counterterrorism operations abroad, including in times of armed conflict during 
which times international humanitarian law is also applicable.’46 However, while 
supporting the broad proposition that the ACHPR is capable of extraterritorial 
application, neither this statement, nor the case on which it relies, give any 
indication as to the relevant criteria according to which extraterritorial 
applicability is to be determined. 
The extraterritorial applicability of the ACHPR has also been referred to, albeit 
in passing and without detailed analysis, by the ICJ. In the Armed Activities 
case, based on many of the same facts as Democratic Republic of Congo v 
Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda, the Court repeated its earlier conclusion from 
the Wall case that the ICCPR is capable of extraterritorial application. 47 
However, the Court interpreted that earlier conclusion as meaning ‘that 
international human rights instruments are applicable “in respect of acts done 
by a State in the exercise of its jurisdiction outside its own territory”, particularly 
in occupied territories’,48 notwithstanding that, in Wall, the Court was dealing 
specifically with the meaning of the applicability clauses of the ICCPR and 
Convention on the Rights of the Child. Nevertheless, the Court went on to list 
the ACHPR as being applicable on that basis, without noting, however, its lack 
of a similar applicability clause.49 In so doing, the Court arguably read in to the 
ACHPR criteria for applicability based, as for the ICCPR, on the exercise of 
jurisdiction.50 While the Court can be criticised for the quality of its reasoning, 
                                            
46  African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, ‘Principles and 
Guidelines on Human and Peoples’ Rights while Countering Terrorism in Africa’ 
(adopted during the 56th Ordinary Session in Bunjul, Gambia, 21 April–7 May 
2015) 15. 
47 Armed Activities (n 18) [216]. 
48 ibid [216] (emphasis added). 
49 ibid [217]. 
50  Ralph Wilde, ‘Human Rights beyond Borders at the World Court: The 
Significance of the International Court of Justice’s Jurisprudence on the 
Extraterritorial Application of International Human Rights Law Treaties’ (2013) 
12 Chinese J Intl L 639, 666–67. 
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the conclusion is arguably consistent with the object and purpose of the 
ACHPR, as discussed above. 
Although the arguments for the extraterritorial application of the ACHPR are not 
yet strong enough to reach a definitive conclusion, the better position is that its 
application is not restricted only to the territory of States parties. However, even 
accepting this broad statement of principle, the limits of the ACHPR’s 
extraterritorial application remain untested. In particular, it remains to be 
confirmed whether the extraterritorial application of the ACHPR will track, as 
suggested by the ICJ in the Armed Activities case, that of other human rights 
treaties, i.e. that it will apply extraterritorially to individuals subject to a State’s 
jurisdiction. It would certainly be an unjustified leap to assume that it will 
inevitably do so; there is no strict requirement for the African system to develop 
consistently with any of the other systems that constitute international human 
rights legal regimes. However, it is submitted that reference to other systems 
could lead to the development of broadly consistent practice and that the 
decisions within other systems are likely to provide helpful indicators of how 
practice concerning the ACHPR is likely to develop. 
3.2.1.4. CAT 
The applicability of different provisions of the Convention Against Torture (CAT) 
varies according to the terms of each. The obligation under Article 5 to ‘take 
such measures as are necessary to establish its jurisdiction’ over offences of 
torture is owed in a number of enumerated situations where the offender may 
clearly be outside the territory of the State party, namely ‘on board a ship or 
aircraft registered in that State; …when the alleged offender is a national of that 
State; [and] when the victim is a national of that State if that State considers it 
appropriate.’ 51  While the assertion of jurisdiction on the basis of victim 
nationality is voluntary, the State has no choice with respect to an offence on a 
registered aircraft or vessel, or with respect to offenders of its own nationality. 
These therefore represent two very clear, and potentially wide-reaching, 
situations in which a State will owe obligations in connection with extraterritorial 
conduct. 
                                            
51 CAT (n 4) art 5(1). 
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Article 5 also applies, as do most other CAT obligations, including the key 
obligations to prevent torture and other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment, ‘in any territory under [a State’s] jurisdiction’.52 As 
noted above, this formulation clearly gives rise to the territorial applicability of 
the provisions concerned; however, the extent to which it can apply outside a 
State’s own territory remains controversial. Notably, the phrase ‘in any territory 
under its jurisdiction’ does not lend itself so easily, if at all, to a disjunctive 
reading equivalent to that given by the HRC to Article 2(1) ICCPR. 
Nevertheless, the Committee Against Torture has clearly stated its 
understanding that the relevant provisions of the CAT are capable of 
extraterritorial application, both to overseas territory under the effective control 
of a State party and to individuals under the State’s effective control.53 
The Committee’s position arguably reflects an interpretation that best reflects 
the object and purpose of the treaty in question. However, the argument is 
weaker than with respect to the ICCPR. Although ‘territory under its jurisdiction’ 
can readily be understood to include overseas territory under a State’s effective 
control,54 it is difficult to avoid the conclusion, reflecting the plain meaning of the 
text, that there must be some exercise of territorial jurisdiction—not merely 
personal. Even if reference is to be made to the travaux preparatoires then, as 
for the ICCPR, the most that can be said about them is that they are 
inconclusive.55 Neither does subsequent State practice provide clear support for 
an expansive reading. Indeed, it is in the context of US and UK objections that 
                                            
52 ibid arts 2(1), 11, 12, 13, 16. 
53 UN Committee Against Torture, ‘General Comment No 2’ (24 January 2008) 
UN Doc CAT/C/GC/2 (CAT General Comment 2) para 16. 
54 This is similar to the position of the United States, which considers this 
formulation to include areas outside its territory, but which it ‘controls as a 
government authority’. UN Committee Against Torture, ‘Consideration of 
Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 19 of the Convention, 
Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee Against Torture: United 
States of America’ (19 December 2014) UN Doc CAT/C/USA/CO/3–5 para 10 
(‘The Committee notes that the State party has reviewed its position concerning 
the extraterritorial application of the Convention and stated that it applies to 
“certain areas beyond” its sovereign territory, and more specifically to “all places 
that the State party controls as a governmental authority”, noting that it currently 
exercises such control at “the United States Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, 
Cuba, and over all proceedings conducted there, and with respect to U.S.-
registered ships and aircraft”.’). 
55 Da Costa (n 1) 296. 
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the Committee Against Torture has expressed most clearly its broad 
interpretation.56 Finally, unlike the position adopted by the HRC with respect to 
the ICCPR, the Committee Against Torture’s expansive interpretation of the 
CAT has not yet featured in the jurisprudence of the ICJ. As a result, while the 
Committee Against Torture’s position is undeniably influential, it must be treated 
with a significant degree of caution. 
Another different approach within CAT is taken in Article 3, which prohibits the 
expulsion, return or extradition of individuals ‘to another State where there are 
substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected 
to torture.’57 This, like the whole of the ACHPR, is not subject to any express 
provision as to applicability, meaning that, as discussed above, there is a 
presumption that it applies within the territories of States parties, but that its 
extraterritorial applicability must be determined according to the normal rules of 
treaty interpretation. As for other provisions of CAT, the Committee Against 
Torture has adopted a broad interpretation. In its Concluding Observations to 
the United States’ second periodic report, the Committee was ‘concerned that 
the State party considers that the non-refoulement obligation, under Article 3 of 
the Convention, does not extend to a person detained outside its territory.’58 It 
stated, on the contrary, that ‘[t]he State party should apply the non-refoulement 
guarantee to all detainees in its custody…’,59 implying that Article 3 has no 
geographical limit in its application.60 
The Committee’s interpretation is, again, more consistent with the object and 
purpose of CAT as an instrument intended to reduce the incidence of torture.61 
A strictly territorial application would arguably undermine the prohibition on 
                                            
56 Da Costa (n 1) 277, 289. 
57 CAT (n 4) art 3(1). For discussion of non-refoulement see below ch 7. 
58 UN Committee Against Torture, ‘Consideration of Reports Submitted by 
States Parties Under Article 19 of the Convention, Conclusions and 
Recommendations of the Committee Against Torture: United States of America’ 
(25 July 2006) UN Doc CAT/C/USA/CO/2 para 15. 
59 ibid. 
60 See, for discussion, Da Costa (n 1) 297–98. 
61 Furthermore, considering the traveaux, Da Costa notes that ‘it can be said 
that although drafters did not consider the precise possibility of exposing 
individuals to torture due to the transfer outside the territory of a State party, 
from the aim of the Convention which was referred to by drafters throughout 
discussions, it is clear that the prevention of torture was the main goal to be 
pursued by States parties.’ Da Costa (n 1) 273. 
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refoulement by allowing a State to circumvent it by holding detainees outside of 
its territory, or even by transferring individuals from its territory to such a facility, 
before onward transfer to a State to which refoulement would otherwise be 
prohibited.62 Furthermore, although analysis of the traveaux is inconclusive,63 it 
is critical to note that the Committee’s position is not undermined, as it is with 
respect to the other provisions of CAT discussed above, by express language 
with which it is hard to reconcile with broad extraterritorial applicability. 
Therefore, although the continued reluctance of some States to accept a broad 
extraterritorial applicability of CAT must be taken into consideration, particularly 
with respect to the practical protection that an extraterritorial detainee of such 
States might enjoy, the Committee’s position is very persuasive. 
In conclusion, the CAT presents a special case amongst the treaties under 
consideration. The Article 5 obligation is plainly capable of extraterritorial effect 
in certain, clearly prescribed, circumstances. In addition, Article 5, as well as 
several other obligations applicable in a ‘territory under [a State’s] jurisdiction’, 
will apply extraterritorially in an area over which a State exercises effective 
control. Rather less convincing, however, is the position adopted by the 
Committee Against Torture that these provisions will also apply extraterritorially 
where a State exercises jurisdiction over individuals. Finally, while the 
Committee’s position that the non-refoulement provision contained in Article 3 
has no geographical limitation is also controversial, its argument is more 
persuasive and reflects, it is submitted, the better view of the law. 
3.2.2. The importance and meaning of ‘jurisdiction’ as a concept in 
regulating extraterritorial application 
It is clear that the concept of ‘jurisdiction’ is a key threshold issue with respect to 
the extraterritorial application of human rights treaties.64 For the ECHR and 
ACHR, application of each instrument, including extraterritorial application, is 
governed, respectively, by what it means to be within or subject to a State 
                                            
62 A point made by Nowak and MacArthur. Manfred Nowak and Elizabeth 
McArthur, The United Nations Convention Against Torture: A Commentary 
(OUP 2008) para 181. 
63 Da Costa (n 1) 267–270. 
64 In Al-Skeini, for example, the Grand Chamber described jurisdiction as a 
‘threshold criterion’. Al-Skeini, ECtHR (n 8) [130]. 
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Party’s jurisdiction. Likewise, once it is accepted that the ICCPR is capable of 
extraterritorial application, the determination whether that is, in fact, the case, 
depends again on what it means to be subject to a State party’s jurisdiction. 
The same is partially true of the CAT, at least with respect to those provisions of 
the CAT limited to application in territory under a State Party’s jurisdiction.65 
While the ACHPR lacks any direct reference to jurisdiction, it is plausible, as 
explained above, that future practice concerning its extraterritorial application 
will develop along broadly the same lines in this regard as for other similar 
instruments. 
Clearly, therefore, understanding the meaning of ‘jurisdiction’ in this context is 
central to understanding the extraterritorial applicability of IHRL treaties. 
Notably, it is a term that carries meaning in wider international law, referring to 
the authority of a State to regulate the activities of individuals and other legal 
persons through its domestic law.66 That concept can be further broken down 
into different types of regulation: prescriptive jurisdiction, being the authority to 
legislate for the conduct of individuals; enforcement jurisdiction, being the 
authority to enforce domestic law with respect to individuals; and adjudicatory 
jurisdiction, being the authority to settle legal disputes relating to an individual’s 
conduct. A significant—and sometimes controversial—body of international law 
deals with the question of where States enjoy such jurisdiction. While it is 
primarily exercised territorially, there are situations in which jurisdiction of each 
type may be exercised extraterritorially, usually in fairly narrowly defined 
circumstances.67 
The obvious question therefore arises as to whether the scope of application of 
human rights treaties can be determined by reference to the principle of 
jurisdiction under general international law.68  Courts have often made this 
assumption,69 particularly in supporting the assertion that the application of 
                                            
65 Though, as cautioned above, considerable doubt must remain as to the 
potential extraterritorial application of key CAT provisions. See above s 3.2.1.4 
66 Malcolm N Shaw, International Law (7th edn, CUP 2014) 469–505. 
67 ibid. 
68 Milanovic addresses this question at some length, ultimately concluding that 
jurisdiction, for the purposes of determining the scope of application of human 
rights treaties, should be equated to ‘power’, irrespective of the lawfulness or 
unlawfulness of a State’s exercise of such power. Milanovic (n 1) 21–41. 
69 ibid 21–23. 
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human rights treaties is primarily territorial. However, when this approach is 
adopted in relation to extraterritorial application, it yields outcomes that run 
counter to the objects and purposes of the treaties concerned. Restricting the 
application of human rights treaties only to such circumstances where a State 
enjoys jurisdiction lawfully to exercise authority over individuals would mean 
that the State would not be bound to adhere to human rights standards when it 
unlawfully exercises authority, to whatever extent it does so.70 Furthermore, 
many things that a State might do in contravention of substantive human rights 
norms—extrajudicial killing, for example—cannot sensibly be described as 
being exercised on account of a State’s jurisdiction, according to the meaning 
given it by general international law, whether such acts are committed on the 
territory of the State concerned or elsewhere.71 
In light of these issues, to avoid the extraterritorial application of human rights 
treaties to only an arbitrarily narrow range of situations, it would seem that 
jurisdiction carries a special meaning in the context of human rights treaties, 
extending beyond, though in some cases encompassing, traditional notions of 
jurisdiction. Such meaning must include both the lawful and unlawful exercise of 
authority, as well as other situations where a State exercises a certain degree of 
control over individuals, irrespective of any legal basis for it do so. As will be 
shown, this is now the common approach of Courts and other bodies. 
As set out above, the position of the HRC, in line with that of the ICJ, is that the 
ICCPR applies both to those within the territory of a State Party and to those 
subject to its jurisdiction.72 General Comment 31 goes on to explain this to 
mean that ‘a State party must respect and ensure the rights laid down in the 
Covenant to anyone within the power or effective control of that State Party, 
even if not situated within the territory of the State Party.’73 This applies not just 
to domestic acts affecting those abroad, but also ‘to those within the power or 
effective control of the forces of a State Party acting outside its territory, 
regardless of the circumstances in which such power or effective control was 
                                            
70 ibid 26–27. 
71 ibid 30. 
72 HRC General Comment 31 (n 15) para 10. 
73 ibid. 
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obtained’.74 Put another way, a State might exercise control over an individual 
absent a lawful basis for doing so. 
Although the expansive interpretation given by the Committee Against Torture 
to the phrase ‘territory under its jurisdiction’ is controversial,75 it is nevertheless 
informative to examine the meaning given by the Committee to the concept of 
jurisdiction. It has stated that territory under the jurisdiction of a State party  
includes all areas where the State party exercises, directly or indirectly, in 
whole or in part, de jure or de facto effective control, in accordance with 
international law. The reference to “any territory” … refers to prohibited 
acts committed not only on board a ship or aircraft registered by a State 
party, but also during military occupation or peacekeeping operations and 
in such places as embassies, military bases, detention facilities, or other 
areas over which a State exercises factual or effective control. … The 
Committee considers that the scope of “territory” … must also include 
situations where a State party exercises, directly or indirectly, de facto or 
de jure control over persons in detention.76 
The Committee appears to recognise the potential for the jurisdictional link to 
arise from either a spatial model, requiring effective control over an area, 
broadly defined as encompassing flagged ships and aircraft, or a personal 
model, requiring effective control over individuals by the authorities of the State 
in question.77 As explained above, the relevance of the latter of these concepts 
to the CAT remains questionable in light of the express wording of the treaty 
itself.78 However, it is notable that the Committee understands effective control 
over territory to mean de facto control, rather than requiring any sort of basis in 
law. Furthermore, notwithstanding its questionable relevance to the CAT, the 
                                            
74 ibid. 
75 See above s 3.2.1.4. 
76 CAT General Comment 2 (n 53) para 16. General Comment 2 specifically 
concerns art 2; however, the Committee has subsequently emphasised that this 
conception of jurisdiction applies throughout CAT. UN Committee Against 
Torture, ‘Decision of the Committee Against Torture under Article 22 of the 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
of Punishment Concerning Communication No 323/2007’ (Communication 
submitted by JHA on behalf of PK et al, concerning Spain) (21 November 2008) 
UN Doc CAT/C/41/D/323/2007 (JHA v Spain) para 8.2. Furthermore, although 
the language of General Comment 2 focuses on the meaning of the term 
‘territory’, the Committee has subsequently equated this with the more general 
meaning of ‘jurisdiction’. ibid para 8.2. 
77 Da Costa (n 1) 293–99. 
78 See above s 3.2.1.4. 
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Committee’s reference to a personal model of jurisdiction is consistent with the 
practice of other Courts and treaty bodies, discussed below. 
Turning to the ECtHR, it has generated copious jurisprudence in dealing with 
the extraterritorial application of the ECHR, largely as a result of States parties’ 
military activities overseas.79 However, while the depth and breadth of the 
practice relating to the extraterritorial application of the ECHR is the most 
developed of the instruments under consideration, the ECtHR has not dealt with 
the issue consistently, giving rise to a confusing—and arguably confused—
jurisprudence. Although some degree of clarity has now provided by the 
decision in Al-Skeini,80 in which the Grand Chamber took the opportunity to 
restate the law on point, potential issues and inconsistencies remain. 
Perhaps most notorious is the case of Banković, 81  which concerned the 
bombing by NATO forces of a radio station in Belgrade during the conflict in 
Kosovo in 1999.82 In determining whether individuals killed or injured by the 
bombing were within the jurisdiction of the States involved, the Court proceeded 
from the basis that ‘the jurisdictional competence of a State is primarily 
territorial’, 83  reaching the view ‘that Article 1 of the Convention must be 
considered to reflect this ordinary and essentially territorial notion of jurisdiction, 
other bases of jurisdiction being exceptional and requiring special justification in 
the particular circumstances of each case’.84 Then, having purported to have 
examined the exceptional circumstances in which the Court had previously 
recognised the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction, the Court concluded that: 
In sum, the case-law of the Court demonstrates that its recognition of the 
exercise of extra-territorial jurisdiction by a Contracting State is 
exceptional: it has done so when the respondent State, through the 
effective control of the relevant territory and its inhabitants abroad as a 
consequence of military occupation or through the consent, invitation or 
acquiescence of the Government of that territory, exercises all or some of 
the public powers normally to be exercised by that Government. 
                                            
79 For example, in relation to Turkey’s military activities in Cyprus and in relation 
to the UK’s involvement in the invasion and occupation of Iraq. 
80 Al-Skeini, ECtHR (n 8). 
81 Banković and Others v Belgium and Others ECHR 2001–XII 333. 
82 The background and facts are recounted at ibid [6]–[11]. 
83 ibid [59]. 
84 ibid [61]. 
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… 
Additionally, the Court notes that other recognised instances of the extra-
territorial exercise of jurisdiction by a State include cases involving the 
activities of its diplomatic or consular agents abroad and on board craft 
and vessels registered in, or flying the flag of, that State. In these specific 
situations, customary international law and treaty provisions have 
recognised the extra-territorial exercise of jurisdiction by the relevant 
State.85 
The Court thus identified an essentially spatial notion of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction, requiring effective control over territory, except in the case a few 
specific situations of de jure jurisdiction. The Court rejected what it referred to 
as ‘a “cause-and-effect” notion of jurisdiction’ and thus took the position that the 
obligations of a State cannot be ‘divided and tailored in accordance with the 
particular circumstances of the extra-territorial act in question’;86 essentially, a 
State must therefore either exercise sufficient control over an area to be able to 
fulfil all its obligations under the ECHR, as it is required to under its own 
territory, or the ECHR does not apply at all. Over and above this already-narrow 
conception of jurisdiction, the Court introduced a further restriction according to 
which the applicability of the ECHR, as a regional instrument, was to be limited 
to the ‘legal space’, or ‘espace juridique’, of the States parties.87 
The Banković decision was widely criticized,88 not least because it is arguably 
difficult to reconcile with the Court’s own jurisprudence. While the Court relied 
upon a series of earlier decisions emphasising the importance of effective 
control over territory,89  it apparently discounted a second line of authority 
according to which jurisdiction had been recognised according to a model 
based on the exercise of jurisdiction over individuals.90 Issa v Turkey concerned 
an allegation that Turkish soldiers had detained and killed civilians in Iraq, in 
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circumstances where Turkey did not exercise effective control over the relevant 
territory.91 Similarly, in Ocalan v Turkey, it was alleged that the applicant’s rights 
had been violated upon being transferred into the custody of Turkish agents in 
Nairobi.92 While the question of the extraterritorial applicability of the ECHR was 
not raised in either admissibility decision, and neither case had yet reached the 
Merits stage, the Court had proceeded on the basis that both claims were at 
least admissible, implying that the ECHR was at least capable of extraterritorial 
application outside of the narrow circumstances described in Banković. 
Furthermore, the narrow conception of jurisdiction adopted by the ECtHR in 
Banković arguably conflicts with the object and purpose of the ECHR. As stated 
in its preamble, the ECHR was intended to reflect ‘the first steps for the 
collective enforcement of certain of the rights stated in the Universal 
Declaration’, such rights being, by definition, universal. It is undeniably hard to 
reconcile such broad ambitions with an interpretation of Article 1 ECHR that 
permits States to act overseas in a manner that would be prohibited under the 
ECHR if acting within their own territories. Indeed, as Milanovic points out, this 
may create ‘a perverse incentive for states acting outside their boundaries.’93 
Perhaps recognising these issues, the ECtHR has subsequently broadened its 
understanding of what it means to be within the jurisdiction of a State party, 
albeit without expressly overruling the decision in Banković. When Issa v Turkey 
came to be decided at the Merits stage, the Court addressed the question of 
extraterritorial applicability, notwithstanding that it had not been raised by the 
Turkish government. Drawing upon earlier decisions of the European 
commission, IACHR, and HRC, the Court decided that, in addition to the 
situation where a State exercises effective control of an area outside its 
territory, it ‘might also be held accountable for violation of the Convention rights 
and freedoms of persons who are in the territory of another State but who are 
found to be under the former State’s authority and control through its agents 
operating—whether lawfully or unlawfully—in the latter State.’94 This, the Court, 
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argued arose from the principle ‘that Article 1 of the Convention cannot be 
interpreted so as to allow a State party to perpetrate violations of the 
Convention on the territory of another State, which it could not perpetrate on its 
own territory’.95 Similarly, when Ocalan v Turkey reached the merits stage, the 
Court noted that it was ‘common ground that, directly after being handed over to 
the Turkish officials by the Kenyan officials, the applicant was effectively under 
Turkish authority and therefore within the “jurisdiction” of that State…even 
though in this instance Turkey exercised its authority outside its territory.’96 
The clear tension between the Banković and the line of authority supporting a 
personal model of jurisdiction has been resolved to some extent by the decision 
in Al-Skeini. That case involved a number of claims arguing that the UK owed 
an obligation under Article 2 ECHR (the right to life) to conduct investigations 
into a number of deaths alleged to have been caused by UK service personnel 
during the UK’s occupation of Basra, Iraq, from 2003–04.97 The claim had 
already been considered by the UK House of Lords under domestic human 
rights legislation that implements the ECHR.98 The House of Lords had refused 
the claim on the grounds that the claimants were outside the UK’s jurisdiction 
for the purposes of Article 1 ECHR. This was because, applying the statement 
of the law in Banković, the House of Lords concluded that the UK did not 
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exercise effective control over Basra at the material time;99 and, in any case, 
Iraq is outside the ECHR’s espace juridique.100 
When the case came to be heard by the ECtHR, the Grand Chamber 
maintained the position set out in Banković that jurisdiction is primarily territorial 
and is exercised extraterritorially only in exceptional circumstances. It reiterated 
that such circumstances include ‘when, through the consent, invitation or 
acquiescence of the Government of [a foreign] territory, it exercises all or some 
of the public powers normally to be exercised by that Government’,101 and 
‘when, as a consequence of lawful or unlawful military action, a Contracting 
State exercises effective control of an area outside [its] national territory.’102 
However, the Grand Chamber also considered the line of authority relating to a 
personal model of jurisdiction, beyond the narrow set of circumstances 
recognised in Banković. As well as Issa and Ocalan, it also considered Al-
Saadoon and Mufdhi v UK, in which Iraqi nationals held in a UK detention 
facility in Iraq were held to be within the UK’s jurisdiction for the purposes of 
Article 1 ECHR,103 and Medvedyev and Others v France, in which Cambodian 
nationals on board a vessel in international waters were held to be within 
France’s jurisdiction on the basis of the control exercised by French agents over 
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the vessel. 104  While the latter two cases could arguably be explained on 
account of the control exercised over particular areas (i.e. the detention facility 
and ship respectively), the Grand Chamber concluded that ‘jurisdiction in [these] 
cases [did not arise] solely from the control exercised by the Contracting State 
over the buildings, aircraft or ship in which the individuals were held. What is 
decisive in such cases is the exercise of physical power and control over the 
person in question.’105 Hence the Court concluded that ‘whenever the State, 
through its agents, exercises control and authority over an individual, and thus 
jurisdiction, the State is under an obligation under Article 1 to secure to that 
individual the rights and freedoms under Section I of the Convention that are 
relevant to the situation of that individual.’ 106  Recognising that this final 
statement is particularly hard to reconcile with Banković, the Grand Chamber 
went on to state that, ‘In this sense, therefore, the Convention rights can be 
“divided and tailored”’.107 
Furthermore, while the Grand Chamber did not depart completely from the 
notion of the espace juridique, it interpreted the concept as meaning only that 
‘where the territory of one Convention State is occupied by the armed forces of 
another, the occupying State should in principle be held accountable under the 
Convention for breaches of human rights within the occupied territory’, in order 
to avoid a vacuum in accountability within the ECHR’s legal space. 108  It 
emphasised, contrary to the clear impression given in the Banković decision, 
that this ‘does not imply, a contrario, that jurisdiction under Article 1 of the 
Convention can never exist outside the territory covered by the Council of 
Europe Member States.’109 The Grand Chamber in Al-Skeini therefore not only 
recognised that both effective control over an area and effective control over an 
individual could give rise to the ECHR’s extraterritorial application, but also that 
the ECHR’s potential extraterritorial applicability is not confined to the combined 
territories of its States parties.  
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In its case law subsequent to Al-Skeini, the ECtHR has reinforced the authority 
of that judgment through the incorporation, verbatim, of the section dealing with 
extraterritorial application into later judgments.110 However, the Court has still 
not gone so far as actually to overrule the decision in Banković either explicitly 
or, arguably, implicitly. Indeed, its reference to Banković in support of its 
reasoning in Al-Skeini maintains the impression, at least, that Banković should 
still be considered good law. Consequently, it remains arguable that the model 
of personal jurisdiction set out in Al-Skeini should be interpreted so as to remain 
compatible with the decision on the facts in Banković. This, it seems, is what the 
Grand Chamber did in its application of the newly restated law to the facts of Al-
Skeini. In finding the ECHR to apply to the use of lethal force against Iraqi 
civilians by UK soldiers, the Grand Chamber did so with express reference to 
the exercise by the UK of ‘public powers’—specifically the UK’s responsibility for 
security—in the area and at the time in question.111 Indeed, in deciding that the 
‘jurisdictional link between the deceased and the United Kingdom’ had been 
established, the Grand Chamber made express reference to the fact that the 
soldiers had been engaged in ‘security operations’ related to the UK’s 
responsibility for security.112 
The reference to ‘public powers’ raises the question whether the use of force by 
the soldiers would, without this feature being present, have been sufficient to 
engage the UK’s obligations under the ECHR. If this were the case, then it 
would seem impossible to reconcile with the decision on the facts of Banković, 
hence, arguably, the imposition by the Court of the additional contextual 
requirement. Therefore, while it seems clear that the jurisdictional link will be 
established when a State agent exercises authority and control over an 
individual whom he or she detains, this being the case in each of the previous 
decisions relied upon by the Grand Chamber in reaching its decision in Al-
Skeini, the situation is less clear with respect to other uses of physical force. 
The question this raises—whether the use of force alone is sufficient to bring an 
individual within the jurisdiction of a State for the purposes of Article 1 ECHR—
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is important in determining the reach of the ECHR in the context of military 
operations, including MSOs. If it is sufficient, then any use of force by the 
military will engage human rights obligations. This is particularly significant in 
the conduct of armed conflict, where armed forces will often use force 
extraterritorially without any level of control over the territory in question, noting 
that application of human rights norms in these circumstances raises difficult 
issues relating to the relationship between human rights law and international 
humanitarian law.113 
Subsequent decisions support the contention that the personal model of 
jurisdiction set out in Al-Skeini remains subject to limitations as to the type of 
authority and control that may qualify. In Hirsi Jamaa v Italy, the Grand 
Chamber implied that the personal model of jurisdiction may be subject to an 
exception, arising from the continued validity of the Banković decision, 
according to which jurisdiction cannot arise from ‘instantaneous extraterritorial 
act[s]’.114 In Jaloud v The Netherlands, which concerned an allegation that 
Dutch forces had shot and killed a civilian passing through a checkpoint in Iraq, 
the Grand Chamber relied on the exercise by the Netherlands of authority and 
control over individuals passing through a checkpoint, generally, rather than 
reaching the same conclusion, more simply, on the basis of the use of physical 
force alone.115 
Notwithstanding the jurisprudence, as a matter of principle it is arguably 
unsustainable to suggest that physical force alone will not engage human rights 
obligations, while accepting the sufficiency of detention.116 When the question 
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was addressed domestically at first instance by the UK High Court in the case 
of Al-Saadoon and Others v Secretary of State for Defence,117 the court held 
that no ‘principled system of human rights law [could] draw a distinction 
between killing an individual after arresting him and simply shooting him without 
arresting him first.’118 If such distinctions are to be avoided then jurisdiction 
cannot depend on the exercise of some purported legal authority—real or 
otherwise—but rather, as the Court in Al-Saadoon found, ‘whenever and 
wherever a [State party] purports to exercise legal authority or uses physical 
force, it must do so in a way that does not violate [ECHR] rights.’119 Based 
largely on such arguments of principle, the High Court thus concluded that 
physical force could be sufficient, in itself, to establish the necessary 
jurisdictional link. However, while the High Court in Al-Saadoon presented 
sound arguments of principle, it could not adequately account for the failure of 
the Grand Chamber expressly to overrule Banković, with which its decision 
clearly conflicted.120 Indeed, this issue was recognised when Al-Saadoon came 
to be considered by the UK Court of Appeal, which stated that: 
The Strasbourg court in Al-Skeini has departed from Bankovic in accepting 
a ground of extra-territorial jurisdiction founded on state agent authority 
and control which is, on any view, of enormous breadth. I accept that once 
this exception is admitted it becomes acutely difficult to distinguish 
between differing degrees of authority and control which may or may not 
as a result give rise to extra-territorial jurisdiction. As the judge 
demonstrated in his powerful judgment, the genie having been released 
from the bottle, it may now prove impossible to contain.121 
Notwithstanding this dilemma, the Court of Appeal nevertheless concluded that 
the Grand Chamber had, indeed, intended to set limits on the personal model of 
jurisdiction set out in Al-Skeini. The Court of Appeal went on to state that: 
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If it had been the intention of the Grand Chamber to create an all-
embracing principle of extra-territorial jurisdiction of the breadth of that 
accepted by the judge, it would have been an even greater departure from 
the previous authorities, requiring a particularly clear, express statement. 
On the contrary, all the indications are that the Grand Chamber intended 
to set limits on the scope of this exception.122 
Following the Court of Appeal’s carefully considered reasoning, the application 
of the ECHR on the basis of the use of physical force alone remains a plausible 
future development rather than an accurate statement of the law as it currently 
stands. 
To summarise the current status of the extraterritorial application of the ECHR, 
Al-Skeini has undoubtedly brought a degree of clarity. It is clear that an 
individual can fall within the jurisdiction of a State party for the purposes of 
Article 1 ECHR either through the exercise of effective control by that State over 
territory in which the individual is located, or through the exercise of authority 
and control by a State agent over that individual. In the latter case, the rights 
protected can be divided and tailored to the particular circumstances. However, 
while a State agent will undoubtedly exercise authority and control over an 
individual when he or she detains that individual, where the use of physical 
force alone is concerned, the better view of the current law is that there must be 
an additional contextual element, which in Al-Skeini was the exercise of public 
powers. On the other hand, the enduring authority of the Banković decision 
arguably reinforces the continued validity of the additional exceptional cases of 
de jure extraterritorial jurisdiction noted in that case. Of particular relevance to 
the conduct of MSOs is the jurisdiction of States over vessels flying its flag, a 
situation discussed in further detail below. 
Turning to the American system, the extraterritorial applicability of the ACHR 
has been addressed on several occasions by the IACHR, which draws heavily 
on the jurisprudence of the ECtHR. In Victor Saldano v Argentina, which 
concerned the right to life of an individual sentenced to death and held, awaiting 
execution, in the United States,123 the Commission stated: 
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The Commission does not believe, however, that the term "jurisdiction" in 
the sense of Article 1(1) is limited to or merely coextensive with national 
territory. Rather, the Commission is of the view that a state party to the 
American Convention may be responsible under certain circumstances for 
the acts and omissions of its agents which produce effects or are 
undertaken outside that state’s own territory.124 
The IACHR went on to note the European Commission’s view in Cyprus v 
Turkey ‘that the High contracting Parties are bound to secure the said rights 
and freedoms to all persons under their actual authority and responsibility, 
whether that authority is exercised within their own territory or abroad’,125 and 
that ‘[t]his understanding of jurisdiction—and therefore responsibility for 
compliance with international obligations—as a notion linked to authority and 
effective control, and not merely to territorial boundaries, has been confirmed 
and elaborated on in other cases decided by the European Commission and 
Court.’126 On the facts of Victor Saldano, the State party concerned, Argentina, 
had exercised no authority or control over Mr Saldano in connection the 
extraterritorial criminal proceedings against him; he was not, therefore, within 
the jurisdiction of Argentina for the purposes of Article 1(1) ACHR.127 
The Commission refined its understanding of jurisdiction for the purposes of 
Article 1(1) ACHR in Armando Alejandre Jr, Carlos Costa, Mario de la Peña and 
Pablo Morales v Republic of Cuba,128 which concerned the alleged shooting 
down of two civilian aircraft in international airspace by Cuban military fighter 
planes.129 The Commission stated that: 
Because individual rights are inherent to the human being, all the 
American states are obligated to respect the protected rights of any 
person subject to their jurisdiction. Although this usually refers to persons 
who are within the territory of a state, in certain instances it can refer to 
extraterritorial actions, when the person is present in the territory of a state 
but subject to the control of another state, generally through the actions of 
that state’s agents abroad. In principle, the investigation refers not to the 
nationality of the alleged victim or his presence in a particular geographic 
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area, but to whether, in those specific circumstances, the state observed 
the rights of a person subject to its authority and control.130 
Considering the facts of the case itself, the Commission concluded that it had 
examined the evidence and [found] that the victims died as a 
consequence of direct actions taken by agents of the Cuban State in 
international airspace. The fact that the events took place outside Cuban 
jurisdiction does not limit the Commission’s competence ratione loci, 
because, as previously stated, when agents of a state, whether military or 
civilian, exercise power and authority over persons outside national 
territory, the state’s obligation to respect human rights continues…131 
This is significant not only for the Commission’s confirmation of its view that the 
exercise of extraterritorial authority and control is sufficient to bring an individual 
within a State’s jurisdiction, but also for the conclusion that a State agent can 
exercise such authority and control through the use of force alone or, more 
broadly, arising from an instantaneous act.132 This is in stark contrast to the 
ECtHR’s conclusion, on arguably similar facts, in Banković, and affords a 
broader meaning to jurisdiction in this context than even Al-Skeini, eschewing 
any reference, for example, to the exercise of public powers. As discussed 
above, such a conclusion arguably reflects the logical outcome of adopting a 
personal model of jurisdiction, consistent with the reasoning of the UK High 
Court in Al-Saadoon discussed above, albeit that the ECtHR remains 
encumbered by more restrictive, and arguably contradictory, jurisprudence. 
The IACHR subsequently applied the same reasoning in Meneses and others v 
Ecuador,133 finding a group of Colombian citizens potentially to have been 
within the jurisdiction of a State party (Ecuador) on the alleged basis that they 
had been shot by members of the Ecuadorian Army within Colombian 
territory.134 It considered itself able to hear the petition on the basis simply 
‘because [it] claims violations of the rights protected under the American 
Convention that were said to have been perpetrated by agents of the State of 
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Ecuador.’ 135  Similarly, in Molina v Ecuador, 136  the Commission found 
Ecuadorian nationals potentially to have been within the jurisdiction of Colombia 
as a result of bombing and other military action conducted by the Colombian 
armed forces in Ecuador. Consistent with the other cases discussed, the 
Commission stated that 
the following is essential for the Commission in determining jurisdiction: 
the exercise of authority over persons by agents of a State even if not 
acting within their territory, without necessarily requiring the existence of a 
formal, structured and prolonged legal relation in terms of time to raise the 
responsibility of a State for acts committed by its agents abroad.  At the 
time of examining the scope of the American Convention's jurisdiction, it is 
necessary to determine whether there is a causal nexus between the 
extraterritorial conduct of the State and the alleged violation of the rights 
and freedoms of an individual.137 
However, consistent with the ECtHR’s conclusion in Al-Skeini that the rights of 
the ECHR could be ‘divided and tailored’ when a State party brings an 
individual within its jurisdiction through the extraterritorial acts of its agents, the 
Commission went on to say: 
What has been stated above does not necessarily mean that a duty to 
guarantee the catalogue of substantive rights established in the American 
Convention may necessarily be derived from a State’s territorial activities, 
including all the range of obligations with respect to persons who are 
under its jurisdiction for the (entire) time the control by its agents lasted. 
Instead, the obligation does arise in the period of time that agents of a 
State interfere in the lives of persons who are on the territory of the other 
State, for those agents to respect their rights, in particular, their right to life 
and humane treatment.138 
Hence a State party may owe only the obligations relevant to the conduct of its 
agents abroad. Conversely, the inability of a State party to fulfil the full range of 
obligations under the ACHR does not mean that the instrument ceases to 
apply.139 
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It is clear from this survey of the IACHR’s practice that it considers the ACHR as 
being capable of extraterritorial application through the exercise of authority and 
control by agents of a State acting outside its territory. Indeed, as De Vylder 
notes, ‘central in the Inter-American concept of jurisdiction are the authority and 
control over a person.’140 Furthermore, authority and control in this context can 
mean simply the instantaneous use of physical force, in which case the State 
party is required at least to respect the rights relevant to that particular conduct. 
Although the Commission’s practice on this point is informative, particularly for 
its treatment of situations involving military activities, it does not necessarily 
mean that the issue will be approached in the same way by the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), which, until recently, had not dealt with it.141 
However, in its recent Advisory Opinion on the Environment and Human 
Rights,142 the Court addressed the question for the first time, drawing upon the 
practice of the Commission, as well as the ECtHR and HRC.143 The Court 
confirmed that States’ jurisdiction, for the purposes of the ACHR, is not limited 
to their territories, though must be ‘examined restrictively in each specific 
case.’144 It concluded that ‘an individual is under a State’s jurisdiction, in respect 
of conduct undertaken outside the territory of the said State (extraterritorial 
conduct) or with effects outside its territory, if that State is exercising its 
authority over that person or when that person is under its effective control’.145 
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English version of the official summary, which states that jurisdiction, in the 
context of the ACHR, encompasses situations in which a State ‘exercises 
effective authority or control over an individual or individuals, either within or 
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Although less detailed than the analysis found in the practice of the 
Commission, the IACtHR appears to have adopted its approach, focusing on 
extraterritorial applicability arising from the exercise of authority and control over 
individuals. 
Taken as a whole, the analysis of practice relating to the meaning of jurisdiction 
in this context reveals a complex legal landscape. The concept has developed 
over time so as increasingly to embrace an expansive conception of jurisdiction 
that is not restricted to its meaning elsewhere in the law. However, important 
vestiges of familiar notions of jurisdiction remain, most notably in the context of 
the ECHR. It would therefore be a mistake to conclude that jurisdiction for the 
purposes of defining the extraterritorial application of human rights treaties is 
unconnected to its other meaning(s) in international law. As will be discussed 
below in the context of the maritime environment, there are specific situations 
where de jure jurisdiction remains particularly relevant to the extraterritorial 
application of human rights treaties. In the context of MSOs, this is most notably 
the case with respect to operations conducted by a State on board vessels 
carrying that State’s own flag.146 
However, this important caveat notwithstanding, authorities regularly refer, 
albeit with slightly differing language, to the exercise of de facto, rather than de 
jure, authority and control. The practice recognises, broadly speaking, two 
distinct instances of this: first, a spatial model, where jurisdiction is equated to 
the exercise by a State of effective control over an area; and, second, a 
personal model, whereby jurisdiction is established when an agent of the State 
exercises authority and control over an individual. While not all systems have 
developed detailed jurisprudence on point, it is submitted that their practice is 
broadly consistent with this statement and the approach is likely to be influential 
in the future development and application of the law. However, notwithstanding 
the similarity of the approaches developed for the extraterritorial application of 
the ICCPR, ECHR and ACHR, there remain important differences, including, 
                                                                                                                                
outside its territory.’ The Environment and Human Rights (State obligations in 
relation to the environment in the context of the protection and guarantee of the 
rights to life and to personal integrity – interpretation and scope of Articles 4(1) 
and 5(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights) (Advisory Opinion OC-
23/17) (Official Summary Issued by the Inter-American Court) (2017) 3. 
146 See below s 3.3.2. 
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most notably, the different approach to situations involving the use of physical 
force by State agents. 
3.3. The application of the principles governing the extraterritorial 
application of IHRL treaties to MSOs 
Having considered the extraterritorial application of relevant human rights in 
general, the next question is how the principles identified above apply in the 
maritime context and, specifically, to MSOs that are conducted outside a State’s 
territory. While there is limited practice on point, this is insufficient, on its own, to 
plot all of the relevant legal contours. Noting that MSOs can take various forms, 
are comprised of numerous discrete activities, and can be conducted in a wide 
range of circumstances, the decided cases lack sufficient breadth in the factual 
scenarios they contemplate. Furthermore, as set out above, there is divergence 
in the broader practice concerning the extraterritorial application of the treaties 
under consideration; as a result, there is a limit to the extent that it is possible to 
draw broad conclusions of universal application from decisions applying just 
one of the treaties in question. Therefore, while it is necessary to consider 
cases dealing directly with the relevant issues, understanding the full scope of 
application of IHRL treaties to MSOs cannot be based on these alone. Instead, 
it is necessary to consider the principles on which extraterritorial application is 
to be determined generally and to examine how those principles might operate 
in a maritime context. 
3.3.1. Applicability arising from the nationality of an individual committing 
acts of torture 
A special situation of extraterritorial applicability arises in the case of Article 5 
CAT, which contains an obligation on the part of a State to assert jurisdiction 
over offences of torture where the offender is of the nationality of the State 
concerned. As noted above, this is one of the specific circumstances in which 
the obligation is expressly stated to arise, wherever the offence is alleged to 
have been committed.147 This narrow obligation is likely to apply to most of 
those conducting MSOs on behalf of a State, given that they are likely to be 
                                            
147 See above s 3.2.1.4. 
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nationals of that State. Where it is engaged, the obligation will apply at every 
stage of the operation, wherever it is conducted. 
3.3.2. Applicability arising from a vessel’s flag 
A second special case of extraterritorial application may arise with respect to a 
State’s own flagged vessels. In connection with the execution of MSOs, there 
are two situations where this may be relevant: first, where the MSO involves 
action taken on board an interdicted vessel that flies the flag of the interdicting 
State; and, second, where individuals are taken on board the interdicting vessel 
in the course of the MSOs, such as may be the case for detainees, or where 
mariners are rescued. If the jurisdictional link can be established on this basis, it 
follows that the instrument will apply throughout the whole of a vessel flagged to 
the State in question, without any requirement to consider the de facto exercise 
of effective control over the vessel or authority and control over particular 
individuals. 
Applicability on a State’s flagged vessels can be provided for expressly in the 
treaty in question. Under Article 5 CAT, a State Party is obliged to ‘take such 
measures as are necessary to establish its jurisdiction’ over acts of torture 
committed ‘on board a ship or aircraft registered in that State’. More generally, 
while a vessel does not constitute part of the territory of its flag State,148 the 
latter enjoys both prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction over vessels flying 
its flag. On the high seas, enforcement jurisdiction is generally exclusive to the 
flag State,149  albeit subject to a number of limited exceptions.150  In other 
maritime zones the coastal State may also enjoy both prescriptive and 
enforcement jurisdiction for some purposes. However, neither on the high seas, 
nor in other maritime zones, does the concurrent jurisdiction of another State 
affect the continued jurisdiction enjoyed by the flag State. While a flag State 
may be limited in the action it may practically and lawfully take to enforce its 
laws when a flagged vessel is in the territorial sea, internal waters or 
                                            
148 Urfan Khaliq, ‘Jurisdiction, Ships and Human Rights Treaties’ in Henrik 
Ringbom (ed), Jurisdiction Over Ships: Post-UNCLOS Developments in the Law 
of the Sea (Brill 2015) 329. 
149 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (adopted 10 December 
1982, entered into force 16 November 1994) 1833 UNTS 397 (UNCLOS) art 
92(1).  
150 See above s 1.1.3.2. See also Shaw (n 66) 445–55. 
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archipelagic waters of another State, this does not preclude the concurrent 
existence of the flag State’s enforcement jurisdiction on board the flagged 
vessel. For example, while a State would not be permitted, absent consent, to 
send its coastguard vessels into a foreign territorial sea in order to enforce its 
laws on board one of its own flagged vessels, such action being outside the 
innocent passage regime, Stage agents already on the vessel in question would 
still be permitted to enforce the flag State’s jurisdiction despite its location in the 
maritime territory of another State. 
As discussed above, where the extraterritorial applicability of human rights 
treaties depends on the existence of a jurisdictional link between the State and 
an individual, that link does not necessarily require the existence of de jure 
jurisdiction. However, this does not mean that de jure jurisdiction, such as that 
of a State over its flagged vessels, even if not necessary, might not be 
sufficient. This, after all, is the basis for the territorial application of both the 
ECHR and ACHR, which refer only to applicability to individuals within their 
jurisdiction. Moreover, the extraterritorial applicability of the ECHR over a 
State’s flagged vessels was a specific exception to that instrument’s primarily 
territorial applicability recognised by the Grand Chamber in Banković. 151 As 
discussed above, while the ECtHR’s jurisprudence has undoubtedly moved on 
to some extent since Banković, there is no plausible reason to question the 
continued validity of this specific conclusion. Indeed, this appears to have been 
the case in Hirsi Jamaa and Others v Italy, decided subsequent to Al-Skeini. In 
Hirsi Jamaa, which considered the applicability of the ECHR to irregular 
migrants taken on board Italian naval vessels, the Grand Chamber considered 
the ECHR to apply on board Italian ‘military ships flying the Italian flag’ while the 
ships in question were on the high seas.152 Importantly, it was the status of the 
vessels as being Italian-flagged, rather than their ‘military’ designation, on which 
the Grand Chamber based its reasoning, which referred to the exclusive 
jurisdiction enjoyed by flag States on the high seas. 
                                            
151 Banković (n 81) [73]. 
152  Hirsi Jamaa (n 2) [76]–[78]. See, for example, Maarten Den Heijer, 
‘Reflections on Refoulement and Collective Expulsion in the Hirsi Case’ (2013) 
25(2) Intl J of Refugee L 265, 271–74. As Den Heijer notes, the Grand 
Chamber referred both to de jure (flag State) jurisdiction and to the de facto 
control exercised by the Italian forces over the individuals. See below s 3.3.4. 
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Notably, when the Grand Chamber stated in Banković that the ECHR could 
apply extraterritorially on the basis of flag State jurisdiction, this was at the 
same time that it declared the ECHR could not be ‘divided and tailored’.153 
While such dividing and tailoring is now accepted post-Al-Skeini,154 it arguably 
follows that the ECtHR envisaged the applicability of the whole of the ECHR 
when it applies on board a flagged vessel, as it does in a State’s territory, rather 
than just those rights engaged by a particular exercise of de facto jurisdiction. 
Hence a State party would be required not only to respect relevant rights in the 
course of any action it took, but also to meet its positive obligations to protect 
and fulfil human rights. 
Consistent with the practice of the ECtHR, the Committee Against Torture has 
also interpreted every provision of CAT applicable in ‘territory under [a State 
party’s] jurisdiction’ as applying in ‘a ship or aircraft registered by a State 
party’,155 notwithstanding that Article 5, but no other, is made subject to an 
express additional provision to that effect. However, although the practice of the 
Committee Against Torture and ECtHR supports the contention that the relevant 
provisions of CAT, and the whole of the ECHR, apply extraterritorially on board 
a State’s flagged vessels, for the other instruments under consideration, no 
clear and authoritative guidance on this specific point yet exists. If, in contrast to 
the position taken by the Committee and ECtHR, extraterritorial application in 
these circumstances is found to depend on a factual determination as to 
whether a State exercises authority and control over individuals, as has been 
the dominant approach, for example, with respect to the ACHR,156 then reliance 
on the notion of jurisdiction over flagged vessels might arguably be misplaced. 
In relation to its negative obligations, when a State does take action on board a 
vessel flying its flag, it would be hard to characterise it as anything but a de 
facto exercise of control or authority such as to engage human rights 
obligations. However, the same analysis does not necessarily hold with respect 
to positive obligations. If extraterritorial application in that context requires the 
exercise of a certain level of control, then it must be open to question whether a 
                                            
153 Banković (n 81) [73], [75]. 
154 See above s 3.2.2. 
155 CAT General Comment 2 (n 53) para 16. 
156 See above s 3.2.2. 
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flag State necessarily exercises sufficient control over vessels flying its flag, or 
whether an assessment must be made whether a State is, in fact, exercising 
control.157  
An answer to this question possibly lies in the provisions of UN Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), according to which a flag State not only has 
jurisdiction but is obliged also to ‘effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control 
in administrative, technical and social matters over ships flying its flag.’158 
Furthermore, a ship may be flagged only to a State with which it has a ‘genuine 
link’.159 Given the obligation of a flag State to exert its authority over vessels 
flying its flag, it might follow that it should similarly be required to meet its 
positive obligations under human rights treaties. If it cannot do so, then 
arguably it could not be said that a sufficiently genuine link exists and the flag 
State should not therefore authorise the use of its flag. 
3.3.3. Applicability arising from the exercise of effective control over an 
area 
As set out above,160 one of the situations where some human rights treaties 
have been considered to apply extraterritorially is where a State exercises 
effective control over a particular area outside its territory. If applicability of a 
human rights treaty were to arise on this basis, then it would apply to the 
conduct of MSOs conducted by the State exercising effective control over the 
area in which the MSO was conducted. It would follow that the rights protected 
by the treaty in question would apply at all stages of the MSO, without reference 
to the exercise of control over a particular vessel or its occupants. However, not 
all treaties have been applied on this basis. In particular, while extraterritorial 
applicability of the ECHR on this basis is well established, and is arguably the 
only basis for the extraterritorial application of many provisions of the CAT,161 
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this is not the case for the ACHR, in respect of which the IACHR has generally 
adopted a personal model of extraterritorial jurisdiction.162 
Moreover, even though courts and treaty bodies have not expressly excluded 
the concept’s application to the maritime domain, it has generally been 
explained and applied in the context of the exercise of effective control over 
land, specifically the situation where a State exercises effective control over the 
territory of another State through the lawful or unlawful actions of its armed 
forces, displacing the authority normally exercised by the territorial State. Courts 
and treaty bodies have not, generally, contemplated the exercise of effective 
control over an area beyond the territory of any State, such as would be the 
case on the high seas, or in the other maritime zones seaward of the territorial 
sea.  
For example, in setting out the principle in Al-Skeini, the ECtHR refers to 
‘domination over the territory’ and, repeatedly, to interaction with the ‘local 
administration’.163 Likewise, where provisions under the CAT apply in ‘territory 
under a State’s jurisdiction’, this most plausibly refers to control over areas 
otherwise considered to be ‘territory’, notwithstanding that the Committee 
Against Torture has construed the phrase broadly to include de facto effective 
control over any ‘area’.164 It follows that the principle could most convincingly 
apply to the exercise of effective control over the territorial sea, internal waters 
and archipelagic waters of another State. Such a situation would be closely 
analogous to the established application of the principle on land; the areas of 
water in question are within the territory of the coastal State, whose authority is 
displaced by the State exercising effective control. A second situation where the 
principle might plausibly be applied is where, as a corollary to the concept of 
flag State jurisdiction, a State exercises effective control over a foreign-flagged 
vessel.165 In this situation, again, a State normally has jurisdiction over the area 
                                            
162 See above s 3.2.2. 
163 Al-Skeini, ECtHR (n 8) [138]–[139] (emphasis added). 
164 See above s 3.2.1.4. 
165 Such a possibility appears to have been contemplated at least by the 
ECtHR; in Medvedyev the ECtHR found the ECHR to have applied on the basis 
of the exercise by France of ‘full and exclusive control over the [vessel] and its 
crew’. Medvedyev (n 2) [67].  
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in question—i.e. the jurisdiction of the flag State over the vessel—and it is this 
authority that is displaced by a State exercising effective control. 
It is less clear whether the principle could apply to the exercise of effective 
control over an area of sea, rather than a vessel, beyond the territory of any 
State. While there is little judicial support for such a proposition, it has not been 
expressly excluded and could arguably, at least in theory, be accommodated 
within the concept’s stated parameters. Notwithstanding the ECtHR’s 
references in Al-Skeini to territory and local administration, the Court initially 
defined the principle simply as the ‘effective control of an area outside [a State’s 
own] national territory’. Indeed, the Court stated that, ‘In determining whether 
effective control exists, the Court will primarily have reference to the strength of 
the State’s military presence in the area’, an indicium clearly that does not 
depend on the displacement of a territorial authority. While the Court’s full 
explanation seems to have assumed the existence of a local administration, this 
could arguably have been because that was the context of the case in question, 
rather than because it was considered to be essential to the operation of the 
principle. 
In this connection, it is particularly relevant to consider those maritime areas 
that are beyond a State’s territory, but within which it nevertheless enjoys 
certain rights under the law of the sea, namely the contiguous zone, exclusive 
economic zone (EEZ), continental shelf, as well as safety zones established 
around certain installations. The contiguous zone is a zone contiguous to the 
territorial sea, over which a State may exercise the control necessary to prevent 
and punish infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration and sanitary laws 
and regulations within its territory or territorial sea.166 Within its EEZ, a State has 
‘sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and 
managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters 
superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil, and with regard to 
other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such 
as the production of energy from the water, currents and winds’, as well as 
‘jurisdiction…with regard to (i) the establishment and use of artificial islands, 
installations and structures; (ii) marine scientific research; [and] (iii) the 
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protection and preservation of the marine environment’.167 The continental shelf 
is an area of sea-bed and subsoil over which a State has sovereign rights to 
explore and exploit its natural resources. It extends up to 350 nautical miles 
from the baseline from which the territorial sea is measured and is defined 
according to bathymetry.168 Finally, safety zones may be established around 
artificial islands, installations and structures in the EEZ or on the continental 
shelf, 169  as well as around installations constructed either to exploit the 
international seabed area,170 or for scientific research.171 Within such safety 
zones, the establishing State may take ‘appropriate measures to ensure the 
safety both of navigation and of the artificial islands, installations and 
structures.’172 
In all of these areas, it is clear that the coastal State, or State establishing a 
safety zone, enjoys certain rights, including enforcement jurisdiction in 
connection with the protection of specified interests. However, it is important to 
note that the determination of whether or not a State exercises effective control 
is a matter of fact rather than law. The legal right of a State to exercise 
jurisdiction for some purposes within a particular area outside its territory does 
not, in itself, give rise to effective control, meaning that it will be necessary to 
determine, as a matter of fact, whether a State exercises effective control over a 
particular area, whatever de jure rights it might enjoy there. As noted above,173 
the application of human rights treaties on the basis of effective control over an 
area has been considered—at least in the case of the ECHR—to entail the 
application of the whole treaty, rather than just those rights pertinent to the 
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actions of the State in question. As the concept of effective control is related to 
the ability of a State to fulfil the full gamut of its human rights treaty obligations, 
it follows that the threshold for effective control is high. Hence, even during the 
occupation of part of Iraq by British forces, the United Kingdom was not 
considered to have been in effective control such as would have given rise to 
the application of the whole of the ECHR.174 Consequently, it is difficult to 
envisage a situation where a State could exercise sufficient control over a 
substantial extraterritorial area of the sea such that the whole of a human rights 
treaty could realistically apply. Indeed, it would be difficult to reconcile that level 
of control with the freedoms afforded vessels in such areas.175 
A more plausible basis on which to recognise the extraterritorial application of 
human rights treaties in such situations is in connection with the exercise of 
jurisdiction, rather than its mere existence. This, essentially, is the personal 
model of jurisdiction, discussed further below. Notable in this respect is the 
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1. The high seas are open to all States, whether coastal or land-locked. 
Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid 
down by this Convention and by other rules of international law. It 
comprises, inter alia, both for coastal and land-locked States: (a) 
freedom of navigation; (b) freedom of overflight; (c) freedom to lay 
submarine cables and pipelines, subject to Part VI; (d) freedom to 
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the interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the 
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Convention with respect to activities in the Area. 
These broad freedoms are extended by art 58 to the EEZ, albeit subject to the 
specific provisions relating to the EEZ. Under art 78 the rights of a coastal State 
with respect to its continental shelf do not affect the character of the superjacent 
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internal waters or archipelagic waters) or territorial sea. UNCLOS (n 149) arts 
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ECtHR’s decision in Drieman and Others v Norway, in which a number of 
Greenpeace protestors claimed that their interdiction and arrest while interfering 
with whaling in Norway’s EEZ, along with their subsequent prosecution, violated 
their freedoms of assembly and expression.176 The ECtHR ultimately judged 
Norway’s conduct clearly to be within its margin of appreciation in applying the 
rights in question, and the application therefore to be inadmissible.177 However, 
the Court did accept that the relevant freedoms were engaged, on the basis that 
the ‘applicants’ convictions and sentence[s]…were all measures which the 
respondent State had taken in the exercise of its jurisdiction in the sense of 
Article 1 of the Convention, and thus were capable of engaging its responsibility 
under the Convention.’178 For present purposes, what is significant here is that 
the ECtHR did not simply state that the ECHR applied throughout the 
Norwegian EEZ, as would be the case if it had considered Norway to be 
exercising effective control over the relevant maritime area, but rather premised 
its applicability on the basis that the Norwegian courts had exercised the 
jurisdiction granted it, over the individuals concerned, under the relevant 
provisions of UNCLOS. 
Notwithstanding these issues, Geiß and Petrig tentatively propose two 
situations relevant to the conduct of MSOs in which a State may exercise 
effective control over an area of the oceans.179 First, they suggest that a 
warship might exercise effective control within an ‘operational radius’, 
throughout which it is able to take enforcement measures, whether it takes 
those measures or not.180 However, it is the actual exercise of control over an 
area that is relevant, rather than capability, that matters; even if a warship might 
be capable of exercising effective control over a certain area, it does not follow 
that it will inevitably do so. Even if a warship could, in theory, exercise effective 
control over a mobile operational radius, the recognition of this as an example 
of effective control of an area would be a novel development of the law, noting 
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that the same argument could apply to other military units, or even individual 
soldiers. Consistent with the ECtHR’s decision in Drieman, if it is the warship’s 
actual enforcement activities on which its effective control over an area 
depends, then a court or treaty body is likely to examine the situation on the 
basis of the authority and control exercised by the ship over individuals by virtue 
of the particular activity.181 
Second, Geiß and Petrig suggest that the cumulative control exerted by a 
number of warships, such as those engaged in counter-piracy activities in the 
Gulf of Aden around 2011, could be sufficient ‘to cast a net of effective overall 
control’, particularly within the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor 
(IRTC).182 However, even in the IRTC, an area in which naval forces were 
concentrated to provide enhanced security for merchant shipping, it is hard to 
see how the assembled naval forces could be said to have exercised sufficient 
control to meet the required standard. Notwithstanding the significant naval 
presence, and their enforcement activities against pirates, they still respected 
the high seas freedoms of merchant shipping, as highlighted by the strictly 
advisory nature of the IRTC. Noting, again, the high standard applied in the land 
context, it seems unlikely that this could realistically have amounted to effective 
control over the relevant area for the purposes of the ECHR. 
It is clear that effective control over an area is a valid basis for the extraterritorial 
application of the ECHR and arguably, by extension, the applicability of other 
IHRL treaties that depend on a jurisdictional link. Nevertheless, it is unlikely to 
be of great importance in the extraterritorial application of IHRL treaties to 
MSOs. Drawing on the practice of the ECtHR, the threshold for applicability on 
this basis is set higher than is likely often to be achieved in a maritime context. 
It might arguably be relevant in some very specific situations: the exercise by 
one State of effective control of the territorial waters of another, such as where 
the former assumes responsibility for the coast guard and other similar 
functions; within tightly delimited areas, such as safety zones; and, conceivably, 
where one State exercises effective control over a foreign-flagged vessel. 
However, even in these circumstances, there may be a more convincing basis 
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for the extraterritorial application of IHRL treaties arising from the exercise of 
State agent authority and control, discussed next. 
3.3.4. Applicability arising from the exercise of State agent authority and 
control over individuals 
As set out above, extraterritorial application of human rights treaties can arise 
according to a personal model of jurisdiction.183 It has consistently been the 
basis on which both the ICCPR and ACHR have been applied extraterritorially 
and has featured increasingly in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, not least in its 
judgment in Al-Skeini. While there is insufficient practice relating to the 
extraterritorial application of the ACHPR, its application on the basis of the 
personal model is a plausible future development. Of the IHRL treaties under 
consideration, it is only the CAT that does not appear to be capable of being 
applied on this basis, notwithstanding the view of the Committee Against 
Torture.184  
In broad terms, an individual will be subject to the jurisdiction of a State when 
that State exercises authority and control over him or her. 185  In such 
circumstances, only those rights relevant to the particular exercise of authority 
and control will be engaged. Given that MSOs involve the exercise of authority 
and control by State agents (i.e. coast guard or naval forces) over other users of 
the maritime domain, this basis of extraterritorial application is obviously of 
particular significance to the present enquiry. This is especially so in light of the 
difficulties set out above with respect to establishing extraterritorial applicability 
on the basis of effective control over an area at sea. However, while the 
principle is easily stated in outline, its detailed application to some concrete 
scenarios can be more complex and, in light of the remaining controversies 
discussed above, less than certain. 
The key determination to be made is whether, at a particular stage in an MSO, 
an individual is under the authority and control of the State agents conducting 
the operation. Referring back to the stages of a generic MSO set out in Chapter 
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1,186 both stages 6 and 7 clearly involve the detention of individuals by the 
interdicting State, on board the interdicted vessel and on the interdicting ship 
respectively. However, wherever detention takes place, detention is the least 
controversial situation in which a State can be argued to be exercising authority 
and control over individuals so as to give rise to extraterritorial application. 
Indeed, detention is the archetypical manifestation of State control over an 
individual, and the principle by which it engages the extraterritorial application of 
human rights treaties on land can be transposed directly to the maritime 
environment. 
Extraterritorial applicability arising from detention is strongly supported by the 
limited ECHR jurisprudence on point. Although these cases relate directly only 
to the application of the ECHR, they are especially notable given the more 
restrictive approach to the personal model adopted by the ECtHR compared, in 
particular, to that of the IACHR. Most prominent is the decision in Medvedyev 
and Others v France, which concerned alleged breaches of Article 5 ECHR, the 
right to liberty and security of the person, in respect of the crew of a 
Cambodian-flagged vessel intercepted and boarded by French naval forces on 
the high seas.187 The crew, suspected of involvement in drug trafficking, were 
detained on board their vessel while it was towed to France, where they were 
handed over to local police. Considering the question of extraterritorial 
applicability, the Grand Chamber determined that that the ECHR applied 
throughout this period.188 Importantly, when this aspect of Medvedyev was 
considered, alongside other analogous cases, by the Grand Chamber in Al-
Skeini, it concluded that jurisdiction did not arise ‘solely from the control 
exercised by the Contracting State over the buildings, aircraft or ship in which 
the individuals were held. What is decisive in such cases is the exercise of 
physical power over the person in question.’189 Furthermore, in finding that the 
applicants in Hirsi Jamaa were within the jurisdiction of Italy, the Grand 
Chamber referred not only to de jure jurisdiction arising from the Italian flag of 
the ship to which they were transferred,190 but also, relying on Medvedyev, to 
                                            
186 See above s 1.1.2. 
187 Medvedyev (n 2). For further discussion of the facts see below s 5.2. 
188 Medvedyev (n 2) [67]. 
189 Al-Skeini, ECtHR (n 8) [136]. 
190 See above s 3.3.1. 
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the de facto control exercised by the Italian forces over the individuals 
concerned.191 
In subsequent cases concerning similar facts, the ECtHR has proceeded, 
without detailed scrutiny of the question of extraterritorial applicability, on the 
basis that the ECHR applies. In Rigopoulos v Spain, the ECtHR considered an 
alleged violation of Article 5(3) ECHR arising from the interdiction and boarding 
of a Panamanian-flagged vessel by Spanish customs officials on the high 
seas.192 The crew, comprising various nationalities, was detained in connection 
with suspected narcotics offences, while the interdicted vessel was escorted to 
a port in the Canary Islands. Although the Court ultimately found the Applicant’s 
detention not to have been in breach of the requirement of promptness,193 there 
is no suggestion of any doubt as to the applicability of the ECHR for the 
duration of the alleged detention. Similarly, in Vassis and others v France, the 
ECtHR considered another alleged violation of Article 5(3), in this case arising 
from the interdiction and boarding of a Panamanian-flagged vessel by French 
naval forces.194 The crew, again suspected of narcotics offences, was detained 
under guard on board the interdicted vessel, which was diverted to Brest, where 
the crew was handed over to the public prosecutor. On this occasion the Court 
found there to have been a violation of Article 5(3);195 and, again, there is no 
suggestion of doubt as to the applicability of the ECHR throughout the period of 
detention. 
These cases confirm the unsurprising conclusion that the ECHR and, by 
extension, other human rights treaties, will apply to those detained at sea. While 
the cases considered by the ECtHR have concerned individuals detained in 
their own vessel, it is inconceivable that this would not also be the case where 
detainees are transferred to the interdicting ship, or another vessel, so long as 
they remain in detention.196 However, less immediately clear is the degree of 
                                            
191 Hirsi Jamaa (n 2) [79]–[81]. See also Den Heijer (n 152) 271–74. 
192 Rigopoulos v Spain ECHR 1999-II 435. The decision is not paginated or 
paragraph-numbered. For further discussion of the facts see below s 5.2. 
193 Rigopoulos (n 192). 
194 Vassis and Others v France App No 62736/09 (ECtHR, 27 June 2013). For 
further discussion of the facts see below s 5.2. 
195 Vassis (n 194) [52]–[62]. 
196 Noting that applicability may also arise in this situation on the basis of flag-
State jurisdiction over the vessel to which detainees are transferred. 
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control required over detainees in order to meet the test of authority and control, 
in particular the degree of control that must be exerted over individuals while 
still on board their own vessel. 
Informative in this regard is the decision in Medvedyev, in which the Applicants 
claimed to have been confined to their quarters throughout the voyage to 
France, while the French government claimed that these measures had been 
relaxed. Notwithstanding this disagreement, the Grand Chamber stated its 
opinion that: 
while it is true that the applicants’ movements prior to the boarding of the 
Winner were already confined to the physical boundaries of the ship, so 
that there was a de facto restriction on their freedom to come and go, it 
cannot be said, as the Government submitted, that the measures taken 
after the ship was boarded merely placed a restriction on their freedom of 
movement. The crew members were placed under the control of the 
French special forces and confined to their cabins during the voyage. 
True, the Government maintained that during the voyage the restrictions 
were relaxed. In the Court’s view that does not alter the fact that the 
applicants were deprived of their liberty throughout the voyage as the 
ship’s course was imposed by the French forces. 
While the Grand Chamber was here considering the separate, but related, 
question of the point at which detention starts and ends,197  it follows by 
necessary implication that it considered the ECHR to apply at least during the 
period of detention. Consequently, in assessing whether the test of State agent 
authority and control is met, it is necessary to consider not only that which is 
exercised over individuals’ actions within a vessel, but also that which is 
exercised over the vessel as a whole. Indeed, when addressing directly the 
question of extraterritorial applicability, the Grand Chamber found that it arose 
as a result of the ‘full and exclusive control over the [Cambodian ship] and its 
crew, at least de facto, from the time of its interception, in a continuous and 
uninterrupted manner until they were tried in France’.198 
A similar conclusion was reached by the Committee Against Torture in JHA v 
Spain, which concerned the rescue by a Spanish vessel of a cargo vessel, the 
Marine I, which capsized in international waters while carrying 369 immigrants 
                                            
197 On this question see below s 5.4.3. 
198 Medvedyev (n 2) [67]. 
 
124 
of various nationalities.199 On reaching the stricken vessel, the Spanish tug 
placed it under tow, before anchoring with it off the coast of Mauritania while the 
Spanish authorities established a course of action for dealing with the 
immigrants. 200  Notwithstanding the issues surrounding the extraterritorial 
applicability of CAT generally, 201  the Committee’s interpretation of what it 
means to be within the jurisdiction of a State party is nevertheless informative. It 
recalled the statement in its General Comment 2,  
that the jurisdiction of a State party refers to any territory in which it 
exercises, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, de jure or de facto 
effective control, in accordance with international law. In particular, it 
considers that such jurisdiction must also include situations where a State 
party exercises, directly or indirectly, de facto or de jure control over 
persons in detention.202 
Applying this to the facts under consideration, the Committee ‘observe[d] that 
the State party maintained control over the persons on board the Marine I from 
the time the vessel was rescued and throughout the identification and 
repatriation process’,203 i.e. from the point the vessel was rescued until the 
individuals were transferred to land. Importantly, this was the case 
notwithstanding the individuals’ location on the Marine I, and not the rescue 
vessel. Although the extent to which this automatically follows from General 
Comment 2 can be questioned, noting that document’s reference to ‘control 
over persons in detention’, the Committee’s understanding of what it means to 
be within the jurisdiction of a State party is consistent with that of the Grand 
Chamber in Medvedyev. 
The decisions in both Medvedyev and JHA v Spain suggest that the State agent 
authority and control test can be met as a result of the de facto control 
exercised over a vessel as a whole, with no necessary requirement for the 
boarding party of an interdicting vessel to be physically present onboard or to 
exercise further control over particular individuals on board; what is important is 
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the degree of control that is being exercised, by whatever means. In particular, 
if the ship’s course (and, by analogy, its speed), are being imposed by the 
interdicting ship, then this would seem to be sufficient. Such a result is arguably 
consistent with the broader concept underlying the personal model of 
jurisdiction, premised on de facto, rather than formalistic, manifestations of 
control, as it applies across other human rights treaties, in particular the ICCPR 
and ACHR.204 Therefore, while the decisions are of direct relevance only within 
their own respective systems, they represent a plausible guide to the 
application of the other instruments. 
Applying these conclusions to the stages of a generic MSO, not only will human 
rights treaties apply in stages 6 and 7, in which the crew of an interdicted vessel 
is detained subsequent to the vessel being boarded, but potentially where it 
exercises control over the interdicted vessel earlier in the operation, i.e. at stage 
5, at which point it is complying with the interdicting ship’s instructions, or 
potentially earlier, if the vessel is immediately cooperative. Where the authority 
and control test is met in this manner, it follows that other relevant rights, in 
addition to those related to deprivation of liberty, may also be engaged. While it 
is true that the applicable rights may be divided and tailored to the 
circumstances, meaning that the full catalogue of rights protected by a particular 
instrument will not necessarily apply, this would not prevent the protection of, for 
example, the right to life with respect to the use of force against a detained 
crew. 
However, an important question this leaves unanswered is whether the State 
agent authority and control test is met when the interdicted vessel is not 
following the directions of the interdicting ship, particularly when the interdicting 
ship uses force in order to compel compliance. This would be the case at stage 
3, at which the interdicting ship may use force to comply with its instructions (for 
example to stop or change course and speed), or at stage 4, when it sends a 
boarding team, which may use force if the crew of the interdicted vessel does 
not cooperate with the boarding. On this point, the decision in Medvedyev 
provides little guidance, given that, while the Grand Chamber implied that the 
                                            
204 See above s 3.2.2. 
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ECHR had applied from the point of ‘interception’,205 it did not state when it 
considered the interception to have occurred, or whether there might be any 
additional basis for the ECHR applying before the interception. Therefore, while 
the decision records that the interdicting French vessel had used force to 
compel compliance with its instructions,206  it is unclear whether the Court 
considered, or would have considered, the ECHR to have applied at that point 
in the operation. This is not particularly surprising; given that the Grand 
Chamber was concerned only with alleged breaches of Article 5, it was strictly 
necessary only to establish whether the ECHR applied throughout the period of 
alleged detention, and not before. Furthermore, the same arises with respect to 
the Committee Against Torture’s decision in JHA v Spain, in which it considered 
the CAT to apply from the point that the Marine I ‘was rescued’. 
In the absence of specific guidance from courts and treaty bodies as to whether 
and when force used in the course of MSOs is capable of meeting the threshold 
of State agent authority and control, it is necessary to consider the law more 
generally. However, as set out above, while a sound argument can be 
constructed that, as a matter of principle, it is unsustainable to limit the personal 
model to only certain types of control (i.e. detention, but not the use of physical 
force), of the instruments under consideration, it is only in the ECtHR’s 
application of the ECHR and IACHR’s application of the ACHR that the limits of 
the personal model have come under detailed scrutiny.207 Furthermore, practice 
on this issue with respect to those two instruments has diverged, and the 
relevant jurisprudence under the ECHR is particularly complex. 
Summarising, briefly, the position with respect to the extraterritorial application 
of the ACHR, the IACHR has relied upon a broad conception of State agent 
authority and control, finding essentially any conduct attributable to a State, that 
results in the violation of rights, to be sufficient. Moreover, it has consistently 
applied this principle in connection with the use of physical force, where it has 
been used by a State both against aircraft in international airspace and against 
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individuals present in another State’s territory.208 In light of this consistent 
practice, albeit outside of the maritime context, it is inconceivable that the 
IACHR would not consider the ACHR to be applicable to the extraterritorial use 
of force by State agents conducting MSOs. 
However, the extraterritorial application of the ECHR on this basis is far more 
controversial. In particular, as set out above,209 the ECtHR’s failure to overrule 
key elements of Banković, reflected in the Grand Chamber’s reference in Al-
Skeini to the exercise of ‘public powers’ as the context against which the ECHR 
was found in that case to apply extraterritorially, arguably prevent the 
application of the ECHR on the basis of physical force alone, however 
unprincipled that result may be. Nevertheless, the context in which force is used 
in the course of MSOs can arguably be distinguished from the situations such 
as that in Banković, resembling more closely the use of force in Al-Skeini in the 
exercise of public powers. 
Force during maritime security operations is generally used pursuant to a 
claimed legal right to do so, for example under UNCLOS, as an exception to 
exclusive flag State jurisdiction. Article 110 UNCLOS provides for the right of 
warships and ‘other duly authorized ships’ to board any vessel that falls within 
specific enumerated circumstances, including those where there are reasonable 
grounds for suspecting that the vessel is engaged in piracy or the slave 
trade.210 Other exceptions to exclusive flag State jurisdiction can be established 
by treaty permitting, in particular circumstances, the boarding by agents of one 
                                            
208 See above s 3.2.2. 
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210 Art 110(1) reads in full: 
 
Except where acts of interference derive from powers conferred by treaty, 
a warship which encounters on the high seas a foreign ship, other than a 
ship entitled to complete immunity in accordance with articles 95 and 96, 
is not justified in boarding it unless there is reasonable ground for 
suspecting that: (a) the ship is engaged in piracy; (b) the ship is engaged 
in the slave trade; (c) the ship is engaged in unauthorized broadcasting 
and the flag State of the warship has jurisdiction under article 109; (d) the 
ship is without nationality; or (e) though flying a foreign flag or refusing to 
show its flag, the ship is, in reality, of the same nationality as the warship.  
UNCLOS (n 149) art 110(1). 
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State of vessels flagged to another.211 The use of force pursuant to such 
provisions is analogous to the basis on which the Grand Chamber established 
the applicants to be within the jurisdiction of the UK on the facts of Al-Skeini. In 
that case it was in the context of the exercise of public powers—i.e. pursuant to 
the UK’s responsibility for security—that the use of force was found to engage 
the ECHR. Similarly, in the context of MSOs, force will generally be used 
against vessels and individuals over whom a State will at least claim to have 
some sort of authority or responsibility, either under the law of the sea or some 
other agreement. Whether or not such a claimed basis is genuine, this is quite 
different from Banković where the only link, claimed or otherwise, between the 
States involved and those injured in the bombing attack was the conduct of the 
attack itself. 
Admittedly, in Al-Skeini, the UK forces in question were exercising public 
powers in place of territorial authorities that had been displaced through 
occupation. If construed very narrowly, it is clearly possible to distinguish this 
from the situation as it pertains to force used in the course of MSOs. However, it 
is submitted that the proposed line of reasoning, while untested, represents a 
plausible basis for the extraterritorial application of the ECHR to all instances of 
the use of force in the course of MSOs. Most persuasively, it avoids the result of 
imposing an artificial limit on the application of the personal model, while 
remaining consistent with the decisions in both Al-Skeini and Banković. 
More generally, the extraterritorial application of human rights treaties arising 
from the use of physical force alone clearly remains unsettled. The IACHR’s 
interpretation of the ACHR aside, it remains to a degree speculative with 
respect to each of the other instruments, as well as for the future interpretation 
of the ACHR by the IACtHR, either because of lack of practice or, in the case of 
the ECHR, because of complications in the related jurisprudence. Nevertheless, 
the arguments in favour of such application clearly demonstrate that future 
application of relevant human rights instruments on this basis should, at the 
very least, be considered a realistic possibility. 
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concluded by the United States to permit the boarding of foreign vessels on the 
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of involvement in the narcotics trade. Douglas Guilfoyle, Shipping Interdiction 
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3.4. Conclusion 
The situation with respect to extraterritorial applicability of IHRL treaties is 
complex, with divergence in law and practice between the treaties under 
consideration. The CAT remains an exceptional case, in relation to which the 
broad scope of application claimed by the Committee Against Torture with 
respect to some provisions remains difficult to justify in light of the obvious 
textual challenges. In contrast, while the extraterritorial applicability of the 
ICCPR remains controversial, the most persuasive view is that, like the ECHR 
and ACHR, it is capable of extraterritorial application, and that this depends 
primarily on the concept of jurisdiction. Similarly, while the ACHPR is silent on 
the subject, and is supported by very little practice, it is plausible that it, too, will 
be applied extraterritorially with reference to the concept of jurisdiction. In this 
context, this can include instances of de jure jurisdiction, but also refers more 
widely to situations of de facto authority and control. These can include both the 
effective control over an area, particularly in the practice relating to the ECHR, 
or from the exercise by State agents of de facto authority and control over 
individuals. 
Applying these principles to MSOs, the extraterritorial application of IHRL 
treaties can arise under a range of circumstances. Although more recent 
practice has often focused on de facto authority and control, flag-State 
jurisdiction, a classic example of de jure extraterritorial jurisdiction, is of 
continued relevance, having been applied by the ECtHR and constituting an 
express basis for the extraterritorial application of Article 5 of the CAT. Turning 
to de facto authority and control, it is conceivable that extraterritorial applicability 
could arise, in certain narrow circumstances, from effective control over an 
area. However, more significant, though less likely to be relevant to application 
of the CAT, is the concept of State agent authority and control, which this 
chapter has argued is capable of applying to many of the activities that 
comprise MSOs. 
The divergence in practice relating to State agent authority and control, 
particularly between the ECHR and ACHR, admittedly complicates the situation 
to a certain extent. The practice of the IACHR would suggest that it would apply 
the ACHR to any activity capable of infringing the rights that it protects. Hence it 
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would apply not only to, for example, situations of detention, but also to the use 
of force alone. In contrast, the ECtHR has applied the ECHR more restrictively; 
while it is settled that detention would suffice, it is less clear whether this would 
be the case at the stage of an MSO where the use of force is the only form of 
authority or control being asserted. However, even in this situation, the use of 
force in the course of MSOs is likely to be premised on the exercise of some 
kind of claimed authority such that a sound argument can be made to 
distinguish it from situations where the ECHR has been held not to apply. On 
this basis, it follows that arguments can plausibly be made that both the ECHR 
and ACHR will apply to most, if not all, of the activity comprising an MSO that is 
potentially capable of infringing rights protected by each instrument. While 
practice is less developed with respect to the ICCPR and ACHPR, it is arguably 
likely that they will be applied at least as broadly as the ECHR, noting the 
ECtHR’s relatively conservative approach to that instrument. 
In sum, when a State that is party to one of the treaties under consideration 
conducts MSOs outside its territory, either the MSO as a whole, or certain of the 
activities of which it is composed, are likely to engage human rights treaty 
obligations. As noted above, a State’s obligations under the CAT present a 
special case, being subject to a range of very specific applicability provisions. 
However, for the rest of the treaties, it is likely that a basis for their application 
will be identifiable, though uncertainties and differences certainly do persist. 
The broadest basis for extraterritorial application, the exercise of State agent 
authority and control, is the least certain in its scope; however, it is submitted 
that this provides a plausible basis for applying each of the treaties under 
consideration (with the likely exception of the CAT) to any activity comprising an 
MSO that is capable of engaging a State’s obligations under the treaty in 
question. 
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4. Use of Force 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter examines the first of the substantive aspects of maritime security 
operations (MSOs) to be considered in this thesis—the use of force. The 
contemplation, at least, that force may be used in the course of MSOs is implicit 
in the provisions of the law of the sea (and elsewhere) that provide the basis in 
law for their execution.1 Indeed, the ability to effect an interdiction, i.e. to stop, 
board and search a vessel, as well as potentially to arrest those on board and 
seize their cargo, depends on the ability to use force if the interdicted vessel 
does not cooperate. 
However, the use of force by State agents presents a paradigmatic example of 
circumstances in which a State’s activities are likely to engage human rights 
obligations. Where the State uses force, it has the potential to interfere with the 
most fundamental of rights, the right to life, as well as others protecting both 
individuals and their property, and, as a result, is subject to a well-developed 
regime of protection. The right to life, in particular, entails both positive and 
negative obligations, including not only the obligation not to deprive a person 
arbitrarily of their life, but to take steps to protect life and to ensure 
accountability when it is taken unlawfully. 
The analysis will proceed from the argument in the previous chapter that human 
rights obligations are engaged in the course of MSOs at least from the point 
that force is first used, even where they are conducted extraterritorially.2 As 
explained in Chapter Three, this remains a controversial proposition. While the 
weight of opinion is on the side of recognising the application of human rights 
law at least at some point during the course of an interdiction, there remain 
States that deny any extraterritorial application at all. The assertions made in 
this and subsequent chapters must therefore be understood to be qualified by 
this important caveat. 
This chapter will begin by describing current practice in the use of force in 
MSOs, examining both doctrine and the relevant literature to explain the range 
                                            
1 On the bases for, and regulation of MSOs, generally, see above s 1.1.3. 
2 See above s 3.3.4. 
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of means and methods employed. It will then briefly set out the parameters for 
the use of force recognised in the law of the sea. These have developed largely 
through case law and have been influenced, it seems, by human rights norms. 
The purpose of this analysis is to provide the comparator for the subsequent 
examination of relevant obligations under international human rights law (IHRL). 
The analysis of IHRL begins by setting out the main rights likely to be engaged 
when force is used in the course of MSOs, examining those that protect 
individuals, as well as those that protect their property. It then proceeds to 
analyse, in detail, the obligations that have been established in the 
jurisprudence of the IHRL systems under consideration with respect to law-
enforcement operations, and the applications of the relevant principles to 
MSOs. In so doing, it focuses on the right to life as the key right that is likely to 
be engaged and the right in respect of which there is the best developed 
practice. These obligations refer not only to the execution of MSOs, but also to 
their authorisation and regulation in law; their planning and resourcing; the 
training of relevant personnel; and obligations following the execution of MSOs 
to render medical aid, inform relatives of those injured, and to conduct 
investigations and hold those responsible for violations to account. This 
analysis reveals that, while the law of the sea is at least consistent with IHRL 
norms concerning the execution of MSOs, the obligations under IHRL run much 
deeper, albeit potentially limited by the issues concerning their extraterritorial 
applicability set out in Chapter Three. 
4.2. Practice concerning the use of force in MSOs 
Before considering the application of either the law of the sea or IHRL to the 
use of force in MSOs, it is helpful first to outline how such force is applied in 
practice. The short account that follows focuses on force used specifically in the 
course of boarding operations, because, as noted in Chapter One, such 
operations are especially prominent amongst MSOs and, by nature, particularly 
likely to involve the use of force. Nevertheless, force may also be used where 
there is no intention or desire to board another vessel. Indeed, many of the 
forceful measures described below could be used in other situations in which 
State authorities wish to compel or persuade a vessel to behave in some 
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desired manner, for example to desist from a certain activity, or to leave a 
particular area. 
As noted elsewhere in this thesis, official publications setting out, in detail, how 
MSOs are executed are usually classified or retained for official use only. The 
following draws significantly on Dutch doctrine, which is one of the few such 
accounts publicly available, as well as a limited range of published NATO and 
US documentation. It also draws upon practice reported in the literature, usually 
based upon either first-hand experience or knowledge of the relevant 
government documents. The intention is not to focus on the practice of one 
particular State, or subsequently to assess its lawfulness, but rather to provide 
the general context for the subsequent analysis of the law. 
Although MSOs are not necessarily violent, force may be used at various 
stages throughout the course of their execution. The type and degree of force 
used will depend on the level of cooperation received from the interdicted 
vessel. While the terminology used to describe the different situations can vary, 
the principles are broadly the same and Dutch doctrine is illustrative. 
Considering, specifically, boarding operations, it defines an ‘unopposed 
boarding’ as one ‘in which the master of the ship follows instructions from the 
naval ship and in which no passive or active resistance is apparent or 
expected.’3 A ‘non-cooperative boarding’ is one ‘in which the ship refuses to 
cooperate but in which no active or armed resistance is expected. The 
resistance is of a passive nature, for instance refusal to answer questions, 
refusal to follow instructions or the presence of passive measures on board that 
obstruct or hamper the boarding or searching of the vessel.’ 4  Finally, an 
‘opposed boarding’ is one ‘in which the master deliberately refuses to 
cooperate, in which active or armed resistance is expected or in which 
measures are in place that are clearly intended to pose a danger to or to injure 
members of the boarding party.’5 
                                            
3 Royal Netherlands Navy, ‘Fundamentals of Maritime Operations: Netherlands 
Maritime Military Doctrine’ (2014) (Netherlands Maritime Military Doctrine) 349. 
As noted at the reference, this may also be referred to as a ‘compliant boarding’ 
or ‘cooperative boarding’. 
4 ibid 349. As noted at the reference, this may also be referred to as a ‘non-
compliant boarding’. ibid fn 386. 
5 ibid 350. 
 134 
To achieve either a non-cooperative or opposed boarding, it may be necessary 
to use force. With respect to a non-cooperative boarding, force may be used ‘to 
persuade the ship to cooperate’ and will cease ‘[a]s soon as cooperation has 
been obtained.’6 It goes on state, ‘If necessary, force will be used in the form of 
warning shots across the bow, non-disabling fire on non-vital parts of the ship 
(such as mast, funnel or cargo), or ultimately disabling fire on vital parts of the 
ship (propulsion, rudder, buoyancy).’7 
Dutch doctrine is broadly representative of wider practice with respect to the 
use of force for this purpose. The terms ‘non-disabling fire’ and ‘disabling fire’ 
are both terms of art in NATO doctrine. The former is defined as, ‘Fire directed 
at a non-vital part of a vessel so as not to impair its seaworthiness and 
manoeuvrability’,8 while the latter is, ‘Fire directed at a vessel so as to impair its 
manoeuvrability but not its seaworthiness.’ 9  Although, according to these 
definitions, neither type of fire is intended to affect the seaworthiness of an 
interdicted vessel, this presumes a narrow definition of seaworthiness, given 
that a vessel subjected to disabling fire will be impaired in its manoeuvrability 
(i.e. its propulsion and ability to change and maintain course), or, according to 
Dutch doctrine, its buoyancy.  
US doctrine is broadly similar, though does not refer explicitly to non-disabling 
fire. The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations refers in 
general terms to oral warnings, warning shots and disabling fire. The latter is 
defined as ‘firing under controlled conditions into a noncompliant vessel’s 
rudder or propulsion equipment for the sole purpose of stopping it after oral 
warnings (if practicable) or warning shots (if practicable) have gone 
unheeded.’10 
As noted above, official documents containing more detailed accounts of the 
procedures used to apply force in MSOs are not generally made available to the 
public. However, within the academic literature on the subject, US Coast Guard 
                                            
6 ibid 351–52. 
7 ibid. 
8 NATO, ‘Glossary of Terms and Definitions’ (AAP-06, 2016) 95. 
9 ibid 44. 
10 US Navy, US Marine Corps, US Coast Guard, ‘The Commander’s Handbook 
on the Law of Naval Operations’ (NWP 1-14M, MCTP 11-10B, COMDTPUB 
P5800.7A, August 2017) para 3.11.5.1. 
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and US Navy doctrine is reported to prescribe a ‘progressive sequence’ of 
measures to enforce an order to permit boarding against a non-compliant 
vessel.11 The Coast Guard approach, for example, requires a progression from 
‘command presence’, through ‘“low-level” and then “higher-level” tactics’, 
ultimately to disabling fire.12 According to Allen: 
A variety of low-level force tactics designed to compel a fleeing vessel to 
stop have been tried over the years, including low level passes by aircraft; 
physically blocking or even “shouldering” the fleeing vessel; directing fire 
hose streams into the fleeing vessel’s exhaust stack to flood the engine; 
deploying nets, lines and other devices designed to entangle the vessel's 
propellers; and severing the vessel’s fuel line.13 
If such tactics fail, as Allen suggests will be likely in the case of ‘a determined 
noncompliant suspect’, then they can be followed with warning shots and, 
ultimately, disabling fire.14  
Disabling fire can, itself, be achieved with a range of means and methods. Allen 
describes US practice as involving a progressive escalation of means, requiring 
initially the use of ‘smaller calibre weapons’, for example a .50 calibre gun, 
before proceeding, if necessary, to employ the ship’s main armament. 15 
Furthermore, disabling fire (and other lesser forceful measures) can be 
employed from platforms other than the interdicting ship itself, including, most 
notably, helicopters. From these, precision weapons can be employed 
effectively by marksmen against fast-moving or highly manoeuvrable vessels.16 
Indeed, these tactics have been considered essential to facilitate the interdiction 
of such targets.17 
After the vessel has been prepared, the boarding itself will begin with the 
insertion of a security team, to ensure the safety of the rest of the boarding 
party. Once the vessel is secure, the remaining members of the team, including 
                                            
11 Craig H Allen, ‘Limits on the Use of Force in Maritime Operations in Support 
of WMD Counter-Proliferation Initiatives’ (2006) 81 Intl L Studies 77, 100. 
12 ibid 100. 
13 ibid 101. 
14 ibid 101. 
15 ibid 105. 
16 See, for example, Rachel Canty, ‘Developing Use of Force Doctrine: A Legal 
Case Study of the Coast Guard’s Airborne Use of Force’ (2000) 31 U Miami 
Inter-American L Rev 357, 369–71. 
17 ibid 364. 
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those tasked with inspecting documentation or searching for any suspected 
illicit cargoes, will embark.18 The subsequent activities of the boarding party will 
depend on the aim of the boarding, but may involve the ancillary use of force, 
for example to arrest individuals or to conduct a search that entails causing 
damage to the vessel.19 
Turning to opposed boardings, Allen’s description of US doctrine suggests that 
the tactics set out above can be used to assist in the execution of these as 
well.20 This makes sense; even if disabling fire fails to persuade a vessel to 
cooperate, it may still make it easier to conduct a subsequent boarding by 
affecting the vessel’s manoeuvrability. However, Allen also suggests that a 
‘vertical take-down’, involving the insertion of special operations forces by 
helicopter to take control of the vessel, may be an ‘effective alternative means 
of overcoming the suspect vessel’s noncompliance or even opposition—often 
without endangering the crew or potentially dangerous cargo on the suspect 
vessel’.21 Similarly, Dutch doctrine suggests that opposed boardings will only be 
conducted by means of a ‘takedown operation’, usually with an element of 
surprise, to gain control of the vessel. 22  NATO doctrine defines such an 
operation as, ‘The insertion of specially trained forces onto a vessel to compel 
the master to submit to a search by a boarding party.’23 However, although 
Dutch doctrine states that ‘there is no question of preparing the target ship’,24 
this may not always be the case. While, as Allen notes, ‘A vertical take-down 
may obviate the need for disabling fire’,25 this may not be the case where 
disabling fire is necessary, or helpful, as a measure to stop or slow the 
interdicted vessel. The situation is therefore more nuanced than the Dutch 
doctrine suggests—a range of forceful measures may be available, each 
carrying advantages or disadvantages in the particular circumstances. In any 
case, once the vessel has been secured, the operation can continue, as for 
                                            
18 Netherlands Maritime Military Doctrine (n 3) 352. 
19 Allen (n 11) 106–08. 
20 ibid 104 
21 ibid 105 
22 Netherlands Maritime Military Doctrine (n 3) 352. 
23 AAP-06 (n 8) 134. 
24 Netherlands Maritime Military Doctrine (n 3) 352. 
25 Allen (n 11) 105. 
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other types of boarding, with the embarkation of a boarding party tasked with, 
for example, searching for illegal cargo.  
Throughout the execution of MSOs, either the interdicting ship or individual 
members of a boarding or takedown team may use force in self-defence. The 
contours and parameters of this basis for the use of force will depend on the 
law (and, possibly, policy) of the State concerned, but Dutch doctrine is 
representative in referring to an inherent right of both individuals and military 
units (e.g. ships) to use force in self-defence, in the latter instance exercised 
under the authority of the unit’s commanding officer.26 In any case, however, 
this is distinct from the use of force, including disabling fire, to persuade the 
interdicted vessel to comply with the interdicting ship’s instructions and prepare 
it for boarding, as well as from the use of force to arrest individuals or conduct a 
search.27  
A related, but more general, distinction should be drawn according to the 
intended lethality of force used in MSOs. NATO defines lethal force as that 
which is ‘intended or likely to cause death, or serious injury resulting in death.’28 
Non-lethal force, by necessary implication, is that which is neither intended, nor 
likely, to cause death or serious injury resulting in death. It is uncontroversial 
that lethal (or deadly, as it is sometimes termed) force may, in some 
circumstances, be used in self-defence.29 However, outside self-defence, force 
in MSOs is usually used on the basis that it is not lethal.30 Indeed, warning 
shots are often considered to be signals, rather than a use of force at all.31 The 
other escalatory measures set out above, up to and including disabling fire, 
while undoubtedly forceful, are, by definition, not intended to cause death (or 
serious injury resulting in death), although whether they are likely to do so 
depends on the particular circumstances. 
                                            
26 Netherlands Maritime Military Doctrine (n 3) 225. See also Allen (n 11) 108–
10. 
27 Allen (n 11) 108–10. 
28 AAP-06 (n 8) 80. 
29 See, for example, Allen (n 11) 86. 
30 With respect to US practice, see, for example, Canty (n 16) 367–68. 
31 ibid 366–67. The US position set out by Canty is consistent with the decision 
of the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) in M/V ‘Saiga’ (No 
2). M/V ‘Saiga’ (No 2) (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v Guinea) (Merits, 
Judgment of 1 July 1999) ITLOS Reports [156]. 
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4.3. The use of force in MSOs in the law of the sea 
While the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)32 does not itself set 
explicit parameters for the use of force, relevant rules can be found in both 
treaty and customary law.33 Most notably, the International Tribunal for the Law 
of the Sea (ITLOS) considered the use of force in the course of interdiction in 
MV ‘Saiga’ (No. 2).34 Noting UNCLOS’s silence on the matter, the Tribunal 
found that general international law  
requires that the use of force must be avoided as far as possible and, 
where force is unavoidable, it must not go beyond what is reasonable and 
necessary in the circumstances. Considerations of humanity must apply in 
the law of the sea, as they do in other areas of international law.35 
The Tribunal went on briefly to state the practice from which it inferred its broad 
statements of principle: 
These principles have been followed over the years in law enforcement 
operations at sea. The normal practice used to stop a ship at sea is first to 
give an auditory or visual signal to stop, using internationally recognized 
signals. Where this does not succeed, a variety of actions may be taken, 
including the firing of shots across the bows of the ship. It is only after the 
appropriate actions fail that the pursuing vessel may, as a last resort, use 
force. Even then, appropriate warning must be issued to the ship and all 
efforts should be made to ensure that life is not endangered…36 
Applying these principles to the facts in MV ‘Saiga’ (No. 2), the Tribunal noted 
that the Saiga was moving slowly and could have been ‘boarded without much 
difficulty’. In any case, there was ‘no excuse’ for firing ‘at the ship itself with live 
ammunition from a fast-moving patrol boat without issuing any of the signals 
                                            
32 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (adopted 10 December 
1982, entered into force 16 November 1994) 1833 UNTS 397 (UNCLOS). 
33 See, for example, Douglas Guilfoyle, Shipping Interdiction and the Law of the 
Sea (CUP 2009) 265–94; Efthymios Papastavridis, Interception of Vessels on 
the High Seas: Contemporary Challenges to the Legal Order of the Oceans 
(Hart 2013) 50–82. 
34 M/V ‘Saiga’ (No 2) (n 31). The case concerned the use of force by a Guinean 
government patrol boat in the course of the 1997 interdiction of the Saiga, an oil 
tanker provisionally registered in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, while the 
Saiga was in the Guinean EEZ. The Saiga was alleged by Guinea to be 
delivering fuel to fishing vessels in violation of Guinean customs law. The 
question of the degree of force used was just one of several issues that were 
engaged. The factual background is set out at ibid [31]–[39]. 
35 ibid [155]. 
36 ibid [156].
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and warnings required by international law and practice.’37 The Tribunal also 
found the use of force on board the Saiga to have been excessive, specifically 
when, ‘[h]aving boarded the ship without resistance, [with] no evidence of the 
use or threat of force from the crew, [the officers] fired indiscriminately while on 
the deck and used gunfire to stop the engine of the ship.’38 
The Tribunal identified the relevant principles in part from two arbitral decisions 
dealing with similar issues. In the I’m Alone case,39 an arbitral panel considered 
that an interdiction pursuant to the bilateral agreement in question might involve 
necessary and reasonable force for the purpose of effecting the objects of 
boarding, searching, seizing and bringing into port the suspected vessel; 
and if sinking should occur incidentally, as a result of the exercise of 
necessary and reasonable force for such purpose, the pursuing vessel 
might be entirely blameless.40 
Similarly, in the Red Crusader case,41 the Commission of Enquiry established to 
investigate the use of force against a British trawler attempting to escape the 
                                            
37 ibid [157]. 
38 ibid [158]. 
39 SS ‘I’m Alone’ (Canada, United States of America) (Joint Final Report of the 
Commissioners, 5 January, 1935) 3 Reports of International Arbitral Awards 
1609. The arbitral award does not give the facts; however, the report in the 
American Journal of International Law states: 
 
The I'm Alone, a British ship of Canadian registry, but de facto owned, 
controlled and managed by a group of American citizens engaged in 
smuggling liquor into the United States, was sunk on the high seas in the 
Gulf of Mexico by a United States coast guard patrol boat, with the loss of 
one member of the I'm Alone’s crew, on March 22, 1929, after a hot 
pursuit which began on March 20 within twelve miles of the United States 
coast. 
‘Claim of the British Ship “I’m Alone” v United States’ (1935) 29(2) AJIL 326, 
326. The case considered a number of questions, including, ‘…whether, in the 
circumstances, the Government of the United States was legally justified in 
sinking the I'm Alone.’ ibid 1615. 
40 ibid. 
41 Investigation of Certain Incidents Affecting the British Trawler Red Crusader 
(Report of 23 March 1962 of the Commission of Enquiry established by the 
Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and 
the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark on 15 November 1961) 29 Reports 
of International Arbitral Awards 523. The case concerned the 1961 interdiction 
of the British trawler, Red Crusader, by a Danish vessel. Having been arrested, 
and initially cooperated, the Red Crusader attempted to escape, in response to 
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Danish authorities, found that the interdicting vessel had ‘exceeded legitimate 
use of armed force’ in two ways. First, the interdicting vessel had fired solid 
gun-shot (intended as warning shots rather than to hit the trawler) without 
warning. Second, it had it had ‘creat[ed] danger to human life on board the 
[trawler] without proved necessity’ when it later used ‘effective’ fire on the 
trawler (i.e. solid gun-shot that impacted on the trawler’s masts and hull). The 
Commission concluded on this point ‘that other means should have been 
attempted…’.42 
The Tribunal in MV ‘Saiga’ (No. 2) also recognised the reaffirmation of ‘[t]he 
basic principle concerning the use of force in the arrest of a ship at sea’ in the 
Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the 
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory 
Fish Stocks (FSA).43 Under the FSA, States shall ensure that their inspectors 
‘avoid the use of force except when and to the degree necessary to ensure the 
safety of the inspectors and where the inspectors are obstructed in the 
execution of their duties. The degree of force used shall not exceed that 
reasonably required in the circumstances.’44 
Almost identical language to that in the FSA was subsequently inserted into the 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation (SUA) by the 2005 Protocol.45 SUA, as amended by its Protocol, 
goes further by setting out particular safeguards, including that States shall: 
                                                                                                                                
which the accompanying Danish vessel used force in an attempt to compel it to 
comply with its orders. ibid 526–39. 
42 ibid 538. 
43 M/V ‘Saiga’ (No 2) (n 31) [156].  
44 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the 
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory 
Fish Stocks (concluded 4 August 1995, entered into force 11 December 2001) 
2167 UNTS 3 art 22(1)(f) (FSA). 
45 As inserted by the 2005 Protocol, art 8bis (9) SUA states that: 
 
the use of force shall be avoided except when necessary to 
ensure the safety of its officials and persons on board, or where 
the officials are obstructed in the execution of the authorized 
actions. Any use of force pursuant to this article shall not exceed 
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(i) take due account of the need not to endanger the safety of life at 
sea;  
(ii) ensure that all persons on board are treated in a manner which 
preserves their basic human dignity, and in compliance with the 
applicable provisions of international law, including international 
human rights law;  
(iii) ensure that a boarding and search pursuant to this article shall be 
conducted in accordance with applicable international law; 
(iv) take due account of the safety and security of the ship and its 
cargo;…46 
More detailed provisions concerning the use of force can be found in numerous 
bilateral and multilateral agreements that authorise or establish a framework for 
the interdiction of one State’s flagged vessels by those of another. For example, 
the 2003 Agreement Concerning Co-operation in Suppressing Illicit Maritime 
and Air Trafficking in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances in the 
Caribbean Area (Caribbean Area Agreement) sets out the following: 
1. Force may only be used if no other feasible means of resolving the 
situation can be applied. 
2. Any force used shall be proportional to the objective for which it is 
employed. 
3. All use of force pursuant to this Agreement shall in all cases be the 
minimum reasonably necessary under the circumstances. 
4. A warning shall be issued prior to any use of force except when force 
is used in self-defence. 
5. In the event that the use of force is authorised and necessary in the 
waters of a Party, law enforcement officials shall respect the laws of 
that Party. 
                                                                                                                                
the minimum degree of force which is necessary and reasonable 
in the circumstances. 
 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation (concluded 10 March 1988, entered into force 1 March 1992) 1678 
UNTS 201 as amended by the Protocol of 2005 (adopted 1 November 2005, 
entered into force 28 July 2010) IMO Doc LEG/CONF.15/21 (SUA). 
46 ibid art 8bis (10). 
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6. In the event that the use of force is authorised and necessary during 
a boarding and search seaward of the territorial sea of any Party, the 
law enforcement officials shall comply with their domestic laws and 
procedures and the directions of the flag State. 
7. The discharge of firearms against or on a suspect vessel shall be 
reported as soon as practicable to the flag State Party. 
8. Parties shall not use force against civil aircraft in flight. 
9. The use of force in reprisal or as punishment is prohibited. 
10. Nothing in this agreement shall impair the exercise of the inherent 
right of self-defence by law enforcement or other officials of any 
Party.47 
SUA, the Caribbean Area Agreement, and other bilateral and multilateral 
agreements apply, as a matter of law, only to the particular operations they 
authorise or govern. However, they, like the FSA, can be considered to reaffirm 
the principles set out in the M/V Saiga (No. 2) judgment, namely that force used 
in the course of interdiction must be necessary, reasonable and proportionate. 
Furthermore, where force is used it must generally follow a process of 
escalation including, most importantly, the giving of warnings (including warning 
shots). 
Importantly, these principles seem to apply both to the use of force in order to 
compel a vessel to stop and submit to boarding, as well as to the use of force 
once officers are on board the interdicted vessel. This can be seen in the 
reasoning of the ITLOS in its M/V Saiga (No. 2) judgment. As Guilfoyle notes, 
the Tribunal’s reliance on the FSA as a reaffirmation of an existing principle 
‘was an interesting elision, as the [I’m Alone and Red Crusader cases] dealt 
only with use of force against a vessel while the FSA deals with the use of force 
aboard a vessel.’ 48  The Tribunal seems to have made the (unstated) 
assumption that the same underlying law governs both phases of an operation. 
This makes sense, given that the law of the sea authorises both arrest and 
searching of vessels. While these are distinct authorizations, it would be 
                                            
47 Agreement Concerning Co-operation in Suppressing Illicit Maritime and Air 
Trafficking in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances in the Caribbean 
Area (concluded 10 April 2003, not yet in force) art 22 (Caribbean Area 
Agreement). 
48 Guilfoyle (n 33) 277. 
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surprising if the basic principles governing the use of force differed between the 
two. Consistent with this reasoning, it is clear that the provisions set out in the 
Caribbean Area Agreement are intended to apply to both phases, noting, in 
particular, Article 22(7), which requires the reporting to the flag State of ‘[t]he 
discharge of firearms against or on a suspect vessel’.49 
It is clear, therefore, that the law of the sea, as interpreted by the ITLOS in light 
of principles derived from general international law, already contains important 
rules and principles governing the use of force in MSOs. As will be shown, 
these reflect, or are at least consistent with, some relevant human rights norms, 
an observation arguably reflected in the reference in M/V Saiga (No. 2) to 
‘[c]onsiderations of humanity’,50 though acknowledging the range of meanings 
that that term could be used to denote. This raises a question as to the extent to 
which human rights norms might have already been incorporated into the law of 
the sea. While the I’m Alone case demonstrates that at least some of these 
principles were recognised before the drafting of the major international human 
rights treaties, the law of the sea has continued to develop alongside human 
rights law and it seems likely, at the very least, that human rights law has 
influenced the development of the law of the sea in this area. Importantly, 
where human rights norms have been incorporated as part of the law of the 
sea, they apply throughout the maritime domain, thus avoiding the debate 
concerning the extraterritorial application of human rights law set out in Chapter 
Three. 
Although the law of the sea provides important restraints on the use of force in 
the course of MSOs, it is, however, limited in its scope. The relevant principles 
are largely negative, prohibiting force that is unnecessary, unreasonable or 
disproportionate. While there are also some positive obligations—the 
requirement to give warnings before the use of force, for example—these are 
arguably just manifestations of the principle of necessity. More fundamentally, 
these principles apply only at the point that force is used, or at least 
contemplated. They are not, therefore, concerned with the wider circumstances 
in which force is used in MSOs, such as its basis in law, the planning and 
                                            
49 Caribbean Area Agreement (n 47) art 22(7). 
50 M/V ‘Saiga’ (No 2) (n 31) [155]. 
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resourcing of the operation in which it is used, or its aftermath.51 As will be 
shown, IHRL rules extend the regulation of the use of force beyond the 
application of force itself to include these broader issues. Therefore, even 
though it is arguable that the law of the sea already incorporates some core 
human rights norms, the full range of obligations that can be identified in IHRL 
is much broader. 
4.4. The application of IHRL to the use of force in MSOs 
Having considered the limits placed on the use of force under the law of the 
sea, the chapter now turns to an analysis of the IHRL provisions that may be 
engaged when force is used in the course of MSOs. The section is in two parts: 
first, an examination of the relevant rights; and, second, a detailed examination 
of how they apply to MSOs, focusing, in particular on the right to life. 
The premise of this analysis is that the rights in question apply to force used at 
any stage of a MSO, wherever the operation might be conducted. However, as 
discussed in detail in Chapters Two and Three, the applicability of IHRL, 
particularly extraterritorially, remains in many respects controversial. This is 
especially so where the only connection between an interdicting ship and an 
interdicted vessel is the force that is used by the former against the latter. 
Although an argument was presented in Chapter Three according to which 
each of the instruments under examination can be considered to apply in such 
situations,52 this is far from settled. It is especially controversial with respect to 
the ECHR. As noted in the introduction to this chapter, the following analysis 
should therefore be understood with this important caveat in mind. 
4.4.1. Relevant rights 
4.4.1.1. Rights protecting property 
The account of the use of force in the course of MSOs set out above 
demonstrated that property damage may be caused in a number of situations, 
either deliberately or inadvertently. For example, damage will be inflicted 
                                            
51 Noting, as a narrow exception, the requirement under the Caribbean Area 
Agreement to notify the flag State when weapons have been discharged. 
Caribbean Area Agreement (n 47) art 22(7). 
52 See above s 3.3.4. 
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intentionally to a vessel when it is subjected to either non-disabling or disabling 
fire, and potentially also if it is damaged deliberately when it is searched. 
Inadvertent damage may be caused whenever force is used; for example, a 
warning shot may unintentionally hit and damage the vessel, or damage to 
property may be an unintended consequence of using force in self-defence. 
Considering rights engaged when property is damaged,53 the First Protocol to 
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR),54 as well as the American 
Convention on Human Rights (ACHR)55 and African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR),56 but not the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR),57 each contain relevant provisions. Article 1 of the First 
Protocol to the ECHR states that: 
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his 
possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the 
public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the 
general principles of international law.  
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of 
a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of 
property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment 
of taxes or other contributions or penalties.  
Article 21(1) ACHR states that, ‘Everyone has the right to the use and 
enjoyment of his property. The law may subordinate such use and enjoyment to 
the interest of society.’ Article 14 of the ACHPR states that, ‘The right to 
property shall be guaranteed. It may only be encroached upon in the interest of 
public need or in the general interest of the community and in accordance with 
the provisions of appropriate laws.’ 
                                            
53 On the right to property, in general, see Walter Kälin and Jörg Künzli, The 
Law of International Human Rights Protection (OUP 2009) 431–39. 
54 Protocol 1 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms (adopted 20 March 1952, entered into force 18 
May 1954) ETS 9 (ECHR Protocol 1). 
55 American Convention on Human Rights: ‘Pact of San José, Costa Rica’ 
(signed 22 November 1969, entered into force 18 July 1978) 1144 UNTS 144 
(ACHR). 
56 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (adopted 27 June 1981, 
entered into force 21 October 1986) (1982) 21 ILM 58 (ACHPR). 
57 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 
1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR). 
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These rights may clearly apply in situations where individuals have been 
deprived of their property. However, they may also be engaged where property 
is subject to damage attributable to the State,58 although relevant practice is 
scarce. In the context of the First Protocol to the ECHR, the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) has made clear that the entitlement to peaceful 
enjoyment of possessions is independent of the right not to be deprived of 
property,59 and has found a State to be in breach of that obligation when 
damage has been caused to individuals’ property.60 The Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights (IACtHR) has found similarly with respect to Article 21 
ACHR.61 While relevant practice with respect to the ACHPR is currently lacking, 
it is plausible that Article 14 will be applied on a like basis. 
In applying these rights these rights, the ECtHR has held that, in cases of 
interference by the State with an individual’s peaceful enjoyment of property, 
‘the Court must determine whether a fair balance was struck between the 
demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the 
protection of the individual’s fundamental rights’.62 With respect to the ACHR, 
Antkowiak and Gonza point out that, in cases concerning the rights of 
indigenous populations, the IACtHR has applied a test requiring ‘restrictions on 
property rights to be: (1) previously established by law, (2) necessary, (3) 
proportional, and (4) with the aim of achieving a legitimate objective in a 
democratic society.’63 However, they note that this test has rarely been applied 
                                            
58 See, for example, Peter Rowe, The Impact of Human Rights Law on Armed 
Forces (CUP 2005) 195. Rowe discusses the issue in the context of armed 
conflict, but the point is of wider application. See also William A Schabas, The 
European Convention on Human Rights: A Commentary (OUP 2015) 972. 
59 Sporrong and Lönnroth v Sweden, Series A no 52 (ECtHR) [61]. 
60 See, for example, Öneryıldız v. Turkey, in which the ECtHR held that art 1 of 
the First Protocol to the ECHR was engaged when the Turkish government 
failed to meet its positive obligation to prevent damage to a house destroyed in 
a methane explosion. The key point for present purposes is simply that property 
damage attributable to the State is capable of engaging the right to peaceful 
enjoyment. Öneryıldız v. Turkey ECHR 2004-XII 79 [133]–[35]. 
61 Ituango Massacres v Colombia (Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations 
and Costs) Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No 148 (1 July 
2008) [172]—[177]. In this case, the Colombian armed forces were found to 
have been complicit in deliberate damage to property caused by a paramilitary 
group in the course of an internal armed conflict. 
62 Sporrong (n 59) [69]. 
63 Thomas M Antkowiak and Alejandra Gonza, The American Convention on 
Human Rights: Essential Rights (OUP 2017) 274 (citation omitted). 
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to property cases outside this particular context, although it is a test familiar 
from the IACtHR’s analysis of other rights.64 
Notwithstanding the paucity of practice, an analysis of legality, necessity, 
proportionality and legitimate aim represents a plausible basis for assessing 
whether intentional interference with property is in violation of individuals’ 
property rights under each instrument. As is established below with respect to 
other rights engaged in the course of MSOs, these concepts are pervasive 
through IHRL, and their application in this context will be no different in principle 
from its application elsewhere. In particular, the points considered below with 
respect to the legal basis requirement under both the right to life,65 and the right 
to liberty and security of the person,66 are of equal relevance here, too.  
As well as a duty to respect individuals’ rights to property, there is some support 
for the suggestion that States may also owe a positive duty with respect to the 
protection of property from damage. In Öneryildiz v Turkey the ECtHR 
considered whether Turkey had violated Article 1 of the First Protocol to the 
ECHR when it failed to prevent the destruction of the applicant’s house in a 
methane explosion. The applicant had also alleged a similar failure, amounting 
to a violation of Article 2 ECHR, to prevent the deaths of several of his relatives. 
The Court stated that: 
Genuine, effective exercise of the right protected by [Article 1 of the First 
Protocol] does not depend merely on the State’s duty not to interfere, but 
may require positive measures of protection, particularly where there is a 
direct link between the measures which an applicant may legitimately 
expect from the authorities and his effective enjoyment of his 
possessions.67 
In the circumstances of the case, the Court held that the State’s positive 
obligation arising under Article 1 of the First Protocol required of it the same 
practical steps as arose from its positive obligations under Article 2.68 Although 
the relevance of property rights is obviously limited only to those instruments in 
which they are protected, and the limited jurisprudence means that any 
                                            
64 ibid 274. 
65 See below s 4.4.2.2. 
66 See below 5.4.4. 
67 Öneryıldız (n 60) [134]. 
68 ibid [136]. 
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conclusions remain tentative, the points raised below with respect to the 
positive obligations arising under the right to life are, to some extent, relevant 
also to property damage.  
4.4.1.2. Rights protecting life and bodily integrity 
As explained above, when force is used in MSOs, harm may be caused either 
deliberately (or at least foreseeably) or inadvertently, and by State agents, 
whether they are complying with or acting outside of rules or procedures 
established by the State in question. Indeed, as the account above implies, the 
object of force in MSOs is rarely, if ever, deliberately to cause death, injury or 
damage, but rather to achieve some other objective, such as the arrest of a 
vessel or the individuals on board. However, individuals may nevertheless be 
killed as a foreseen, or unforeseen, consequence of force used for some other 
purpose, or as a result of force employed by a State agent acting outside the 
State’s rules or procedures. It is therefore important to understand both the 
negative obligation to respect the parameters in the use of force derived from 
the relevant rights, as well the positive obligation to protect individuals, in some 
circumstances, from the excessive use of force. As explained below, although a 
State may be entitled to use force in certain circumstances, notwithstanding that 
it is intended or expected to cause harm, it must meet its obligations to respect 
the relevant rights when it does so. In addition, it must protect individuals from 
deliberate excess force, or the unintended consequences of force.  
Considering the relevant rights, the most prominent is the right to life,69 which is 
protected by Article 6 ICCPR, which states that, ‘Every human being has the 
inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be 
arbitrarily deprived of his life.’70 Both the ACHR and ACHPR set out the right in 
similar terms. Under Article 4 ACHR, ‘Every person has the right to have his life 
respected. This right shall be protected by law and, in general, from the moment 
                                            
69 On the right to life, generally, see Nigel Rodley, ‘Integrity of the Person’ in 
Daniel Moeckli, Sangeeta Shah and Sandesh Sivakumaran (eds), International 
Human Rights Law (2nd edn, OUP 2014) 184–92; Kälin and Künzli (n 53) 274–
303. 
70 ICCPR (n 57) art 6(1). The remainder of art 6 deals exclusively with capital 
punishment and the crime of genocide. 
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of conception. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.’71 According to 
Article 4 of the ACHPR, ‘Human beings are inviolable. Every human being shall 
be entitled to respect for his life and the integrity of his person. No one may be 
arbitrarily deprived of this right.’72 While these three provisions are not identical, 
there is clear overlap in their language. Most importantly, all three instruments 
prohibit the ‘arbitrary’ deprivation of life, which, as will be shown, underpins 
much of the detailed content of the right to life.  
The structure of Article 2 ECHR is different to its counterparts in the other 
instruments under consideration.73 In particular, the term ‘arbitrary’ does not 
appear in Article 2, which is as follows: 
1. Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be 
deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence 
of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is 
provided by law. 
2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention 
of this Article when it results from the use of force which is no more 
than absolutely necessary: 
(a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence; 
(b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a 
person lawfully detained; 
(c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or 
insurrection.74 
Under the ECHR the taking of life is therefore not unlawful when it results from 
the use of force in the specific, enumerated circumstances set out in Article 
2(2), and so long as to do so is ‘absolutely necessary’. Where these criteria are 
met, force that results in death does not violate the right to life.75 Although this 
construction is, on the face of it, different from that used in the other 
instruments, subsequent practice has brought the different approaches closer 
                                            
71 ACHR (n 55) art 4(1). The remainder of art 4 deals exclusively with capital 
punishment. 
72 ACHPR (n 56) art 4. 
73 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(European Convention on Human Rights, as amended) (ECHR) art 2. 
74 ibid art 2. 
75 Schabas (n 58) 122. 
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together. From the perspective of the ECHR, where a State seeks to rely on 
these exceptions, it has been held that its actions must not be arbitrary.76 On 
the other hand, arbitrariness, at least so far as Article 6 ICCPR is concerned, 
has been interpreted consistently with Article 2 ECHR.77 
Notwithstanding the express language used in the provisions protecting the 
right to life, especially the reference in Article 2 ECHR to the ‘intentional’ 
deprivation of life, they apply to a broader set of circumstances than might at 
first appear. At least so far as the ECHR is concerned, it may extend to 
situations where an individual does not actually die, but who nevertheless 
suffered injuries indicative that his or her life was in ‘serious danger’.78 The 
IAtCHR has similarly considered Article 4 ACHR applicable where individuals 
have had their lives placed at serious risk but have nevertheless survived.79 The 
ECtHR has also held that Article 2 ECHR ‘covers not only intentional killing but 
also the situations where it is permitted to use force which may result, as an 
unintended outcome, in the deprivation of life.’80 As Schabas notes, it is no 
longer seriously disputed that Article 2 ECHR not only limits the circumstances 
in which a State may intentionally deprive an individual of his or her life, but also 
entails a positive obligation to safeguard life.81 The obligations that flow from the 
right to life are, therefore, both negative—the right not to be arbitrarily deprived 
of life by the State or its agents—and positive, including a number of duties to 
protect individuals from arbitrary or unlawful deprivation of life.82  
The circumstances in which the right to life has been applied are wide ranging, 
and have been considered specifically in the context of the use of force by State 
agents. With respect to the application of Article 6 ICCPR the Human Rights 
Council (HRC) has stated: 
                                            
76 See, for example, Finogenov and Others v Russia ECHR 2011 [207]. 
77 Sarah Joseph and Melissa Castan, The International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights: Cases, Materials and Commentary (3rd edn, OUP 2013) para 
8.05. 
78 Krivova v Ukraine App No 25732/05 (ECtHR, 9 Nov 2010) [45]. See also 
Schabas (n 58) 125. 
79 Antkowiak and Gonza (n 63) 62–63. 
80 Makaratzis v Greece ECHR 2004-XI 195 [49]. 
81 Schabas (n 58) 139–40. 
82 See, for example, Joseph and Castan (n 77) para 8.01; Schabas (n 58) 122. 
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that States parties should take measures…to prevent arbitrary killing by 
their own security forces. The deprivation of life by the authorities of the 
State is a matter of the utmost gravity. Therefore, the law must strictly 
control and limit the circumstances in which a person may be deprived of 
his life by such authorities.83 
With respect to the ECHR, in Finogenov, the ECtHR stated: ‘As the text of 
Article 2 itself shows, the use of lethal force by law- enforcement officers may 
be justified in certain circumstances. Nonetheless, Article 2 does not grant them 
carte blanche. Unregulated and arbitrary action by State agents is incompatible 
with effective respect for human rights.84 The IACtHR has similarly held with 
respect to Article 4 ACHR that, ‘States have the obligation to guarantee the 
creation of the conditions required to ensure that violations of this inalienable 
right do not occur and, in particular, the obligation to prevent its agents from 
violating this right.’85 Likewise, the African Commission has stated that Article 4 
ACHPR requires that, ‘The State must take all reasonable precautionary steps 
to protect life and prevent excessive use of force by its agents’.86 
With regard to the application of the right of life specifically to law enforcement 
operations, the HRC, 87  IACtHR, 88  and ECtHR, 89  have all made notable 
                                            
83 UN Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment No 6’ (30 April 1982) UN 
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88 See, for example, Landaeta Mejías Brothers (n 85) [126] (‘The State must 
establish precise internal policies in relation to the use of force and identify 
strategies to implement the Basic Principles on the Use of Force and the Code 
of Conduct’ (citations omitted)). 
 152 
reference to the Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law 
Enforcement Officials (Basic Principles).90 This soft law document, adopted by 
the United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of 
Offenders in 1990, emphasises in its preamble the requirement that ‘the use of 
force and firearms by law enforcement officials should be commensurate with 
due respect for human rights.’ Although, in itself, not legally binding, its 
provisions reflect, and have been widely cited in, judgments and treaty-body 
comments and communications. Similarly, while not written with MSOs 
specifically in mind, it is submitted that its provisions are equally applicable, and 
are as capable of being applied, to armed forces and others executing MSOs as 
they are to other individuals more commonly thought of as law-enforcement 
officials. It therefore provides an important and influential standard against 
which the compatibility of MSOs can be measured against relevant rights, 
including the right to life. Its provisions, so far as they are relevant, are 
considered below. 
Before considering these obligations arising from the right to life in more detail, 
it should be understood that other rights may be engaged when individuals are 
harmed in the course of MSOs. An additional right relevant to bodily injury 
outside the context of detention is the right to liberty and security of the person, 
at least as it has been interpreted and applied by the HRC. Each of the main 
instruments under consideration contains a right protecting liberty and 
security,91 but these have generally been understood to apply in practice only to 
situations where individuals are deprived of their liberty.92 Nevertheless, with 
respect to Article 9 ICCPR, the HRC stated in General Comment 35 that the 
                                                                                                                                
89 See the extensive survey of practice at Schabas (n 58) 130–31. 
90 ‘Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement 
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right entails obligations with respect to bodily harm to individuals ‘whether the 
victim is detained or non-detained.’93 Consequently, the practice of the HRC 
has developed to treat the ‘right to security of person’ as separate and distinct 
from the ‘right to liberty of person’.94 
Consistent with its interpretation of the right to life, the HRC has stated that, as 
well as prohibiting the infliction of unjustifiable bodily injury by State agents,95 
the right to security of person imposes positive obligations on States ‘to protect 
individuals from foreseeable threats to life or bodily integrity proceeding from 
any governmental or private actors.’96 However, noting the detailed practice that 
has developed under the right to life with respect to the use of force in law 
enforcement operations, including that which is neither intended nor expected 
to cause death or serious injury, it is difficult, if not impossible, to separate the 
concrete obligations that arise in this regard under Article 9 ICCPR from those 
that arise under Article 6 ICCPR. 
4.4.2. Application of relevant IHRL principles to MSOs 
Noting the obvious potential for the use of force by State agents to cause death 
or serious injury, either intentionally or inadvertently, it is unsurprising that there 
is extensive practice relating to the application of the right to life in the context 
of law-enforcement operations. Given that MSOs are conducted in peacetime, 
usually to enforce the State’s jurisdiction over individuals, they can be 
considered at least analogous to other types of law-enforcement operation.97 
The following analysis therefore proceeds on this basis, setting out the key 
obligations that flow from the application of the right to life to law enforcement 
operations generally, before explaining, in turn, how the principles that are 
identified apply to MSOs. In doing so, it focuses, in particular, on those 
obligations that are particularly affected in their application by the MSO context.  
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These obligations relate almost exclusively to the right to life, though some, 
particularly in their expression through the Basic Principles, make reference, 
explicitly or implicitly, to the protection of property and the right to security of the 
person, at least as interpreted by the HRC. However, the extensive 
jurisprudence relating to the right to life demonstrates its central importance in 
the context of law-enforcement operations generally, particularly in light of its 
broad application beyond just intentional killing, and therefore to MSOs. 
4.4.2.1. The requirements of necessity and proportionality in the use of force 
As set out above, the ICCPR, ACHR and ACHPR prohibit the arbitrary 
deprivation of life. In the context of the use of force by law-enforcement officers, 
this has been interpreted by the HRC to mean that the right to life would be 
violated where death resulted from actions that were ‘disproportionate to the 
requirements of law enforcement in the circumstances of the case’.98 Such a 
requirement to use force would exist where ‘necessary in [the police’s] defence 
or that of others’, and where ‘necessary to effect the arrest or prevent the 
escape of’ those suspected of an offence.99 As Joseph and Castan note, these 
mirror the first two situations, set out in express terms in Article 2 ECHR, in 
which lethal force may be permitted under that instrument.100 
With respect to the ACHR, the IACtHR, on reviewing the relevant jurisprudence, 
has stated ‘that force or coercive means can only be used once all other 
methods of control have been exhausted and have failed’,101 and that: 
The use of lethal force and firearms against individuals by law 
enforcement officials – which must be forbidden as a general rule – is only 
justified in even more extraordinary cases. The exceptional circumstances 
under which firearms and lethal force may be used shall be determined by 
the law and restrictively construed, so that they are used to the minimum 
extent possible in all circumstances and never exceed the use which is 
“absolutely necessary” in relation to the force or threat to be repealed. 
                                            
98 Suarez de Guerrero (n 83) para 13.3. 
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When excessive force is used, any resulting deprivation of life is 
arbitrary.102  
To illustrate, the IACtHR has not considered the requirement of absolute 
necessity to have been met, for example, where lethal force was used to detain 
individuals who did not pose a danger.103 It has further emphasised that, 
‘Excessive or disproportionate use of force by law enforcement officials that 
result in the loss of life may…amount to arbitrary deprivations of life.’104 Force 
may be disproportionate where lesser, non-violent means, would have achieved 
the relevant aim.105 
Similarly, the African Commission has stated that Article 4 ACHPR requires that 
Force may be used in law enforcement only in order to stop an imminent 
threat. The intentional lethal use of force by law enforcement officials and 
others is prohibited unless it is strictly unavoidable in order to protect life 
(making it proportionate) and all other means are insufficient to achieve 
that objective (making it necessary). 106 
Turning to the ECHR, which, as noted above, enumerates the circumstances in 
which lethal force may be permitted, the requirement of ‘absolute’ necessity 
restricts the circumstances in which those grounds can be relied upon. With 
respect to the use of force ‘in defence of any person from unlawful violence’,107 
Schabas summarises the case law of the ECtHR as meaning that, ‘Lethal force 
in self-defence will only be justified if a serious threat of death or serious injury 
is perceived.’108 Similarly, with respect to the use of force ‘in order to effect a 
lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained’,109 the 
ECtHR has stated that the test of absolute necessity is not met ‘where it is 
known that the person to be arrested poses no threat to life or limb and is not 
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suspected of having committed a violent offence, even if a failure to use lethal 
force may result in the opportunity to arrest the fugitive being lost.’110  
Consistent with this, the Basic Principles require, inter alia, that: 
4. Law enforcement officials, in carrying out their duty, shall, as far as 
possible, apply non-violent means before resorting to the use of force 
and firearms. They may use force and firearms only if other means 
remain ineffective or without any promise of achieving the intended 
result. 
5. Whenever the lawful use of force and firearms is unavoidable, law 
enforcement officials shall: 
(a) Exercise restraint in such use and act in proportion to the 
seriousness of the offence and the legitimate objective to be 
achieved; 
(b) Minimize damage and injury, and respect and preserve human 
life; …111 
In particular, with respect to the use of firearms against persons: 
9. Law enforcement officials shall not use firearms against persons 
except in self-defence or defence of others against the imminent 
threat of death or serious injury, to prevent the perpetration of a 
particularly serious crime involving grave threat to life, to arrest a 
person presenting such a danger and resisting their authority, or to 
prevent his or her escape, and only when less extreme means are 
insufficient to achieve these objectives. In any event, intentional 
lethal use of firearms may only be made when strictly unavoidable in 
order to protect life. 
10. In the circumstances provided for under principle 9, law enforcement 
officials shall identify themselves as such and give a clear warning of 
their intent to use firearms, with sufficient time for the warning to be 
observed, unless to do so would unduly place the law enforcement 
officials at risk or would create a risk of death or serious harm to 
other persons, or would be clearly inappropriate or pointless in the 
circumstances of the incident. 112 
To summarise the relevant principles that can be identified from across the 
different human rights treaties and systems, although it can be difficult to 
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separate out the requirements of necessity and proportionality, it is clear that 
force must be both necessary, meaning that it may only be used where non-
violent measures would be insufficient, and limited to that which is proportionate 
to the aim in pursuit of which force is to be used. Lethal force is permitted only 
in narrow circumstances, including defence of self and others, and to arrest or 
prevent the escape of an individual, but only where strictly necessary to protect 
life, or at least prevent serious injury. Furthermore, it will only be permitted only 
when less violent means have proven, or would prove to be, ineffective. 
More broadly, all force, whether intended or likely to kill or not, is subject to 
requirements of necessity and proportionality. The reference to the minimization 
of ‘damage and injury’ in the Basic Principles arguably relates to the existence, 
as discussed above, of other human right norms that are relevant to the use of 
force, noting that the Basic Principles are derived not just from the right to life. 
However, given that death or serious injury may arise from law-enforcement 
operations in which that result is not intended, or even necessarily foreseen, it 
makes sense that the right to life would also entail restrictions on any use of 
force by law-enforcement officials. These are also reflected in the obligations, 
discussed below, to regulate the use of force in such situations; to plan law-
enforcement operations so as to minimise the recourse to force; and to train 
and equip law-enforcement officials appropriately. 
Applying these principles to MSOs, it is clear that lethal force, in the sense of 
force intended, or likely, to cause death or serious injury is likely to be justified 
only in exceptional circumstances, just as in other law-enforcement situations. 
The most plausible situation is the use of force, either by a ship or by individuals 
members of a boarding party, to use lethal force to defend themselves or others 
from an imminent threat to life. Less plausible, though still conceivable, is that 
lethal force could be justified to effect the arrest of a vessel, or of individuals on 
board a vessel, where necessary to avert a threat to life, such as might be the 
case with respect to known terrorists or, for example, where pirates are 
expected to kill or seriously injure those that they attack. However, outside of 
these narrow circumstances, the criteria for the use of lethal force would not be 
met. With respect to the use of force in MSOs more broadly, States are required 
to exercise restraint, taking into account the reason, for example, for wanting to 
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interdict a vessel, and resorting to force only where non-violent means are 
ineffective. 
To a large extent, these principles are reflected in the practice described above, 
as well as in the restrictions on the use of force under the law of the sea, as 
identified by the ITLOS in the M/V ‘Saiga’ (No. 2) case. So far as force in MSOs 
is used in accordance with the practice described above, lethal force is not 
generally used to interdict vessels; in particular, neither non-disabling nor 
disabling fire are intended, nor to be employed so as to be expected, to cause 
death or serious injury. Moreover, the IHRL requirement to act with restraint in 
the use of any force, and to use force only where less-violent means are 
ineffective, is reflected in the practice of escalating the type of force used, 
through non-disabling and disabling fire, and the use of warnings and warning 
shots before doing so. To this extent, it is likely that the practice described, 
consistent with the law as stated by the ITLOS, is also consistent with the 
relevant IHRL norms. 
Where a potential issue may lie, however, is in the requirement when using 
force, set out in the Basic Principles, to ‘act in proportion to the seriousness of 
the offence’.113 It should be recalled in this context that the interdiction of 
vessels may be justified in a diverse range of circumstances. However, neither 
the practice set out above, nor the statement of the law by the ITLOS in M/V 
‘Saiga’ (No. 2), entails, explicitly at least, weighing the use of force against the 
purpose for which a vessel is to be interdicted. Applying the requirement set out 
in the Basic Principles, a State is arguably required to consider whether the 
reason for interdicting a vessel is sufficiently serious to justify the use of force at 
all, whether or not it is intended or expected to be lethal. This is a more rigorous 
standard than that identified by the ITLOS in M/V ‘Saiga’ (No. 2); it means that 
the importance of interdicting a particular vessel ought at least to be considered 
when deciding whether and what force to use to do so. It also means, 
ultimately, that there may be situations where force is not justified at all. 
                                            
113 ibid para 5(a). 
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4.4.2.2. The requirement that the use of force be authorised and regulated by 
law 
Practice relating to the right to life where force is used by State agents 
demonstrates that force must be subject to authorization and regulation by 
law—a principle sometimes described as that of ‘legality’.114 The HRC has 
stated that ‘the law must strictly control and limit the circumstances in which a 
person may be deprived of his life by [State] authorities.’115 The ECtHR has held 
that ‘as well as being authorised under national law, policing operations must be 
sufficiently regulated by it, within the framework of a system of adequate and 
effective safeguards against arbitrariness and abuse of force, and even against 
avoidable accident.116 In interpreting Article 4 ACHR, the IACtHR has stated 
that ‘it is essential that the State…has an appropriate legal framework 
regulating the use of force that ensures the right to life’.117 Similarly, the African 
Commission has interpreted Article 4 ACHPR as requiring that ‘States must 
adopt a clear legislative framework for the use of force by law-enforcement and 
other actors that complies with international standards, including the principles 
of necessity and proportionality.’118 
The Basic Principles similarly state, in general, that ‘Governments and law 
enforcement agencies shall adopt and implement rules and regulations on the 
use of force and firearms against persons by law enforcement officials.’119 
However, they also provide a good deal more detail as to exactly what matters 
ought to be regulated. Specifically, rules and regulations concerning the use of 
force ‘should include guidelines’ that do the following: 
(a) Specify the circumstances under which law enforcement officials are 
authorized to carry firearms and prescribe the types of firearms and 
ammunition permitted;  
(b) Ensure that firearms are used only in appropriate circumstances and 
in a manner likely to decrease the risk of unnecessary harm;  
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(c) Prohibit the use of those firearms and ammunition that cause 
unwarranted injury or present an unwarranted risk;  
(d) Regulate the control, storage and issuing of firearms, including 
procedures for ensuring that law enforcement officials are 
accountable for the firearms and ammunition issued to them;  
(e) Provide for warnings to be given, if appropriate, when firearms are to 
be discharged;  
(f) Provide for a system of reporting whenever law enforcement officials 
use firearms in the performance of their duty.120 
Although the language used differs, underlying each of these statements is the 
requirement, set out particularly clearly by the ECtHR, that the use of force be 
both authorised by law, meaning that there must be a lawful basis for the use of 
force, and regulated by law, meaning that the law must control the 
circumstances in which force may be used. Crucially, it is clear from their 
formulation that these obligations extend beyond situations in which State 
intends to deprive an individual of his or her life, to wherever force is used by 
law-enforcement officials. Indeed, the central purpose of such a legal framework 
of authority and regulation must be to restrain State agents from depriving 
individuals of their life contrary to the principles set out above. It is therefore 
particularly relevant to situations in which an individual is deprived of his or her 
life notwithstanding the use of force was not intended nor expected to bring 
about that result. In that situation, the absence of an adequate system of legal 
authority and regulation will amount, in its own right, to a violation of the right to 
life on the part of the State. This is clearly relevant to MSOs. Whilst the force 
used is not usually intended to be lethal, it nevertheless has the potential to 
cause injury or death if not properly controlled.  
As set out in Chapter Five, a similar requirement of authorisation and regulation 
by law exists with respect to detention. The discussion there as to the source or 
sources from which the law in question can be derived (domestic, international 
or both) is equally as valid in the context of the use of force.121 In brief, while 
reference is often made only to domestic or national law, for example by the 
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ECtHR in the extract above from Finogenov and Others v Russia, it is unclear 
whether the relevant authority and regulation may only be located in domestic 
law, or if it may be found in international law instead. If only domestic law will 
suffice, then international law would arguably qualify only if incorporated or 
otherwise recognised at the domestic level according to each State’s particular 
constitutional arrangements.122 However, it is argued in Chapter Five that the 
more persuasive argument is that it should be the existence of ‘legal certainty’ 
that is decisive rather than any formal requirement as to source. This concept 
has been described consistently by the ECtHR as requiring ‘that all law be 
sufficiently accessible and precise to allow the person— if necessary with 
appropriate advice—to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the 
circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail’. 123 
Nevertheless, this remains an unsettled issue, and one of possible divergence 
between the different instruments under consideration. 
Turning, with this caveat in mind, to the question of the authorisation and 
regulation of the use of force in MSOs, the first point is that authority to use 
force in MSOs does not come from a single source. As noted above and set out 
in more detail in Chapter One, authority for MSOs is often, though not 
exclusively, 124  found in international law. However, it may derive from 
customary or treaty law; it may be multilateral or bilateral; and it may be 
enduring or established on a case-by-case basis. Nevertheless, wherever the 
authority to arrest a vessel is found in the law of the sea, it is arguable that it will 
carry the implicit permission to use necessary and proportionate force to do so, 
by application of the customary law principles identified by the ITLOS in M/V 
‘Saiga’ (No. 2).125 According to this reasoning, so long as authority exists under 
the law of the sea to arrest a vessel, force will be authorised to effect the arrest, 
at least so far as international law is concerned. 
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States may, of course, enact domestic law specifically to authorise the use of 
force in MSOs. In the United States, 14 U.S Code § 637 authorises certain 
Coast Guard and other government vessels to ‘fire at or into [a vessel liable to 
seizure or examination] which does not stop’,126 so long as a warning shot is 
first fired, unless to do so ‘would unreasonably endanger persons or property in 
the vicinity of the vessel to be stopped.’127 It also indemnifies the person in 
command of the vessel that authorises the use of force pursuant to the 
section.128 
In Australia, the Maritime Powers Act 2013 (MPA 2013) provides a remarkably 
detailed legal framework for the authorisation and execution of MSOs. As well 
as a general authorisation for designated individuals exercising powers under 
the MPA 2013 to ‘use such force against a person or thing as is necessary and 
reasonable in the circumstances’,129 it contains specific authorisation, where 
‘the person in charge of a vessel does not comply with a requirement to stop or 
facilitate boarding of the vessel’, to: 
(a)  chase the vessel; 
(b) use any reasonable means to obstruct the passage of the vessel; 
(c) use any reasonable means to halt or slow the passage of the vessel, 
including by fouling the propellers of the vessel; 
(d) after firing a warning shot, fire at or into the vessel to disable it or 
compel it to be brought to for boarding.130 
The MPA 2013 is unusual in providing such clear and detailed authorisation for 
the use of force in MSOs. Many other States, including the United Kingdom, 
have no equivalent in their domestic legislation. Nevertheless, while noting the 
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discussion above concerning the source of the authorisation, for States without 
such domestic legislation, it is at least arguable that international law may 
suffice to provide the authority to use force, at least with respect to interdictions 
authorised by the law of the sea. The more challenging requirement under the 
right to life is arguably that the use of force must be regulated by law. 
Considering international law, it is possible to identify rules that arguably do 
regulate, to some extent, the use of force in certain categories of MSOs.131 For 
example, where applicable to the MSO in question, a degree of regulation is 
contained in the FSA and SUA, discussed above, which permit only force that is 
necessary and reasonable. More generally, the customary law principles 
identified in M/V ‘Saiga’ (No. 2) require not only that force used in order to arrest 
a vessel be necessary and reasonable, but must follow an escalatory process, 
including the issuing of warnings. More specific still may be rules contained in 
the various bilateral and multilateral agreements that authorise MSOs, such as 
Caribbean Area Agreement, also discussed above; however, not only are those 
rules limited in their application only to the specific subject matter of the 
instruments in question, but also do not set forth complete regulatory regimes. 
Indeed, the Caribbean Area Agreement makes specific reference to the 
applicability of external regulation contained in the domestic law of coastal and 
flag States.132 In any case, absent from all of these is the detailed regulation 
required under the Basic Principles, such as the specification of circumstances 
in which firearms may be carried, the type of firearm and ammunition that may 
be carried, and the procedures for their control, storage and issue.133 
A helpful comparison may be made to the ECtHR’s decision in Makaratzis v 
Greece, which concerned the use of firearms by Greek police officers during a 
car chase. The Court noted that, at the time of the incident, the use of firearms 
was regulated by an old statute that ‘listed a wide range of situations in which a 
police officer could use firearms without being liable for the consequences’, 
subject only to a later decree that they be used ‘only when absolutely necessary 
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133 Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement 
Officials (n 90) para 11(a) and (d). 
 164 
and when all less extreme methods have been exhausted’.134 This, arguably, is 
broadly similar to the level of regulation described above under the law of the 
sea. However, the ECtHR in Makaratzis considered that, ‘On its face, the 
above, somewhat slender, legal framework would not appear sufficient to 
provide the level of protection “by law” of the right to life that is required in 
present-day democratic societies in Europe.’135  
Arguably, therefore, the law of the sea is unlikely to be adequate in its 
regulation of the use of force in MSOs to meet the requirements of the right to 
life, meaning that it must be supplemented by more detailed regulation, most 
likely at the domestic level. A detailed analysis of whether and how different 
States have met this standard is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, it 
may be achieved in part, particularly with respect to the use of force on board 
interdicted vessels, through the extension of laws and regulations normally 
applicable on land to the maritime environment. For example, the Australian 
MPA 2013 permits officials who are ‘authorised in another capacity’ to carry and 
use arms to do so, subject to any conditions that apply in that other capacity, 
when exercising powers under the MPA 2013.136 Other areas, particularly those 
that are specific to MSOs, such as the use of disabling fire against vessels, may 
require bespoke regulation, such as that contained in the MPA 2013, or 
plausibly such as might be contained in instructions, such as rules of 
engagement, issued to the military, so long as these meet the test of 
foreseeability set out above. 
4.4.2.3. Obligations relating to the planning and allocation of resources to 
MSOs 
A State’s obligations under the right to life in connection with law-enforcement 
activities begin well before the point at which force is used, including the 
planning an operation and the allocation of resources to it. The IACtHR has 
held that, before using force, ‘State agents should assess the situation and 
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draw up a plan of action before intervening.’137 The African Commission has, 
likewise, stated that the steps required of States include ‘wherever possible, 
careful planning of individual operations.’138 It has also stated, with respect to 
the allocation of resources, that law-enforcement personnel ‘must receive 
appropriate…equipment’,139 and that, ‘Particular attention should be paid to 
ensuring the availability and use of weapons less likely to cause death or 
serious injury than are firearms.’140 The Basic Principles do not refer explicitly to 
planning, but state that 
Governments and law enforcement agencies should develop a range of 
means as broad as possible and equip law enforcement officials with 
various types of weapons and ammunition that would allow for a 
differentiated use of force and firearms. These should include the 
development of non-lethal incapacitating weapons for use in appropriate 
situations, with a view to increasingly restraining the application of means 
capable of causing death or injury to persons.141 
The requirement to plan operations so as to minimise recourse to lethal force is 
particularly well established in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR. The case of 
McCann and Others v United Kingdom, concerned the question whether an 
operation conducted by special forces soldiers, taken as a whole to include its 
planning and organization, had violated Article 2 of the ECHR.142 In McCann, 
the UK authorities were alleged to have failed to arrest suspects at a point 
where doing so would have avoided the need to use lethal force against the 
suspects later on.143 The ECtHR accepted that, at the point that lethal force was 
eventually used, the UK was under an obligation to protect the local population. 
As a result, the eventual shooting of the suspects was, taken in isolation, 
necessary and therefore not, in itself, a violation of Article 2. However, the Court 
held that the UK had failed properly to control the operation so as to avoid the 
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situation where lethal force became necessary. 144  Therefore, despite the 
necessity of lethal force at the point it was used, the operation as a whole was 
held to be in violation of Article 2. Although McCann concerned the ultimate use 
of force that must have been intended, or at least expected, to cause death or 
serious injury, as explained above, the right to life entails obligations with 
respect to the use of any force that results in death (or even, in some cases, 
serious injury). It follows that the requirement to plan operations extends to 
those involving, or potentially involving, any use of force.  
Nevertheless, it is important not to overstate the standard required of those 
planning and controlling operations. In the case of McCann the Court identified 
that there had been a ‘serious miscalculation by those responsible for 
controlling the operation.’ As a result of the planning and control failures, the 
eventual necessity to use lethal force became ‘a foreseeable possibility if not a 
likelihood.’ 145  The Court was not, therefore, taking advantage of hindsight 
simply to postulate a different course of action that would not have resulted in 
the use of lethal force. Rather, its approach was to examine the situation as it 
was presented to those in charge and evaluating the quality of the decisions 
they made on the basis of the information they had.  
With respect to planning and the allocation of resources, the UK Supreme Court 
has recognised that the right to life under the ECHR may, in some 
circumstances, require the provision of suitable equipment. In Smith (No. 2) v 
The Ministry of Defence it held that Article 2 could potentially be breached 
where a government fails to equip its own forces adequately to protect the 
soldiers’ right to life. 146  Having reviewed the ECtHR’s jurisprudence, the 
Supreme Court concluded that it was required to 
avoid imposing positive obligations on the state in connection with the 
planning for and conduct of military operations in situations of armed 
conflict which are unrealistic or disproportionate. But it must give effect to 
                                            
144 ibid [202]–[214]. 
145 ibid [205]. 
146  Smith (No. 2) v The Ministry of Defence [2013] UKSC 41. The case 
specifically concerned the provision of sufficiently well-armoured vehicles, 
rather than lightweight ‘Snatch’ Land Rovers, to soldiers operating in an 
environment where they were subject to attack using roadside explosives. The 
facts are set out at ibid [1]–[8]. 
 167 
those obligations where it would be reasonable to expect the individual to 
be afforded the protection of the article.147 
While the case was dealing specifically with the rights of personnel using the 
equipment in question, rather than those against whom it would be used, the 
reasoning can be extended to other affected individuals for whom the protection 
of the right to life is ‘reasonable’, including, it is submitted, those against whom 
military equipment is used. 
These principles have obvious relevance to the conduct of MSOs. With respect 
to planning, it may be insufficient that an interdicting vessel follows an 
escalation of force process if that escalation leads to loss of life (or serious 
injury) that could reasonably have been avoided through better planning. For 
example, if the necessity to use force to arrest a vessel at sea could 
foreseeably have been prevented by stopping it from leaving port, then any loss 
or threat to life could be in breach of the right to life, however justifiable the 
subsequent interdiction of the vessel might be. More generally, the proper 
planning of MSOs may involve both the choice of means and methods 
appropriate to the particular circumstances, as well as the coordination of 
complex activity undertaken by a range of actors. The discussion of practice 
above demonstrated both the potential complexity of MSOs, as well as the 
diverse range of techniques that may be used in their execution. While the 
ITLOS in M/V ‘Saiga’ (No. 2) referred to the escalation through a limited range 
of options, in practice the interdiction of vessels can involve the use of force 
from both sea and air, as well as the use of various non-lethal methods and 
advanced techniques including the insertion of special forces teams by air. 
Closely related to the requirement to plan MSOs so as to avoid loss of life, is 
the requirement that they should be appropriately resourced. For example, 
where firearms are used against a vessel, either as non-disabling or disabling 
fire, the risk of inadvertently causing death or injury may be reduced by using 
more precise weapons, operated by more highly skilled personnel. Similarly, it 
was noted that an opposed boarding could be achieved by means of a ‘vertical 
take-down’, involving the use of special operations forces to seize control of a 
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vessel ‘often without endangering the crew’.148 Such resources may be scarce 
and a balance must therefore be struck between the improvement in safety that 
a particular capability might bring and the difficulty, or cost, involved in 
implementing it. However, if the test identified by the UK Supreme Court in 
Smith (No. 2) is extended to this situation, then, where reasonable, and not 
disproportionate or unrealistic to do so, such resources must be made available. 
Although somewhat nebulous, this requirement, at the very least, means that 
the use of particular methods or means will be lawful simply because they are 
the only ones available. For example, if the use of a precision marksman 
operating from a helicopter to effect disabling fire would be less likely to cause 
death or serious injury than the use of a ship’s main armament, the lack of the 
former capability would not, in itself, justify the use of the latter. Instead, it would 
need to be shown that the provision of the more precise capability would be 
disproportionate, unrealistic or unreasonable. 
4.4.2.4. The requirement to train officials conducting MSOs  
A step further removed from the actual use of force, a State’s obligations with 
respect to the use of force extends to a situation where death or serious injury 
can be attributed to the insufficiency of the training provided to personnel who 
use force in the course of law-enforcement operations. With respect to the 
ICCPR, Joseph and Castan conclude that the obligation to train such personnel 
is something that can be assumed on the basis of the HRC’s practice with 
respect to other rights.149 More specifically, the IACtHR has stated that, ‘The 
State must also train its agents to ensure that they know the legal provisions 
that permit the use of firearms and are properly trained so that if they have to 
decide on their use, they have the relevant criteria do so.’150 This requirement 
has been echoed by the African Commission,151 and is reflected in the Basic 
Principles, which state that: 
19. Governments and law enforcement agencies shall ensure that all law 
enforcement officials are provided with training and are tested in 
accordance with appropriate proficiency standards in the use of 
force. Those law enforcement officials who are required to carry 
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firearms should be authorized to do so only upon completion of 
special training in their use. 
20. In the training of law enforcement officials, Governments and law 
enforcement agencies shall give special attention to issues of police 
ethics and human rights, especially in the investigative process, to 
alternatives to the use of force and firearms, including the peaceful 
settlement of conflicts, the understanding of crowd behaviour, and 
the methods of persuasion, negotiation and mediation, as well as to 
technical means, with a view to limiting the use of force and firearms. 
Law enforcement agencies should review their training programmes 
and operational procedures in the light of particular incidents.152 
A particular issue in this regard relates to the use of military forces for law-
enforcement tasks. As reflected in the discussion on current practice, MSOs are 
often conducted by naval forces rather than by dedicated law-enforcement 
officers such as the coast guard or domestic police force. The use of the military 
for law-enforcement activities, in general, is discouraged, but not prohibited ‘in 
exceptional circumstances and where strictly necessary.’153 Nevertheless, it is 
appropriate that there should be, as the IACtHR has stated, a ‘clear 
demarcation between military and police duties’.154 This arguably involves a 
particular obligation to ensure that military forces are trained in the use of force 
to a similar standard as applied by their civilian law-enforcement counterparts. 
On this point, the ECtHR held in the McCann case that  
[The soldiers’] reflex action [lacked] the degree of caution in the use of 
firearms to be expected from law enforcement personnel in a democratic 
society, even when dealing with dangerous terrorist suspects, and stands 
in marked contrast to the standard of care reflected in the instructions in 
the use of firearms by the police which had been drawn to their attention 
and which emphasised the legal responsibilities of the individual officer in 
the light of conditions prevailing at the moment of engagement.155 
                                            
152 Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement 
Officials (n 90) paras 19–20. According to para 18, personnel must furthermore 
be ‘selected by proper screening procedures, have appropriate moral, 
psychological and physical qualities for the effective exercise of their functions 
and receive continuous and thorough professional training. Their continued 
fitness to perform these functions should be subject to periodic review.’ Basic 
Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials (n 
90) para 18. 
153 African Commission General Comment 3 (n 86) para 29. See also Antkowiak 
and Gonza (n 63) 82–83. 
154 Zambrano Vélez (n 101) [51]. 
155 McCann (n 143) [212]. 
 170 
With respect to MSOs, while law enforcement activities on land are only 
exceptionally carried out by military personnel, many States use their navies to 
conduct peacetime law enforcement activities at sea.156 Indeed, the use of 
warships for such tasks is specifically authorised in the law of the sea.157 
Although States might ideally maintain separate maritime law enforcement 
agencies, the expense of doing so means that navies are likely to continue to 
be undertake law enforcement activities. It is therefore of particular importance 
to ensure that navy personnel are equipped with the skills required to use force 
consistent with the law enforcement paradigm. Such training may be provided 
to all members of a navy, or only for specific personnel, so long as it equips 
personnel responsible for using force with the skills required to minimise the risk 
to life. 
The obligation to train personnel is particularly acute with respect to specialist 
tasks such as the use of gunfire to disable vessels. Such force may be used in 
particularly challenging circumstances, including from moving aerial platforms, 
against small moving targets, and with individuals close to the intended point of 
impact. In accordance with the principles set out above, the personnel 
responsible for using force in these circumstances must be trained not only to 
know when force may lawfully be used, but also to use force in such a way as to 
minimise the risk to life. As explained above in the context of the appropriate 
resourcing of MSOs, unless to do so is disproportionate, unrealistic or 
unreasonable, it is likely that the lawful use of such force is contingent on it 
being conducted by suitably trained personnel. 
4.4.2.5. Obligations following the use of force 
Where force has been used and has resulted in injury, States are under an 
obligation to provide necessary medical care and inform relatives as soon as 
possible. These requirements are contained in the Basic Principles and have 
been recognised by the ECtHR158 and IACtHR159. The requirement to provide 
medical care, in particular, may be challenging in the context of MSOs, where 
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force will often be used against a vessel before the interdicting ship has 
personnel on board, and where access to medical facilities may be limited by 
the interdicting ship’s own resources and the difficulty in transporting a casualty 
ashore. Nevertheless, consistent with the general requirement, discussed 
above, to plan and resource MSOs appropriately, it follows that the ability and 
means to provide medical care in the case of injury should be included, to the 
extent that it is reasonable, realistic and proportionate to do so. 
In addition, the obligation to investigate alleged breaches of the right to life and 
to punish those responsible is well-established.160 Although there is nothing 
special or unusual about its application to MSOs and while it will not, therefore, 
be analysed in any great depth here, it is an important requirement 
nonetheless. With respect to Article 6 ICCPR, the practice of the HRC has been 
to require an adequate investigation in the case of all State killings and to bring 
to justice those identified as having violated the law,161 in respect of whom only 
criminal proceedings, rather than mere disciplinary procedures, will be 
adequate.162 For example, in connection with the killing of a suspected terrorist 
(who turned out to be the victim of mistaken identity) by UK police, the HRC 
recommended that the UK pursue the investigation ‘vigorously, including on 
questions of individual responsibility, intelligence failures and police training’.163 
The IACtHR has stated that incidents ‘must be investigated in order to 
determine the level and manner of participation of each of those who 
intervened, whether directly or indirectly, so that the corresponding 
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responsibilities may be established.’164 The African Commission has been even 
clearer in stating that: 
The failure of the State transparently to take all necessary measures to 
investigate suspicious deaths and all killings by State agents and to 
identify and hold accountable individuals or groups responsible for 
violations of the right to life constitutes in itself a violation by the State of 
that right. This is even more the case where there is tolerance of a culture 
of impunity. All investigations must be prompt, impartial, thorough and 
transparent.165 
It goes on to state that, ‘Accountability, in this sense, requires investigation and, 
where appropriate criminal prosecution.’166 Similarly, the ECtHR has recognised 
a procedural obligation under Article 2 for there to be an investigation that is 
thorough, independent, prompt and accessible, and to hold those responsible to 
account. This entails an obligation to pursue criminal prosecution where 
appropriate, with civil redress alone being inadequate. 167 
Conducting an investigation that meets these standards following a MSO may 
pose considerable practical challenges. While the requirement of independence 
will almost certainly require the intervention of outside authorities, the vessel 
responsible for the alleged breach may be the only entity capable of securing 
perishable evidence and conducting the initial stages of the inquiry. However, 
this has not prevented the same requirements from being held to apply, for 
example, with respect to the deaths caused in the course of military operations 
conducted overseas on land. The ECtHR has stated ‘that the procedural 
obligation under Article 2 continues to apply in difficult security conditions, 
including in a context of armed conflict’.168 In such circumstances, although 
‘concrete constraints may compel the use of less effective measures of 
investigation or may cause an investigation to be delayed…all reasonable steps 
must be taken to ensure that an effective, independent investigation is 
conducted.’169 There is therefore no reason why these requirements would not 
apply equally to MSOs and ought therefore to be considered in the planning 
and resourcing of operations. 
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4.5. Conclusion 
This chapter began with a summary of current practice with respect to the use 
of force in MSOs. It explained that force may be used at various stages in the 
course of an MSO and that a variety of means and methods may be brought to 
bear. Importantly, force used in MSOs is rarely intended or expected to cause 
death or serious injury; rather it is often used to compel a vessel to comply with 
the instructions of an interdicting ship, by either demonstrating the willingness 
and intent of the interdicting ship, or by physically affecting the ability of the 
interdicted vessel to resist boarding. 
The use of force is regulated, to some extent, by the law of the sea. UNCLOS 
does not, itself, contain provisions that limit force or prescribe how it is to be 
used; however, the ITLOS has recognised the requirement to use only force in 
interdicting a vessel that is reasonable and necessary, and to follow a 
procedure whereby force is escalated through a progression of measures, 
beginning with warnings and ending with disabling fire. Similar requirements 
have been incorporated into a range of agreements dealing with particular 
situations in which the interdiction of vessels is authorised. 
Turning to applicable human rights, a number might plausibly be engaged when 
force is used in the course of MSOs. Most of the instruments under examination 
protect the peaceful enjoyment of possessions, a right that may be violated 
when property is damaged by force used by a State in the course of an MSO. 
With respect to harm to individuals, all of the instruments protect the right to life. 
This applies not only when the death of an individual is intended or expected, 
but also applies when force is used that leads to unintentional killing. It may 
even apply in some circumstances when an individual does not die, but instead 
suffers serious injury. In addition, the right to liberty and security of the person 
under the ICCPR has been interpreted by the HRC as applying where injury is 
caused both to detainees and non-detainees. 
The chapter proceeded to examine, in detail, the obligations that flow, in 
particular, from the right to life, bearing in mind the issues discussed in Chapter 
Three with respect to the extraterritorial applicability of human rights treaty 
obligations to the use of force alone. These included the requirement to use 
only that force which is necessary and proportionate, including an obligation 
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only to resort to forceful means once other options have been exhausted. To a 
large extent, this mirrors the position under the law of the sea, a conclusion that 
is perhaps unsurprising given the likely influence of human rights law on the 
development of the law of the sea. Indeed, only in narrow circumstances might 
IHRL be more restrictive in the actual conduct of MSOs, namely with respect to 
the arguable requirement under IHRL to take into account the underlying 
reason for interdicting a vessel when deciding whether the use of force is 
proportionate to that aim. 
However, IHRL imposes a range of obligations that go beyond the requirements 
of the law of the sea. First, force must be authorised and regulated by law. 
Although authority might arguably derive from international law, the detailed 
regulation required under IHRL can only plausibly be found in domestic 
provisions. Second, IHRL requires that MSOs be planned and resourced so as 
to minimise risk to life. The obligations on States with respect to resourcing are 
limited to only those measures that are realistic, reasonable and proportionate, 
this nevertheless imposes obligations on States well before force is actually 
used. Therefore, while force might be used consistently with the requirements of 
necessity and proportionality (and hence probably consistent with the 
requirements of the law of the sea) any resulting death might nevertheless 
violate the right to life if the operation could have been better planned, or 
conducted by safer means. Third, individuals conducting MSOs must be 
adequately trained, noting, in particular, the requirement to train military 
personnel conducting MSOs to use force according to law-enforcement 
standards. Finally, IHRL imposes requirements following the use of force to 
provide medical aid and to notify the relatives of casualties, as well as to 
investigate potential violations of the right to life and to hold those responsible 
to account. It is clear, therefore, that IHRL entails a number of obligations that 
do not exist under the law of the sea, notwithstanding the difficulty with which 
some of the requirements may be met in practice. 
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5. Deprivation of Liberty 
5.1. Introduction 
Several different human rights may be engaged when individuals are deprived 
of their liberty in the course of maritime security operations (MSOs). The most 
obvious of these is the right to liberty and security of the person.1 However, 
individuals deprived of their liberty also enjoy a range of rights relating to their 
treatment. As well as the right to life,2 detainees benefit from the prohibition of 
torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,3 and from the 
prohibition of slavery and forced labour.4 The International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR) and American Convention on Human Rights 
(ACHR) further specify the right of ‘persons deprived of their liberty’ to ‘be 
treated [with humanity and] with respect for the inherent dignity of the human 
person.’5 
Other rights may also be relevant to the treatment of individuals deprived of 
their liberty, including the freedoms of thought, conscience and religion;6 of 
expression; 7  and of assembly and association. 8  Where individuals are 
subsequently tried, further rights will apply. Most importantly, they will enjoy the 
                                            
1 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 
1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR) art 9; 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(European Convention on Human Rights, as amended) (ECHR) art 5; American 
Convention on Human Rights: ‘Pact of San José, Costa Rica’ (signed 22 
November 1969, entered into force 18 July 1978) 1144 UNTS 144 (ACHR) art 
7; African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (adopted 27 June 1981, 
entered into force 21 October 1986) (1982) 21 ILM 58 (ACHPR) art 6. 
2 ICCPR (n 1) art 6; ECHR (n 1) art 2, ACHR (n 1) art 4; ACHPR (n 1) art 4. 
3 ICCPR (n 1) art 7; ECHR (n 1) art 3; ACHR (n 1) art 5; ACHPR (n 1) art 5; 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment (adopted 10 December 1984, entered into force 26 June 1987) 
1465 UNTS 113 (CAT) arts 2–5, 16. 
4 ICCPR (n 1) art 8; ECHR (n 1) art 4, ACHR (n 1) art 6; ACHPR (n 1) art 5. 
5 ICCPR (n 1) art 10, ACHR (n 1) art 5(2). The words in brackets are in the 
relevant provision of the ICCPR, but not the ACHR. 
6 ICCPR (n 1) art 18; ECHR (n 1) art 9, ACHR (n 1) arts 12–13; ACHPR (n 1) 
art 8. 
7 ICCPR (n 1) arts 19–20; ECHR (n 1) art 10, ACHR (n 1) art 13; ACHPR (n 1) 
art 9. 
8 ICCPR (n 1) arts 21–22; ECHR (n 1) art 11, ACHR (n 1) arts 15–16; ACHPR 
(n 1) arts 10–11. 
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right to a fair trial.9 In addition, any sentence, as well as being constrained by 
general rights concerning the treatment of detainees, may be subject to specific 
provisions concerning the availability of capital punishment.10 Finally, where a 
State seeks to transfer detainees to another State, or to release detainees in 
circumstances that may place them at risk of their rights being violated, 
particular human rights obligations may be engaged. In addition to explicit 
provisions concerning the prohibition of non-refoulement, human rights 
instruments have been interpreted in some circumstances so as to prohibit 
actions that give rise to a foreseeable risk that an individual’s rights will be 
violated. 
The transfer of individuals, particularly the prohibition on non-refoulement, is the 
subject of Chapter Seven. Of the other rights noted above, this chapter focuses 
specifically on the right to liberty and security of the person, which raises issues 
of particular significance in the context of MSOs. Questions of applicability 
aside, the application of the others with respect to individuals deprived of their 
liberty at sea will be largely the same as on land. Therefore, although some of 
these rights, particularly those relating to the treatment of detainees and the 
right to a fair trial, are of considerable importance with respect to the application 
of international human rights law (IHRL) to the deprivation of liberty in general,11 
and therefore to MSOs in practice,12 this thesis does not examine them further. 
As this chapter explains, the right to liberty and security of the person requires 
that detention not be arbitrary, meaning first and foremost that individuals may 
be deprived of their liberty only where there exists a legal basis to do so and 
according to grounds and procedures established by law. However, even where 
an individual is lawfully deprived of his or her liberty, the deprivation must 
conform to additional standards of non-arbitrariness, including necessity and 
                                            
9 ICCPR (n 1) art 14; ECHR (n 1) art 6, ACHR (n 1) art 8; ACHPR (n 1) art 7. 
10 ICCPR (n 1) art 6(2)–(6); ACHR (n 1) art 4(2)–(6); Protocol 6 to the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(adopted 28 April 1983, entered into force 1 March 1985) ETS 114 art 1. 
11  On the prohibition of torture and other ill-treatment in the context of 
detainees, see, for example, Nigel S Rodley and Matt Pollard, The Treatment of 
Prisoners Under International Law (3rd edn, OUP 2009) 45–81. On conditions 
of imprisonment or detention, see ibid 379–426. 
12 On the right to a fair trial with respect to individuals detained in connection 
with piracy, see Anna Petrig, Human Rights and Law Enforcement at Sea: 
Arrest, Detention and Transfer of Piracy Suspects (Brill Nijhoff 2014) 412–33. 
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proportionality. Depending on the instrument in question, permitted grounds and 
specific procedural requirements may also be set out in express terms, or may 
have been developed through subsequent practice. 
The chapter begins by examining practice relating to deprivation of liberty in the 
course of MSOs. It does so principally by introducing three European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) cases, in which the right to liberty has been applied 
specifically to instances of detention at sea: Rigopoulos v Spain,13 Medvedyev 
and others v France,14 and Vassis and others v France.15 The facts of these 
cases are presented as examples of detention practice during MSOs and, as 
such, demonstrate the key issues engaged in the application of IHRL. They also 
place into context the subsequent references made in this chapter to the three 
cases. 
Next, the chapter briefly sets out how and where deprivation of liberty features 
in the law of the sea, with respect to either authorisation or regulation. This is 
done through an examination of relevant provisions of the UN Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),16 as well as other key instruments. The law 
presented is not intended to be exhaustive, but rather to illustrate key points. As 
will be explained, although the law of the sea authorises the deprivation of 
liberty in some situations, and further recognises the right of a State in certain 
circumstances to take action that may result in deprivation of liberty, it does 
relatively little in protecting the rights of those affected. 
The chapter finally turns to the application of the right to liberty and security of 
the person to the deprivation of liberty in the course of MSOs. In doing so, it first 
provides a short recap of the relevant points identified in Chapters Two and 
Three relating to the applicability of IHRL, before setting out the basic legal 
framework, including the relevant provisions of the instruments under 
consideration and a comparison of their language and structure. It then 
considers four key issues in the context of MSOs: the circumstances that 
engage the right to liberty; the requirement of lawfulness; the prohibition of 
                                            
13 Rigopoulos v Spain ECHR 1999-II 435. The decision is not paginated or 
paragraph-numbered. 
14 Medvedyev and Others v France ECHR 2010. 
15 Vassis and Others v France App No 62736/09 (ECtHR, 27 June 2013). 
16 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (adopted 10 December 
1982, entered into force 16 November 1994) 1833 UNTS 397 (UNCLOS) 
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arbitrary deprivation of liberty, including permitted grounds; and procedural 
rights and obligations. 
5.2. Notable practice relating to deprivation of liberty 
Considering, first, Rigopoulos v Spain, the case concerned the 1995 interdiction 
of the Panamanian-flagged merchant vessel Archangelos by a Spanish 
customs inspection department vessel Petrel I. Spain had obtained 
authorisation from Panama to board and search the Archangelos, which was 
carrying a cargo of cocaine, under the terms of Article 17 of the United Nations 
Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 
(Vienna Convention).17 The Archangelos was boarded on 23 January 1995, 
while on the high seas about three thousand miles from the Canary Islands. 
However, some of the crew members resisted and it was not until 26 January, 
following an exchange of fire, that they surrendered to the Spanish officials. In 
the meantime, a search of the vessel resulted in the seizure of a large quantity 
of cocaine and the applicant in the case, the Greek master of the Archangelos, 
                                            
17  United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances (adopted 20 December 1988, entered into force 11 
November 1990) 1582 UNTS 165. The key provisions, arts 17(2)–(3), read: 
 
3. A Party which has reasonable grounds to suspect that a vessel 
exercising freedom of navigation in accordance with international 
law, and flying the flag or displaying marks of registry of another 
Party is engaged in illicit traffic may so notify the flag State, request 
confirmation of registry and, if confirmed, request authorization from 
the flag State to take appropriate measures in regard to that vessel.  
4. In accordance with paragraph 3 or in accordance with treaties in 
force between them or in accordance with any agreement or 
arrangement otherwise reached between those Parties, the flag 
State may authorize the requesting State to, inter aria:  
a)  Board the vessel;  
b) Search the vessel;  
c) If evidence of involvement in illicit traffic is found, take 
appropriate action with respect to the vessel, persons and 
cargo on board.  
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had been transferred to the Petrel I.18 The Petrel I then proceeded to escort the 
Archangelos to the Canary Islands, where they arrived on 7 February.19 
On 26 January, the Central Investigating Court in Spain, noting that the vessels 
would not reach the Canary Islands in time to meet the seventy-two-hour limit 
within which detainees were required, under Spanish law, to be brought before 
judicial authorities, exceptionally authorised the crew’s continued detention. It 
did so in light of the ‘special circumstances’, including the vessels’ location and 
the large quantity of drugs that had been seized. The government said that the 
crew had been first informed of their detention on 24 January, were informed of 
the Court’s decision on 27 January and asked for details of people, including 
lawyers, they wished to be informed. The applicant claimed that it was not until 
2 February that he was notified of the Court’s decision, and he complained that 
he had had no contact with the investigating judge during the voyage to the 
Canary Islands, only being properly informed of his rights once they arrived. He 
also noted that he had not had the assistance of an interpreter and had no 
lawyer present on the Petrel I. On either account, the applicant and other 
members of the crew were flown to Madrid on 7 February, and it was not until 8 
February that they were brought before the relevant judicial authority and 
questioned with the assistance of both lawyers and interpreters.20 
Turning, next, to Medvedyev and others v France, that case concerned the 
detention in 2002 of the crew of the Winner, a merchant ship registered in 
Cambodia, by French naval forces. The Winner had been suspected by l’Office 
Central de Répression du Trafic Illicite des Stupéfiants (OCRTIS—the French 
Central Office Against Illegal Drug Trafficking) of carrying a large quantity of 
drugs for onward transfer to Europe.21 In light of this, the French authorities had 
asked for, and received, permission from Cambodia to interdict the Winner.22 
The operation was assigned to a French naval frigate, the Lieutenant de 
                                            
18 It is unclear from the case report what was done with the other thirteen crew 
members of the Archangelos. 
19 Rigopoulos (n 13). 
20 ibid. 
21 Medvedyev (n 14) [9]. 
22 ibid [10]. 
 180 
vaisseau Le Hénaff, in which was embarked a French navy commando unit, as 
well as experts from OCRTIS.23 
On 13 June 2002, the frigate located the Winner off Cape Verde and, having 
used warning shots, followed by fire directed at the vessel, eventually 
persuaded the Winner to stop and allow a boarding to be conducted.24 While 
the Winner had been evading the frigate, its crew had been seen jettisoning a 
number of packages, one of which was recovered and found to contain a large 
quantity of cocaine. Following a search of the vessel,25 and under orders of the 
French authorities, a tug was despatched to tow the Winner to Brest, escorted 
by a different French naval frigate, the Commandant Bouan. However, because 
of damage to the Winner and poor weather, they could proceed at no more than 
five knots,26 and it was not until 26 June that the Winner arrived in Brest.27 The 
crew of the Winner remained on board during the voyage; according to the 
French government, they were confined to their quarters at first, but were 
subsequently allowed to move around the ship during the remainder of the 
voyage, albeit under supervision. However, the crew claimed that ‘the coercive 
measures were maintained throughout’.28 
During the voyage, the French authorities had commenced an investigation into 
the Winner’s involvement in narcotics-related activities. However, it was only on 
24 June that an investigation was opened by the public prosecutor’s office and 
two investigating judges appointed.29 When the Winner arrived in Brest on 26 
June, the crew were handed to police, acting under the authority of the 
investigating judges, told that they were being placed in custody and informed 
of their rights.30 That same day, the crew members were brought before an 
                                            
23 ibid [12]. 
24 ibid [13]. 
25 In the course of the search one of the Winner’s crew members was fatally 
wounded when one of the commandos fired a warning shot to try and compel 
him to open a compartment. He later died in hospital. However, this aspect of 
the incident was not the subject of the case of the case at the ECtHR. ibid. 
26 ibid [14]. 
27 ibid [18]. 
28 ibid [15]. 
29 ibid [17]. 
30 ibid [18]. 
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investigating judge; they were again brought before an investigating judge the 
next day and subsequently each was charged on either 28 or 29 June.31 
Finally, the case of Vassis and others v France concerned the 2008 interdiction 
of a suspected drug-smuggling vessel by French naval forces, again acting on 
the request of OCRTIS. The vessel in question, the Junior, was again 
Panamanian-flagged, and the operation was again carried out with the consent 
of the Panamanian authorities.32 The Junior was intercepted by the French navy 
ship Tonnerre on 7 February 2008 about three hundred kilometres southwest of 
Guinea, at which point crew members of the Junior were seen jettisoning a 
package, which was recovered and found to contain a large quantity of cocaine. 
The Junior was boarded and then searched once permission was given by 
Panama to do so on 8 February;33 then, on 9 February, agreement was given 
by Panama to transfer jurisdiction over the case to France and, on 10 February, 
the Junior was diverted to Brest, initially escorted by Tonnerre, before being 
handed over to another French naval vessel, the Ravi.34 
Although not stated so explicitly in the judgment, it seems that the crew 
remained on board the Junior throughout the interdiction and subsequent 
voyage to Brest. However, on 14 February, at the same time that further 
narcotics were found on board, the crew was placed under guard of twelve 
marines.35 The Junior arrived in Brest on 25 February and its crew handed over 
to the Brest public prosecutor. The crew was then placed in police custody, 
which was extended on 26 February for a further twenty-four hours by a public 
prosecutor after having interviewed each crew member. Their custody was 
again extended on 27 February, from which point they continued to be subject 
to the French justice system until their eventual trial several years later.36 
These three cases illustrate a number of key issues with respect to detention in 
the course of MSOs, at least so far as is relevant to the application of IHRL. 
                                            
31 ibid [19]. 
32 Vassis (n 15) [5], [8]–[9]. 
33 The judgment mentions seizures being made at this point, but provides no 
further details. Similarly, it is unclear exactly what was being done with respect 
to the crew, except that their identities had been checked and that they were 
presumably still on board the Junior. ibid [7]. 
34 ibid [6]–[11]. 
35 ibid [11]. 
36 ibid [12]–[23]. 
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First, the legal basis for detention can be complex or unclear, involving both 
international and domestic law. This is discussed further below, but, in each of 
the three cases, the application of the law was complicated by the fact that the 
State authorities were exercising jurisdiction over a foreign-flagged vessel on 
the high seas, relying on consent granted either under a pre-existing treaty 
framework (the Vienna Convention in the case of Rigopoulos) or on an ad hoc 
basis (as was the case in Medvedyev and Vassis). 
Second, a range of measures may be taken in practice to control a vessel and 
its crew. The cases illustrate the range of situations involved: either the vessel 
itself, or individual crew members, may be subject to control on the part of the 
interdicting ship; the vessel may be escorted or placed under tow; the crew 
members may remain on board their own vessel, or be transferred onto the 
interdicting ship; and they may be subject to additional restrictions on their 
freedom. These restrictions must also be understood in light of the fact that 
individuals in a ship at sea will already be restricted in their freedom, on a 
practical level, in light of their inability to leave the vessel. As a result, as will be 
discussed below, it may be unclear whether, and at what point, the control 
exerted by a State over an individual amounts to a deprivation of liberty. 
Third, the distance at which MSOs may be conducted from the interdicting 
State’s territory means that there can be a substantial delay before individuals 
are brought before judicial authorities. As discussed below, a range of options 
may plausibly be available to a State in this situation, such as the commitment 
of additional resources (such as aircraft or faster ships) to expedite the journey, 
transfer to the authorities of a closer State, or the use of technology to connect 
individuals remotely to judges located in a State’s territory. Nevertheless, delay 
beyond that which is normally expected in the course of domestic law 
enforcement may be inevitable, and the question arises whether a particular 
measure to reduce delay is required of the State irrespective of the cost or 
difficulty involved. 
Finally, noting that individuals detained in MSOs may be of any nationality, the 
absence of an interpreter on board the interdicting ship may present a practical 
challenge to any procedure administered while still at sea. Likewise, the 
provision of legal advice may be difficult or impossible; even if it can be 
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provided remotely, it may be difficult in practice to allow individuals to 
communicate in sufficient detail such that they can participate effectively in any 
legal process. 
The three cases all concern counter-narcotics operations; however, the issues 
engaged are representative of those that may be encountered whenever 
individuals are detained in the course of MSOs. An additional layer of 
complication, not encountered in these cases, is involved in the particular 
context of counter-piracy operations. In recent years these have been 
conducted by multinational forces, responding, in particular, to the rise of piracy 
off the coast of Somalia. For a variety of reasons, the States involved have 
often been reluctant to prosecute pirates in their own courts, and have therefore 
developed a practice of transferring detained pirates to regional States, such as 
Kenya, for prosecution.37 The IHRL issues raised by the transfer of detainees is 
discussed in Chapter Seven; however, with respect to the detention of 
suspected pirates, the practice means that such individuals may be detained 
without any definite plan for their onward transfer or prosecution. The State 
involved may negotiate a transfer, elect to mount its own prosecution, or decide, 
either immediately or at some later point, simply to release the suspect. This 
practice exacerbates the issues encountered in the detention of individuals in 
the course MSOs more generally. 
5.3. Deprivation of liberty in the law of the sea 
Deprivation of liberty is specifically permitted in certain circumstances under the 
law of the sea. Relevant provisions may relate either to the individuals or to 
ships, noting, as discussed below, that action taken against the latter may 
necessarily result in the deprivation of liberty of those on board. Considering 
UNCLOS, Articles 105 and 109 authorise the arrest of both individuals and 
ships, in connection with piracy and unauthorised broadcasting respectively. 
Under Article 105, ‘On the high seas, or in any other place outside the 
jurisdiction of any State, every State may seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or a ship 
or aircraft taken by piracy and under the control of pirates, and arrest the 
persons and seize the property on board.’ Under Article 109(4), certain States 
                                            
37 For a detailed account of the practice of the EU’s counter-piracy forces, see 
Petrig (n 12) 82–126. 
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with one of the jurisdictional links defined in Article 109(3),38 may, on the high 
seas, ‘arrest any person or ship engaged in unauthorized broadcasting and 
seize the broadcasting apparatus.’ Furthermore, Articles 213–222 UNCLOS 
provide for the enforcement of the rules related to prevention, reduction and 
control of maritime pollution; Article 220, in particular, provides for the 
inspection and detention by a coastal State of vessels in its waters suspected of 
violating relevant laws and regulations relating to pollution. 
In addition to these explicit permissions to arrest individuals or vessels, Article 
110 UNCLOS sets out the right of warships and other authorised vessels to visit 
foreign ships reasonably suspected of: being engaged in piracy, the slave trade 
or unauthorized broadcasting;39 being without nationality; or despite flying a 
foreign flag, in fact being of the same nationality as the visiting ship.40 In 
exercise of this right, the visiting ship may conduct an inspection ‘to verify the 
ship’s right to fly its flag.’41 Although there is no express right to arrest the ship 
or individuals on board, the conduct of the inspection might, as discussed 
below, involve, a deprivation of liberty. 
Further provisions authorising deprivation of liberty may be found in other 
multilateral and bilateral treaties. For example, the Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, as 
amended by the 2005 Protocol,42 makes express provision for the granting of 
permission by a flag State for another State to exercise jurisdiction over its 
flagged vessels, in connection with certain specified unlawful acts connected to 
                                            
38 Art 109(3) states that: 
 
Any person engaged in unauthorized broadcasting may be prosecuted 
before the court of: (a) the flag State of the ship; (b) the State of registry of 
the installation; (c) the State of which the person is a national; (d) any 
State where the transmissions can be received; or (e) any State where 
authorized radio communication is suffering interference. 
UNCLOS (n 16) art 109(3). 
39 Subject to the requirement for a jurisdictional link as defined in art 109. 
40 UNCLOS (n 16) art 110(1). 
41 ibid art 110(2). 
42  Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of 
Maritime Navigation (concluded 10 March 1988, entered into force 1 March 
1992) 1678 UNTS 201 as amended by the Protocol of 2005 (adopted 1 
November 2005, entered into force 28 July 2010) IMO Doc LEG/CONF.15/21 
(SUA). 
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endangering ships.43 Such permission may include authorisation to ‘detain the 
ship, cargo and persons on board pending receipt of disposition instructions 
from the flag State.’44 Similar provisions are contained in Article 17 Vienna 
Convention, which allow for a flag State to authorise another State to board and 
search one of its flagged vessels suspected of being engaged in the illicit traffic 
in drugs, and ‘[i]f evidence of involvement in illicit traffic is found, [to] take 
appropriate action with respect to the vessel, persons and cargo on board.’45 
Authorisation of measures that may result in deprivation of liberty at sea may 
also be found in UN Security Council Resolutions. For example, UN Security 
Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1846 authorized States cooperating with the 
Transitional Federal Government of Somalia to ‘[u]se, within the territorial 
waters of Somalia, in a manner consistent with such action permitted on the 
high seas with respect to piracy under relevant international law, all necessary 
means to repress acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea.46 The effect of this 
was to extend the application of Article 105 and 110, including the authorisation 
to detain ships and individuals set out above, to Somalia’s territorial sea. 
Similarly, UNSCR 2182, for example, sets forth an inspection regime for vessels 
suspected of violating either the embargo on arms shipments to Somalia or the 
ban on exporting charcoal from Somalia.47 Like Article 110 UNCLOS, although 
it does not specifically authorise the arrest of ships or individuals, the process of 
inspection may require the temporary deprivation of liberty of those on board. 
As well as specific authorisations for the arrest of vessels or individuals, or of 
other activities that may involve the deprivation of liberty, the law of sea 
contemplates the exercise by States of jurisdiction, albeit limited in some cases, 
over certain vessels. Beyond the territorial sea, the basic rule is that ships are 
subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of their flag State, except where provided 
otherwise by treaty.48 Within the territorial sea, Articles 27 and 28 UNCLOS 
                                            
43 ibid art 8bis. 
44 ibid art 8bis (6). 
45  United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances (n 17) art 17(4). 
46 UNSC Res 1846 (2 December 2008) UN Doc S/RES/1846 para 10. 
47 UNSC Res 2182 (24 October 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2182 paras 11–22. The 
right to inspect a foreign vessel is dependent on making ‘good-faith efforts’ to 
seek the consent of the flag State. ibid para 16. 
48 UNCLOS (n 16) art 92(1). 
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provide for the circumstances in which a coastal State may exercise its criminal 
and civil jurisdiction, respectively, over foreign ships. The right of a coastal State 
to exercise jurisdiction is extended in more limited sets of circumstances to the 
contiguous zone by Article 33, and by Article 73 to the exclusive economic 
zone. Where a State exercises its jurisdiction in accordance with these rules, its 
actions may involve, either by design or consequence, deprivation of liberty. 
Turning to the protection of the rights of those who are deprived of their liberty, 
the law of the sea does not contain a single set of obligations that apply in every 
instance. Rather, particular authorisations are accompanied by their own 
provisions, which vary in their content, but, on the whole, are relatively scant in 
detail. Article 27(3) UNCLOS requires a coastal State exercising its criminal 
jurisdiction over a foreign vessel in its territorial sea to ‘notify a diplomatic agent 
or consular officer of the flag State’ if requested to do so by the master, and to 
‘facilitate contact between such agent or officer and the ship's crew.’ Under 
Article 73(2), a vessel or crew arrested in connection with prohibited activities in 
the exclusive economic zone ‘shall be promptly released upon the posting of 
reasonable bond or other security’; and, under Article 73(4), a State arresting a 
foreign vessel in its exclusive economic zone ‘shall promptly notify the flag 
State’. More detailed provisions are contained in Articles 223–233 UNCLOS, 
but relate only to the enforcement of rules to prevent, reduce and control 
pollution. These include obligations not to ‘delay a foreign vessel longer than is 
essential’49 and not to ‘discriminate in form or in fact against vessels of any 
other State’,50 as well as procedural provisions relating to subsequent judicial 
proceedings.51 
Considering sourced of authorisation other than UNCLOS, SUA contains a 
number of ‘safeguards’, including the obligation to ‘ensure that all persons on 
board [a vessel against which specified measures are taken] are treated in a 
manner which preserves their basic human dignity, and in compliance with the 
applicable provisions of international law, including international human rights 
law’.52 It also requires that  
                                            
49 ibid art 226(1)(a). 
50 ibid art 227. 
51 ibid art 228. 
52 SUA (n 42) art 8bis (10)(a)(ii). 
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Any person who is taken into custody, or regarding whom any other 
measures are taken or proceedings are being carried out pursuant to this 
Convention, shall be guaranteed fair treatment, including enjoyment of all 
rights and guarantees in conformity with the law of the State in the territory 
of which that person is present and applicable provisions of international 
law, including international human rights law.53 
However, illustrating the inconsistency in the law, the Vienna Convention does 
not contain equivalent provisions, instead only obliging a State (consistent with 
other provisions of SUA) to ‘take due account of the need not to endanger the 
safety of life at sea, the security of the vessel and the cargo or to prejudice the 
commercial and legal interests of the flag State or any other interested State.’54 
As this brief survey illustrates, although the law of the sea directly or indirectly 
permits deprivation of liberty in a wide range of circumstances, it is relatively 
scant in setting out the rights of individuals affected. Different authorisations are 
accompanied by widely varying obligations; and, although SUA, for example, 
does at least oblige States to protect the rights of those deprived of their liberty, 
it contains little detail. Instead, it expressly defers to other bodies of law, 
including international human rights law, as the source of concrete obligations. 
5.4. The application of the right to liberty and security of the person to the 
deprivation of liberty in MSOs 
5.4.1. Particular applicability issues 
Before considering the application of the right to liberty and security of the 
person to deprivation of liberty in MSOs, it is helpful to recap the main points of 
relevance from Chapters Two and Three concerning the applicability, generally, 
of IHRL to MSOs. It will be recalled that each of the instruments under 
consideration will usually apply throughout a State’s territory, including its 
territorial sea, as well as in its internal and archipelagic waters. Hence, when a 
State conducts an MSO in one of these zones, relevant rights, including the 
right to liberty and security of the person, may be engaged. 
With respect to the extraterritorial applicability of the instruments under 
consideration, i.e., in areas beyond a State’s own territorial sea, the situation is 
                                            
53 ibid art 10(2). 
54  United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances (n 17) art 17(5). 
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more complicated. It is uncontroversial that the treaties under consideration 
apply in a State’s own flagged vessels, which will almost certainly include 
vessels used by a State to conduct MSOs. Therefore, where individuals are 
deprived of their liberty on board such vessels in these areas, or are transferred 
to them having already been deprived of their liberty, the State’s obligations 
under the human rights treaties under consideration will apply.  
Outside these scenarios, applicability is most likely to arise from the exercise by 
a State agent of authority and control over an individual. Deprivation of liberty is 
the archetypical example of State agent authority and control; therefore, human 
rights obligations are likely to be engaged on this basis where individuals are 
deprived of their liberty in the course of MSOs, notwithstanding uncertainty, as 
discussed below, as to exactly what circumstances will reach that threshold. 
This is consistent with the practice of the ECtHR in Medvedyev, in which it held 
the ECHR to have applied from the point at which the Winner was intercepted, 
and therefore to at least as long a period as it considered the crew members to 
have been deprived of their liberty. With this in mind, while noting the various 
points of contention discussed in Chapter Three as to the extraterritorial 
applicability of the treaties under consideration, this chapter proceeds on the 
basis that the human rights obligations in question will apply, as a minimum, at 
the point at which individuals are considered to have been deprived of their 
liberty, wherever that should occur. 
5.4.2. Legal framework 
Each of the four instruments under examination contains a right protecting 
individuals’ liberty and personal security.55 The relevant provision of the ICCPR 
is Article 9, which states: 
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall 
be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be 
deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance 
with such procedure as are established by law. 
                                            
55 On the right to liberty, generally, see Sangeeta Shah, ‘Detention and Trial’ in 
Daniel Moeckli, Sangeeta Shah and Sandesh Sivakumaran (eds), International 
Human Rights Law (2nd edn, OUP 2014) 259–69; Walter Kälin and Jörg Künzli, 
The Law of International Human Rights Protection (OUP 2009) 443–50. 
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2. Anyone who is arrested shall be informed, at the time of arrest, of the 
reasons for his arrest and shall be promptly informed of any charges 
against him. 
3. Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be brought 
promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise 
judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or 
to release. It shall not be the general rule that persons awaiting trial 
shall be detained in custody, but release may be subject to 
guarantees to appear for trial, at any other stage of the judicial 
proceedings, and, should occasion arise, for execution of the 
judgement. 
4. Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be 
entitled to take proceedings before a court, in order that that court 
may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and 
order his release if the detention is not lawful. 
5. Anyone who has been the victim of unlawful arrest or detention shall 
have an enforceable right to compensation. 
The equivalent provision of the ECHR, Article 5, is as follows:  
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall 
be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in 
accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: 
(a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent 
court; 
(b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for non-compliance 
with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the 
fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; 
(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the 
purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on 
reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it 
is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing 
an offence or fleeing after having done so; 
(d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of 
educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose 
of bringing him before the competent legal authority; 
(e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the 
spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, 
alcoholics or drug addicts, or vagrants; 
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(f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting 
an unauthorized entry into the country or of a person against 
whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or 
extradition. 
2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language 
which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and the charge 
against him. 
3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of 
paragraph 1(c) of this article shall be brought promptly before a judge 
or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power and shall 
be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. 
Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 
4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be 
entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention 
shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the 
detention is not lawful. 
5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in 
contravention of the provisions of this article shall have an 
enforceable right to compensation. 
Article 7 ACHR is as follows: 
1. Every person has the right to personal liberty and security. 
2. No one shall be deprived of his physical liberty except for the 
reasons and under the conditions established beforehand by the 
constitution of the State Party concerned or by a law established 
pursuant thereto. 
3. No one shall be subject to arbitrary arrest or imprisonment. 
4. Anyone who is detained shall be informed of the reasons for his 
detention and shall be promptly notified of the charge or charges 
against him. 
5. Any person detained shall be brought promptly before a judge or 
other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power and shall be 
entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to be released without 
prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings. His release may be 
subject to guarantees to assure his appearance for trial. 
6. Anyone who is deprived of his liberty shall be entitled to recourse to 
a competent court, in order that the court may decide without delay 
on the lawfulness of his arrest or detention and order his release if 
the arrest or detention is unlawful. In States Parties whose laws 
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provide that anyone who believes himself to be threatened with 
deprivation of his liberty is entitled to recourse to a competent court 
in order that it may decide on the lawfulness of such threat, this 
remedy may not be restricted or abolished. The interested party or 
another person in his behalf is entitled to seek these remedies. 
7. No one shall be detained for debt. This principle shall not limit the 
orders of a competent judicial authority issued for nonfulfillment of 
duties of support. 
Finally, Article 6 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(ACHPR), which eschews any detailed provisions concerning procedure, is as 
follows: 
Every individual shall have the right to liberty and to the security of his 
person. No one may be deprived of his freedom except for reasons and 
conditions previously laid down by law. In particular, no one may be 
arbitrarily arrested or detained. 
As noted in Chapter Four, the Human Rights Committee’s (HRC’s) 
interpretation of the ICCPR is unique amongst the four instruments in 
considering the rights to liberty and security of the person as two distinct rights, 
the latter protecting individuals, both those who have been detained and those 
who have not, from the ‘intentional infliction of bodily or mental injury’.56 So far 
as the practice relating to the other instruments in concerned, the reference to 
security of the person carries no independent meaning.57 As Schabas notes, 
                                            
56 With respect to art 9 ICCPR, the practice of the HRC has developed to treat 
the ‘right to security of person’ as separate and distinct from the ‘right to liberty 
of person’. The terminology used for the two rights is that used by the HRC in 
General Comment 35. UN Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment No 35’ 
(16 December 2014) UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/35 (HRC General Comment 35) 
paras 3, 9. See also Sarah Joseph and Melissa Castan, The International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Cases, Materials and Commentary (3rd 
edn, OUP 2013) paras 11.03–11.07. In General Comment 35, the HRC 
summarised the position as being that, ‘The right to security of person protects 
individuals against intentional infliction of bodily or mental injury, regardless of 
whether the victim is detained or non-detained.’ HRC General Comment 35 (n 
56) para 9. In particular, as well as prohibiting the infliction of unjustifiable bodily 
injury by State agents, the right to security of person imposes positive 
obligations on States ‘to protect individuals from foreseeable threats to life or 
bodily integrity proceeding from any governmental or private actors.’ ibid para 9 
(citing 1560/2007, Marcellana and Gumanoy v. Philippines, para. 7.7). 
57 While the European Commission and ECtHR have both referred to separate 
rights of liberty and security of person, there appears little if any meaningful 
distinction. William A Schabas, The European Convention on Human Rights: A 
Commentary (OUP 2015) 228–29. At most, where a separate meaning has 
 192 
the practice of the European Commission and ECtHR in interpreting Article 5 
ECHR has been to focus ‘almost exclusively on “liberty” and [to give] no distinct 
or autonomous meaning … to “security of person”.’58 Given the focus of this 
Chapter on deprivation of liberty, to the extent that Article 9 ICCPR contains a 
separate right of security of person, that aspect of the right to liberty and 
security of person will not be discussed here. For the sake of simplicity, the term 
‘right to liberty’ will be used throughout this chapter with respect to each of the 
four provisions. 
Comparing the four provisions, each first states the existence of a right to liberty 
in general terms, before proceeding to set out the circumstances in which 
individuals may nevertheless be deprived of it. They all contain a requirement 
that the grounds for detention be lawful, albeit that the textual approach differs 
between the instruments. Whereas the other instruments require that the 
grounds, or reasons,59 for detention be established by, or previously laid down 
in, law, Article 5(1) ECHR instead enumerates specific grounds, each 
containing a requirement that the act or order by which an individual is deprived 
of his liberty is itself ‘lawful’.60 Each instrument also incorporates a requirement 
that either the procedure,61 or the conditions,62 for detention be prescribed or 
established by, or previously laid down in, law. 
Turning to the grounds for detention, the textual approach between the ECHR 
and the other instruments is again different. The ICCPR, ACHR and ACHPR 
each prohibit ‘arbitrary’ arrest or detention,63 whereas Article 5 ECHR does not. 
Instead, it contains an enumeration of circumstances in which arrest or 
detention may be such as not to violate the right to liberty. Nevertheless, it is 
                                                                                                                                
been attached to security of person under the ECHR, it has been used to refer 
to procedural obligations related to protection from arbitrary detention. Rhonda 
Powell, ‘The Right to Security of Person in European Court of Human Rights 
Jurisprudence’ (2007) 6 Eur Human Rights L Rev 649, 655. Although the right 
to security of the person under art 7 ACHR has not been applied as a separate 
right, it has been argued that it nevertheless ought to be. Thomas M Antkowiak 
and Alejandra Gonza, The American Convention on Human Rights: Essential 
Rights (OUP 2017) 146–47. 
58 Schabas (n 57) 228. 
59 For simplicity, these will be referred to hereafter simply as ‘grounds’. 
60 ECHR (n 1) art 5(1)(a)–(f). 
61 In the case of the ICCPR and ECHR. 
62 In the case of the ACHR and ACHPR. 
63 Referred to as ‘imprisonment’ in ACHR (n 1) art 7(3). 
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well established in the jurisprudence relating to Article 5 that it contains—
indeed, is arguably premised upon—protection from arbitrary deprivation of 
liberty.64 
In the case of the ICCPR, ECHR and ACHR, but not the ACHPR, all of the 
relevant Articles proceed to set out specific procedural requirements, dealing 
mainly with the right of an individual to be informed of the reasons for his or her 
detention, and the right to have access to, and to be brought promptly before, a 
competent court. These requirements are discussed in further detail below. 
From this summary, and assuming the applicability of the right in question, the 
issues engaged in the application of the right to liberty can be separated into 
four areas: first, whether a particular situation amounts to a deprivation of liberty 
such as to engage the right; second, whether a particular deprivation of liberty 
meets the requirement of legality; third, whether the deprivation of liberty is 
arbitrary and, in the case of the ECHR, falls within one of the prescribed 
grounds; and, finally, whether the procedural requirements of the right have 
been complied with. The remainder of this section considers these issues in the 
specific context of deprivation of liberty in the course of MSOs. 
5.4.3. Circumstances that engage the right to liberty 
As described above, in the course of MSOs individuals may be subject to a 
range of measures that affect their freedom to a greater or lesser extent. These 
include both measures that are taken against a vessel as a whole, such as 
when it is escorted or towed to a particular port, as well as those whereby 
individuals are subject to individual restrictions on their liberty, such as when 
they are placed under guard or held in a particular location within a vessel. 
Furthermore, these measures may or may not be characterised by the State in 
question as ‘detention’. 
In general, the applicability of the right to liberty is premised on substance rather 
than form, depending on an objective determination as to whether an individual 
has, in fact, been deprived of liberty. The articles refer variously to arrest, 
                                            
64 Schabas (n 57) 231–32. The textual approach in art 5 ECHR is analogous to 
that adopted in the drafting of art 2 ECHR; both eschew express reference to 
arbitrariness for an enumeration of circumstances in which actions that would 
normally violate the right in question may nevertheless be permitted.  
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detention, imprisonment and deprivation of liberty in setting out different 
substantive and procedural aspects of the right to liberty. Although this might be 
taken to imply a distinction in the meaning of—and obligations associated 
with—each term, in practice this is not the case. Fundamentally, the right to 
liberty is to be construed broadly as being engaged by any deprivation of liberty 
and not, in particular, just to individuals subject to criminal charges. The HRC 
has stated that Article 9(1) ICCPR ‘is applicable to all deprivations of liberty, 
whether in criminal cases or in other cases such as, for example, mental illness, 
vagrancy, drug addiction, educational purposes, immigration control, etc.’65 This 
is not an exhaustive list, but rather emphasizes the point that it is the fact of 
deprivation of liberty that is relevant, rather than the character of that 
deprivation. The HRC goes on to state that, while certain provisions of Article 9 
are, by nature, ‘only applicable to persons against whom criminal charges are 
brought’, the rest ‘appl[y] to all persons deprived of their liberty by arrest or 
detention.’66 Consistent with the approach of the HRC, Article 5 ECHR and 
Article 7 ACHR have been applied in numerous contexts outside of the context 
of the criminal process.67 As for the ICCPR, the relevant question is whether a 
person has, in fact, been deprived of their liberty. 
In the context of MSOs, it will not necessarily matter whether a State intends to 
return an individual to its own territory for prosecution, to transfer him or her to 
another State, or subsequently to release them; if the control over them 
amounts to a deprivation of liberty (the criteria for which are discussed below) 
then the right will be engaged. Similarly, the applicability of the right to liberty 
                                            
65 UN Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment No 8’ (30 June 1982) UN 
Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1, 8 (HRC General Comment 8) para 1. 
66 ibid para 1. The HRC indicated the provisions applicable only to those subject 
to criminal charges to be ‘part of paragraph 2 and the whole of paragraph 3’. 
The HRC reiterated this view in HRC General Comment 35 (n 56) para 4. 
67  Schabas identifies examples including ‘the placement of persons in 
institutions for psychiatric care and social services, international zones in 
airports, interrogation in police stations, house arrest, confinement in an “open 
prison”, and crowd control efforts.’ Schabas (n 57) 227 (citations omitted). 
Similarly, Antkowiak and Gonza identify from the IACtHR’s jurisprudence 
instances of art 7 ACHR being applied in situations including ‘a military base, a 
customs facility, an airport detention center, a secret military detention site, 
police stations and vehicles, administrative offices of an intelligence agency, 
and a military hospital. … The Court has even found violations for detentions in 
a church, in a mine, and “along the public roads” where individuals were forced 
to herd cattle’. Antkowiak and Gonza (n 57) 145–46. 
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will not depend on a particular step that might, or might not, have been taken in 
a State’s domestic legal system to ‘regularise’ the detention of an individual. 
Such a step was, for example, taken in each of the cases whose facts are set 
out above; however, in each, the individuals concerned were subject to 
restrictions on their liberty before the domestic authorities of the State 
concerned formally detained them under domestic law. Furthermore, the fact 
that a State may not describe the situation of an individual as, for example, 
‘detention’, ‘custody’ or ‘imprisonment’, is not determinative of the applicability 
of the right to liberty. 
Having established that what matters is an objective determination as to 
whether an individual has been deprived of his or her liberty, the next step is to 
understand where the threshold in that determination lies in the context of 
MSOs. This is not a simple matter; as the ECtHR has stated, ‘In order to 
determine whether someone has been “deprived of his liberty” within the 
meaning of Article 5 the starting-point must be his concrete situation and 
account must be taken of a whole range of criteria such as the type, duration, 
effects and manner of implementation of the measure in question’. 68 
Nevertheless, some general observations can be made. 
The right to liberty is essentially a physical concept, which the HRC has stated 
concerns ‘freedom from confinement of the body, not a general freedom of 
action.’69 Furthermore, not all restrictions on an individual’s physical freedom 
will be sufficient to engage the right to liberty. In this respect, the right to liberty 
has been compared and contrasted with broader rights protecting freedom of 
movement. For instance, the HRC states that Article 9 ICCPR is engaged only 
by a ‘more severe restriction of motion within a narrower space than mere 
interference with liberty of movement under article 12.’70  
It is clear, however, that the nature of the space in which a person is detained is 
not determinative. Hence, with respect to the distinction between restriction and 
deprivation of liberty, the ECtHR has made clear that, ‘The difference…is 
merely one of degree or intensity, and not one of nature or substance’.71 This is 
                                            
68 Medvedyev (n 14) [73]. See also Schabas (n 57) 227. 
69 HRC General Comment 35 (n 56) para 3. 
70 ibid para 5. Art 12 concerns the more general freedom of movement. 
71 Medvedyev (n 14) [73]. See also Schabas (n 57) 227. 
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reflected in the broad range of situations in which individuals have been 
determined to have been deprived of their liberty.72 Examples cited include not 
only situations that might typically be thought of in the context of detention, such 
as police custody and imprisonment, but also house arrest, and even 
confinement within particular areas of an airport. Furthermore, the location does 
not necessarily need to be fixed geographically. For example, the HRC 
considers that an individual may be deprived of his or her liberty when ‘being 
involuntarily transported.’73 Similarly, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
(IACtHR) has found individuals to be deprived of their liberty when held in the 
trunk of a police vehicle.74 
Considering other factors, while the duration of a restriction on an individual’s 
freedom is relevant, it does not necessarily need to be prolonged in order to 
amount to a deprivation of liberty. Although a ‘negligible’ period of time will not 
suffice,75 the ECtHR has, for example, found that individuals stopped by the 
police for less than thirty minutes in order to conduct a search were deprived of 
their liberty such as to engage Article 5.76 Similarly, the IACtHR has held that ‘a 
detention, whether for a brief period, or a “delay,” even if merely for 
identification purposes, is a form of deprivation of physical liberty of the 
individual’.77 
Essential, however, to the deprivation of liberty is the absence of consent.78 
Specifically, ‘Individuals who go voluntarily to a police station to participate in an 
                                            
72 These include ‘police custody, arraigo, remand detention, imprisonment after 
conviction, house arrest, administrative detention, involuntary hospitalization, 
institutional custody of children and confinement to a restricted area of an 
airport, as well as being involuntarily transported.’ HRC General Comment 35 (n 
56) para 5 (citations omitted). For relevant ECHR jurisprudence covering a 
similar set of circumstances, see Schabas (n 57) 227. For relevant ACHR 
jurisprudence covering a similar set of circumstances, see Antkowiak and 
Gonza (n 57) 145–46. 
73 HRC General Comment 35 (n 56) para 5. 
74 Gómez Paquiyauri Brothers v Peru (Merits, Reparations and Costs) Inter-
American Court of Human Rights Series C No 110 (8 July 2004) [67(f)], [87]. 
75 Schabas (n 57) 227. 
76 Gillan and Quinton v the United Kingdom ECHR 2010-I (extracts) [57]. 
77 Lysias Fleury et al v Haiti (Merits and Reparations) Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights Series C No 236 (23 November 2011) [54]. See also Torres 
Millacura et al v Argentina (Merits, Reparations and Costs) Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights Series C No 229 (26 August 2011) [76]. 
78 HRC General Comment 35 (n 56) para 6; Schabas (n 57) 227. 
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investigation, and who know that they are free to leave at any time, are not 
being deprived of their liberty.’79 What is required, therefore, is an element of 
coercion, such as, though not necessarily, liability to being charged with a 
criminal offence.80 
Turning to the application of these principles to MSOs,81 a broad range of 
restrictions may be placed on the freedom of the crew of an interdicted vessel. 
Considering the progress of a typical interdiction set out in Chapter One,82 at 
stages two and three, the interdicting ship brings the interdicted vessel under its 
control, by giving directions, potentially supported by both warnings and forceful 
measures, including non-disabling and disabling fire. Then, at stage four, the 
interdicting ship may send a boarding party to the interdicted vessel to conduct 
an inspection or search, during the course of which restrictions may be placed 
on the freedom of the crew to move freely on board. At some point, the 
boarding party may decide to detain certain members of the crew, holding them 
in a certain location either in the interdicted vessel or on board the interdicting 
ship. Finally, the interdicted vessel may be escorted, or towed, to another 
location, with the crew either still on board or transferred to the interdicting ship, 
and either with or without restrictions placed on the freedom of the crew 
members to move within whichever vessel they are situated. Notwithstanding 
that some of these measures are applied against a vessel as a whole, each 
may arguably amount to a direct or indirect restriction on the freedom of the 
individual crew members. 
Some of these restrictions are essentially identical to those recognised as 
amounting to a deprivation of liberty in other contexts. In particular, where an 
individual is arrested and confined to a cell, or similarly small space, on board 
either the interdicting ship or interdicted vessel, then there is no sensible 
argument that he will not have been deprived of his liberty in the same way as if 
arrested and detained in similar circumstances on land.83  Other situations 
                                            
79 HRC General Comment 35 (n 56) para 6. 
80 See, for example, Gillan and Quinton v the United Kingdom (n 76) [57]. See 
also Schabas (n 57) 226–27. 
81 For discussion of the application of these principles, as they relate to the 
ICCPR and ECHR, in the context of counter-piracy operations, see Petrig (n 12) 
156–67. 
82 See above s 1.1.2. 
83 Petrig (n 12) 157–59. 
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recognised as being capable of amounting to a deprivation of liberty might be 
argued to be analogous. For example, the HRC’s reference to ‘involuntary 
transport’ can be extended to transport via ship, either on an interdicted vessel 
or on the interdicting ship. Similarly, measures imposed against the crew of an 
interdicted vessel in the exercise of law-enforcement jurisdiction at sea are 
analogous to a police traffic stop, or brief detention for the purposes of 
identification, each of which have, as noted above, been recognised as 
amounting to a deprivation of liberty. Perhaps more helpful, however, is the 
guidance found in the limited jurisprudence specifically dealing with deprivation 
of liberty in the course of MSOs, particularly the ECtHR’s decisions in 
Medvedyev and Vassis. 
Two broad points can be identified from these cases. First, members of a crew 
may be deprived of their liberty when measures are imposed to control their 
vessel as a whole. In Medvedyev, the crew of the interdicted vessel, the 
Winner, remained on board throughout the interdiction and voyage to France, 
for which the Winner was placed under tow. Although the crew members were, 
for a period at least, confined to their cabins,84 the Court found that they had 
been ‘deprived of their liberty throughout the voyage as the ship’s course was 
imposed by the French forces.’85 Therefore, while the Court made reference to 
the additional restrictions placed upon the individual crew members,86 it seems 
to have been the measures applied to the vessel as a whole that were decisive. 
Similarly, in Vassis, the Court, relying on Medvedyev, determined that the crew 
members had been deprived of their liberty from some point on the day that the 
                                            
84 Medvedyev (n 14) [15]. The government claimed that these restrictions had 
been relaxed at some point during the voyage, though this assertion was 
disputed by the applicants. ibid [74]. 
85 ibid [74]. 
86 ibid (‘In the Court’s opinion, while it is true that the applicants’ movements 
prior to the boarding of the Winner were already confined to the physical 
boundaries of the ship, so that there was a de facto restriction on their freedom 
to come and go, it cannot be said, as the Government submitted, that the 
measures taken after the ship was boarded merely placed a restriction on their 
freedom of movement. The crew members were placed under the control of the 
French special forces and confined to their cabins during the voyage. True, the 
Government maintained that during the voyage the restrictions were relaxed. In 
the Court’s view that does not alter the fact that the applicants were deprived of 
their liberty throughout the voyage as the ship’s course was imposed by the 
French forces.’). 
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vessel had first been boarded and throughout the voyage to France, 87 
notwithstanding that it was only several days into the journey that the Court 
noted that the crew had been placed under guard.88 Although the Court was 
less explicit in its reasoning than in Medvedyev, the Court’s findings appear 
again to have been premised on deprivation of liberty arising from control over 
the interdicted vessel as a whole. 
Second, it is not necessary that the restriction placed on a vessel as a whole be 
achieved through physical control, such as would be the case where it is placed 
under tow. Although, in Medvedyev, the Winner was, indeed, placed under tow, 
the Court did not refer specifically to this in its reasoning, but only to the fact 
that the vessel’s course was imposed on the Winner, without reference to how 
this was achieved.89 Furthermore, in Vassis, the interdicted vessel was not 
placed under tow, but diverted under escort.90 Although the Court’s reasoning in 
the latter case was not set out in clear terms, it follows from the fact that the 
Court considered the crew members to have been deprived of their liberty 
throughout the voyage, that the control exercised by the French forces was 
sufficient, despite the absence of a physical connection. 
The decisions in Medvedyev and Vassis are not surprising given their 
consistency with the wider practice noted above, according to which a broad 
range of circumstances have been considered to amount to a deprivation of 
liberty in other contexts, and under which it is the fact that an individual’s liberty 
has been curtailed, rather than any formal criteria, that matters. Considering the 
range of restrictions on freedom that may be imposed in the course of MSOs, 
both those measures taken against the vessel as a whole, and those taken 
against individual crew members, are likely to be capable of amounting to a 
deprivation of liberty. Indeed, although neither decision is entirely clear, in both 
Medvedyev and Vassis the period in which the crew members were considered 
to have been deprived of their liberty appears to have extended back to around 
the point where the vessel was first intercepted. Therefore, so long as the 
interdicted vessel, as a whole, is subject to the control of the interdicting ship, 
                                            
87 Vassis (n 15) [58]. 
88 ibid [11]. 
89 Medvedyev (n 14) [74]. 
90 Vassis (n 15) [10]. 
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the individual crew members may be considered to have been deprived of their 
liberty. 
The only caveat to this conclusion, however, is that both Medvedyev and Vassis 
concerned periods of many days in which the interdicted vessel was subject to 
control. This raises the question whether a much shorter period, such as that 
required simply to conduct an inspection of the interdicted vessel, would still 
qualify. Bearing in mind that duration is a relevant factor, generally, it is at least 
possible that the answer should be yes. However, noting the ECtHR’s 
recognition, highlighted above, of a police traffic-stop as amounting to a 
deprivation of liberty, analogous situations in MSOs ought arguably to qualify 
too. 
Similarly, although Medvedyev and Vassis concerned deprivation of liberty 
following the boarding of the respective vessels, the same principles should 
apply at the point before a vessel is boarded, but when it is subject to the 
control of the interdicting ship, such as when it has stopped in preparation for 
boarding. This follows from the reasoning of the Court in Medvedyev that it was 
the imposition of the vessel’s course that was material to the deprivation of 
liberty. In light of this, it is unsurprising that the fact of boarding does not, itself, 
appear to have been decisive, or necessarily even relevant. Furthermore, there 
can be no rational distinction between the imposition of a course and, for 
example, a requirement to remain station; both amount to the exercise of 
control over the movement of the vessel as a whole. 
Notwithstanding that the decisions in Medvedyev and Vassis are directly 
relevant only to the application of Article 9 ECHR, they are likely to be influential 
in guiding the application the right to liberty, more broadly, in the course of 
MSOs. Consistent with the application of the law in other contexts, they provide 
support to the proposition that crew members of interdicted vessels will be 
deprived of their liberty not only in situations in which they are individually 
detained in a manner analogous to being held in a police cell, but in a broader 
range of circumstances. In light of this, it is submitted that this will include the 
situation when control is exerted over the interdicted vessel as a whole, such as 
when its course is dictated by the interdicting vessel. This will arguably be the 
case even where a vessel is stopped only briefly; however, the lack of practice 
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dealing specifically with such a situation leaves the situation less certain than 
with respect to measures imposed over a longer period of time. 
5.4.4. The requirement of lawfulness 
From the texts of the instruments, it is clear that lawfulness is an important 
concept in relation to the deprivation of liberty. Under the ICCPR, the 
requirement is that, ‘No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such 
grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law.’91 
Under the ACHR, ‘No one shall be deprived of his physical liberty except for the 
reasons and under the conditions established beforehand by the constitution of 
the State Party concerned or by a law established pursuant thereto.’92 Similarly, 
under the ACHPR, the requirement is that, ‘No one may be deprived of his 
freedom except for reasons and conditions previously laid down by law.’93 
However, the ECHR is structured differently in this regard: first, ‘No one shall be 
deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a 
procedure prescribed by law’;94 and, second, each of the specified grounds for 
detention requires that it be ‘lawful’. 95  Notwithstanding the differences in 
structure and language, common between the instruments is the requirement 
that both the grounds and either conditions or procedures according to which 
individuals are deprived of their liberty must be based in law. 
This requirement has often been interpreted as referring to domestic law. The 
ACHR is clearest and, arguably, most exacting in this respect,96 on account of 
the express requirement in Article 7(2) that the reasons and conditions for 
deprivation of liberty be found in either the State’s constitution, or in ‘law 
established pursuant thereto’. With respect to the ICCPR, the HRC refers in the 
body of General Comment 35 to ‘legal authorization’, 97  but includes the 
following quote from its own practice in the associated footnote: ‘the principle of 
legality is violated if an individual is arrested or detained on grounds which are 
                                            
91 ICCPR (n 1) art 9(1). 
92 ACHR (n 1) art 7(2). 
93 ACHPR (n 1) art 6. 
94 ECHR (n 1) art 5(1). 
95 ECHR (n 1) art 5(1)(a)–(f). 
96 Antkowiak and Gonza (n 57) 148. 
97 HRC General Comment 35 (n 56) para 22. 
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not clearly established in domestic legislation’.98 General Comment 35 goes on 
to refer repeatedly to domestic law. For example, it states that, ‘“Unlawful” 
detention includes both detention that violates domestic law and detention that 
is incompatible with the requirements of article 9, paragraph 1, or with any other 
relevant provision of the Covenant.’99 Similarly, with respect to Article 5 ECHR, 
the ECtHR has stated ‘that the expressions “lawful” and “in accordance with a 
procedure prescribed by law” essentially refer back to national law and state the 
obligation to conform to the substantive and procedural rules thereof.’100 
In the context of MSOs, the Australian Maritime Powers Act 2013 (MPA 2013) is 
an example of how deprivation of liberty may be authorised and regulated within 
domestic law. It contains a range of powers not only for authorised ‘maritime 
officers’ to arrest an individual whom is reasonably suspected of committing an 
offence under Australian law,101 or in respect of whom an arrest warrant has 
been issued,102 but also to exercise certain detention powers on behalf of other 
officials,103 and, more generally, when ‘exercising powers in relation to a vessel, 
installation, aircraft or land [to] place or keep a person in a particular place on 
the vessel, installation, aircraft or land.’104 With respect to a detained vessel,105 
individuals on board may be held there, and may be detained and taken, or 
                                            
98 UN Human Rights Committee, ‘Views of the Human Rights Committee under 
Article 5(4) of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights Concerning Communication No 702/1996’ (Communication 
submitted by Clifford McLawrence, concerning Jamaica) (Views adopted 18 
July 1997) UN Doc No CCPR/C/60/D/702/1996 para 5.5 (emphasis added). 
This is cited at HRC General Comment 35 (n 56) 7 fn 64. Although the 
reference to ‘legislation’ might seem unfortunate given its apparent exclusion of 
other forms of domestic law (such as the Common Law), it cannot plausibly be 
the case that the HRC intended to exclude other such forms of domestic law. 
99 HRC General Comment 35 (n 56) para 44. 
100 Hilda Hafsteinsdóttir (n 123) [51]. 
101 Maritime Powers Act 2013 s 76 
102 ibid s 77 
103 ibid s 73. 
104 ibid s 71. 
105 The term ‘detained vessel’ is not defined; however, the powers that relate to 
such a vessel permit a maritime officer to take it, or cause it to be taken, to any 
destination, and to either remain in control of it himself or herself, or to require 
the person in charge of the vessel to remain in control. ibid s 69(2). 
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caused to be taken, to any destination,106 and held for as long as is reasonably 
required to do so.107 
Each of these powers is subject to further obligations on the part of the State, 
including a general requirement that, ‘A person arrested, detained or otherwise 
held under this Act must be treated with humanity and respect for human 
dignity, and must not be subject to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.’108 
With respect, specifically, to those who are arrested, the MPA 2013 sets out 
further detailed requirements, that the person be informed of the reason for their 
arrest;109 and that, as soon as practicable, they be brought before a magistrate 
or delivered to the police or another competent authority.110 Notably, where an 
action must be done ‘as soon as practicable’, the MPA 2013 requires that 
certain matters be taken into account:  
(a) the location of the place where a person is arrested or detained;   
(b) the weather conditions at the time;   
(c) the means of transport available;   
(d) the need to proceed or continue with the exercise of powers under 
[the MPA 2013];   
(e) the need to ensure the safety of a vessel, installation or aircraft;   
(f) the need to take action to: 	
(i) protect human life, animal life or the environment; or  	
(ii) aid a vessel in distress; or 	
(iii) obtain medical assistance for any person.111 
Both the powers contained in the MPA 2013, and the procedural obligations, 
reflect the particular requirements of MSOs. As set out above, in the course of 
                                            
106 ibid s 72. 
107 ibid s 72A. 
108 ibid s 95 
109 ibid s 100 
110 ibid s 101. 
111 ibid s 96. 
 204 
MSOs, individuals may be argued to have been deprived of their liberty in a 
broader range of circumstances than narrowly defined circumstances of, for 
example, arrest or police custody. It is therefore notable that the MPA 2013 
provide positive powers that deal explicitly with this issue; indeed, it expressly 
states that, ‘Any restraint on the liberty of a person that results from the 
operation of [the relevant part of the MPA 2013] does not constitute arrest, and 
is not unlawful.’112 Also clearly tailored to the particular requirements of MSOs 
are the factors to be taken into account in determining the time in which things 
may practicably be done. 
The MPA 2013 is unusual in providing such clear bases and procedures for the 
deprivation of liberty in the course of MSOs in a State’s domestic law, 
particularly in a consolidated form. To illustrate, the UK, for example, has no 
equivalent to the MPA 2013, although certain powers are contained in 
legislation dealing with specific issues. For example, the Criminal Justice 
(International Co-operation) Act 1990, which implements the Vienna 
Convention,113 contains enforcement powers in respect of UK-flagged ships 
suspected of involvement in drug trafficking, as well as stateless vessels and 
vessels flagged to a State party to the Convention, for which permission from 
that State has been granted.114 It provides for a right of arrest in respect of 
individuals reasonably suspected of being guilty of a relevant offence,115 but 
does not contain further details as to procedure, or broader powers to deprive 
individuals of their liberty, other than when they are placed under arrest. 
Furthermore, other circumstances where individuals may be deprived of their 
liberty, such as in the case of those suspected of piracy, are not dealt with at all 
in the UK’s domestic legislation. 
Such lacunae prompt the question whether other sources of law may suffice to 
meet the requirement of lawfulness. In the context of MSOs, which by their 
nature, often involve action taken by agents of one State against nationals of 
another, it is especially important to consider the potential role of international 
                                            
112 ibid s 75. 
113  United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances (n 17). 
114 Criminal Justice (International Co-operation) Act 1990 (CJICA 1990) ss 18–
20. 
115 ibid sch 3 para 4(a). 
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law.116 This is an area where there is likely be divergence between the different 
IHRL treaty regimes. For the ACHR, the express terms of Article 7(2) are such 
that only law that forms part of a State’s constitution, or is enacted pursuant to 
it, will suffice. However, the language of the other instruments, which refer only 
to ‘law’ and lawfulness, is arguably less restrictive. Although, as noted above, 
the HRC and ECtHR have generally referred to domestic law, this might be 
argued to reflect the fact that, in the common situation where a State acts within 
its own borders, international law will simply not be relevant as a potential basis 
for the deprivation of liberty. 
Notably, where international law has been of potential relevance, the practice of 
the ECtHR, and of other courts applying the ECHR, suggests that it may be 
capable of meeting the lawfulness requirements. 117 In Medvedyev and others v 
France, the Court stated ‘that where the “lawfulness” of detention is in issue, 
including the question whether “a procedure prescribed by law” has been 
followed, the Convention refers essentially to national law but also, where 
appropriate, to other applicable legal standards, including those which have 
their source in international law.’118 Consistent with this, in Hassan v United 
Kingdom the Grand Chamber held that Article 5 ECHR should be read to 
include, alongside Article 5’s enumerated grounds, detention in the course of an 
international armed conflict.119 On the specific question of lawfulness, the Grand 
Chamber stated that  
As with the grounds of permitted detention already set out in those 
subparagraphs, deprivation of liberty pursuant to powers under 
international humanitarian law must be “lawful” to preclude a violation of 
Article 5 § 1. This means that the detention must comply with the rules of 
international humanitarian law and, most importantly, that it should be in 
keeping with the fundamental purpose of Article 5 § 1, which is to protect 
the individual from arbitrariness.120 
                                            
116 Noting the different types of relationship that it may have with domestic law 
according to a State’s particular constitutional arrangements. See, for example, 
Malcolm N Shaw, International Law (7th edn, CUP 2014) 92–141. 
117 Petrig (n 12) 213. 
118 Medvedyev (n 14) [73] (emphasis added). See also Tullio Treves, ‘Human 
Rights and the Law of the Sea’ (2010) 28 Berkeley J of Intl L 1, 8–10. 
119 Hassan v the United Kingdom ECHR 2014. 
120 Ibid [105] (citations omitted). 
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The reliance on international humanitarian law in Hassan, and absence of any 
reference to a requirement for it to be implemented in domestic law, provides 
strong support for the argument that, at least for the purposes of the ECHR, a 
legal basis may be found in unincorporated international law. 
As set out above, the law of the sea contains numerous provisions that might 
be argued to authorise, implicitly or explicitly, the deprivation of liberty. For 
example, Article 110 UNCLOS provides that warships and other authorized 
vessels are entitled to board foreign-flagged vessels on the high seas when 
reasonable grounds exist for suspecting that the vessel is engaged in piracy; 
the slave trade; unauthorized broadcasting (in certain circumstances); is without 
nationality; or is feigning its foreign-flagged status. 121  In such cases, the 
interdicting ship 
may proceed to verify the ship's right to fly its flag. To this end, it may 
send a boat under the command of an officer to the suspected ship. If 
suspicion remains after the documents have been checked, it may 
proceed to a further examination on board the ship, which must be 
carried out with all possible consideration.122 
The power described provides clear authority in international law for a vessel to 
be stopped, boarded and searched in clearly defined circumstances. 
Furthermore, the process to be followed is set out in brief but certain terms. 
Therefore, to the extent that the crew members of the interdicted vessel are 
necessarily deprived of their liberty in the course of their vessel being boarded 
and searched in accordance with Article 110, UNCLOS might plausibly provide 
a legal basis for the interdicting State’s actions, although not the detail required 
as to the procedures to be followed. 
However, whatever the source of the law, either domestic or international, it 
must adhere to the principle of legal certainty, which has been referred to by 
both the ECtHR and IACtHR.123 As the Grand Chamber in Medvedyev stated: 
                                            
121 UNCLOS (n 16) art 110(1). 
122 ibid art 110(2). 
123 Medvedyev (n 14) [80]. With respect to the IACtHR, see Antkowiak and 
Gonza (n 57) 150, though noting the point that ‘it is currently uncommon for the 
Court to find violations when domestic law fails to comply with the principle of 
legal certainty.’ 
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It is…essential that the conditions for deprivation of liberty under domestic 
and/or international law be clearly defined and that the law itself be 
foreseeable in its application, so that it meets the standard of “lawfulness” 
set by the Convention, a standard which requires that all law be sufficiently 
precise to avoid all risk of arbitrariness and to allow the citizen – if need 
be, with appropriate advice – to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in 
the circumstances of the case, the consequences which a given action 
may entail.124 
The application in Medvedyev of this principle, and of the law concerning the 
lawfulness requirement, generally, under Article 5(1) ECHR, is illustrative of the 
complexity that may be encountered and the particular issues that can arise in 
the context of MSOs. The situation in Medvedyev was complicated by the fact 
that Cambodia, the flag State of the Winner, was party to neither UNCLOS nor 
the Vienna Convention. Therefore, Article 108 UNCLOS and Article 17 Vienna 
Convention, both of which make provision for cooperation in the suppression of 
narcotics trafficking between States parties, were held to be inapplicable.125 As 
a consequence, also inapplicable were provisions of French domestic law that 
provided enforcement powers with respect to vessels reasonably suspected of 
illicit narcotics trafficking, but only where the vessel in question is French-
flagged, stateless, or flagged to a State party of the Vienna Convention, 
notwithstanding that the French courts had found the provisions to be 
applicable. 126  Even if the domestic law provisions somehow had been 
applicable, a majority of the Grand Chamber considered that their application 
would have violated the principle of legal certainty, as it was ‘unreasonable to 
contend that the crew of a ship on the high seas flying the Cambodian flag 
could have foreseen —even with appropriate advice— that they might fall under 
French jurisdiction in the circumstances of the case.’127 
                                            
124 Medvedyev (n 14) [80] (citations omitted). 
125 ibid [84]–[85]. The Grand Chamber rejected an argument put forward by the 
French government that its actions were permitted by Article 110 UNCLOS on 
the basis that the Winner was not showing its flag; however, the Grand 
Chamber correctly pointed out that France clearly knew the Winner was 
Cambodian-flagged and clearly, therefore, was neither withholding a French 
flag, nor reasonably suspected of being without nationality. ibid [86]–[89]. It also 
considered, and rejected, the possibility that the relevant provisions of UNCLOS 
and the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances represented customary law, and would thus be 
binding on Cambodia. ibid [92]. 
126 ibid [90]–[91]. 
127 ibid [92]. 
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In light of these findings, the Grand Chamber turned to consider whether a 
diplomatic note, in which Cambodia authorised the actions of the French 
government, could satisfy the requirement of lawfulness. The Court agreed that 
States are free to enter into ad hoc agreements to combat narcotics trafficking 
at sea;128 that diplomatic notes are sources of international law;129 and that the 
note in question formalised Cambodia’s agreement to the interception of the 
Winner.130 However, the majority did not consider that the note in question, 
which authorised ‘the French authorities to intercept, inspect and take legal 
action against the ship Winner, flying the Cambodian flag’,131 dealt sufficiently 
clearly with the action to be taken against the crew members, such that ‘their 
deprivation of liberty was the subject of an agreement between the two States 
that could be considered to represent a “clearly defined law” within the meaning 
of the Court’s case-law.’132 The note also failed to meet the requirement of 
foreseeability; the absence ‘of any current and long-standing practice between 
Cambodia and France in the battle against drug trafficking at sea in respect of 
ships flying the Cambodian flag’ meant that detention by France on the basis of 
an ad hoc agreement was not foreseeable to the crew.133  
Consequently, by a majority of ten to seven, the Court found there to have been 
a violation of Article 5(1). The dissenting judges considered that ‘it is necessary 
to be realistic in such exceptional circumstances.’ Notwithstanding the issues 
identified by the majority, they concluded that the deprivation was ‘was not 
arbitrary, which is, of course, what Article 5 requires above all’, and that, in the 
circumstances, it was not ‘necessary to apply the same criteria of “lawfulness” to 
the legal basis provided by the diplomatic note as are applied in much less 
exceptional situations.’ In summary, they found that 
When there is sufficient concurring evidence to suspect that a ship on the 
high seas, thousands of miles from the State thus authorised to board it, is 
engaged in international trafficking to which all countries want to put a 
stop, it is without a doubt legitimate not to place as narrow an 
                                            
128 ibid [95]. 
129 ibid [96]. 
130 ibid [97]. 
131 ibid [10] (quoting the diplomatic note). 
132 ibid [99]. 
133 ibid [100]. 
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interpretation on the legal basis as one would inside the territory of the 
State concerned.134 
However, according to the majority in Medvedyev, even though international law 
is capable of providing the legal basis for the deprivation of liberty, at least for 
the purposes of the ECHR, it must not only be sufficiently clear in its 
authorisation, but also foreseeable in its application. According to this position, 
even if an ad hoc agreement sets out in detail the power of another State to 
detain the authorising State’s nationals, it will still fail to meet the required 
standard of foreseeability if it is not supported by either established practice or 
some form of pre-existing framework agreement. Although Medvedyev 
represents only a single decision, decided by majority, it may amount to a 
significant restraint on the ability of States to deprive individuals of their liberty 
outside of frameworks established either by agreement or practice. While the 
minority view highlights, perhaps understandable, discomfort at the 
consequences of applying a rigid approach to such complicated situations, the 
majority position was arguably inevitable given the requirement of foreseeability, 
with which ad hoc arrangements will be inherently difficult to reconcile. 
5.4.5. Arbitrariness and grounds for deprivation of liberty 
As set out above, the relevant provisions of the ICCPR, ACHR and ACHPR 
each expressly prohibit arbitrary deprivation of liberty. On the face of it, the 
ECHR takes a different approach setting out particular circumstances in which 
deprivation of liberty may be permitted, without express reference to 
arbitrariness. These grounds are discussed further below. However, the 
practice of the ECtHR has demonstrated that a prohibition of arbitrary 
deprivation of liberty nevertheless underpins Article 5 ECHR.135 
Although there is significant overlap between the concept of unlawful detention 
and arbitrary detention,136 it is not sufficient for deprivation of liberty merely to 
be lawful. The view expressed by the HRC in General Comment 35 summarises 
the position: 
                                            
134 Ibid, Joint Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judges Costa, Casadevall, Bîrsan, 
Garlicki, Hajiyev, Šikuta And Nicolaou [10]. 
135 See the practice and discussion at Schabas (n 57) 232. 
136 See, for example, HRC General Comment 35 (n 56) para 11. 
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An arrest or detention may be authorized by domestic law and 
nonetheless be arbitrary. The notion of “arbitrariness” is not to be equated 
with “against the law”, but must be interpreted more broadly to include 
elements of inappropriateness, injustice, lack of predictability and due 
process of law, as well as elements of reasonableness, necessity and 
proportionality.137 
Similarly, the IACtHR has stated that Article 7 prohibits the deprivation of liberty 
‘for reasons and by methods which, although classified as legal, could be 
deemed incompatible with respect for the fundamental rights of the individual 
because, among other matters, they are unreasonable, unforeseeable or 
disproportionate.’138 The African Commission has also found that detention that 
is lawful within a State’s domestic legal order may nevertheless violate Article 6 
ACHR, which ‘must be interpreted in such a way as to permit arrests only in the 
exercise of powers normally granted to the security forces in a democratic 
society.’139 For example, in Amnesty International and others v Sudan, the 
African Commission held that detentions pursuant to a decree were in violation 
of Article 6 in part because ‘the wording of this decree allows for individuals to 
be arrested for vague reasons, and upon suspicion, not proven acts, which 
conditions are not in conformity with the spirit of the African Charter.’140 
With respect to ECtHR’s practice, deprivation of liberty may be considered 
arbitrary, notwithstanding that it may comply technically with an authorising law, 
and whether or not it is justified under one of the grounds set out in Article 5(1). 
The ECtHR has summarised the position as follows: 
Compliance with national law is not, however, sufficient: Article 5 § 1 
requires in addition that any deprivation of liberty should be in keeping with 
the purpose of protecting the individual from arbitrariness. It is a 
fundamental principle that no detention which is arbitrary can be 
compatible with Article 5 § 1 and the notion of “arbitrariness” in Article 5 §1 
extends beyond lack of conformity with national law, so that a deprivation 
                                            
137 ibid para 12. 
138 Yvon Neptune v Haiti (Merits, Reparations and Costs) Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights Series C No 180 (6 May 2008) [97]. See also Antkowiak and 
Gonza (n 57) 156. 
139 Amnesty International and Others v Sudan [2000] African Human Rights 
Law Reports 297 (ACtHPR 1999) [59]. See also Bronwen Manby, ‘Civil and 
Political Rights in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Articles 
1–7’ in Malcolm Evans and Rachel Murray (eds), The African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights (2nd edn, CUP 2008)197. 
140 Amnesty International (n 139) [59]. 
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of liberty may be lawful in terms of domestic law but still arbitrary and thus 
contrary to the Convention.141 
Although there is no ‘global definition’ as to what arbitrariness means in the 
context of the ECHR,142 ‘an element of bad faith or deception on the part of the 
authorities’ will render an otherwise lawful deprivation of liberty arbitrary.143 In 
addition, ‘both the order to detain and the execution of the detention must 
genuinely conform with the purpose of the restrictions permitted by the relevant 
[grounds]’.144 
From this brief survey, it is clear that arbitrariness is a broad concept, which, as 
a result, is difficult to apply in the abstract. Whether or not a particular 
deprivation of liberty is, for example, unnecessary or disproportionate, will 
depend on the particular circumstances. This is as true in MSOs as in any other 
context. More helpful is to consider the specific grounds in Article 5(1) ECHR on 
which deprivation of liberty may be permitted. These are strictly applicable only 
to the ECHR, but also provide a guide as to what may be considered arbitrary 
or not under the other instruments. 
Considering the list of grounds itself, although the practice of the ECtHR has 
been to treat it as exhaustive,145 recent developments reveal a slightly more 
flexible approach. In Hassan v United Kingdom, the Grand Chamber noted that, 
‘It has long been established that the list of grounds…does not include 
internment or preventive detention where there is no intention to bring charges 
within a reasonable time’.146 However, in light of both subsequent State practice 
and other relevant rules of international law, 147  namely international 
humanitarian law, a majority in the Grand Chamber concluded that Article 5 
could be interpreted as permitting security detention during an international 
                                            
141 Saadi v the United Kingdom ECHR 2008-I 31 [67]. 
142 ibid [68]. 
143 ibid [69]. 
144 ibid [69]. 
145 See, for example, Labita v Italy ECHR 2000-IV 99 [170]. See also Schabas 
(n 57) 234. 
146 Hassan (n 119) [97] (citations omitted). 
147 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (concluded 23 May 1969, entered 
into force 27 January 1980) 1155 UNTS 332 (1969 Vienna Convention) art 
31(3)(b)–(c). 
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armed conflict.148 The result of this decision was effectively to extend the list of 
permissible grounds under Article 5(1), opening the door to the potential future 
addition of further grounds. However, while Hassan represents an important 
departure, its impact on cases unrelated to the vexed issue of the interaction 
between international humanitarian law and international human rights law 
should not be overstated. Instead, it should be treated as a genuinely 
exceptional case and, in general, it remains the case that any deprivation of 
liberty must fall within one of the listed grounds.149 
In the context of MSOs, three of the listed grounds are likely to be relevant. 
First, though addressing them out of order, under Article 5(1)(c), an individual 
may be deprived of his liberty in the case of ‘the lawful arrest or detention of a 
person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal 
authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is 
reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or 
fleeing after having done so’. Deprivation of liberty may therefore be permitted 
under Article 5(1)(c) in three distinct circumstances: where there is reasonable 
suspicion that an individual has committed an offence; where reasonably 
necessary to prevent commission of an offence; and where reasonably 
necessary to prevent an individual fleeing having committed an offence. 
However, for all three, deprivation of liberty is only permissible for the purpose 
of bringing an individual before a competent legal authority,150 whether or not 
                                            
148 Specifically, ‘the taking of prisoners of war and the detention of civilians who 
pose a threat to security’. Hassan (n 119) [100]–[104]. See, however, the partly 
dissenting opinion of Judge Spano, joined by Judges Nicolaou, Bianku and 
Kalaydjieva, concluding that: 
 
the powers of internment under the Third and Fourth Geneva 
Conventions, relied on by the Government as a permitted ground for the 
capture and detention of Tarek Hassan, are in direct conflict with Article 5 
§ 1 of the Convention. The Court does not have any legitimate tools at its 
disposal, as a court of law, to remedy this clash of norms. It must therefore 
give priority to the Convention…. By attempting to reconcile the 
irreconcilable, the majority’s finding today does not, with respect, reflect an 
accurate under-standing of the scope and substance of the fundamental 
right to liberty under the Convention…. 
Hassan (n 119) Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Spano Joined by Judges 
Nicolaou, Bianku and Kalaydjieva [19]. 
149 Schabas (n 57) 235. 
150 Lawless v Ireland (no 3) Series A no 3 (ECtHR) [14]. 
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that outcome is ultimately achieved.151 As a result, the Court has stated that, ‘A 
person may be detained within the meaning of Article 5 § 1 (c) only in the 
context of criminal proceedings, for the purpose of bringing him before the 
competent legal authority on suspicion of his having committed an offence.’152 
Consequently, purely preventive detention is not permitted.153 In addition, the 
‘offence’ on which the availability of Article 5(1)(c) rests must be ‘specific and 
concrete’.154 
In the context of MSOs, Article 5(1)(c) will frequently provide the grounds for 
depriving an individual of his liberty, albeit only where the purpose genuinely is 
to bring the individual before a competent legal authority, in relation to a 
particular offence. This will primarily be the case where individuals are detained 
based on a crime set out in domestic criminal law, with respect to which there is 
an interaction with the requirement of legality, discussed above. Piracy is an 
obvious example of an offence in relation to which individuals will frequently be 
detained at sea. However, while the law of the sea provides a definition of 
piracy arguably sufficient to meet the ‘specific and concrete’ standard in terms 
of its specificity,155 detention of individuals suspected of piracy will only be 
permitted where there is a genuine intent and possibility to pursue criminal 
proceedings. To this extent, it will be necessary to examine whether there exists 
an appropriate offence within the jurisdiction of the State responsible for 
detention, or within the jurisdiction of a State to which the detainee might be 
transferred. The mere fact that the act of piracy is defined under international 
law does not, in itself, create a criminal offence and does not mean, therefore, 
that the detention of anyone suspected of an act meeting that definition can be 
grounded in Article 5(1)(c). 
Turning, second, to Article 5(1)(b), under the second limb of the article, an 
individual may be deprived of his liberty ‘in order to secure the fulfilment of any 
obligation prescribed by law’. This ground is relevant where it is truly necessary 
to deprive an individual of his liberty in order to secure the fulfilment of a 
                                            
151 Petrig (n 12) 173–4 (citing Labita v Italy (n 145) [155]). 
152 Jėčius v Lithuania ECHR 2000-IX 235. 
153 Petrig (n 12) 170. 
154 Ciulla v Italy (1989) Series A no 148 (ECtHR) [40]. 
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‘specific and concrete obligation which he has until then failed to satisfy’,156 in 
contrast to a mere ‘general duty of obedience to the law.’157 It is particularly 
relevant where it is necessary to deprive an individual of his liberty in a law-
enforcement context, absent the ‘reasonable suspicion of having committed an 
offence’ required under Article 5(1)(c), and has been applied in various such 
circumstances.158 
For example, in Iliya Stefanov v Bulgaria, the applicant, a lawyer, was detained 
by the police for several hours while he was interviewed as a witness in 
connection to a serious allegation against one of his clients.159 At the time of the 
interview, there was not ‘a sufficiently firm suspicion against him to the extent 
that this interview was in reality a preparatory stage to charging him’, and thus 
deprivation of liberty under Article 5(1)(c) was not permissible. However, 
although he had attended voluntarily, Bulgarian law placed ‘witnesses not only 
under the obligation to appear for questioning, but also to remain at the disposal 
of the authorities until necessary for this purpose’.160  The Court therefore 
considered whether the deprivation of liberty could be justified under Article 
5(1)(b) on account of the specific obligation placed on him by Bulgarian law. 
The Court stated that deprivation on this ground must meet certain criteria: 
It has to be specific and concrete, and the arrest and detention must be 
truly necessary for the purpose of ensuring its fulfilment. Moreover, in 
assessing whether the deprivation of liberty is justified, a fair balance has 
to be drawn between the significance in a democratic society of securing 
the fulfilment of the obligation in issue and the importance of the right to 
liberty. The relevant factors in drawing this balance are the nature and the 
purpose of the obligation, the detained person, the specific circumstances 
which led to his or her detention, and the length of the detention.161 
In the circumstances of the case, the Court considered that the deprivation of 
the applicant’s liberty ‘for a limited amount of time for the purpose of taking his 
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statement’ was not contrary to Article 5(1)(b).162 Specifically, it did ‘not consider 
that by keeping the applicant in custody for a period totalling five hours the 
authorities overstepped the reasonable balance between the need to question 
him and his right to liberty.’163 
Analogous situations may arise in MSOs. While detention will frequently occur 
in circumstances where there is reasonable suspicion of the detained individual 
having committed an offence (e.g. piracy), considered in connection with Article 
51(1)(c) above, it may be necessary to deprive individuals of their liberty in 
circumstances where that is not necessarily the case. This may happen, for 
example, where a vessel is subject to the right of visit under Article 110 
UNCLOS, which authorises inspections in a range of situations much broader 
than just where an individual is reasonably suspected of committing an offence. 
In the course of such inspections, the crew members may nevertheless be 
deprived of their liberty. Where this is the case, the grounds may be compatible 
with Article 51(1)(b), so long as they amount to a specific and concrete legal 
obligation, and the deprivation of liberty also meets the other criteria identified 
by the ECtHR, as set out above. 
It should be emphasised, however, that Article 51(1)(b) requires there to be a 
legal obligation on the part of the individual deprived of his or her liberty, and 
not merely a legal right on the part of the State to undertake the activity 
concerned. Otherwise, apart from distorting the actual language used, it would 
go no further than the requirement of legality. For example, in the context of 
MSOs, Article 110 UNCLOS, creates a right on the part of the State conducting 
an inspection of an interdicted vessel, but does not, in itself, create a 
corresponding obligation on the part of the individual crew members. Such an 
obligation will more plausibly derive from the domestic law of the State 
responsible for the deprivation of liberty. For example, under the Australian 
MPA 2013, an individual may be required to cooperate with a boarding in a 
number of ways, such as to take reasonable steps to facilitate the boarding of a 
vessel,164 or to answer questions or produce documents.165 Requirements of 
this kind, set out in the domestic law of the interdicting State, are likely to 
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amount to specific and concrete legal obligations such as might justify 
deprivation of liberty under Article 51(1)(b). Although Australia is not, of course, 
subject to the ECHR, the grounds under Article 5(1) may, as suggested above, 
be illustrative of the situations in which deprivation of liberty might be 
considered non-arbitrary under the other instruments, including the ICCPR. 
Finally, under Article 5(1)(f) it may be permissible to deprive an individual of his 
liberty in the case of ‘the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his 
effecting an unauthorized entry into the country or of a person against whom 
action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition.’ As Schabas 
notes, all that this ground ‘requires is that detention be directed at preventing 
unauthorized entry or at removal from the country.’166 It does not require that an 
individual has committed an offence, nor even that detention is necessary for 
any reason beyond preventing entry or effecting removal. Nevertheless: 
such detention must be carried out in good faith; it must be closely 
connected to the purpose of preventing unauthorised entry of the person 
to the country; the place and conditions of detention should be 
appropriate…; and the length of the detention should not exceed that 
reasonably required for the purpose pursued.167 
Article 5(1)(f) will be relevant in a maritime security context, but only in narrowly 
delimited circumstances. Where individuals attempt to gain unauthorized entry 
to a coastal State (including its territorial sea and internal waters) by sea, then, 
to the extent that they are deprived of their liberty in the course of being 
removed, it will provide grounds under Article 5 for the coastal State’s actions. 
However, it cannot be relied upon as grounds for a coastal State to detain 
unauthorized immigrants at sea for any longer than required to effect their 
removal, or for any other purpose. It could not, for example, be relied upon with 
respect to the detention of an unauthorized immigrant in connection with a 
suspected crime.168 
It is important to recognise that deprivation of liberty may be justified under 
more than one of the Article 5(1) grounds, and the relevant grounds may 
change during the course of an individual’s detention. For example, where an 
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individual is deprived of his liberty in order for a State to exercise its power 
under Article 110(1)(d) UNCLOS to visit a ship reasonably suspected of being 
without nationality, the relevant ground is likely to be the second limb of Article 
5(1)(b), i.e. in order to fulfil a legal obligation. Where the result of the visit is 
reasonable suspicion that the individual has committed an offence, continued 
deprivation of liberty will be justified under Article 5(1)(c). Similarly, where a 
coastal State intercepts a vessel heading towards its coast in order to check the 
immigration status of its occupants, any deprivation of liberty will again be 
justified on grounds under Article 5(1)(b). If the coastal State then continues to 
deprive individuals of their liberty in order to remove them from its territory, that 
will be justified on grounds under Article 5(1)(f). 
5.4.6. Procedural rights and obligations 
The ICCPR, ECHR and ACHR each contain similar, express, procedural 
requirements relating to the deprivation of liberty.169 However, as noted by 
Evans and Murray, the ACHPR is ‘comparatively vestigial in its details when 
read alongside the ICCPR or other regional treaties’.170 Indeed, it contains no 
express procedural requirements whatsoever. Nevertheless, the African 
Commission has adopted Guidelines on the Conditions of Arrest, Police 
Custody and Pre-Trial Detention in Africa, which are intended to assist States in 
their implementation of Article 6 ACHPR, as well as other relevant rights,171 in 
the context of arrest, police custody and pre-trial detention. Although amounting 
only to soft law, the Guidelines are nevertheless likely to be illustrative of the 
approach that will be taken by the African Commission. In the analysis below, 
footnotes indicate where an obligation contained in the text of the other 
instruments is also reflected in the Guidelines. 
Identifying, in broad terms, the procedural rights and obligations relating to 
deprivation of liberty, Article 9(2) ICCPR, Article 5(2) ECHR and Article 7(4) 
ACHR contain the obligation for States to inform individuals of the reason for 
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their arrest (‘detention’ in the case of the ACHR) and of any charges against 
them.172 Article 9(3) ICCPR, Article 5(3) ECHR and Article 7(5) ACHR require 
States to bring detained individuals promptly before a judicial authority; for any 
trial to be held within a reasonable time; and for detainees to be released, 
potentially subject to guarantees, if a trial is not held within a reasonable 
time.173 Article 9(4) ICCPR, Article 5(4) ECHR and Article 7(6) ACHR require 
that individuals deprived of their liberty have the right promptly to challenge the 
lawfulness of their detention before a court empowered to order their release 
(essentially a right to Habeas Corpus).174 Finally, Article 9(5) ICCPR and Article 
5(5) ECHR (but not Article 7 ACHR) require that individuals have an 
enforceable right to compensation in the case of violations of Article 9 ICCPR 
and Article 5 ECHR respectively.175 
                                            
172  Guidelines on the Conditions of Arrest, Police Custody and Pre-Trial 
Detention in Africa (n 171) 9 (‘The following rights shall be afforded to all 
persons under arrest: … The right to be informed of the reasons for their arrest 
and any charges against them.’) 
173 ibid 9–10 (‘The following rights shall be afforded to all persons under arrest: 
… The right to apply for release on bail or bond pending investigation or 
questioning by an investigating authority and/or appearance in court.’); ibid 14 
(‘All persons shall have the right to a fair trial, within a reasonable time, in 
accordance with international law and standards’). 
174 ibid 9–10 (‘The following rights shall be afforded to all persons under arrest: 
… The right to challenge promptly the lawfulness of their arrest before a 
competent judicial authority.’) In addition, under art 7(6) ACHR, where a State 
party allows an individual, or someone acting on their behalf, to seek redress 
where there is a perceived threat of being deprived of his or her liberty, that 
right is not to be restricted or abolished. ACHR (n 1) art 7(6). 
175  Guidelines on the Conditions of Arrest, Police Custody and Pre-Trial 
Detention in Africa (n 171) 29 (‘All persons who are victims of illegal or arbitrary 
arrest and detention, or torture and ill-treatment during police custody or pre-
trial detention have the right to seek and obtain effective remedies for the 
violation of their rights. This right extends to immediate family or dependents of 
the direct victim. Remedies include, but are not limited to: … Compensation, 
including any quantifiable damages resulting from the right violation and any 
physical or mental harm (such as physical or mental harm, pain, suffering and 
emotional distress, lost opportunities including education, material damage and 
loss of actual or potential earnings, harm to reputation or dignity, and costs 
required for legal services or expert assistance, medicines, medical services, 
and psychological and social services).’) 
 219 
5.4.6.1. The obligation to inform individuals of the reason for their arrest and of 
any charges against them (Article 9(2) ICCPR, Article 5(2) ECHR and Article 
7(4) ACHR) 
The requirements to inform individuals of the reason for arrest and to inform 
them of any charges against them are separate and distinct.176 Considering, 
first, the latter of these, the obligation to inform an individual of the charge 
against him or her will arise only in circumstances where criminal charges are 
brought. 177  It follows that there will be little that is remarkable about its 
application to MSOs; where an individual who has been deprived of their liberty 
is subject to criminal charges, he or she must be told what they are, although 
not necessarily in the detail that would be required in advance of trial.178 
Language differences between detainees and the detaining crew might be more 
likely to present an issue at sea than on land; however, so long as 
communication with shore authorities is possible, resources ought to be 
available to provide a translation of the essential facts within the required 
timescale. 
With respect to the requirement to give reasons for arrest, the use of the words 
‘arrest’ and ‘criminal’ in Article 5(2) ECHR (and, similarly, in Article 9(2) ICCPR) 
could be read as implying that requirement to inform individuals of the reason 
for their arrest is relevant only in the context of criminal proceedings. However, 
this is not the case and the obligation to give reasons applies to any deprivation 
of liberty. The HRC, consistent with the practice of the ECtHR, has stated that 
‘Because “arrest” means the commencement of a deprivation of liberty, [the 
requirement to give reasons] applies regardless of the formality or informality 
with which the arrest is conducted and regardless of the legitimate or improper 
reason on which it is based.’179 Indeed, it would make little sense for only a 
subset of situations amounting to a deprivation of liberty to be subject to the 
requirement to give reasons. As explained above, it is fundamental to the right 
to liberty that its deprivation be only for lawful, non-arbitrary reasons; if such 
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reasons must exist in the case of any deprivation of liberty in order for it not to 
violate the right to liberty, there is no apparent justification for withholding them 
in some situations but not others. 
Turning to the ACHR, the situation is less clear. Article 7(4) ACHR refers to 
‘detention’ rather than ‘arrest’, although the IACtHR has frequently used the 
latter terminology, and has construed it broadly, stating that ‘the obligation to 
inform the person of the motives and reasons for his arrest and of his rights 
does not accept exceptions and must be observed independently of the way in 
which the arrest occurs.’180 However, in the context of the particular judgment, 
this concerned the distinction between ‘arrest made through a court order and 
that practiced infragranti’,181 and arguably still referred only to arrest in the 
course of criminal proceedings. 
More generally, all of the procedural obligations under Article 7(5)–(6) ACHR 
have been interpreted in the literature as being ‘specific to criminal matters’, in 
contrast to the generality of the earlier paragraphs.182 Although Antkowiak and 
Gonza note that they ‘now [also] extend to administrative deprivations of liberty, 
such as the detention of migrants or the mentally ill’,183 this still does not 
encompass the full range of situations in which individuals are deprived of their 
liberty. Hence, in Torres Milacura et al v Argentina, which concerned, in part, 
the lawfulness of a short-term deprivation of liberty while an individual was 
transported to a police station,184 the Court did not consider the procedural 
requirements under the ACHR, notwithstanding that they clearly had not been 
met. Instead, it found there to have been a violation of Article 7(2), on the basis 
that a failure to meet procedural requirements under domestic law rendered the 
deprivation of liberty unlawful.185 Therefore, although the argument in principle 
for imposing such an obligation applies equally to the ACHR as it does to the 
ICCPR and ECHR, the obligation to give reasons under the ACHR arguably 
may not currently extend to all deprivations of liberty. 
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With respect to timing, the instruments contain differing requirements. Article 
9(2) ICCPR requires that the reasons for arrest must be given ‘at the time of 
arrest’, which the HRC has stated amounts to a material distinction from the 
requirement of promptness that applies to notification of charges. Whereas the 
nature of the charges may be explained ‘some hours later’,186 the requirement 
to give reasons for arrest must be met immediately, except in the case of 
exceptional circumstances, such as the unavailability of an interpreter, which 
may be particularly relevant to MSOs.187 However, under Article 5(2) ECHR, the 
standard of promptness applies both to reasons and to any charges. While the 
meaning of ‘prompt’ will depend on the ‘special features’ of each case,188 both 
requirements will be met if the information is provided within ‘a few hours’.189 
Article 7(4) ACHR takes another approach again, referring to promptness in 
relation to notification of charges, but remaining silent with respect to giving 
reasons for arrest. However, in interpreting the requirement under Article 7(4), 
the IACtHR has cited the equivalent provision of the United Nations’ Body of 
Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or 
Imprisonment,190 which requires that, ‘Anyone who is arrested shall be informed 
at the time of his arrest of the reason for his arrest and shall be promptly 
informed of any charges against him.’ 191  From this, it seems that the 
requirement under the ACHR reflects that which applies under the ICCPR. 
Applying this to deprivation of liberty in the course of MSOs, it was argued 
above that the right to liberty may be engaged in a broad range of 
circumstances, including situations where an interdicted vessel, as a whole, is 
subject to control by the interdicting ship, potentially even before a boarding 
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takes place. If this is correct, it follows that the requirement to give reasons for 
the deprivation of liberty will apply. In practice, given the requirement under the 
ICCPR and ACHR that this be done at the time of arrest, this will mean that the 
action taken by an interdicting ship to bring an interdicted vessel under its 
control ought to be accompanied by notification of the reason for the 
interdiction. It will therefore be insufficient to inform a vessel simply that it is to 
be boarded; rather the direction should include the legal basis and grounds 
pursuant to which the order is being made. Although not necessarily an onerous 
obligation, it obviously requires that the legal basis and grounds be properly 
identified in advance and may, as a result, expose any issues or defects with 
them. Furthermore, although even the stricter requirements of the ICCPR can 
be relaxed where an interpreter is not available, language differences between 
the detainees and detaining crew may nevertheless present a practical 
challenge, noting that any delay must be no more than ‘the absolute minimum 
necessary.’192 
5.4.6.2. The obligation to bring detainees before a judicial authority (Article 9(3) 
ICCPR, Article 5(3) ECHR and Article 7(5) ACHR) 
The applicability of Article 9(3) ICCPR and Article 5(3) ECHR is contingent, in 
both instruments, on the existence of criminal charges. This is apparent from 
the express terms of Article 9(3) ICCPR and by implication with respect to 
Article 5(3) ECHR, on account of the reference to Article 5(1)(c). This 
requirement has been construed narrowly by the HRC,193 as well as in the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR.194 The obligations under Article 9(3) ICCPR and 
Article 5(3) ECHR are not, therefore, of general application to all circumstances 
in which an individual is deprived of his liberty, but rather only to situations 
where an individual is detained in order to pursue criminal charges. With 
respect to the ACHR, although Article 7(5) ACHR does not limit itself explicitly 
to detention only in the case of criminal charges being brought, it was noted 
above that the applicability of all of the ACHR’s procedural requirements may 
be limited to deprivation of liberty only in certain circumstances. 
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In any case, as noted by the ECtHR, ‘The fact that a detained person is not 
charged or brought before a court does not in itself amount to a violation of the 
first part of Article [5(3)]. No violation of Article [5(3)] can arise if the arrested 
person is released “promptly” before any judicial control of his detention would 
have been feasible’.195 Such an approach makes obvious sense, particularly if 
the obligation is applied outside of the criminal process, as might be the case 
with respect to the ACHR. Given that deprivation of liberty has been interpreted 
so widely as to include, for example, relatively brief, routine, measures such as 
traffic stops, a requirement to bring the individual concerned before a judicial 
authority in all such situations would plainly be impractical. In such 
circumstances, the grounds for deprivation of liberty are likely to have expired 
before it can reasonably be expected that the individual can be brought before a 
judicial authority. Indeed, to do so may extend the deprivation of liberty beyond 
what would otherwise have been necessary. 
Where the requirement applies, there are three important questions of 
interpretation. First, what characteristics must an authority have in order to meet 
the standards of the two provisions? Second, what does it mean to be brought 
‘promptly’ before that authority, particularly in the context of a maritime security 
operation that may have taken place far from a State’s courts? And, third, how 
must the hearing be conducted? In particular, must the individual concerned be 
presented in person, or could the hearing be conducted remotely? 
In relation to the nature of the authority before whom a detainee must be 
brought, it is clear from the text of all three provisions that the authority need not 
necessarily be a judge, but may instead be an ‘officer authorized by law to 
exercise judicial power’. However, in addition to being authorized under the law 
of the State concerned, the officer exercising judicial power must meet certain 
standards. These have been expressly linked by the IACtHR to the provisions 
under Article 8(1) ACHR relating to the right to a fair trial, requiring the officer to 
fulfil the requirements of ‘competence, independence, and impartiality.’ 196 
Similarly, with respect to the ICCPR and ECHR, what matters is that the 
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authority is ‘independent, objective and impartial in relation to the issues dealt 
with.’197 
These requirements will apply to individuals deprived of their liberty during 
MSOs as it does in any other context. However, a unique question raised in the 
maritime context is whether the standards of independence and impartiality 
could be met by a judicial officer deployed to a ship, rather than located ashore. 
As will be discussed below, the potential for individuals to be deprived of their 
liberty in remote locations presents a challenge with respect to the timescale 
within which they are brought before a judicial authority. Therefore, if a judicial 
officer could be located in the interdicting ship, then the delay might be reduced 
or eliminated. 
Such an option does not, in itself, appear to be prohibited under any of the 
instruments, so long as the individual meets the required standards of 
independence and impartiality. However, to situate such an individual in a ship 
for any substantial amount of time is unlikely to be an attractive option in 
practice. This is because the requirements of independence and impartiality 
mean that he or she is likely to be able to do little else besides fulfil their judicial 
function on board the ship. They could not, for example, be part of the chain of 
command responsible for the detention over which they subsequently exercise 
judicial oversight, such as may be the case if the judicial function were a 
secondary duty given to a member of the regular crew. Furthermore, although 
there are differences in the application of the different instruments, it is unlikely 
that the judicial officer could also act as a prosecutor, at least not one involved 
in the decision to detain in the first place. Whereas the ECtHR has accepted 
that the required standard of independence and impartiality may, in some 
circumstances, be met by individuals within public prosecution departments,198 
the HRC has stated that ‘a public prosecutor cannot be considered as an officer 
exercising judicial power under [Article 5(3) ICCPR].’199 With respect to the 
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ACHR, the IACtHR has found that a prosecutor could not exercise judicial 
power where this would involve reviewing ‘the legality of his own orders.’200 
Turning to the question of promptness, this is a notable issue in the maritime 
context given the potential for individuals to be deprived of their liberty in remote 
locations. In general, the view of the HRC is that, while there is no clearly 
defined time limit, ‘48 hours is ordinarily sufficient to transport the individual and 
to prepare for the judicial hearing; any delay longer than 48 hours must remain 
absolutely exceptional and be justified under the circumstances.’201 In relation 
to the ECHR, Schabas identifies from the relevant practice an upper limit of 
about four days for the delay tolerated by the ECtHR.202 However, in Brogan 
and others v UK, the Court has recognised that ‘promptness is to be assessed 
in each case according to its special features’, although ‘the significance to be 
attached to those features can never be taken to the point of impairing the very 
essence of the right…to the point of effectively negativing the State’s obligation 
to ensure a prompt release or a prompt appearance before a judicial 
authority.’ 203  With respect to the ACHR, Burgorgue-Larsen and Úbeda de 
Torres note that, although the IACtHR has referred to ‘immediate judicial 
control’,204 in practice it has developed its own standard of prompt judicial 
intervention.205 Antkowiak and Gonza identify the shortest period of detention 
found by the IACtHR to have been in violation of that standard to have been 
thirty-eight hours, in the case of a child.206 However, the IACtHR has also 
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acknowledged the relevance of considering the ‘special features’ of a case, 
citing the passage above from the ECtHR’s decision in Brogan and others.207  
Such special features are likely to exist in the case of deprivation of liberty in the 
course of MSOs, as reflected in the ECtHR’s decisions in Rigopolous, 
Medvedyev and Vassis, which together provide detailed guidance on the 
application to MSOs of Article 5(3) ECHR, and, by extension, the right to prompt 
judicial review more generally.208 In Rigopolous, a period of sixteen days to 
transfer the applicant 5,500km by sea did not amount to a breach of Article 5(3) 
in light of the ‘wholly exceptional circumstances’,209 which meant that it had 
been ‘materially impossible to bring the applicant physically before the 
investigating judge any sooner’. 210  The Court considered the applicant’s 
suggestion that a handover to have been conducted with UK authorities located 
on Ascension Island (closer than Spain, but still 890 nautical miles from the 
location where the vessel was boarded) to have been ‘unrealistic’.211 It does 
seem, however, that the Court considered Spain to have done all that it feasibly 
could to protect the rights of the applicant. It noted, for example, that ‘once he 
had arrived at Las Palmas, the applicant was transferred to Madrid by air and that 
he was brought before the judicial authority on the following day.’212 Furthermore, 
the applicant’s detention was regularised by the Central Investigating Court in 
Spain during the period at sea and, while the applicant disputed some of the facts, 
the Government claimed that he was both informed of the basis for his detention 
and provided with access to legal advice.213 Therefore, although the applicant was 
not brought physically before a judicial authority until his arrival in Spain, such 
as to satisfy his rights under Article 5(3), his detention was nevertheless 
conducted within a framework of judicial control. 
Similarly, in Medvedyev, a majority of nine to eight concluded that a delay of 
thirteen days at sea, covering a similar distance to that in Rigopolous, followed 
by eight or nine hours in custody in France, did not amount to a violation of 
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Article 5(3).214 As in Rigopolous, key to this decision was the finding that the 
French authorities took no longer than necessary to escort the vessel 
containing the detainees to France. 215  The majority again rejected the 
applicants’ argument that the French authorities ought to have taken certain 
measures to reduce the delay. In particular, it was suggested that the detainees 
could have been transferred from their own ship to the French vessel; however, 
the majority concluded, ‘As to the idea of transferring them to a French naval 
vessel to make the journey faster, it is not for the Court to assess the feasibility 
of such an operation in the circumstances of the case, particularly as it has not 
been established that the frigate was capable of accommodating all the crew 
members in sufficiently safe conditions.’216 Most notable in this regard is not 
only the margin of appreciation afforded to the French authorities, but the 
apparent acceptance of their judgment as to the feasibility of options to reduce 
the delay. 
The minority in Medvedyev, however, took a different view, concluding that 
Article 5(3) had been violated.217 They sought to distinguish Rigopolous on the 
grounds that, in the earlier case, the applicant’s detention had been supervised 
by the Central Investigating Court and the applicant had, for example, been 
kept informed and given access to a lawyer, whereas in Medvedyev the only 
supervision was by a public prosecutor on board the interdicting ship. They also 
drew attention to the fact that the lawfulness of the detention in Rigopolous was 
never in question.218 Furthermore, although the minority accepted that ‘wholly 
exceptional circumstances’ might justify a delay longer than that normally 
permitted, this ‘connotes, if not “insurmountable” or “insuperable”, then, at least, 
circumstances in which the authorities could not reasonably envisage or 
execute any other measures in order to comply with their obligations under the 
Convention.’219 The minority considered that, in the circumstances, options 
were available to reduce the delay: given the reasonable foreseeability of what 
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was to transpire, a judicial officer could have been embarked in the interdicting 
ship at some point before the interdiction of the Winner; alternatively, the 
detainees could have been transferred to the interdicting ship, or airlifted to 
France, the latter noted as an option previously used by France for suspected 
pirates.220  These options were not exhaustive, but rather intended by the 
minority to emphasise that ‘far from doing everything possible to bring the 
applicants promptly before a judge, there is no evidence at all that the above or 
any alternative measures were even contemplated.’221 
Turning to Vassis, the case, decided by the Fifth Section sitting as a Chamber, 
concerned a period of eighteen days at sea, followed by 48 hours in police 
custody ashore before the applicants were brought before a judge. It is 
noteworthy that the (unanimous) decision cites the relevant part of the majority 
decision in Medvedyev in full.222 Notwithstanding the minority position in the 
earlier case, the Court in Vassis referred again to the ‘wholly exceptional 
circumstances’ present in both Rigopoulos and Medvedyev, concluding that 
there was ‘nothing to suggest that its diversion to France took any longer than 
necessary’, and again dismissed the suggestion that other options ought to have 
been explored, stating that, ‘As for the other possible scenarios, it is not for the 
Court to assess their feasibility in the specific circumstances of the case.’ 223 
Although not stated explicitly, it seems clear that the Court therefore considered the 
period of eighteen days at sea not to be in violation of Article 5(3). However, it went 
on to consider the period of 48 hours ashore, for which it found there to have been 
‘no justification for such an additional delay of some forty-eight hours under the 
circumstances of the case.’224 Given the delay already incurred by the journey to 
France, and the opportunity this presented to prepare for the applicants’ arrival, ‘as 
soon as the applicants arrived in France they should have been brought, without 
delay, before a “judge or other officer authorised to exercise judicial power”.’225  
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From these judgments, it is clear that the need to transfer detainees long 
distances by sea can amount to ‘wholly exceptional circumstances’, such as to 
justify a delay in bringing individuals before a judicial authority.226 Although the 
eighteen-day delay incurred during the sea voyage in Vassis provides a useful 
upper point of reference, the Court’s reasoning across all three cases implies 
that there is no particular limit to the delay that may be incurred. What is 
important is that the delay is no longer than necessary in the circumstances. 
With respect to this standard, although noting the views of the minority in 
Medvedyev, the Court’s judgments have consistently deferred to the States 
concerned with respect to the feasibility of proposed measures that could have 
been taken to reduce the length of the delay. Similarly, although the Court 
noted the judicial oversight present during the period of the voyage in 
Rigopolous, the absence of similar measures in either Medvedyev or Vassis did 
not give rise to a violation of Article 5(3). Clearly, however, it follows from the 
decision in Vassis that much less flexibility is afforded States once the transfer 
by sea is complete. 
Notwithstanding the apparent endorsement of the majority judgment in 
Medvedyev by the Chamber in Vassis, the dissenting opinion of such a 
significant minority of the Grand Chamber in the earlier case may nevertheless 
influence future development of the law with respect to Article 5(3) ECHR. It 
may also provide the basis for divergence in the approach taken in other human 
rights systems when similar situations come to be considered. In particular, 
noting the apparently reasonable options proposed by the minority, there may 
be a limit to the extent to which future courts will be willing to defer to States, 
particularly if obviously practicable steps for reducing delay are not taken, and 
the State concerned cannot explain why. Considering the minority opinion, it is 
clear that its point of departure from the majority view relates to the measures 
that a State might be expected to take to either reduce or mitigate the period of 
delay in bringing individuals deprived of their liberty before a judicial authority. 
With respect to reducing delay, the implication is that the Court ought to be 
more searching with respect to the feasibility of an open-ended range of 
measures, including embarkation of the judicial authority on the interdicting 
ship, or the use of faster means to transfer individuals to the destination State. 
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The point was not that such measures must invariably be taken, but rather that 
the State would be expected to demonstrate that it genuinely had done all it 
could to reduce delay. This, it is submitted, would help to mitigate a lacuna in 
protection, without placing an undue burden on the State concerned. 
With respect to mitigating delay, the minority placed significant emphasis on the 
judicial oversight provided in Rigopoulos during the voyage. It is notable in this 
respect that both the ECtHR and HRC have referred to the requirement to bring 
an individual physically before the judicial authority.227 The use, therefore, of 
teleconferencing facilities, or other means, to communicate with a judicial 
authority located elsewhere, would not be sufficient to meet the procedural 
requirement. Nevertheless, the minority opinion in Medvedyev implied that a 
lengthy delay in bringing individuals before a judicial authority could be 
mitigated through measures including remote judicial oversight and access to 
legal advice. Although not stated in express terms, and without removing the 
obligation also to take measures to reduce delay in bringing individuals before 
judicial authorities, the implication is that the use of such measures might be 
required in the case of lengthy delays. Indeed, it is submitted that to deliberately 
choose not to use such methods, if they are reasonably available to mitigate 
unavoidable delay, would be perverse. 
Therefore, although the jurisprudence of the ECtHR relating to Article 5(3) 
suggests that States will be afforded considerable latitude in meeting this 
obligation when individuals are deprived of their liberty in the course of MSOs, 
there is potential for a stricter approach to be adopted by other courts or by the 
ECHR in future cases. Reliance on the approach taken by the majority in 
Medvedyev may be misplaced and States might be well-advised to consider 
innovative options to reduce or mitigate delay in bringing individuals before 
judicial authorities. At the very least, States ought to be able to explain in detail 
why such measures were not feasible. 
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5.4.6.3. The right of detainees to challenge the lawfulness of their detention 
(Article 9(4) ICCPR, Article 5(4) ECHR and Article 7(6) ACHR) 
There is obvious overlap between Articles 9(3) ICCPR, 5(3) ECHR and 7(5) 
ACHR on the one hand, and Articles 9(4) ICCPR, 5(4) ECHR and 7(6) ACHR 
on the other. Both sets of rights relate broadly to a right for the lawfulness of 
detention to be reviewed. However, whereas Articles 9(3), 5(3) and 7(5) provide 
for an automatic obligation to bring individuals detained on the basis of criminal 
charges before a judicial authority, Articles 9(4), 5(4) and 7(6) contain a right of 
broader application for all detainees to have the lawfulness of their detention 
reviewed. It is notable that the latter right was not considered in the Medvedyev, 
Rigopoulos or Vassis judgments, although the reason for this is not clear. It is 
plausible that it was assumed merely to duplicate the complaints relating to 
Article 5(3); however, Article 5(4), as well as its equivalents under the other 
instruments, arguably provides an additional right that may be exercised before 
an individual is brought before a judicial authority so as to satisfy Article 5(3). 
The reviewing authority is stated in all three instruments as a ‘court’. In practice 
this has been interpreted by the HRC as meaning that the deciding authority 
‘should ordinarily be a court within the judiciary’, but exceptionally may be a 
specialized tribunal, so long as it is ‘independent of the executive and legislative 
branches or enjoys judicial independence in deciding legal matters in 
proceedings that are judicial in nature.’228 Similarly, the ECtHR emphasises that 
the court must have ‘a judicial character and provide guarantees appropriate to 
the kind of deprivation of liberty in question’.229 Likewise, the IACtHR requires 
the decision to be taken by the judiciary, and not a military, administrative of 
political body.230 As noted above with respect to the previous obligation, it is 
unlikely to be practicable to locate such an individual in a ship at sea for long 
periods of time, but he or she could plausibly be deployed to a ship to deal with 
a specific situation. 
All three instruments require timely consideration of the application. Under 
Article 9(4) ICCPR and Article 7(6) ACHR, the application must be decided 
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‘without delay’, while, under Article 5(4), ECHR the application ‘shall be decided 
speedily’. Notably, however, there does not seem to be the same requirement 
for a hearing in the physical presence of the detainee as there is under Article 
9(3) ICCPR, Article 5(3) ECHR and Article 7(5) ACHR. While the HRC states 
that ‘In general, the detainee has the right to appear in person before the court’ 
and that ‘The court must have the power to order the detainee brought before 
it’, it does not specify that the detainee must be ‘physically’ present as it does in 
respect of Article 9(3).231 In the context of MSOs and deprivation of liberty 
during a transfer to a destination State, it is arguable that the physical 
dislocation of the individual concerned would not necessarily justify a delay in 
fulfilling the right to challenge the lawfulness of the deprivation of liberty. Hence, 
the ‘wholly exceptional circumstances’ that justified a delay in meeting the 
States’ obligations under Article 5(3) ECHR in the Medvedyev, Rigopoulos and 
Vassis cases, would not apply in the case of Article 5(4) and its equivalents 
under the other instruments. 
There is an obvious connection here to the mitigation measures suggested 
above as a potential requirement to avoid violation of Article 5(3) ECHR and its 
equivalents. However, it is arguable that Article 5(4) presents an alternative, 
more direct, basis for challenging deprivation of liberty during lengthy transfers 
from the point at which individuals are deprived of their liberty in the course of 
an MSO to a destination State. 
5.5. Conclusion 
Individuals may be deprived of their liberty for a wide variety of reasons in the 
course of MSOs. Such measures are authorised, either directly or indirectly, in a 
variety of circumstances under the law of the sea. However, these 
authorisations are accompanied by differing obligations with respect to the 
protection of the affected individual, usually with little detail and sometimes with 
broad reference to adherence to other bodies of law, such as IHRL. 
On the other hand, assuming it applies, IHRL contains a number of rights of 
potential application. The foregoing analysis has concentrated on the right to 
liberty and security of the person, notwithstanding that other rights may be 
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engaged, particularly with respect to the treatment of those who have been 
deprived of their liberty. Applying the right to liberty in the context of MSOs 
exposes a number of issues; however, unusually amongst the rights considered 
in this thesis, it has been the subject of relatively detailed judicial scrutiny in that 
context, at least with respect to Article 5 ECHR. 
As well as the applicability of the instruments concerned, discussed in Chapters 
Two and Three, a second important threshold issue arises with respect to the 
right to liberty, namely the circumstances that will engage the right. Although 
there are situations in which an individual will clearly have been deprived of 
their liberty, such as when he or she is confined to a cell on a ship at sea, other 
situations are less clear. In particular, where control is exerted over an 
interdicted vessel, this may be argued to amount to a deprivation of liberty of 
those on board. Although somewhat tentative, the potential for the right to 
liberty to be engaged in such circumstances is supported both by the 
consideration of such a situation by the ECtHR in Medvedyev, as well as by the 
broader practice concerning the application of the ECHR, and other 
instruments, in analogous situations. 
Where the right to liberty is engaged, each of the instruments imposes 
requirements on the measures that are taken, including that they be lawful, not 
arbitrary and, in the case of the ECHR, aligned with one of several specified 
grounds. With respect to MSOs, the lawfulness requirement raises some 
important issues in light of the wide range of potential legal bases for 
deprivation of liberty in that context. While domestic legislation, such as the 
Australian MPA 2013, will arguably satisfy the lawfulness requirement most 
clearly, for at least some of the human rights treaties under consideration it is 
arguably not necessary. Nevertheless, while other sources of law, including 
international law, may plausibly provide a satisfactory legal basis to meet the 
requirement of lawfulness, they are less likely to set out sufficient detail with 
respect to the procedure to be followed. 
Even where deprivation of liberty is lawful, it may still violate the right to liberty if 
it is arbitrary, which this chapter discussed primarily by reference to the express 
grounds set out in Article 5 ECHR. Where individuals are deprived of their 
liberty in order to pursue criminal prosecution, this requirement is likely to be 
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met so long as the measures taken are proportionate. However, in other cases, 
the most plausible of the specified grounds is that relating to fulfilment of a legal 
obligation. This will potentially be relevant to a wide range of situations arising 
in the course of MSOs, such as when individuals are deprived of their liberty as 
a necessary consequence of an interdiction. However, following a similar theme 
to the requirement of lawfulness, the obligation in question needs to be clearly 
specified. 
Finally, the chapter considered a range of procedural obligations set out in the 
relevant provisions of the ICCPR, ECHR and ACHR, and which may be applied 
in practice in connection with the ACHPR. In connection with MSOs, the most 
notable of these relates to the obligations to bring those deprived of their liberty 
promptly before a judicial authority, and to allow such individuals to challenge 
the lawfulness of their detention. Where individuals are deprived of their liberty 
at sea, this may occur in particularly remote locations, meaning that States may 
be unable to meet standards of promptness developed in a domestic, land-
based, context. Decisions of the ECtHR demonstrate notably flexibility in 
applying the law to such ‘wholly exceptional circumstances’, as well as a 
remarkable willingness on the part of the Court to defer to the State concerned 
in determining what measures may be feasible to reduce delay. However, it is 
by no means certain that other Courts or treaty bodies will be so forgiving, or, 
indeed, that the ECtHR will not become more demanding as its practice 
develops. 
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6. Rescue 
6.1. Introduction 
This chapter concerns the provision of assistance to those in distress at sea, in 
particular the question whether and when international human rights law (IHRL) 
imposes an obligation to provide such assistance, as well as the substance of 
any obligation. This issue can arise in a number of different contexts in 
connection with maritime security operations (MSOs). At the most basic level, 
ships engaged in MSOs may encounter vessels in distress in the course of their 
operations. The presence of such vessels, and their state of distress, may be 
unrelated to the MSO; this would be the case, for example, when a ship 
conducting an MSO is in the vicinity of a vessel that has suffered an incident on 
board, such as a fire, flood or engine failure. 
On the other hand, the distress situation may be closely connected to the MSO, 
such as when a vessel is in distress as a result of a maritime security threat, 
such as piracy, or where action taken by a ship conducting a MSO itself causes 
a situation of distress, such as when it uses force against a vessel, causing 
injury or damage.1 Alternatively, situations of distress may be intrinsically linked 
to the issue with which particular MSOs are concerned. Notably, this is the case 
in some situations of irregular migration,2 in which individuals attempting to 
reach a country by sea make use of overloaded or unseaworthy vessels, 
                                            
1 See above ch 4. 
2 Irregular migration is defined by the International Organization for Migration 
as: 
 
Movement that takes place outside the regulatory norms of the sending, 
transit and receiving countries. There is no clear or universally accepted 
definition of irregular migration. From the perspective of destination 
countries it is entry, stay or work in a country without the necessary 
authorization or documents required under immigration regulations. From 
the perspective of the sending country, the irregularity is for example seen 
in cases in which a person crosses an international boundary without a 
valid passport or travel document or does not fulfil the administrative 
requirements for leaving the country. There is, however, a tendency to 
restrict the use of the term "illegal migration" to cases of smuggling of 
migrants and trafficking in persons. 
International Organization for Migration, ‘Key Migration Terms’ <https:// 
www.iom.int/key-migration-terms> accessed 5 July 2018. 
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sometimes with the intention that this will lead to their rescue and transfer to a 
desired destination State. In such a situation, as is the case in general, once an 
individual has been rescued, the rescuing State may owe obligations not to 
transfer him or her to particular States where there exists a risk of certain 
violations of his or her human rights.3 
The potential for rescue to provide the ‘final leg’ of an irregular migration route, 
either by design or accident, means that States may be wary of conducting 
rescue operations that may have the effect, or at least perceived effect, of 
encouraging irregular migration by such methods. More broadly, in any situation 
when a ship goes to the assistance of a vessel in distress, its actions will almost 
inevitably come at some cost, at least in terms of time and opportunity. For the 
ship involved and its owner or operator, whether they be a State or private 
entity, rescue operations can be extremely disruptive, especially where the 
options for the disposition of those rescued are limited or unclear. 
In recent years, issues surrounding the provision of assistance to those in 
distress have been especially prominent with respect to irregular migration from 
the north coast of Africa, particularly Libya, to southern Europe. During one year 
alone, 2011, at least fifteen hundred people were reported to have lost their 
lives while attempting to cross the Mediterranean.4 In one particularly notorious 
incident, sometimes referred to as the ‘left-to-die boat’,5 a small boat that had 
left Libya with seventy-two individuals on board was found back on Libya’s 
shores fifteen days later with just nine survivors.6 The boat had come into 
                                            
3 See below ch 7. 
4 Council of Europe Committee on Migration, Refugees and Displaced Persons, 
‘Lives Lost in the Mediterranean Sea: Who is Responsible’ (29 March 2012) 
(CoE Report) 1. 
5  See, for example, Francesco Messineo, ‘The “Left-to-Die Boat”: Whose 
Responsibility for the Death of 63 Migrants in the Mediterranean?’ (EJIL: Talk!, 
31 March 2012) <https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-left-to-die-boat-whose-responsib 
ility-for-the-death-of-63-migrants-in-the-mediterranean/> accessed 5 July 2018. 
6 The facts are recounted at CoE Report (n 4) 6–10. See also Jack Shenker and 
Giles Tremlett, ‘Migrant Boat Disaster: Spain Challenges Nato Over Distress 
Call Claim’ (The Guardian, 29 March 2012) <https://www.theguardian. 
com/world/2012/mar/29/migrant-boat-disaster-spain-nato> accessed 5 July 
2018; ‘Nato “Failed to Aid” Libyan Migrant Boat – Council of Europe Report’ 
(BBC News, 29 March 2012) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-
17548410> accessed 5 July 2018. 
 237 
difficulties off the Libyan coast at the start of its journey to Europe; despite 
various authorities having been aware of its situation, it had not been rescued. 
A report prepared for the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 
identified ‘a catalogue of failures’ that contributed to the tragedy, with ‘many 
opportunities for saving the lives of the persons on board the boat [having been] 
lost.’7 According to the report, Maritime Rescue Coordination Centres in both 
Rome and Malta were made aware of the boat’s situation,8 and information was 
also passed to NATO, which was operating in the area in connection with the 
conflict in Libya.9 Furthermore, there was evidence that military and civilian 
aircraft and ships were operating in the vicinity, and that some, including a large 
military ship, were aware of the boat and its difficulties;10 indeed, an unidentified 
helicopter provided limited assistance by lowering water and biscuits to the boat 
in distress.11 Nevertheless, no rescue operation was mounted. Although, as the 
report concluded, nobody involved questioned ‘the basic obligation to rescue at 
sea’, the incident demonstrated ‘that there are gaps in both law and practice 
concerning rescue at sea which need to be remedied.’12 
This chapter will not examine the ‘left-to-die boat’ incident in detail; less still will 
it attempt to attribute responsibility. However, the case both highlights the 
relevance, in general, of the issue of assistance to those in distress, and 
demonstrates why the existence of an obligation under IHRL would be 
significant.13 Although, as will be discussed, States may violate the law of the 
sea when they fail to meet obligations connected to the provision of assistance 
to those in distress, individual recourse to a remedy to those affected by such a 
violation is limited or non-existent. However, if an obligation exists under IHRL, 
                                            
7 CoE Report (n 4) 1. 
8  Maritime Rescue Coordination Centres (MRCCs) are the authorities 
established by States to discharge their responsibility for search and rescue 
within designated areas under the SAR Convention, on which see below. In this 
case, the boat in question was not located in the area for which the Rome 
MRCC is responsible, but rather was in the area for which the Tripoli MRCC 
was notionally responsible; however, the Tripoli MRCC was not functioning at 
the time. CoE Report (n 4) 12–13. 
9 ibid 17–19. 
10 ibid 15–16. 
11 ibid 15–16. 
12 ibid 22. 
13 This possibility was tentatively suggested in response to the publication of the 
Council of Europe report. Messineo (n 5). 
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then a route for making an individual complaint may be available, depending on 
the human rights system in question. 
Numerous human rights obligations may be engaged once States (or even 
merchant vessels) have rescued those in distress at sea. In particular, the 
principle of non-refoulement will be central to determining the options available 
to States dealing with situations where irregular migrants are rescued and 
therefore come within the power of the State.14 Where individuals are detained 
following rescue, noting the broad definition given to the concept of detention,15 
the conditions in which they are held will be subject to the same human rights 
considerations as other situations of detention. This chapter, however, will 
concentrate on the question whether a State owes obligations under human 
rights law to assist those in distress. 
The chapter will begin by discussing the duty to render assistance under the 
law of the sea, examining the legal basis and scope of the duty in both treaty 
and customary law, addressing, in particular, the question whether the law of 
the sea contains an individual right to be rescued. In common with other 
chapters in this thesis, this will both place any IHRL obligation in context and 
also provide a basis for comparison. The chapter will then proceed to examine 
whether a duty to render assistance can be found in human rights law. In order 
to do so, it will first discuss the positive obligations that States owe generally 
under the right to life, concluding that this extends to situations of distress at 
sea. It will then proceed to examine the complicated question of applicability, 
examining in particular the circumstances in which a vessel in distress may fall 
within a State’s jurisdiction such that human rights obligations are engaged. 
Next, the chapter will seek to identify the content of the obligations owed by 
States under IHRL to vessels in distress, before briefly comparing and 
contrasting this with the duties found in the law of the sea. 
                                            
14 See below ch 7. 
15 See above s 5.4.3. 
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6.2. The Provision of assistance to those in distress under the law of the 
sea 
The law of the sea has long recognised a duty to render assistance to those in 
distress. In treaty law it is set out in Article 98 of the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS):16 
(1) Every State shall require the master of a ship sailing under its flag, 
insofar as he can do so without serious danger to the ship, the crew 
or the passengers: 
(a) To render assistance to any person found at sea in danger of 
being lost; 
(b) To proceed with all possible speed to the rescue of persons in 
distress if informed of their need of assistance, insofar as such 
action may reasonably be expected of him; 
(c) After a collision, to render assistance to the other ship, her crew 
and her passengers and, where possible, to inform the other 
ship of the name of his own ship, her port of registry and the 
nearest port at which she will call. 
(2) Every coastal State shall promote the establishment, operation and 
maintenance of an adequate and effective search and rescue service 
regarding safety on and over the sea and, where circumstances so 
require, by way of mutual regional arrangements cooperate with 
neighbouring States for this purpose. 
This replicates an equivalent article in the 1958 Convention on the High Seas,17 
which was itself based on similar provisions in earlier treaties.18 The duty as set 
out in UNCLOS has two components: an obligation on States in Article 98(1) to 
require masters of ships flying their flag to render assistance in certain 
circumstances; and the obligation on coastal States in Article 98(2), with respect 
to the provision of search and rescue services.19 Both of these are reflected in 
other treaties. The duty of masters to render assistance is also reflected in the 
                                            
16 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (adopted 10 December 
1982, entered into force 16 November 1994) 1833 UNTS 397 (UNCLOS). 
17 Convention on the High Seas (adopted 29 April 1958, entered into force 30 
September 1962) 450 UNTS 11 art 12(1). 
18  Mark Pallis, ‘Obligations of States towards Asylum Seekers at Sea: 
Interactions and Conflicts Between Legal Regimes’ (2002) 14 Intl J of Refugee 
L 329, 331. 
19 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (adopted 10 December 
1982, entered into force 16 November 1994) 1833 UNTS 397 (UNCLOS) art 98. 
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Salvage Convention,20 and given greater detail in the International Convention 
for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS Convention).21 Similarly, the Article 98(2) 
obligation is reflected in the 1979 International Convention on Maritime Search 
and Rescue (SAR Convention).22 As well as its basis in treaty law, the duty to 
render assistance is also generally considered a rule of customary law.23 
In terms of geographical scope, the fact that the Article 98 UNCLOS replicates 
the earlier provision in the Convention of the High Seas is reflected in its 
inclusion in Part VII, which deals purportedly with the high seas (and is applied 
in part, by virtue of Article 58, to the exclusive economic zone). This has led 
some to doubt its applicability landward of the high seas and exclusive 
economic zone, particularly in the territorial sea.24 However, the reference to 
those ‘found at sea’ in Article 98(1)(a),25 coupled with indirect reference to the 
provision of assistance in the territorial sea in Article 18, 26  has led to a 
commonly accepted view that ‘the duty to render assistance exists throughout 
the ocean, whether in the territorial sea, in straits used for international 
navigation, in archipelagic waters, in the exclusive economic zone or on the 
                                            
20 International Convention on Salvage (concluded 28 April 1989, entered into 
force 14 July 1996) 1953 UNTS 165 (Salvage Convention) art 10. The Salvage 
Convention does not apply to warships and other sovereign immune vessels 
unless the State concerns chooses for it to do so. ibid art 4(1). 
21 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (concluded 1 November 
1974, entered into force 25 May 1980) 1184 UNTS 277 (SOLAS) annex, ch 5, 
reg 33. Reg 33 expands on the UNCLOS provision to include, notably, an 
obligation on masters to record reasons in their log-books for not proceeding to 
the assistance of a vessel in distress. However, the relevant provisions of 
SOLAS do not bind warships and other sovereign immune vessels. ibid annex, 
ch 5, reg 1(1). Notably, both the Salvage Convention and SOLAS refer to a duty 
directly on the Master, rather than just on the State, though it is unclear how an 
individual’s violation of these rules could be dealt with, other than via a State’s 
domestic law. 
22 International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (concluded 27 April 
1979, entered into force 22 June 1985)1405 UNTS 97 (SAR Convention). 
23 Pallis (n 18) 333–34; Seline Trevisanut, ‘Is there a Right to be Rescued at 
Sea? A Constructive View’ (2014) Zoom-in 4 Questions of Intl L 3, 5. 
24 Pallis (n 18) 335. 
25 Emphasis added. 
26 Art 18 refers to a right for ships to stop and anchor in the territorial sea where 
they do so to render ‘assistance to persons, ships or aircraft in danger or 
distress’. UNCLOS (n 16) art 18. 
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high seas. Assistance is to be given to any person, ship or aircraft in distress.’27 
Further support for this position comes from the equivalent provision of the 
Salvage Convention being applicable ‘in navigable waters or in any other 
waters whatsoever’,28 and the SOLAS Convention provisions apply to ‘all ships 
on all voyages’,29 except those ‘operating solely in waters landward of the 
baseline’, to which the flag State may choose to apply them.30 Furthermore, the 
obligation generally applies to warships, as well as commercial vessels.31 
The duty to render assistance in the law of the sea is therefore broad in its 
scope. The Article 98(1) requirement for masters to provide assistance applies 
wherever they are and contains obligations both to rescue those that they 
encounter in danger of being lost, as well as to proceed to the assistance of 
those in distress. However, these obligations, alone, do not amount to any sort 
of general duty on the part of the State to rescue those in distress. They arise 
only where a vessel flying a State’s flag happens to be sufficiently close to a 
situation of distress such that it can reasonably be expected to assist.32 Only in 
that limited situation will a State have failed to meet its obligations under Article 
98(1) if it does not require the master of the ship to provide assistance. If there 
are no vessels flagged to a particular State that are reasonably able to respond, 
then that State cannot be responsible for a violation of Article 98(1) UNCLOS. 
Article 98(2) UNCLOS comes closer to creating a general obligation on the part 
of States to rescue those in distress, requiring States to take positive action to 
create and maintain a system for providing search and rescue services. 
Therefore, while the Article 98(1) obligation applies only so far as a State has 
                                            
27 Satya N Nandan and Shabtai Rosenne (eds), United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary, vol 3 (Martinus Nijhoff 1995) para 
98.11g. 
28 Salvage Convention (n 20) art 1(a). 
29 SOLAS (n 21) annex, ch 5, reg 1(1). 
30 ibid annex, ch 5, reg 1(2). As noted above, the relevant provisions of SOLAS 
do not bind warships and other sovereign immune vessels. ibid annex, ch 5, reg 
1(1). 
31 Irini Papanicolopulu, ‘The Duty to Rescue at Sea, in Peacetime and in War: A 
General Overview’ (2016) 98(2) Intl Rev of the Red Cross 491, 495–97. It is 
important to note, however, that the incorporation of the duty in some treaties, 
such as the SOLAS Convention, excludes its application to warships. 
32 A standard that is vague in its practical application, noting the significant cost 
that may attach to even a short delay in the voyage of a large commercial 
vessel. 
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flagged vessels within a reasonable distance of those in distress (albeit that it 
applies wherever those vessels may be), the Article 98(2) duty requires States 
to make provision for search and rescue services, or at least to take steps to 
ensure that such services are in place. This obligation is also reflected in the 
SAR Convention,33 which goes further in providing a detailed framework for the 
provision of search and rescue services, including cooperation between States 
in such matters. Importantly, it provides for the division of the ocean into search 
and rescue regions, 34  for which rescue coordination centres exercise 
responsibility for the conduct of search and rescue operations.35 
In itself, Article 98(2) UNCLOS is an obligation only for States to establish and 
maintain search and rescue services. As such, it falls short of establishing a 
concrete obligation to rescue particular individuals in distress. However, such 
an obligation is arguably found in certain provisions of the SAR Convention, 
which requires, inter alia, that: 
2.1.9 On receiving information that a person is in distress at sea in an 
area within which a Party provides for the overall co-ordination 
of search and rescue operations, the responsible authorities of 
that Party shall take urgent steps to provide the most 
appropriate assistance available. 
2.1.10 Parties shall ensure that assistance be provided to any person 
in distress at sea. They shall do so regardless of the nationality 
or status of such a person or the circumstances in which that 
person is found.36 
These provisions require, beyond the mere creation of a system for the 
provision of search and rescue services, the allocation of resources to deal with 
specific instances of distress. 
Nevertheless, although these provisions arguably amount to a concrete 
obligation on the part of States to ensure that individuals within their search and 
rescue areas are given assistance, they still contain a significant lacuna with 
respect to the subsequent disembarkation of those individuals. Indeed, until 
2004 there was no specific provision dealing with the disposition of those who 
                                            
33 SAR Convention (n 22) annex, para 2.2.1–2.2.2. 
34 ibid annex, para 2.1.4. 
35 ibid annex, para 2.3. 
36 ibid annex, paras 2.1.9–2.1.10. 
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had been rescued, leading to situations where merchant vessels that had taken 
individuals in distress onboard were refused permission to disembark them in 
nearby coastal States. Perhaps most notoriously, in 2001 a Norwegian-flagged 
vessel, the MV Tampa, rescued a number of Indonesian nationals off the coast 
of Australia, but were refused permission by Australian authorities to disembark 
those it had rescued. 37  The reasoning of Australia was that the rescued 
individuals were no longer in a situation of distress and therefore that any 
obligation had been discharged. To some extent, the issues raised by the 
Tampa incident were addressed in 2004, through amendments to the SOLAS 
Convention, which provided that 
Contracting Governments shall co-ordinate and co-operate to ensure that 
masters of ships providing assistance by embarking persons in distress 
at sea are released from their obligations with minimum further deviation 
from the ships' intended voyage, provided that releasing the master of 
the ship from the obligations under the current regulation does not further 
endanger the safety of life at sea. The Contracting Government 
responsible for the search and rescue region in which such assistance is 
rendered shall exercise primary responsibility for ensuring such co-
ordination and co-operation occurs, so that survivors assisted are 
disembarked from the assisting ship and delivered to a place of safety, 
taking into account the particular circumstances of the case and 
guidelines developed by the Organization. In these cases the relevant 
Contracting Governments shall arrange for such disembarkation to be 
effected as soon as reasonably practicable.38 
While these amendments, in particular the reference to delivery to a ‘place of 
safety’, go some distance to addressing the problem of disembarkation, they do 
not contain an obligation on the part of any particular State to allow 
disembarkation on its own shores. 
Notwithstanding the specific issue of disembarkation, can it be argued that the 
law of the sea contains or reflects an individual right to be rescued? For 
Papastavridis, the obligations bound up in the duty to render assistance are ‘of 
the legal nature of obligations of means rather than of result, which have to be 
met in due diligence.’39 This distinction, derived from civil law systems, is similar 
                                            
37 Donald R Rothwell and Tim Stephens, The International Law of the Sea (2nd 
edn, Bloomsbury 2016) 57–58. 
38 SOLAS (n 21) annex, ch 5, reg 33(1.1). 
39 Efthymios D Papastavridis, ‘Is there a Right to be Rescued at Sea? A 
Skeptical View’ (2014) Zoom-in 4 Questions of Intl L 17, 22. The language used 
here reflects civil law principles. 
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to that found in the law of State responsibility between obligations of conduct 
and obligations of result,40 albeit that ‘obligations of means’ refers specifically to 
the allocation of a particular amount of resources. 41  Because of this, 
Papastavridis argues that, on the face of the relevant provisions, ‘there is no 
individual “right to be rescued” under [UNCLOS] and other maritime 
conventions; the sole implicit reference within these instruments to the rights of 
the persons in distress may be that the latter should be disembarked in a “place 
of safety”.’42 This, however, does not necessarily follow. Individual rights give 
rise not only to obligations of result, but also those that might be characterised 
as obligations of means, requiring the investment of resources rather than the 
achievement of a particular result. Indeed, this is precisely the nature of many 
positive obligations owed by States under human rights law.43 Furthermore, 
Papastavridis does not appear to have considered the provisions of the SAR 
Convention, cited above, that purport to require States to take action in 
individual situations of distress. 
Nevertheless, even if it can be argued that the law of the sea does contain or 
reflect a right to be rescued, the crucial point is that the responsibility of a State 
for violations of that right cannot be invoked by individuals, who ‘as a general 
rule lack standing to assert violations of international treaties in the absence of 
a protest by the state of nationality’. 44  Although treaties may provide 
mechanisms for their enforcement by individuals and other non-State entities,45 
this is not generally the case, and is not the case with respect to the obligations 
under discussion in the law of the sea. Therefore, while a breach attributable to 
                                            
40 James Crawford, State Responsibility: The General Part (CUP 2013) 220–23. 
41 See, for a discussion of the term in one particular context in the French (civil 
law) legal system, Christian Rothhahn, ‘Liability Outsourcer under Obligation de 
Resultat’ (Bird & Bird, 6 September 2006) <https://www.twobirds.com/en/news/ 
articles/2006/liability-outsourcer-under-obligation-de-resultat> accessed 5 July 
2018. 
42 Papastavridis (n 39) 22. 
43 See, for example, Nigel Rodley, ‘Integrity of the Person’ in Daniel Moeckli, 
Sangeeta Shah and Sandesh Sivakumaran (eds), International Human Rights 
Law (2nd edn, OUP 2014) 183, 191; Dinah Shelton and Ariel Gould, ‘Positive 
and Negative Obligations’ in Dinah Shelton (ed), The Oxford Handbook of 
International Human Rights Law (OUP 2013) 577–82. 
44 Malcolm N Shaw, International Law (7th edn, CUP 2014) 189. 
45 ibid 548–49. 
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a State will give rise to an internationally wrongful act,46 it will generally only be 
another State that will be able to invoke the violating State’s responsibility.47 In 
concrete terms, this means that where a State is in breach of its obligations 
under the law of the sea to provide assistance to those in distress, the individual 
affected will be unable to invoke the responsibility of that State and seek a 
remedy from it. Instead, any claim would have to be pursued by a State that can 
be said to have been injured by the alleged internationally wrongful act, most 
plausibly the State of nationality of the affected individual. Even where a 
mechanism for the settlement for disputes between States exists, such as under 
the optional provisions of Part XV of UNCLOS, the ability for an individual to 
seek redress will depend on the cooperation of an injured State, which may be 
impossible where, for example, the affected individual is a national of a failed 
State. If, however, an obligation to provide assistance to those in distress arises 
under IHRL, then, depending on the treaty system in question, it may be 
enforceable by individuals. It is to this question that the chapter now turns. 
6.3. The duty to rescue under IHRL 
Positive obligations arise under many human rights.48 However, as this section 
will demonstrate, it is under the right to life that obligations most relevant to an 
obligation to rescue those in distress at sea are likely to arise. 
6.3.1. Particular applicability issues 
Chapters Two and Three explained that human rights norms are capable of 
both territorial and extraterritorial application; although the limited application of 
human rights to the maritime domain within the practice of human rights courts 
and supervisory bodies means that the subject is not fully resolved in all 
circumstances, it is informed by relatively well-developed principles. With 
respect to the territorial application of the treaties under consideration, a State’s 
obligations under the treaties under consideration can persuasively be argued 
                                            
46  International Law Commission, ‘Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts’ (2001) UN Doc A/56/10, 20 (ARSIWA) art 2. 
47 ibid art 42. 
48 On the nature of obligations under IHRL, see, for example, Frédéric Mégret, 
'Nature of Obligations' in Daniel Moeckli, Sangeeta Shah and Sandesh 
Sivakumaran (eds), International Human Rights Law (2nd edn, OUP 2014)101–
04. 
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to apply throughout its territorial sea, as well as its internal and archipelagic 
waters. Consequently, in these maritime zones, the right to life, including any 
positive obligation to provide assistance to those in distress at sea, will apply. 
The circumstances in which a State’s human rights obligations apply 
extraterritorially may, however, be more difficult to identify with precision, 
relying, as they do, on a concept of jurisdiction unique to this context. The 
relevant criteria may be met in specific situations of de jure jurisdiction; of 
relevance here, it may arise as a consequence of the exclusive jurisdiction 
exercised by States over vessels flying their flag, in which case the flag State’s 
full range of human rights obligations applies onboard its ships, wherever they 
are located.49 As a result, a State’s human rights obligations will apply with 
respect to individuals situated onboard a vessel in distress that is flagged to that 
State, as well as to individuals taken on board a rescuing ship flagged to the 
State. 
Jurisdiction, such as to engage States’ extraterritorial IHRL obligations, can also 
arise either through effective control of an area, or through the exercise by 
State agents of power and authority over an individual. The application of these 
principles in the maritime, generally, as well as in the course of MSOs, was 
discussed in Chapter Three. It will be recalled that the control exercised by 
States over extraterritorial maritime areas will only rarely amount to effective 
control. However, it was argued that many of the actions taken by State ships in 
the course of MSOs will amount to an exercise of power and authority, such as 
to give rise to the extraterritorial applicability of the human rights treaties under 
consideration. 
Notwithstanding these general conclusions, applying the principles concerning 
extraterritorial applicability in the context of the provision of assistance to those 
in distress raises specific questions. In particular, does the role played by a 
State within its search and rescue area amount to effective control such that the 
State’s IHRL obligations apply throughout that area? Alternatively, can the 
relationship between a State and a vessel in distress amount to one of authority 
and control, and, if so, when is this the case?  
                                            
49 Indeed, this was the situation in the case of the French-flagged ship in Leray 
and Others v France App No 44617/98 (ECtHR, 20 December 2001), discussed 
below, which found itself in difficulty off the coast of Spain. 
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Considering, first, the question of the control exercised by a State over its 
search and rescue area, it was explained in Chapter Three that extraterritorial 
application within a certain area depends on the State, as a matter of fact, 
exercising effective control over it. 50 This threshold, which has been applied, at 
least in connection with the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR),51 
as implying the ability of a State to discharge the full range of human rights 
obligations under a particular instrument, is especially difficult to reconcile with 
the freedoms afforded vessels in maritime areas seaward of a State’s territorial 
waters. Although it was concluded that the exercise of effective control over 
areas of the sea cannot be excluded, such situations are likely to be confined to 
narrow circumstances, within tightly delimited areas. 
Search and rescue areas are, however, necessarily vast; the Australian region, 
for example, covers nearly 53 million square kilometres, around a tenth of the 
Earth’s surface.52 Beyond those zones in which a State may have rights and 
obligations as a coastal State, its responsibilities within its search and rescue 
region are limited only to search and rescue. Moreover, the responsibility of a 
State within its search and rescue region does not displace its obligations under 
UNCLOS, including, for example, its duty to respect the freedom of the high 
seas and the exclusive jurisdiction of a vessel’s flag State. In light of these 
considerations, and no matter how diligently it discharges its search and rescue 
functions, it is not plausible that a State could exercise sufficient control over its 
search and rescue region, so as to amount to effective control, according to the 
meaning currently given to that term.  
Turning to the question of authority and control over particular vessels in 
distress, a vessel in distress may be brought within the jurisdiction of a State 
through the control exercised by a vessel responding to the situation. In 
general, it is uncontroversial that ship operated by a State may exercise 
sufficient authority and control over the individuals situated in another vessel to 
bring them within that State’s jurisdiction and therefore engage human rights 
                                            
50 See above s 3.3.3. 
51 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(European Convention on Human Rights, as amended) (ECHR). 
52 ‘Australia’s Search and Rescue Region’ (Australian Maritime Safety Authority, 
13 November 2017) <https://www.amsa.gov.au/safety-navigation/search-and-
rescue/australias-search-and-rescue-region> accessed 5 July 2018. 
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obligations with respect to them. 53 Furthermore, it may do so even without its 
agents being physically present onboard the second vessel.54 Indeed, in JHA v 
Spain, the Committee Against Torture considered a stricken vessel to be within 
the jurisdiction of the assisting State from the point it ‘was rescued’,55 at which 
point it had been placed under tow by the assisting ship. 
Whether and when individuals on board a stricken vessel come within the 
jurisdiction of an assisting State during the course of a rescue operation will, 
however, depend on the particular actions taken by the rescuing State. 
Consistent with the exercise of authority and control over ships in the course of 
MSOs more generally, certain acts undertaken by a rescuing ship in the course 
of rescue will almost certainly be sufficient, such as when it takes control of a 
vessel in distress by directing its course and speed, or by placing it under tow.56 
Clearly, however, these are actions taken once a rescue operation is in 
progress, and are of little relevance to the question whether a positive duty can 
exist to provide assistance, in the first place, to a ship located seaward of a 
State’s territorial waters. 
Applicability on even this basis will be complicated where the ship in question is 
a non-State vessel, rather than by a warship or other State-operated vessel.57 
This is because it must be established that the acts amounting to authority and 
control are, in fact, attributable to the State, as this is the very premise on which 
the required jurisdictional link between the State and the individual concerned is 
founded.58  If, as is usually the case in the execution of MSOs, the ship 
                                            
53 See above s 3.3.4. 
54 As was the case, for example, during certain stages of Medvedyev and in 
JHA v Spain. See above s 3.3.4. 
55 UN Committee Against Torture, ‘Decision of the Committee Against Torture 
under Article 22 of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment of Punishment Concerning Communication No 323/2007’ 
(Communication submitted by JHA on behalf of PK et al, concerning Spain) (21 
November 2008) UN Doc CAT/C/41/D/323/2007 (JHA v Spain) para 8.2. For an 
outline of the facts, see above s 3.3.4. 
56  Anne T Gallagher and Fiona David, The International Law of Migrant 
Smuggling (CUP 2014) 466. 
57 The same issue arises with respect to the IHRL obligations of a State 
coordinating a rescue, where a ship that comes to the assistance of the vessel 
in distress is a warship or State-operated vessel of another State. 
58 Marko Milanovic, ‘Jurisdiction, Attribution and Responsibility in Jaloud’ (EJIL 
Talk!, 11 December 2014) <https://www.ejiltalk.org/jurisdiction-attribution-and-
responsibility-in-jaloud/> accessed 5 July 2018. 
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executing the operation is a warship or other State-operated vessel, there is no 
doubt that its actions, as those of a de jure organ, will generally be attributable 
to the State.59 On the other hand, where a privately-operated merchant vessel 
intervenes in a distress situation of its own accord, without any involvement of a 
State, its actions will not generally be attributable to a State,60 and cannot 
therefore give rise to the extraterritorial application of human rights treaties on 
the basis of any authority and control it exercises over the rescued vessel.61 
However, given the role a State may play in coordinating or directing a rescue 
operation, the question arises whether this may be sufficient such that the 
actions of merchant vessels involved in the rescue are, in fact, attributable to 
the State and are, as a result, potentially capable of amounting to State agent 
authority and control. 
The actions of a merchant ship are likely to be attributable to a State where the 
ship acts ‘on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of’ that State.62 
This might conceivably occur when a merchant vessel is directed to assist a 
vessel in distress; however, this will only be the case where the State directs or 
controls the specific rescue operation, and the acts in question are ‘an integral 
part of that operation.’63 Hence, if a State directs a particular merchant ship to 
                                            
59 ARSIWA (n 46) art 4. 
60 ibid commentary to ch 2, para 3. 
61 Papastavridis (n 39) 29. Papastavridis suggests, however, that a vessel in 
distress would be within the jurisdiction of a (flag) State ‘in the exceptional case 
that the flag State was informed by the master of the private vessel about the 
boat in distress, yet it instructed the master not to render assistance’. It is 
submitted, though, that this ignores the requirement for an act that amounts to 
authority and control over the vessel in distress. While the merchant ship might 
be acting on the instructions, or under the direction or control of the State in 
question, and its actions thus attributable to that State, it is difficult to see how 
the merchant ship could be said to be exercising authority and control over the 
vessel in distress. 
62 ARSIWA (n 46) art 8. Although ARSIWA is concerned primarily with the 
responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts, whereas the present 
issue is one of attribution more generally, it is submitted that ARSIWA provides 
an authoritative account of this area of the law. See ARSIWA Commentary to 
Chapter II para 4 (‘As a normative operation, attribution must be clearly 
distinguished from the characterization of conduct as internationally wrongful. 
Its concern is to establish that there is an act of the State for the purposes of 
responsibility. To show that conduct is attributable to the State says nothing, as 
such, about the legality or otherwise of that conduct, and rules of attribution 
should not be formulated in terms which imply otherwise.’). 
63 ibid commentary to art 8, para 3. 
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conduct a specific rescue operation, the actions of the merchant ship may be 
attributable to the State. However, where a State merely requests, for example, 
that any merchant ship close to a vessel in distress goes to its aid—as is more 
likely to be the case, given the general lack of authority on the part of States to 
direct ships on the high seas other than those flying their own flag—this is 
unlikely to amount to direction or control on the part of the State. Also 
insufficient would be a general requirement under a State’s domestic law, in 
fulfilment of the State’s obligation contained Article 98(1) UNCLOS, to require 
masters of vessels to go to the aid of vessels in distress. 
In any case, beyond applicability of IHRL arising on the basis of the rescuing 
ship’s actions, it has also been argued that, where the shore authorities of a 
State receive a distress call, this establishes a relationship giving rise to 
‘exclusive long distance de facto control’ of the State over the vessel in 
distress.64 Trevisanut argues that vessels in distress could, in this way, be 
brought within the jurisdiction of a State both within or outside a State’s search 
and rescue area, although the argument in the latter situation is bolstered on 
account of the State’s additional legal obligations under the SAR Convention. A 
similar, but slightly narrower, argument is made by Papastrividis, to the effect 
that sufficient control will be exercised by a State over a vessel in distress 
where a distress call is 
received and acknowledged by the Rescue Coordination Centre of the 
coastal State; in these cases, arguably, a form of long distance de facto 
control, between the State that received the call and the persons who sent 
it, may be established. Indeed, the life of the persons in distress depends 
on the conduct of the recipient State, which, being aware of the location of 
the vessel in distress and being aware of their situation, exerts certain 
control over these persons.65 
In considering these arguments, it should first be noted that the fact that the 
shore authorities will usually be located in the territory of the State concerned 
does not preclude finding that they exercise authority and control over 
individuals situated outside its territory. To illustrate the point, in Smith (No 2), 
the United Kingdom Supreme Court concluded that government authorities 
located in the United Kingdom exercised authority and control over members of 
                                            
64 Trevisanut (n 23) 12–14. 
65 Papastavridis (n 39) 28 (emphasis added). 
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its armed forces deployed overseas, and that deployed personnel were 
therefore within the United Kingdom’s jurisdiction for the purposes of the 
ECHR.66 This decision also demonstrates that the extraterritorial applicability of 
IHRL can arise on the basis of State agent authority and control, 
notwithstanding substantial physical separation between the State agent and 
the individual in question. Although, it is submitted, distance may be a factor in 
considering whether a State agent is, in fact, exercising authority and control 
over an individual, it is not, in itself, determinative. 
In principle, therefore, there is no inherent impediment to shore-based State 
authorities exercising authority and control over a vessel in distress. However, 
the argument that the receipt of a distress call, whether or not acknowledged, is 
sufficient to place a vessel in distress under the authority and control of the 
State in question would be a novel application of the law. This is particularly so 
given that authority and control in this context may, where it fails to take action 
to rescue a vessel in distress, depend on inaction on the part of the State. While 
it could be argued that, as a matter of principle, it would be perverse that a 
State taking action in an attempt to rescue a ship in distress would owe 
obligations under IHRL to the vessel in distress, whereas a State that 
deliberately chooses not to would not, authority and control has typically been 
established through positive acts on the part of the State agent. For example, 
the case of Victor Saldano concerned the alleged failure of Argentina to take 
action to protect the right to life with respect to its nationals sentenced to death 
in the United States.67 Although the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights considered that ‘a state party to the American Convention may be 
responsible under certain circumstances for the acts and omissions of its 
agents which produce effects or are undertaken outside that state’s own 
territory’,68 mere inaction on the part of Argentina did not amount to an exercise 
of authority and control.69 
Moreover, the fact that the acts of a State are capable of violating a right does 
not necessarily mean that the test of authority and control is met, as to conclude 
                                            
66 Smith (No. 2) v The Ministry of Defence [2013] UKSC 41. 
67  Victor Saldano v Argentina, Petition, Report No 38/99, Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95 Doc 7 rev at 289 (1998) [2]. 
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otherwise would render the test meaningless. For example, the Grand Chamber 
in Bankovic explicitly rejected what it referred to as ‘a “cause-and-effect” notion 
of jurisdiction’, which ‘is tantamount to arguing that anyone adversely affected 
by an act imputable to a Contracting State, wherever in the world that act may 
have been committed or its consequences felt, is thereby brought within the 
jurisdiction of that State for the purpose of Article 1 of the Convention.’70 
According to this position, the mere fact that a State may be in the position to 
protect the life of an individual, as may be the case where its authorities receive 
a call from a vessel in distress, does not, in itself, constitute the exercise of 
authority and control. 
In light of these considerations, the argument that the receipt of a distress call, 
even if acknowledged, can be characterised as an exercise of authority and 
control, is not convincing. Therefore, although the contrary view of a court or 
treaty body cannot be ruled out, it is submitted that the extraterritorial 
applicability of a State’s IHRL obligations on this basis of its receipt of a distress 
call is not compatible with the current state of the law. More persuasive is the 
argument that a State might exercise authority and control over a vessel in 
distress, through its shore authorities, once action is taken to mount a rescue, 
or a plan has at least been formulated to do so. In that situation, the vessel in 
distress could more convincingly be argued to be under the control of the 
rescuing State, particularly where it acts under instruction as part of, and in 
reliance on, the plan. Nevertheless, applicability arising on this basis would still 
represent a novel application of the law, and is speculative at best. 
To summarise, where a vessel in distress is located in a State’s territorial sea, 
or internal or archipelagic waters, IHRL treaty obligations, including positive 
obligations arising under the right to life, will apply. Extraterritorially, a State’s 
IHRL treaty obligations will apply onboard its own flagged vessels, including 
when such vessels are in distress, wherever they are located. In addition, where 
a vessel in distress is located in an area outside any State’s territorial waters, 
but over which a State exercises effective control, that State’s IHRL obligations 
                                            
70  Banković and Others v Belgium and Others ECHR 2001–XII 333 [75]. 
Although, as discussed in ch 3, doubt has been cast on some aspects of 
Bankovic, there is no reason to doubt the continued authority of this statement. 
See also Al-Saadoon and Others v Secretary of State for Defence [2015] 
EWHC 715 (Admin) [104]–[105]. 
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will apply. Importantly, however, as the law stands, this will not be the case with 
respect to a State’s entire search and rescue area. Finally, where a State, 
through its agents, exercises authority and control over the individuals on board 
a vessel in distress, that State’s IHRL obligations will apply to its activities 
concerning those individuals. This will almost certainly be the case where a 
warship, other State-operated ship, or private vessel acting on the specific 
instructions of a State, directly controls the vessel in distress, such as by 
placing it under tow or directing its navigation. On the other hand, it is unlikely to 
be established through the mere receipt of a distress call, and applicability 
arising from the coordination of a rescue by a State’s shore authorities is 
speculative, though more plausible. Considering, specifically, the applicability of 
IHRL to a vessel in distress that is yet to be rescued, and over which a State is 
therefore unlikely yet to be exercising authority and control, the only States 
whose positive obligations under the right to life are likely to be engaged are the 
flag State (if any), as well as the coastal State if the vessel is located in its 
territorial waters, or, exceptionally, waters over which it exercises effective 
control. 
6.3.2. Duties relating to the provision of assistance to those in distress 
under the right to life 
The right to life has long been understood to entail positive obligations on the 
part of the State. With respect to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR),71 the Human Rights Committee (HRC) observed in 
1982 that ‘the right to life has been too often narrowly interpreted. The 
expression “inherent right to life” cannot properly be understood in a restrictive 
manner, and the protection of this right requires that States adopt positive 
measures.’72 Draft General Comment 36 states that ‘States parties are thus 
under a due diligence obligation to undertake reasonable positive measures, 
which do not impose on them impossible or disproportionate burdens, in 
                                            
71 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Ratification Instrument of 
the United States of America (deposited 8 June 1992, with effect from 8 
September 1992) 1676 UNTS 543. 
72 UN Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment No 6’ (30 April 1982) UN 
Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1, 6 (HRC General Comment 6) para 5. 
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response to foreseeable threats to life originating from private persons and 
entities, whose conduct is not attributable to the State.’73  
With respect to the ECHR, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has 
recognised a positive duty on States to take ‘appropriate steps to safeguard the 
lives of those within their jurisdiction’.74 Indeed, the Grand Chamber has held 
that the positive obligation arising from the right to life ‘must be construed as 
applying in the context of any activity, whether public or not, in which the right to 
life may be at stake’.75 Likewise, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
(IACtHR), interpreting Article 4 of the American Convention on Human Rights 
(ACHR),76 requires States ‘to take reasonable steps to prevent human rights 
violations’,77 and has required positive steps on the part of States specifically in 
connection with the right to life.78 Similarly, in its General Comment 3, the 
African Commission interprets the right to life under the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR)79 as imposing  
a positive duty to protect individuals and groups from real and immediate 
risks to their lives caused either by actions or inactions of third parties. In 
cases where the risk has not arisen from malicious or other intent then the 
State’s actions may not always be related to criminal justice. Such actions 
include, inter alia, preventive steps to preserve and protect the natural 
environment and humanitarian responses to natural disasters, famines, 
outbreaks of infectious diseases, or other emergencies.80 
                                            
73 UN Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment No 36 on Article 6 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, on the Right to Life’ 
(Revised draft prepared by the Rapporteur) <https://ohchr.org/Documents/ 
HRBodies/CCPR/GCArticle6/GCArticle6_EN.pdf> accessed 5 July 2018 para 
25. 
74 LCB v the United Kingdom ECHR 1998-III [36]. See also the cases cited at 
William A Schabas, The European Convention on Human Rights: A 
Commentary (OUP 2015)  126 fn 77. 
75 Öneryıldız v Turkey ECHR 2004-XII 79 [71]. 
76 American Convention on Human Rights: ‘Pact of San José, Costa Rica’ 
(signed 22 November 1969, entered into force 18 July 1978) 1144 UNTS 144 
art 4. 
77 Velásquez Rodríguez v Honduras (Merits) Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights Series C No 4 (29 July 1988) [174]. 
78 Thomas M Antkowiak and Alejandra Gonza, The American Convention on 
Human Rights: Essential Rights (OUP 2017) 65–66. 
79 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (adopted 27 June 1981, 
entered into force 21 October 1986) (1982) 21 ILM 58. 
80 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, General Comment No 3 
on the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The Right to Life (Article 
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Notwithstanding these general conclusions, there is relatively little jurisprudence 
dealing specifically with the provision of assistance to those in distress at sea. 
Nevertheless, the extension of States’ positive obligations under the right to life 
to such situations has been recognised by the ECtHR. The case of Leray and 
others v France concerned a French-flagged merchant vessel that sank off the 
coast of Spain in 1979, leading to the loss of twenty-three lives.81 The case was 
brought by relatives of the victims, alleging in part that the French authorities 
had committed a series of serious mistakes in responding to distress signals 
sent by the stricken vessel. These allegations had been subject to extensive 
litigation in the French courts, with no fault found. As a result, this part of the 
case was declared manifestly ill-founded. Nevertheless, the Court proceeded on 
the basis that the provision of rescue services to vessels in distress was within 
the scope of Article 2 ECHR. Furthermore, as noted above, the case concerned 
the obligations owed by a flag State to its vessel situated outside its territory. 
The later case of Furdik v Slovakia concerned, on its own facts, the adequacy of 
mountain rescue services provided to an injured climber following an incident in 
the High Tatra mountains in 2005. However, although the facts on which the 
decision was based concerned the provision of emergency services on land, 
the Court’s reasoning contains a number of important principles concerning the 
provision of emergency services, generally, that are applicable equally to the 
maritime domain. Indeed, the Court in Furdik referred directly to the provision of 
‘air-sea rescue facilities to assist those in distress’ as an example of such 
emergency services.82 Having considered the relevant jurisprudence, the Court 
stated that: 
the State’s duty to safeguard the right to life must also be considered to 
extend to the provision of emergency services where it has been brought 
to the notice of the authorities that the life or health of an individual is at 
risk on account of injuries sustained as a result of an accident. Depending 
on the circumstances, this duty may go beyond the provision of essential 
emergency services such as fire-brigades and ambulances and, of 
                                                                                                                                
4) (adopted during the 57th Ordinary Session in Bunjul, Gambia, 4–18 
November 2015) para 41. 
81 Leray (n 49). 
82 Milan Furdik v Slovakia (Admissibility) App no 42994/05 (ECtHR, 2 December 
2008). The decision is not paginated. 
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relevance to the instant case, include the provision of air-mountain or air-
sea rescue facilities to assist those in distress.83 
From this, requirements can be identified both to make provision for emergency 
services and to deploy them in response to particular situations of which a State 
has been made aware. It is submitted that, although the Court refers specifically 
to ‘air-sea’ rescue, it would make no sense for the scope of emergency services 
that must be provided not to extend to the provision of assistance by sea. 
Notwithstanding, however, the obligation to provide emergency services, the 
Court in Furdik went on to state that 
the positive obligation is to be interpreted in a way as not to impose an 
excessive burden on the authorities, bearing in mind, in particular, the 
unpredictability of human conduct and operational choices which must be 
made in terms of priorities and resources. The Court recalls in this 
connection that the choice of means for ensuring the positive obligations 
under Article 2 is in principle a matter that falls within the Contracting 
State’s margin of appreciation. There are different avenues to ensure 
Convention rights, and even if the State has failed to apply one particular 
measure provided by domestic law, it may still fulfil its positive duty by 
other means.84 
From this passage, two important caveats to the general obligation to provide 
emergency services can be identified. First, the obligation is limited to the 
provision of only that which is not excessive with respect to the burden it places 
on authorities. Given the subsequent reference to resources, the ‘burden’ in 
question presumably refers at least in part to the financial cost of providing the 
services in question, both in terms of the general provision of rescue services, 
and with respect to a particular rescue operation. Second, a State is to be 
afforded a margin of appreciation in deciding how to meet its positive 
obligations under the right to life, and thus in the provision of rescue services. 
This applies, in particular, to decisions as to the deployment of resources to 
meet competing requirements, as well as to decisions as to how to use those 
resources in order to fulfil its positive obligations.  
Both principles are relevant to the provision of assistance to those in distress at 
sea, noting, in particular, the potential cost of rescuing vessels in remote 
locations, such as may be the case with respect to a State’s flagged vessels, 
                                            
83 ibid. 
84 ibid (citations omitted). 
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which may be located anywhere in the world. Given the relevance of the burden 
placed on the State, and the margin of appreciation it is afforded, it might 
justifiably rely on such grounds to differentiate the assistance provided to 
remote vessels, as compared to those located close to its coast, where the cost 
of rescue is likely to be lower. By this logic, it is likely to be justifiable for a State 
to establish a coast guard service only close to its coast, while meeting its 
positive obligations to its remote flagged vessels through agreements made for 
the provision of mutual assistance, including, in particular, the system 
established under the SAR convention. 
Furthermore, the simple fact that an option might exist to mount a rescue does 
not necessarily imply that the State is obliged to conduct the operation, if the 
cost would be excessive given the priority of the operation relative to other 
demands on resources. To give a concrete, hypothetical, example, a situation 
may arise where assistance could be provided to a vessel in distress either by 
air or by sea, with the former being more expensive than the latter, but with a 
higher chance of averting a threat to the lives of the individuals being rescued. 
In these circumstances, the State would still be justified in choosing the cheaper 
option, either if rescue by air would be excessive in its cost relative to the 
resources of the State concerned, or if the decision is justified as an allocation 
of resources between competing priorities, within the State’s margin of 
appreciation. 
To give another hypothetical example, a vessel in distress may be located off a 
State’s coast (within its territorial sea, for the sake of argument) when it finds 
itself in difficulty and in need of assistance within a certain timeframe to avert a 
threat to the life of individuals onboard. If there is no rescue vessel situated 
sufficiently close to intervene in time, the State concerned will not necessarily 
have failed to meet its obligations by failing to provide a rescue vessel within 
close enough range to have been of assistance. Not only may the provision of 
more rescue vessels, such as to reduce the distance between them, have been 
excessive relative to the resources of the State concerned, but the decision 
where to locate vessels, in order to meet operational priorities, is likely to be 
within the State’s margin of appreciation. 
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As well as the actual provision of emergency services, it is clear from Furdik 
that the positive obligation entails the ‘setting up of an appropriate regulatory 
framework for rescuing persons in distress and ensuring the effective 
functioning of such a framework’. 85  This extends to the establishment of 
domestic mechanisms for addressing situations where the response to a 
situation of distress is alleged to have been inadequate. The Court in Furdik 
stated that, ‘The State’s positive obligation also requires an effective 
independent judicial system to be set up so that an alleged deficient response 
to an emergency resulting in the death of the person in distress can be the 
subject of scrutiny and, as appropriate, those found to be responsible held 
accountable for their acts or omissions.’86 The Court explained that this does 
not necessarily mean that criminal consequences must flow from a failure, 
rather that an appropriate remedy should be provided for.87 
The application of these principles to the facts of the case in Furdik is illustrative 
of how they operate in practice. In issue in Furdik was the specific allegation 
that Slovakia’s positive obligation under the right to life had been breached 
through the absence in its regulatory framework of a specific time limit for the 
provision of an air ambulance, referring only to the provision of ‘indispensable 
medical assistance without delay.’88 Having examined the Slovakian regulatory 
framework, the Court could see ‘no reason for putting in doubt the adequacy of 
the mechanisms in place as a whole’, notwithstanding that regulations dealing 
specifically with the response times of air ambulances had been planned for but 
not yet created.89 The Court ‘[did] not consider that the positive obligations 
under Article 2 stretch as far as to require the incorporation in the relevant 
regulations of an obligation of result, that is a time-limit within which an aerial 
ambulance must reach a person needing urgent medical assistance, as 
suggested by the applicant.’90 The Court further explained that the dependence 
of airborne assistance on weather, terrain and technical constraints ‘would 
render such a general obligation difficult to fulfil and impose a disproportionate 
                                            
85 ibid. 
86 ibid. 
87 It may be, for example, that an acknowledgment of failure and/or an apology 
would be sufficient. 
88 Furdik (n 82). 
89 ibid. 
90 ibid. 
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burden on the authorities of Contracting States’. 91  This point has clear 
application by analogy to the maritime domain, in which the provision of rescue 
services will be similarly dependent on environmental, operational and technical 
factors, particularly in the case of rescues effected at significant distance from 
the State in question. 
The ECtHR’s decisions in Furdik and Leray provide support for the contention 
that States’ positive obligations under Article 2 ECHR can encompass the 
provision of assistance to of those in distress at sea, as well as providing, in 
Furdik, a reference point as to how they apply in practice. Moreover, the 
practice of the ECtHR, although of direct relevance only to the ECHR, is 
consistent with the broader principles set out above concerning the duty to 
protect recognized under each of the other systems. It provides, therefore, 
support for the proposition that the right to life under each of the instruments 
under consideration entails positive obligations relating to the provision of 
assistance to those in distress at sea. Even so, predicting how those obligations 
will be applied in practice is unavoidably speculative, given the limited case law 
dealing directly with the subject. 
Nevertheless, it is submitted that principles that can be identified from Furdik, 
emphasizing, in particular, the flexibility afforded to States in the provision of 
rescue services to meet their positive obligation under the right to life, are of 
relevance not only to the Article 2 ECHR, but more widely to the other 
instruments under consideration. In determining whether a State has met its 
obligations, a court or other supervising body will be concerned primarily with 
the structures put in place by the State for the provision of rescue services, 
including systems for investigation and accountability when things go wrong, 
rather than the conduct of a particular rescue operation. If the structures 
implemented by a State are within its margin of appreciation, and the 
associated policies and procedures have been followed in a particular case, 
then the State is unlikely to be found in breach of its positive obligations under 
the right to life. From the opposite perspective, a successful claimant would 
have to show that the system for the provision of rescue services was so flawed 
in its structure or implementation that it fell outside the considerable latitude 
granted to States, taking into account both the resources and priorities of that 
                                            
91 ibid. 
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particular State. Absent evidence of a blatant failure on the part of the State to 
provide assistance to particular individuals in distress when it was clearly 
reasonable to do so, it is submitted that this presents a substantial obstacle to a 
successful claim in practice. 
6.4. Conclusion 
From the above analysis, it is clear that States may, in some circumstances, 
have a duty to assist those in distress both under the law of the sea and under 
IHRL. While there is overlap between the two, there are also important 
differences in their scope and content. First, with respect to the applicability, the 
law of the sea contains obligations that apply in two distinct areas. The duty to 
render assistance, reflected in UNCLOS Article 98(1), applies in the vicinity of 
vessels flying the State’s flag. In contrast, the duty of coastal States to establish 
search and rescue services, contained in UNCLOS Article 98(2) and expanded 
upon in the SAR Convention, is not geographically constrained, though with 
particular obligations incurred by States within their own search and rescue 
regions. On the other hand, the IHRL obligation to provide assistance to those 
in distress arises in a number of different set of situations. It applies, on account 
of the territorial applicability of the treaties in question, in the State’s internal 
and archipelagic waters and territorial sea. It may also apply extraterritorially, 
according to the same criteria discussed in other contexts; this is most likely to 
be the case with respect to a State’s flagged vessels, and where a vessel 
whose actions are attributable to the State exercises authority and control over 
a vessel in distress, wherever it might be located. According to the current state 
of the law, the arguments that IHRL obligations can apply throughout a State’s 
search and rescue area, or on the basis of a distress call, acknowledged or not, 
are unconvincing. More plausible, though still speculative, is the argument that 
a State’s shore authorities might exercise authority and control over a vessel 
when they take action in response to a distress call. 
Second, turning to the content of the obligations under the law of the sea and 
under human rights law, there is significant overlap. To the extent that a vessel 
in distress falls within the jurisdiction of a State while in the vicinity of that 
State’s vessels, IHRL clearly includes an obligation on the State to render 
assistance to the extent reasonable. Furthermore, the duty owed under the law 
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of the sea to establish search and rescue services is closely analogous to the 
obligation owed under human rights law and applied in Furdik. Both are 
obligations of conduct rather than result, requiring the creation, maintenance 
and enforcement of a system for the provision of rescue services. Indeed, it is 
likely that a Court examining the compliance of a State with the human rights 
obligation would look to the law of the sea in assessing whether the appropriate 
standard had been met. In any case the human rights obligation does not 
appear to go much further than that owed under the law of the sea. 
Finally, however, although the substance of the obligations may be broadly 
similar, there is a significant difference in their enforceability by individuals. The 
law of the sea obligation is owed strictly between States and it is therefore only 
through the State of nationality that an individual may seek recourse for a failure 
on the part of another State to provide assistance. The IHRL obligation, on the 
other hand, is a duty owed to the individual and, where appropriate 
mechanisms exist, may be subject to individual complaint. This, arguably, is the 
most important consequence of finding an obligation to assist vessels in 
distress under human rights law. 
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7. Non-Refoulement 
7.1. Introduction 
Non-refoulement, or the prohibition of the expulsion, return or extradition of 
individuals to another State where there is a risk that their rights will be violated, 
is a principle of fundamental importance in human rights law. It is perhaps 
surprising that such an important concept is not set out in express terms in 
either the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 1 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)2 or African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR),3 instead, as explained below, being inferred 
from the broader responsibilities to respect and protect the rights to which 
individuals are entitled. Of the human rights instruments under consideration, 
only the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR)4 and Convention 
Against Torture (CAT)5 contain express non-refoulement provisions, which, as 
set out below, are limited in their application to specific, relatively narrow, 
circumstances. Nevertheless, international human rights law (IHRL) has 
developed detailed doctrine relating to the principle of non-refoulement and the 
principle has been applied in the context of a relatively broad range of 
substantive rights. 
The prohibition of refoulement is often considered in a specific context, rather 
than as a unitary concept in itself. In the maritime, it has arisen frequently in 
discussions relating to the expulsion or return of irregular migrants intercepted 
at sea.6 However, it may apply also to the transfer of suspected criminals to 
                                            
1 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Ratification Instrument of 
the United States of America (deposited 8 June 1992, with effect from 8 
September 1992) 1676 UNTS 543 (ICCPR). 
2 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(European Convention on Human Rights, as amended) (ECHR). 
3 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (adopted 27 June 1981, 
entered into force 21 October 1986) (1982) 21 ILM 58 (ACHPR). 
4 American Convention on Human Rights: ‘Pact of San José, Costa Rica’ 
(signed 22 November 1969, entered into force 18 July 1978) 1144 UNTS 144 
(ACHR). 
5  Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (adopted 10 December 1984, entered into force 26 
June 1987) 1465 UNTS 113 (CAT). 
6 See, for example, Anne T Gallagher and Fiona David, The International Law 
of Migrant Smuggling (CUP 2014) 160–63, 175–79; Efthymios Papastavridis, 
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another State for prosecution, for example in the case of individuals suspected 
of piracy.7 Indeed, it is potentially relevant whenever a State expels, returns or 
extradites an individual to another State. As will be discussed below, its 
applicability beyond the territory of the State concerned depends on the broader 
question of the extraterritorial application of the instruments in question, and 
potentially of the specific rights implicated by the particular situation at hand.8 
This chapter begins by briefly examining the principle of non-refoulement, or 
analogous principles, as they exist, first, in the law of the sea and, second, in 
refugee law. This short discussion will provide context for the subsequent 
examination of non-refoulement under IHRL, in particular by identifying the 
weaknesses and deficiencies that exist in protection elsewhere. The chapter will 
then proceed to outline the principle of non-refoulement in IHRL, noting that the 
depth and breadth of the law and practice relating to non-refoulement, 
generally, precludes a comprehensive survey within the confines of this chapter. 
The subsequent analysis will then focus on particular issues arising from the 
application of the principle of non-refoulement under IHRL to maritime security 
operations (MSOs), dealing, first, with its applicability, and, second, with its 
implementation in practice. 
It should be noted at the outset that a variety of language is used in connection 
with the non-refoulement obligation. Different instruments refer to ‘expulsion’, 
‘return’ and ‘extradition’, alongside the term ‘refoulement’ itself. Except where a 
distinction is deliberately to be made, refoulement (and non-refoulement) will be 
used to refer to the concept as a whole. 
                                                                                                                                
Interception of Vessels on the High Seas: Contemporary Challenges to the 
Legal Order of the Oceans (Hart 2013) 302-08. 
7 See, for example, Anna Petrig, Human Rights and Law Enforcement at Sea: 
Arrest, Detention and Transfer of Piracy Suspects (Brill Nijhoff 2014) 315–412. 
8 On extraterritorial application generally, see above ch 3. 
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7.2. Non-refoulement and analogous principles elsewhere in international 
law 
7.2.1. Law of the sea 
The law of the sea contains no specific prohibition of refoulement.9 However, as 
discussed in Chapter Six, individuals who have been rescued must be taken to 
a ‘place of safety’.10 Gallagher and David suggest that the concept of a place of 
safety ‘is increasingly understood as encompassing protection from 
refoulement.’11  Of the evidence they cite, most convincing is a Council of 
Europe definition of a place of safety as requiring that individuals’ fundamental 
rights be protected. 12  According to such a definition, it would hardly be 
conceivable that a place of safety could include a place to which transfer would 
be prohibited on the basis of non-refoulement and, to that extent, Gallagher and 
David’s assertion seems, to a certain extent, justified. 
Nevertheless, the requirement to take a rescued individual to a place of safety 
should not simply be equated with the principle of non-refoulement. The former 
is a positive obligation on the part of rescuing States to find a suitable location 
to which rescued individuals may be taken. While the suitability of a place of 
safety may be gauged with respect to human rights norms, the nature of the 
obligation is fundamentally different to that of non-refoulement, which is 
primarily a negative obligation not to expel, return or extradite individuals to 
particular territories. Conversely, the principle of non-refoulement carries with it 
                                            
9 It has been suggested, in the context of individuals detained on suspicion of 
piracy, that only the detaining State is competent under the terms of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (adopted 10 December 1982, 
entered into force 16 November 1994) 1833 UNTS 397 (UNCLOS) to prosecute 
them and that their transfer to another State for prosecution is therefore 
prohibited. However, as Petrig persuasively argues, such arguments are flawed 
on several grounds, not least the established universality of jurisdiction to try 
piracy suspects. Petrig (n 7) 316–19. 
10 See above s 6.2. 
11 Gallagher and David (n 6) 480. See also Virginia Passalacqua, ‘The “Open 
Arms” Case: Reconciling the Notion of “Place of Safety” with the Human Rights 
of Migrants’ (EJIL Talk!, 21 May 2018) <https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-open-arms-
case-reconciling-the-notion-of-place-of-safety-with-the-human-rights-of-
migrants/> accessed 5 July 2018. 
12 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Resolution 1821 ‘The 
Interception and Rescue at Sea of Asylum Seekers, Refugees and Irregular 
Migrants’ (2011) para 9.5. 
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significant procedural obligations, as will be discussed below, whereas the 
place of safety requirement is ultimately an obligation of result. 
Whatever the contours of the place of safety requirement, it is of only limited 
application, specifically to those rescued at sea. In this sense, it is of much 
narrower application than the principle of non-refoulement, which concerns 
expulsion, return or extradition for any reason. Therefore, while the requirement 
to take an individual to a place of safety may be relevant, for example, where 
migrants are rescued while attempting to reach a coastal State, it is of no 
general application to those detained, or who otherwise fall under the control of 
a State, in other circumstances. 
7.2.2. Refugee law 
Non-refoulement is arguably the cornerstone of modern refugee law.13 Indeed, 
inherent in the concept of asylum is protection from refoulement to a State 
where a refugee has a well-founded fear of persecution. Article 33 of the 1951 
Refugee Convention, 14  which is widely considered to reflect customary 
international law,15 sets out the non-refoulement obligation as follows: 
1. No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in 
any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or 
freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion. 
2. The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by 
a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a 
danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who, having 
been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, 
constitutes a danger to the community of that country. 
                                            
13 See, generally, Guy S Goodwin-Gill and Jane McAdam, The Refugee in 
International Law (3rd edn, OUP 2007) 201–84; Gallagher and David (n 6) 160–
63. 
14 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (concluded 28 July 1951, 
entered into force 22 April 1954) 189 UNTS 137 as amended by the Protocol 
Relating to the Status of Refugees (concluded 31 January 1967, entered into 
force 4 October 1967) 606 UNTS 267. 
15 See, for example, UN High Commissioner for Refugees, ‘Advisory Opinion on 
the Extraterritorial Application of Non-Refoulement Obligations under the 1951 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol’ (26 
January 2007) (UNHCR advisory opinion on the extraterritorial application of 
non-refoulement) paras 14–16. 
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However, the text of Article 33 reveals two important limitations to the principle 
of non-refoulement as manifested in the Refugee Convention. First, it applies 
only to refugees as defined under the Refugee Convention, usually referring 
only to those who, 
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to 
such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or 
who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former 
habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such 
fear, is unwilling to return to it.16 
While a formal assessment of refugee status is not necessarily required,17 
protection from non-refoulement under the Refugee Convention is limited to 
those with a credible fear of persecution on particular grounds. The concept of 
persecution is not defined precisely and can be interpreted broadly to include 
not only ‘the threat of deprivation of life or physical freedom’, but to other ‘less 
overt’, albeit discriminatory, policies.18 Although the language of Article 33(1) 
might suggest that the protection from refoulement is further restricted to 
situations only where there is a threat to life or freedom, it has been interpreted 
in practice to apply to all those who qualify as a refugee.19 
Nevertheless, the requirement of discriminatory grounds significantly limits the 
availability of refugee status and, as a result, protection from refoulement under 
the Refugee Convention. While the State’s grounds can be interpreted broadly, 
particularly with respect to the category of ‘social group’, the measures taken by 
the State must be discriminatory in order to amount to persecution. Hence there 
is no refugee status, and no protection from refoulement, for those who fear 
mistreatment on an individual or non-discriminatory basis. For example, 
deficiencies in the criminal justice system, such as the right to a fair trial or 
exposure to cruel or inhuman punishment, would not, in and of themselves, give 
rise to refugee status so long as they are not discriminatory. In the maritime 
                                            
16 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (concluded 28 July 1951, 
entered into force 22 April 1954) 189 UNTS 137 as amended by the Protocol 
Relating to the Status of Refugees (concluded 31 January 1967, entered into 
force 4 October 1967) 606 UNTS 267 art 1A(2). 
17 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam (n 13) 232–33. 
18 Ibid 90–92. 
19 ibid 233–34. 
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context this means that many potentially relevant situations, such as the 
transfer of individuals suspected of piracy, may fall outside the protection of 
Article 33.20 As will be discussed below, protection from refoulement under 
IHRL is potentially broader. 
The second notable limitation arises from the exclusions contained in Article 
33(2) relating to threats to national security and public safety. If these criteria for 
exclusion are met, then the plain meaning of Article 33(2) is to permit 
refoulement no matter what the consequences for the individual. It has been 
argued that a decision to deny the protection of Article 33 is, or should be, 
subject to a proportionality assessment, in which the grounds for exclusion are 
weighed against the harm expected to be caused.21 Even if this is the case, the 
point remains that refoulement that would otherwise be prohibited may be 
permitted where the threat to national security or public safety is sufficiently 
high. Importantly, these exclusions do not apply to the protection against 
refoulement under IHRL.22 
In addition to these two limitations, another issue arises with respect to the 
spatial applicability of Article 33, which has proved at least as controversial as 
the applicability of IHRL treaties,23 discussed in Chapters Two and Three. 
Article 33 is not made subject to any express provision concerning its spatial 
scope of applicability; as a result, debate has focused on whether the language 
of Article 33, particularly the words ‘expel’, ‘return’ and ‘refouler’, should be 
interpreted as applying outside a State’s territory, as well as within. A detailed 
analysis is beyond the scope of this thesis; however, continued doubt as to the 
extraterritorial applicability of the non-refoulement norm in refugee law provides 
a further reason why alternative protection from refoulement, under IHRL, may 
be of particular interest and importance. For that reason, a brief summary of the 
debate is presented here. 
The argument for a narrow application of Article 33, limited to the territory of 
States parties, is best illustrated by the position of the United States Supreme 
                                            
20 Petrig (n 7) 323. 
21 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam (n 13) 240–41. 
22 See, in the context of Article 3 CAT, Manfred Nowak and Elizabeth McArthur, 
The United Nations Convention Against Torture: A Commentary (OUP 2008) 
195, 197–98. 
23 See, for example, Gallagher and David (n 6) 264–72 
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Court in Sale, Acting Commissioner, INS v Haitian Centers Council,24 which 
concerned the United States’ policy in the early 1990s of intercepting on the 
high seas irregular migrants attempting to reach the United States from Haiti, 
and returning them without determination of refugee status. In Sale the US 
Supreme Court considered whether this practice was prohibited under either 
Article 33 or relevant US domestic law, finding in the negative with respect to 
both. On the international law question, the Court’s examination of Article 33 
focused on two points in particular. First, the Court found that accepting 
extraterritorial application of Article 33 would lead to ‘an absurd anomaly’, in that 
an individual presenting a danger to security could be denied protection from 
refoulement under Article 33(2) when present in a State’s territory, but not when 
on the high seas.25 Second, the Court considered that the specific use of the 
term ‘refouler’ implied a narrower legal definition ought to be given to the word 
‘return’ in Article 33(1). Specifically, the Court concluded that ‘return’ in this 
context referred to an individual present within a territory but not yet resident 
there (as distinct from ‘expel’, which would apply to an individual admitted to a 
territory).26 These points, alongside a brief examination of the travaux, led the 
Court ultimately to conclude that Article 33 applied only within the territory of a 
State, and not, therefore, on the high seas.27 
The Supreme Court’s judgment in Sale has been criticised as being motivated 
by political considerations and lacking in the quality of its analysis of the 
international law issues involved. 28  Furthermore, when the case was 
subsequently considered by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 
the Commission reached a different conclusion, agreeing with the views 
submitted to the Supreme Court by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) in an amicus curae brief ‘that Article 33 had no geographical 
                                            
24 Sale v Haitian Centers Council 509 US 155 (1993). 
25 ibid 179–80. 
26 ibid 180–82. 
27 ibid 187 (‘The negotiating history, which suggests that the Convention's 
limited reach resulted from a deliberate bargain, is not dispositive, but it solidly 
supports our reluctance to interpret Article 33 to impose obligations on the 
contracting parties that are broader than the text commands. We do not read 
that text to apply to aliens interdicted on the high seas.’). 
28 The debate is summarised in Gallagher and David (n 6) 269–72; see also 
Goodwin-Gill and McAdam (n 13) 247. 
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limitations.’29 UNHCR had argued that the language of Article 33 is ‘broad and 
unequivocal’, in prohibiting ‘both the expulsion of a refugee from a contracting 
State and, of critical importance here, the return of a refugee to a territory where 
his or her life or freedom would be endangered.’30  The latter prohibition, 
UNHCR argued, was not subject to any geographical limitation, pointing in 
support to: the structure of the treaty, which expressly limits other provisions to 
States’ territory; the Refugee Convention’s ‘broad and overriding humanitarian 
purpose’; the United States’ prior practice; and the negotiating history of the 
treaty.31 
UNHCR subsequently reaffirmed its position on the extraterritorial applicability 
of Article 33 in a 2007 Advisory Opinion.32 Academic support is also strongly on 
the side of the UNHCR position but, as Gallagher and David note, ‘Despite its 
scholarly strength and persuasive logic, this consensus view among 
commentators and UNHCR is worryingly one-sided, and consequentially 
fragile.’33 Indeed, as they point out, the position of the US Supreme Court has 
also been adopted in domestic decisions in the United Kingdom 34  and 
Australia.35 Although such practice clearly cannot be determinative of the issue, 
it is a fair conclusion that, ‘What is clear is the lack of strong evidence for State 
consent to an understanding of the obligation of non-refoulement that extends 
to asylum-seekers who are not at the borders or physically within the territory of 
the State.’36 
In conclusion, Article 33 of the Refugee Convention may be relevant to an 
important category of individuals that States might encounter in the course of 
conducting MSOs. However, extraterritorial applicability issues aside, it applies 
                                            
29 The Haitian Centre for Human Rights et al v United States, Case 10.675, 
Report No 51/96, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95 Doc 7 rev at 550 (1997) [157]. 
30 Reproduced at Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 
‘The Haitian Interdiction Case 1993 Brief Amicus Curiae’ (1994) 6(1) Intl J of 
Refugee L 85 (UNHCR amicus brief), 87. 
31 The argument is summarised at ibid 86–87. 
32 UNHCR advisory opinion on the extraterritorial application of non-refoulement 
(n 15) paras 23–43. 
33 Gallagher and David (n 6) 271. 
34 R (European Roma Rights Centre) v Immigration Officer at Prague Airport 
[2004] UKHL 55. 
35 Applicant A v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 190 CLR 225. 
36 Gallagher and David (n 6) 271. 
 270 
only to those who qualify as refugees and is not absolute in light of the security 
exception. As explained below, the prohibition on refoulement under IHRL is 
significantly broader in that it does not rely on refugee status, and is not 
generally subject to the same caveat where individuals present a threat to 
security. Furthermore, although extraterritorial applicability is often a 
contentious issue within IHRL, the separate and continuing controversy as to 
the applicability of Article 33 beyond a State’s territory means that the existence 
of equivalent (or greater) protection under IHRL might be especially pertinent. 
7.3. Non-refoulement in IHRL 
7.3.1. The prohibition on refoulement 
Each of the human rights treaties under consideration prohibits refoulement in 
various circumstances, either by virtue of express provision, or as arising 
implicitly in connection with various substantive rights. Express provisions are 
contained in both the CAT and the ACHR. Article 3 CAT states that: 
1. No State Party shall expel, return (‘refouler’) or extradite a person to 
another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that 
he would be in danger being subjected to torture. 
2. For the purposes of determining whether there are such grounds, the 
competent authorities shall take into account all relevant 
considerations including, where applicable, the existence in the State 
concerned of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass 
violations of human rights. 
Although, as discussed below, the principle of non-refoulement applies to a 
wide, potentially open-ended, set of rights under the other treaties under 
consideration, Article 3 CAT has been interpreted by the Committee Against 
Torture as applying only to torture in the strict sense, as defined in Article 1 
CAT.37 The travaux show that consideration was given during the drafting 
process to the extension of the non-refoulement provision to other cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, but that this was ultimately 
rejected by the majority.38 Against this backdrop, it is unsurprising that the 
                                            
37 Nowak and McArthur (n 22) para 183. 
38 ibid para 182. 
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Committee has declined to infer a broader principle of non-refoulement from 
other CAT provisions, particularly Article 16.39 
Article 22(8) ACHR makes express provision for non-refoulement in some 
circumstances, stating that: 
In no case may an alien be deported or returned to a country, regardless 
of whether or not it is his country of origin, if in that country his right to life 
or personal freedom is in danger of being violated because of his race, 
nationality, religion, social status, or political opinions. 
Protection under Article 22(8) is limited to an individual’s ‘right to life or personal 
freedom’, and then only where the threat to those rights arises because of one 
of the specified reasons. As a result, although broader than Article 33 of the 
Refugee Convention, in that it does not require the individual in question to 
meet the definition of a refugee,40 it is considerably narrower than the principle 
as it has been identified as arising implicitly, discussed next. 
Beyond these express provisions, the principle of non-refoulement has been 
identified as arising implicitly under the ICCPR, ECHR, ACHR and ACHPR. In 
general terms, the Human Rights Committee (HRC) stated in General Comment 
31 that: 
Moreover, the article 2 obligation requiring that States Parties respect and 
ensure the Covenant rights for all persons in their territory and all persons 
under their control entails an obligation not to extradite, deport, expel or 
otherwise remove a person from their territory, where there are substantial 
grounds for believing that there is a real risk of irreparable harm, such as 
that contemplated by articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant, either in the country 
to which removal is to be effected or in any country to which the person 
may subsequently be removed. 41 
Notable here is that the HRC refers, by way of example, to Article 6 ICCPR 
(right to life) and Article 7 ICCPR (prohibition of torture and cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment of punishment), but does not limit the non-refoulement 
                                            
39 ibid para 183. 
40 Rights and Guarantees of Children in the Context of Migration and/or in Need 
of International Protection (Advisory Opinion OC-21/14) Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights Series A No 21 (19 August 2014) (Advisory Opinion on the 
Rights and Guarantees of Children) para 217. 
41 UN Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment No 31’ (26 May 2004) UN 
Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 13 (HRC General Comment 31), para 12. 
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principle to these rights alone, but rather to situations where there is a risk of 
‘irreparable harm’.42 
With respect to the ECHR, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has 
stated that a State party’s ‘responsibility may…be engaged on account of acts 
which have sufficiently proximate repercussions on rights guaranteed by the 
Convention, even if those repercussions occur outside its jurisdiction.’ 43 
However, although this passage implies that the principle of non-refoulement 
under the ECHR is not limited to particular rights, the practice noted below 
demonstrates that it will not necessarily act to prohibit refoulement wherever 
there is a risk that any right will be violated to any degree. This, it is submitted, 
can be compared with the requirement of ‘irreparable harm’ under the ICCPR. 
The principle is arguably applied most consistently in connection with the risk of 
torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.44 With respect 
to the ICCPR, the HRC stated in General Comment 20 that ‘In the view of the 
Committee, States parties must not expose individuals to the danger of torture 
or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment upon return to another 
country by way of their extradition, expulsion or refoulement.’45 Similarly, the 
ECtHR has stated that the responsibility of a State Party is engaged ‘where 
substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person concerned, 
if extradited, faces a real risk of being subjected to torture or to inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment in the requesting country.’46 Likewise, the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) has held that 
Article 5 of the American Convention, read together with the obligations 
erga omnes to respect and ensure respect for the norms that protect 
human rights, reveals the obligation of the State not to deport, return, 
expel, extradite, or remove in any other way to another State a person 
who is subject to its jurisdiction, or to a third State that is unsafe, when 
                                            
42 ibid para 12. 
43 Ilasçu and Others v Moldova and Russia ECHR 2004-VII 179 [317]. See also 
William A Schabas, The European Convention on Human Rights: A 
Commentary (OUP 2015) 95–96. 
44 For discussion relating to the ECHR and ICCPR, see Petrig (n 7) 334–48 
45 UN Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment No 20’ (10 March 1992) 
UN Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1, 30 para 9. 
46 Soering v the United Kingdom Series A no 161 (ECtHR) [91]. 
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there are grounds for believing that they would be in danger of being 
subjected to torture, or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.47 
With respect to the ACHPR, although practice is more limited, the African 
Commission has stated in its Guidelines and Measures for the Prohibition of 
Torture, Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in Africa that, 
‘States should ensure no one is expelled or extradited to a country where he or 
she is at risk of being subjected to torture.’48 
The prohibition of refoulement has also been applied in connection with other 
rights, although practice differs between instruments. For example, the HRC, 
IACtHR and ACHPR have also applied the principle in connection with the right 
to life.49 In particular, both the IACtHR and ACHPR have specifically identified it 
as being applicable with respect to refoulement by States that have abolished 
the death penalty to those that have retained it.50 With respect to the ECHR,51 
                                            
47 Advisory Opinion on the Rights and Guarantees of Children (n 40) para 226. 
48  African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, ‘Guidelines and 
Measures for the Prohibition of Torture, Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment in Africa’ (adopted during the 32nd Ordinary Session in Banjul, 
Gambia, 17–23 October 2002) para 15. 
49 See, for example, UN Human Rights Committee, ‘Views of the Human Rights 
Committee under Article 5(4) of the Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Concerning Communication No 
470/1991’ (Communication submitted by Joseph Kindler, concerning Canada) 
(Views adopted 30 July 1993) UN Doc CCPR/C/48/D/470/1991. Advisory 
Opinion on the Rights and Guarantees of Children (n 40) para 227–29. 
50 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, ‘General Comment No 3 
on the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The Right to Life (Article 
4)’ (adopted during the 57th Ordinary Session in Bunjul, Gambia, 4–18 
November 2015) para 23 (‘Those States which have abolished the death 
penalty in law shall not reintroduce it, nor facilitate executions in retentionist 
States through refoulement, extradition, deportation, or other means including 
the provision of support or assistance that could lead to a death sentence.’) 
Wong Ho Wing v Peru (Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs) 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No 297 (30 June 2015) [134] 
(‘States that have abolished the death penalty may not expose an individual 
under their jurisdiction to the real and foreseeable risk of its application and, 
therefore, may not expel, by deportation or extradition, persons under their 
jurisdiction, if it can be reasonably anticipated that they may be sentenced to 
death, without requiring guarantees that the death sentence would not be 
carried out.’). 
51 For a summary of the position under the ECHR, see, for example, Husayn 
(Abu Zubaydah) v Poland App no 7511/13 (ECtHR, 24 July 2014) [450]–[455]. 
See also Schabas (n 43) 96. 
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the ECtHR has applied it to Article 2 (right to life),52 and, where there is a real 
risk of a ‘flagrant breach’ of the right in question, to Article 5 (prohibition of 
arbitrary detention)53 and Article 6 (right to a fair trial).54  
7.3.2. Particular applicability issues 
Although the applicability of the instrument in question is of pivotal importance 
to non-refoulement in the context of MSOs, as it is in the case of the other 
substantive rules and norms of IHRL discussed in this thesis, in practice the 
situation is, in some respects, simpler. Considering Article 3 CAT, it was noted 
in Chapter Three that the position of the Committee Against Torture is that, ‘The 
State party should apply the non-refoulement guarantee to all detainees in its 
custody…’. 55  As was explained, although the Committee’s position is not 
universally accepted, it is persuasive and arguably represents the better view of 
the law.56 On that basis, Article 3 CAT is not geographically limited in its scope 
of application; rather, it will apply whenever an individual is detained, a 
threshold that should, it is submitted, be construed as broadly as for other IHRL 
rules applicable to individuals deprived of their liberty.57 
With respect to the ICCPR, ECHR, ACHR and ACHPR, the applicability of the 
prohibition on refoulement will depend on the applicability of the instrument in 
question. As explained in Chapter Two, each of these instruments applies 
throughout the territories of States parties, including their internal waters, 
territorial sea and any archipelagic waters. Seaward of the territorial sea, each 
instrument may apply extraterritorially, according to the principles set out in 
Chapter Three. Without rehearsing the full analysis, two bases are especially 
likely to be relevant in the context of non-refoulement and worthy of brief 
                                            
52 See, for example, Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v the United Kingdom ECHR 2010 
[123]. 
53 See, for example, Othman (Abu Qatada) v the United Kingdom ECHR 2012-I 
(extracts) [233]. 
54 See, for example, Soering (n 46) [113]. 
55 UN Committee Against Torture, ‘Consideration of Reports Submitted by 
States Parties Under Article 19 of the Convention, Conclusions and 
Recommendations of the Committee Against Torture: United States of America’ 
(25 July 2006) UN Doc CAT/C/USA/CO/2 para 15. 
56 See above s 3.2.1.4. 
57 See above s 5.4.3. 
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discussion here: flag-State jurisdiction; 58  and State agent authority and 
control.59 
The first of these, flag-State jurisdiction, is particularly likely to arise where 
individuals, either following rescue or arrest, are transferred to an interdicting 
ship, thereby falling under the jurisdiction of the flag State. Although, as was 
noted in Chapter Three, the relevance of this basis for extraterritorial 
applicability to the ICCPR, ACHR and ACHPR is speculative, it is well 
established with respect to the ECHR. This is illustrated, in the particular 
context of non-refoulement, by the decision in Hirsi Jamaa v Italy,60 which 
concerned the high seas interception by Italian Revenue Police and Coastguard 
vessels of Somali and Eritrean nationals attempting to reach Italy from Libya. 
In Hirsi, the migrants, once intercepted, were transferred onto the Italian ships 
and taken to Tripoli.61 With regard to applicability, the Grand Chamber observed 
that in the instant case the events took place entirely on board ships of the 
Italian armed forces, the crews of which were composed exclusively of 
Italian military personnel. In the Court’s opinion, in the period between 
boarding the ships of the Italian armed forces and being handed over to 
the Libyan authorities, the applicants were under the continuous and 
exclusive de jure and de facto control of the Italian authorities.62 
As a result, ‘the events giving rise to the alleged violations fall within Italy’s 
“jurisdiction” within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention.’63 Importantly, 
this was the case in spite of the characterisation of the incident as a ‘rescue 
operation’ and what the Italian government alleged to be the ‘minimal control 
exercised by the authorities over the parties concerned at the material time.’64 
As illustrated by Hirsi, whenever individuals are taken on board a State’s 
warships or other vessels on government service, the ECHR, including the 
                                            
58 See above s 3.3.2. 
59 See above s 3.3.4. 
60 Hirsi Jamaa and Others v Italy ECHR 2012. 
61 The facts are summarised at ibid [9]–[12]. 
62 ibid [81]. 
63 ibid [82]. On the question of jurisdiction, see Den Heijer, ‘Reflections on 
Refoulement and Collective Expulsion in the Hirsi Case’ (2013) 25(2) Intl J of 
Refugee L 265, 271–74; Violeta Moreno-Lax, ‘Hirsi Jamaa and Others v Italy or 
the Strasbourg Court versus Extraterritorial Migration Control?’ (2012) 12(3) 
Human Rights L Rev 574, 579–82 
64 Hirsi Jamaa (n 60) [79]. 
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prohibition on refoulement, will apply. This will be so even where the control 
over the individuals once onboard the ship is limited (as was alleged to be the 
case in Hirsi), so it will certainly be the case when individuals are subject to a 
greater degree of control, such as when individuals are held in close custody 
having been arrested for their alleged commission of a crime, such as piracy. 
Turning to the second basis for extraterritorial applicability particularly likely to 
arise in the context of non-refoulement, State agent authority and control is of 
relevance to all four treaties in question. As discussed in Chapter Three, the 
threshold question is whether and when, the conduct of a State, through its 
agents, does, in fact, amount to the exercise of authority and control over 
individuals.65 Although sometimes clear, this can be difficult to determine; while, 
in the context of MSOs, it can be met through the control exercised over the 
vessel on which individuals are located, for example by directing its course and 
speed, as well as through authority and control over particular individuals, this 
still does not deal with every conceivable scenario. However, in the specific 
context of non-refoulement, the situation is potentially simpler. This is because 
the issue of non-refoulement only arises when a State has sufficient control 
over an individual so as actually to be able to expel, extradite or return them to 
another State. Without repeating the analysis set out in Chapter Three, and 
noting that the two issues are technically separate in law, it is submitted that 
whenever a State, through its agents, is in a position to violate the principle of 
non-refoulement, it will almost certainly be exercising sufficient authority and 
control over the individual in question, such that the relevant IHRL treaty 
provisions prohibiting refoulement will apply. This, furthermore, is consistent 
with the Committee Against Torture’s understanding with respect to Article 3 
CAT, discussed above, that the principle of non-refoulement is not 
geographically limited. 
A complication does arise, however, where it is suggested that a State is in 
breach of the prohibition on refoulement when it acts through a third party. This 
situation might arguably arise where a State seeking to prevent the entry into its 
territory of irregular migrants encourages or persuades the State from which the 
individuals have departed to intercept them and ‘pull’ them back to its shores. 
Just such a scenario is the subject of a current application against Italy to the 
                                            
65 See above s 3.3.4. 
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ECtHR, involving an incident in which the Libyan coastguard intercepted a 
migrant dinghy in distress, at the same time as an attempted rescue by a vessel 
operated by a German non-governmental organisation (NGO).66 In what is 
described as a ‘confrontational’ rescue, a number of migrants were recovered 
by the Libyan coastguard and returned to Libya; a number were rescued by the 
NGO and taken to Italy; and a number died. This is set against the context of an 
agreement between Italy and Libya, under which Italy provides money, training 
and equipment to the Libyan coastguard,67 apparently in return for cooperation 
in curbing migrant flows. In light of this, the actions of the Libyans in ‘pulling-
back’ migrants is presumably, at least in principle, exactly what Italy had hoped 
to bring about, and, in so doing, avoid engaging the principle of non-
refoulement, as was held to have happened in Hirsi in light of the involvement 
of Italy’s own vessels. 
The key legal question this raises is whether individuals intercepted by the 
Libyan coastguard are within the jurisdiction of Italy, in light of the involvement 
of the latter.68 In principle, it is conceivable that a State could exercise authority 
and control through the armed forces, or other government agencies, of 
another, consistent with the rules of attribution under the law of State 
responsibility.69 This may happen where the latter State places its forces at the 
                                            
66 Moritz Baumgärtel, ‘High Risk, High Reward: Taking the Question of Italy’s 
Involvement in Libyan “Pullback” Policies to the European Court of Human 
Rights’ (EJIL Talk!, 14 May 2018) <https://www.ejiltalk.org/high-risk-high-
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68 Similar issues were discussed above, in the context of rescue affected by a 
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69 David S Goddard, ‘Understanding the Challenge of Legal Interoperability in 
Coalition Operations’ (2017) 9(2) J of National Security L & Policy 211, 221–23. 
Not discussed in this thesis is the possibility that the acts of one State may be 
attributable to another where the latter coerces the former to undertake the acts 
in question. International Law Commission, ‘Articles on Responsibility of States 
for Internationally Wrongful Acts’ (2001) UN Doc A/56/10, 20 (ARSIWA) art 18. 
Although technically possible in the type of situation under consideration, the 
threshold for attribution on this basis is set very high, requiring ‘conduct with 
forces the will of the coerced State, giving it no effective choice but to comply 
with the wishes of the coercing State.’ ibid commentary to art 18, para 2. See 
also James Crawford, State Responsibility: The General Part (CUP 2013) 419–
21. A further possibility, not discussed in this thesis, is the possibility of one 
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disposal of the former, although this requires the forces in question to be acting 
under the ‘exclusive direction and control [of the receiving State], rather than on 
instructions from the sending State.’70  It could also occur with respect to 
particular acts of the forces that belong to one State, but which are undertaken 
on the instructions, or under the direction and control, of another.71 This might 
be the case if a coastguard vessel of one State responds to an incident on the 
instructions of the coastal authorities of another, or even, plausibly, if a State is 
involved in the planning and supervision of the coastguard of another. 72 
However, while noting that it remains to be seen exactly what the extent of 
Italy’s involvement with Libya’s coastguard in this particular case was, it is 
unlikely that funding, training or equipping another State’s coastguard would be 
sufficient.73 
7.3.3. Issues arising in the implementation of the principle of non-
refoulement in the course of MSOs 
The applicability of IHRL, and hence the prohibition on refoulement, to 
individuals brought within the jurisdiction of a State during the course of MSOs 
may amount to a significant restraint on the freedom to deal with them as they 
may otherwise have wished. However, it must be recognised that the principle 
of non-refoulement does not equate to an outright prohibition on transfer to 
another State.74 Expulsion, return and extradition are explicitly contemplated in 
Article 3 CAT, with such transfers only prohibited in the circumstances defined 
                                                                                                                                
State providing aid or assistance to another; under art 16 ARSIWA, the 
assisting State commits a separate internationally unlawful act through its 
assistance, rather than the original act being attributable to it. ARSIWA (n 69) 
art 16. 
70 ARSIWA (n 69) commentary to art 6, para 2. See also Crawford (n 69) 132–
36. 
71 ARSIWA (n 69) commentary to art 6, para 3 (‘Situations can also arise where 
the organ of one State acts on the joint instructions of its own and another State 
. . . . In these cases, the conduct in question is attributable to both States under 
other articles of this chapter.’). In this case, responsibility arises under art 8: 
‘The conduct of a person of group of persons shall be considered an act of a 
State under international law if the person or group of persons is in fact acting 
on the instructions of, or under the directions and control of, that State in 
carrying out the conduct.’ ibid art 8. 
72 ibid commentary to art 8 paras 4–8. 
73 This is likely to be case whether a test of ‘effective control’ or ‘overall control’ 
is applied. ibid commentary to art 8 paras 4–8. 
74 See, for example, Petrig (n 7) 320–23. 
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by the provision. Both the HRC and ECtHR have stated explicitly that extradition 
is not unlawful, per se, under either the ICCPR75 or ECHR76 respectively. 
Indeed, the ECtHR has recognised the importance of not creating ‘safe havens 
for fugitives[, which] would not only result in danger for the State obliged to 
harbour the protected person but also tend to undermine the foundations of 
extradition.’ 77  It has also reiterated the right of a State, ‘as a matter of 
international law and subject to its treaty obligations, to control the entry of 
aliens into its territory and their residence there.’78 
Instead, under each of the instruments, refoulement is prohibited in specific 
circumstances, specifically where the State expels, returns or extradites an 
individual in spite of a known risk that rights protected under the respective 
instruments may be violated. This section highlights three areas of particular 
note with respect to the implementation of the principle in practice: the scope of 
the determination that is to be made; the procedural obligations that States 
must meet; and the role of assurances given by States to which individuals are 
to be expelled, extradited or returned. 
7.3.3.1. The scope of the determination to be made 
The broad potential scope of the non-refoulement principle under the ICCPR, 
ECHR, ACHR and ACHPR means that a wider assessment must be made of 
the risks faced by those potentially subject to refoulement than would be the 
case under Article 3 CAT, or, indeed the Refugee Convention. Not only must 
the risk of ill-treatment beyond the narrow category of torture be considered, but 
potentially also the risk of arbitrary detention, as well as the risk, at least so far 
as the ECHR is concerned that individuals will suffer a ‘flagrant’ denial of their 
fair trial rights. The latter protection is likely to be of particular relevance to 
States transferring pirates and other detainees to regional States for 
                                            
75 See, for example UN Human Rights Committee, ‘Decision of the Human 
Rights Committee under the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights Concerning Communication No 117/1981’ 
(Communication submitted by the family of MA, later joined by MA, concerning 
Italy) (Views adopted 10 April 1984) UN Doc A/39/40, 190 para 13.4. 
76 See, for example, Soering (n 46) para 85. 
77 ibid para 89. 
78 See, for example, Ustinov v Russia App No 7994/14 (ECtHR, 8 November 
2016) [42] (citing Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v the United Kingdom 
Series A no 94 (ECtHR) [67]). See also Schabas (n 43) 395. 
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prosecution, in circumstances where fair trial rights may be less than perfectly 
protected.79 
Furthermore, it is insufficient for States to consider only the risk of rights 
violations in the particular country to which an individual is expelled, returned or 
extradited. To do otherwise would allow a State to circumvent the prohibition 
through the use of an intermediary State, defeating its object and purpose. 
States must therefore also take into account the risk of violations in a third 
country to which it is foreseeable that an individual may subsequently be 
transferred.80  
For example, in Hirsi, the applicants argued that they had potentially faced 
treatment in violation of Article 3 ECHR not only in Libya, to which they were 
returned by the Italian authorities, but also in their countries of origin, Somalia 
and Eritrea, to which they claimed they may subsequently have been 
transferred. The ECtHR took the view that, in light of the situation in Somalia 
and Eritrea, subsequent repatriation would arguably breach Article 3,81 and that 
Italy could not rely on the Libyan authorities to mitigate that risk. The Court 
considered 
that when the applicants were transferred to Libya, the Italian authorities 
knew or should have known that there were insufficient guarantees 
protecting the parties concerned from the risk of being arbitrarily returned 
to their countries of origin, having regard in particular to the lack of any 
asylum procedure and the impossibility of making the Libyan authorities 
recognise the refugee status granted by the UNHCR.82 
The obligation to consider subsequent transfer in determining whether an 
individual ought to be protected from refoulement thus further complicates an 
already difficult determination to be made by States.  
                                            
79 See, for example, Tullio Treves and Cesare Pitea, ‘Piracy, International Law 
and Human Rights’ in Nehal Bhuta (ed), The Frontiers of Human Rights: 
Extraterritoriality and its Challenges (OUP 2016) 122–24. 
80  See, for example, Advisory Opinion on the Rights and Guarantees of 
Children (n 40) para 221; HRC General Comment 31 (n 41) para 12. See also 
Nowak and McArthur (n 22) 178–79. 
81 Hirsi Jamaa (n 60) para 151–52. See also Den Heijer (n 63) 278–80. 
82 Hirsi Jamaa (n 60) para 156. 
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7.3.3.2. Procedural obligations 
Turning to the practical implementation of the prohibition on refoulement, there 
is potential overlap with other procedural obligations contained in the 
instruments under examination. The ICCPR, ACHR and ACHPR each contain 
provisions affording due process rights to aliens ‘lawfully in the territory of a 
State Party’ (or, equivalently, ‘non-national[s] legally admitted in a territory of a 
State Party’ in the case of the ACHPR).83 Protocol 7 to the ECHR contains a 
similar provision, but applicable to aliens ‘lawfully resident in the territory of a 
State’. 84  However, not only do these provisions provides only procedural 
guarantees, rather than any substantive guarantee against expulsion,85 but they 
apply to a significantly narrower category of individuals than those that benefit 
from protection against refoulement. 
The Human Rights Committee has emphasised that the phrase, ‘lawfully in the 
territory of a State party’, ‘means that national law concerning the requirements 
for entry and stay must be taken into account in determining the scope of that 
protection, and that illegal entrants and aliens who have stayed longer than the 
law or their permits allow, in particular, are not covered by its provisions.’86 It 
went on to state that any dispute about the legality of an alien’s presence in the 
territory of a State should be settled in accordance with Article 13. 87 
Nevertheless, the requirement of lawful presence in the territory of a State is a 
significant restriction on its applicability. While there is no reason to exclude the 
territorial sea, internal waters and archipelagic waters from the ‘territory’ in 
which the provision applies,88 the requirement of lawful presence may be harder 
to satisfy. Individuals passing through the territorial sea might be argued to be 
lawfully in the territory of the coastal State, so long as they comply with the 
                                            
83 ICCPR (n 1) art 13, ACHR (n 4) art 22(6); ACHPR (n 3) art 12(4). 
84 Protocol 7 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms (adopted 22 November 1984, entered into force 1 
November 1988) ETS 117 art 1. 
85 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, ‘Expulsion of 
Aliens in International Human Rights Law’ (Discussion Paper) (September 
2006) (UNHCR Discussion Paper) 10. 
86 UN Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment No 15’ (11 April 1986) UN 
Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1, 18 (HRC General Comment 15) para 9. 
87 ibid para 9. 
88 See above ch 2. 
 282 
requirements of innocent passage, including passage to reach a port facility.89 
However, a vessel is in violation of the innocent passage regime where it 
participates in ‘the loading or unloading of any…person contrary to 
the…immigration…regulations of the coastal State’; 90  furthermore, where a 
vessel enters a State’s territorial sea in order to proceed to a port facility, the 
State is entitled ‘to take the necessary steps to prevent any breach of the 
conditions to which [access to the port] is subject.’91 It will therefore only be in 
the case of compliance with the coastal State’s maritime immigration laws that 
the presence of an individual attempting to reach the shore could reasonably be 
considered lawful. 
The application of Article 1 of Protocol 7 to the ECHR is even narrower, being 
restricted only to those lawfully resident in the territory of the State concerned. 
The Explanatory Report accompanying Protocol 7 makes clear that lawful 
residence is a narrower concept than lawful presence in a State’s territory. 
Specifically, it excludes those who have ‘arrived at a port or other point of entry 
but [have] not yet passed through the immigration control or who has been 
admitted to the territory for the purpose only of transit or for a limited period for 
a non-residential purpose.’92 Put more simply, the ECtHR has observed that the 
‘wording [of Article 1 of Protocol 7] cannot be ignored.’93 It obviously follows that 
an individual passing through the territorial sea, whether complying with the 
requirements of innocent passage or not, without clearing the State’s 
immigration process, will not be lawfully resident and will not benefit from Article 
1 of Protocol 7. 
Of greater potential relevance is the prohibition on the ‘collective expulsion of 
aliens’, contained in the ACHR and Protocol 4 to the ECHR,94 along with the 
equivalent prohibition on ‘[t]he mass expulsion of non-nationals’ contained in 
                                            
89 UNCLOS (n 9) arts 17–19. 
90 ibid art 19(2)(g). 
91 ibid art 25(2). 
92  Council of Europe, ‘Explanatory Report to the Protocol No 7 to the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’ 
(22 November 1984) para 9. See also Schabas (n 43) 1128. 
93 Hirsi Jamaa (n 60) 173. 
94  ACHR (n 4) art 22(9), Protocol 4 to the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (adopted 16 
September 1963, entered into force 2 May 1968) ETS 46 art 4. 
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the ACHPR,95 the chief effect of which is to require an examination of each 
individual’s case. 96  Although it is not immediately obvious that the term 
‘expulsion’ is capable of extension to the transfer of individuals within the 
jurisdiction of one State at sea to another, the ECtHR in Hirsi held that it was 
applicable at least in the case of irregular migrants brought on board Italian 
naval vessels on the high seas,97 stating that 
the removal of aliens carried out in the context of interceptions on the high 
seas by the authorities of a State in the exercise of their sovereign 
authority, the effect of which is to prevent migrants from reaching the 
borders of the State or even to push them back to another State, 
constitutes an exercise of jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 1 of the 
Convention which engages the responsibility of the State in question 
under Article 4 of Protocol No. 4.98 
On the facts of the case in Hirsi, the Grand Chamber went on to find there to 
have been a breach of Article 4 of Protocol 4 because: 
the transfer of the applicants to Libya was carried out without any form of 
examination of each applicant’s individual situation. It has not been 
disputed that the applicants were not subjected to any identification 
procedure by the Italian authorities, which restricted themselves to 
embarking all the intercepted migrants onto military ships and 
disembarking them on Libyan soil. Moreover, the Court notes that the 
personnel aboard the military ships were not trained to conduct individual 
interviews and were not assisted by interpreters or legal advisers. 
That is sufficient for the Court to rule out the existence of sufficient 
guarantees ensuring that the individual circumstances of each of those 
concerned were actually the subject of a detailed examination.99 
Not only, therefore, does the prohibition on collective expulsion require an 
individual, detailed, examination of each individual’s case, but the examination 
must be conducted by suitably qualified individuals working alongside, where 
appropriate, interpreters. Furthermore, individuals should have access to legal 
advice. 
                                            
95 ACHPR (n 3) art 12(5). 
96 See, for example, Nadege Dorzema et al v Dominican Republic (Merits, 
Reparations and Costs) Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No 251 
(24 October 2012) [171], [175]; UNHCR Discussion Paper (n 85) 15–16. 
97 Hirsi Jamaa (n 60) [161]–[182]. See also Den Heijer (n 63) 280–85; Moreno-
Lax (n 63) 586–89. 
98 Hirsi Jamaa (n 60) [180]. 
99 Ibid [185]. 
 284 
It is not, however, clear that the prohibition of collective expulsion will apply to 
all circumstances in which the prohibition on refoulement applies. In particular, 
the reasoning of the Grand Chamber in Hirsi, characterising a situation of 
maritime refoulement as a form of expulsion, is arguably confined to the specific 
context of irregular migration. Therefore, although the reasoning could be 
plausibly extended to, for example, the transfer of individuals suspected of 
involvement in piracy, or other crimes, for trial in another State, this remains 
somewhat speculative. 
This uncertainty is, however, is arguably immaterial to the requirement for an 
individual determination of the risk that the prohibition on refoulement will be 
violated, in light of the right of individuals under the ICCPR, ECHR, ACHR and 
ACHPR to an effective remedy with respect to violations of substantive rights.100 
                                            
100 Under art 3 ICCPR, ‘Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes: 
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized 
are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation 
has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity; …’. ICCPR (n 1) 
art 3. Under art 25 ACHR: 
 
1. Everyone has the right to simple and prompt recourse, or any other 
effective recourse, to a competent court or tribunal for protection 
against acts that violate his fundamental rights recognized by the 
constitution or laws of the state concerned or by this Convention, 
even though such violation may have been committed by persons 
acting in the course of their official duties. 
2. The States Parties undertake: 
a. to ensure that any person claiming such remedy shall have his 
rights determined by the competent authority provided for by 
the legal system of the state; 
b. to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy; and 
c. to ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such 
remedies when granted. 
ACHR (n 4) art 25. Finally, under art 7 ACHPR: 
 
Every individual shall have the right to have his cause heard. This 
comprises: 
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Under Article 13 ECHR, for example, ‘Everyone whose rights and freedoms as 
set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before 
a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by 
persons acting in an official capacity.’101 The ECtHR has interpreted this as 
meaning, in the context of individual alleging potential violations of Article 3, that 
there must be ‘firstly “independent and rigorous scrutiny” of any complaint made 
by a person in such a situation, where “there exist substantial grounds for 
fearing a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3” and secondly, “the 
possibility of suspending the implementation of the measure impugned”.’102 On 
the facts of Hirsi, the ECtHR found Article 13 to have been violated on account 
of the lack of information provided to the applicants, alongside their inability to 
lodge a complaint with a competent authority in order ‘to obtain a thorough and 
rigorous assessment of their requests before the removal measure was 
enforced.’103 
The difficulty of giving adequate protection from refoulement while at sea has 
been recognised elsewhere. The ACHR has stated that, ‘Regarding the 
interception of asylum seekers in international waters so as not to allow their 
requests to be evaluated in potential host States, the Court understands that 
this practice is contrary to the principle of non-refoulement, because it does not 
permit the evaluation of each person’s specific risk factors.’104 Similarly, the 
views of UNHCR are informative, notwithstanding that they are expressed 
specifically with respect to refugee status determination, rather than non-
refoulement more generally under IHRL. UNHCR takes the position that, 
‘Processing onboard maritime vessels is generally not appropriate’,105 but does 
accept that, in exceptional circumstances, ‘profiling or pre-screening’ may offer 
                                                                                                                                
The right to an appeal to competent national organs against acts of 
violating his fundamental rights as recognized and guaranteed by 
conventions, laws, regulations and customs in force; … 
ACHPR (n 3) art 7. The equivalent ECHR provision is set out below. 
101 ECHR (n 2) art 13. 
102 Hirsi Jamaa (n 60) [198] (citations omitted). 
103 ibid [205]. See also Moreno-Lax (n 63) 589–92. 
104 Advisory Opinion on the Rights and Guarantees of Children (n 40) para 220. 
105 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, ‘Maritime 
Interception Operations and the Processing of International Protection Claims: 
Legal Standards and Policy Considerations with Respect to Extraterritorial 
Processing’ (Protection Policy Paper) (November 2010) para 55. 
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a means to identify individuals in need of protection from refoulement. 106 
Nevertheless, ‘if during profiling a person expresses in any manner a need for 
international protection, or there is any doubt whether an individual may be in 
need of international protection, referral to [refugee status determination] is the 
required response.’107 In the view of UNHCR, full refugee status determination 
will generally not be possible at sea in light of the difficulty in providing 
adequate reception facilities.108 If the required standards could be met, then it 
be only in cases that ‘could be decided quickly, i.e. manifestly founded or 
unfounded cases’ that would be appropriate.109 
As noted above, the views of UNHCR apply, strictly speaking, to the 
determination of refugee status, rather than the procedural obligations flowing 
from the principle of non-refoulement contained in IHRL. However, their 
concerns are arguably equally relevant to refoulement decisions under IHRL as 
they are to refugee status determinations, particularly in light of the 
requirements identified by the ECtHR in Hirsi and discussed above. While a 
decision as to refoulement made at sea is not unlawful per se, satisfying the 
requirement for a detailed examination, with independent and rigorous scrutiny 
will undoubtedly be challenging. 
7.3.3.3. Assurances 
A common mechanism by which individuals may be expelled, returned or 
extradited in spite of a prima facie concern about rights violations is by 
obtaining assurances from the government of the State to which refoulement is 
proposed. Ultimately, the point of this, clearly, is to reduce the risk of rights 
violations below the level required to trigger protection from refoulement, either 
with respect to a specific case or on an enduring basis. Such assurances are 
well established in some contexts, perhaps most notably with respect to capital 
punishment, notwithstanding challenges to their credibility and therefore validity 
in this context.110 Indeed, such assurances may be necessary to avoid a 
violation of the prohibition against refoulement, particularly where the risk of 
                                            
106 ibid para 55. 
107 ibid para 55. 
108 ibid para 56. 
109 ibid para 57. 
110 Schabas (n 43) 145. 
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mistreatment arises in connection not with respect to the State to which the 
individual is to be initially returned, but rather with respect to one to which they 
may be subsequently transferred. This is illustrated, again, by the decision in 
Hirsi, in which the ECtHR concluded ‘that the Italian Government [was required 
to] take all possible steps to obtains assurances from the Libyan authorities that 
the applicants will not be subjected to treatment incompatible with Article 3 of 
the Convention or arbitrarily repatriated.’111 
While assurances may be appropriate in some contexts, they cannot displace 
the requirement to make a proper determination as to protection from 
refoulement. If a real risk of rights violations remains, in spite of any 
assurances, then the non-refoulement obligation will still apply. Furthermore, 
assurances have been controversial in the particular context of ‘rendition’ to 
states in which torture is suspected of being carried out. Not only is it argued 
that such assurances are unreliable, but also that they undermine the absolute 
prohibition on torture.112 Nevertheless, assurances remain an important feature 
of practice with respect to refoulement. 
7.4. Conclusion 
This chapter has not attempted to provide a comprehensive account of the 
principle of non-refoulement in IHRL. Rather it has sought to make a number of 
points that illustrate the relevance, and importance, of the prohibition of 
refoulement under IHRL to the conduct of MSOs, as well as some important 
issues relating to its application in practice. Before doing so, and in order to 
place the discussion in context, relevant rules from other bodies of law were 
briefly outlined. First, the law of sea provides an associated obligation to render 
those rescued to a ‘place of safety’. However, although the qualification of a 
particular place as one of safety may depend, to some extent, on the risk of 
human rights violations, the law of the sea rule is, in some respects, very 
narrow in its scope, applying only in connection with rescue, rather than all 
those who may fall under the control of a State at sea, such as those detained 
on suspicion of offences such as piracy. Second, the chapter briefly covered 
non-refoulement as it exists in refugee law. However, although obviously an 
                                            
111 Hirsi Jamaa (n 60) [211] (emphasis added). 
112 Nowak and McArthur (n 22) 212–17. 
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important principle in its own right, it applies only with respect to those who 
qualify for refugee status, and is subject to considerable controversy, if not 
doubt, with respect to its extraterritorial applicability. It arguably therefore has 
limited relevance to MSOs. 
Turning to IHRL, the first point is that it may prohibit refoulement in a much 
wider range of circumstances than refugee law, or in which the ‘place of safety’ 
requirement applies under the law of the sea. In terms of applicability, it applies 
with respect to all individuals within the jurisdiction of a State, a criterion likely to 
be met whenever a State exercises sufficient control over an individual such as 
to be able to effect transfer to another State. It also applies with respect to the 
risk of violation of a number of rights, not limited to freedom from torture (except 
under the CAT), but also to other rights, including the freedom from cruel and 
inhuman treatment or punishment, the right to life, and even, at least with 
respect to the risk of particularly flagrant abuses under the ECHR, the right to 
liberty and the right to a fair trial. 
With respect to the implementation of the prohibition of non-refoulement, the 
requirement for an individual determination of risk potentially imposes a 
considerable obstacle to the transfer of individuals who fall within the jurisdiction 
of a State at sea. Although the various express procedural obligations set out 
above may not apply either at all, or in all circumstances in which non-
refoulement arises in connection with MSOs, an individual assessment is 
nevertheless invariably required. While there is no fundamental reason why this 
cannot be done at sea, to do so may in practice be difficult, if not impossible, in 
any but the clearest of circumstances. Furthermore, although assurances from 
States to which refoulement is proposed can play an important role in meeting 
the relevant obligations, an assurance that an individual’s rights will not be 
violated cannot, in itself, absolve the transferring State from the requirement to 
conduct an individual assessment. 
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8. The Policing of Protest at Sea 
8.1. Introduction 
Previous chapters have described how specific activities undertaken in the 
course of maritime security operations (MSOs) are constrained and regulated 
by human rights law. However, the decision to mount an operation may itself be 
subject to human rights considerations. Specifically, the obligation to respect 
certain rights enjoyed by individuals may preclude action that would otherwise 
be permitted under the law of the sea. This chapter will explore an important 
example of this, the policing of protest at sea, in which a State’s legitimate aims 
in, for example, preventing disorder, must be weighed and balanced against the 
freedoms of expression and assembly enjoyed by the protestors. 
The chapter begins with a short analysis of the powers contained in the law of 
the sea that are relevant to the regulation of protest. As will be explained, 
coastal States enjoy considerable latitude to regulate protest in their internal 
waters and territorial sea, with diminishing authority further out in their 
contiguous zone and exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The chapter then moves 
on to a description of the rights under international human rights law (IHRL) 
most relevant to protest: the freedoms of expression and assembly. As will be 
discussed, these freedoms are generally considered hand-in-hand with respect 
to protest. Under both there are similar criteria for lawful interference, 
depending most importantly on the necessity and proportionality of the 
measures adopted in achieving a legitimate aim on the part of the State. 
The chapter next sets out the limited, but important, jurisprudence relating to the 
application of IHRL to protest at sea. Two cases considered by the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) disclose useful guidance as to how human 
rights relating to protest are applied in a maritime context. A further case dealt 
with under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)1 compulsory 
dispute resolution procedure then provides valuable insight into the application 
of human rights norms outside of a human rights court or treaty body. 
                                            
1 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (adopted 10 December 
1982, entered into force 16 November 1994) 1833 UNTS 397 (UNCLOS). 
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Finally, the chapter concludes with an analysis of the law in light of the 
jurisprudence that has been discussed. This reveals further important examples 
of the relationship between the law of the sea and human rights law, as well as 
the role of human rights law in regulating MSOs. As is demonstrated, the law of 
the sea is likely to provide the legal basis for interfering with rights related to 
protest sea, while, at the same time, IHRL provides restraint to the measures 
that might otherwise be considered permissible pursuant to that legal basis. 
8.2. Notable practice relating to the policing of protest 
Courts have, on a small number of occasions, dealt directly with alleged 
violations of human rights related to protest at sea. The most prominent of the 
cases considered by the ECtHR is that of Women on Waves and others v 
Portugal,2 which concerned the prevention by Portugal of the entry into its 
territorial sea of a Dutch-flagged vessel, the Borndiep, which was intended to be 
used to promote reproductive rights in Portugal. The Borndiep was chartered by 
the charity ‘Women on Waves’ with the intention of sailing to a Portuguese port, 
where various seminars and workshops would be held on board to discuss 
issues including family planning and the decriminalization of abortion. 3 
However, in anticipation of the Borndiep’s arrival, the Portuguese government 
issued a decree asserting the government’s belief that the Borndiep would be 
used to distribute drugs and carry out procedures related to abortion, as well as 
to encourage abortion, contrary to Portuguese domestic law. The decree 
purported to rely on powers contained in domestic law to prohibit the entry of 
the Borndiep into the Portuguese territorial sea, citing also the section of 
UNCLOS setting out the innocent passage regime, together with Portuguese 
health laws.4 A Portuguese warship was despatched to enforce the decree by 
preventing the entry of the Borndiep into the Portuguese territorial sea.5 
Attempts within the Portuguese domestic legal system to compel the authorities 
to allow entry of the Borndiep into the territorial sea, relying in part on the 
                                            
2  Women on Waves and Others v Portugal App No 31276/05 (ECtHR, 3 
February 2009). For discussion, see Tullio Treves, ‘Human Rights and the Law 
of the Sea’ (2010) 28 Berkeley J of Intl L 1, 10–11. 
3 Women on Waves (n 2) [7]. 
4 ibid [8]. 
5 ibid [9]. 
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freedoms of expression and of assembly, were unsuccessful.6 An application 
was subsequently made to the ECtHR, alleging violations of Articles 10 and 11 
of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).7 The applicants argued 
that they intended only to impart information concerning reproductive rights. 
They had no intention of violating Portuguese domestic law and, if the aim of 
the government was to avert any such breach, preventing the entry of the 
Borndiep into the territorial sea was a disproportionate means of doing so.8 The 
government argued that preventing the entry of the Borndiep did not, in itself, 
infringe the applicants’ rights under Article 10 and 11, as they could still arrange 
meetings and disseminate information in Portugal without sailing a ship into 
Portuguese waters.9 If the relevant rights were found to have been infringed, it 
argued that a legal basis for this could be found in the innocent passage regime 
under UNCLOS, when considered in light of the anticipated violation of 
Portuguese domestic law. According to the government, preventing the entry of 
the Borndiep was a proportionate means of achieving the legitimate aim of 
protecting public order and health.10 However, as discussed below, the ECtHR 
ultimately rejected the government’s arguments and found there to have been a 
violation of Article 10.11 
The ECtHR had also earlier considered freedom of expression in a maritime 
context in Drieman and others v Norway,12 albeit only reaching the stage of 
determining admissibility. This meant that the case was decided on the basis of 
the applicants’ submissions alone and the Court’s decision must, therefore, be 
treated with caution. Nevertheless, it provides a valuable counterpoint to the 
Women on Waves judgment. 
Drieman and others concerned a complaint that Norway had violated Articles 10 
and 11 ECHR in its policing of Greenpeace ships disrupting whaling activities in 
the Norwegian EEZ. It involved the actions taken by the Norwegian authorities 
                                            
6 ibid [10]–[14]. 
7 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(European Convention on Human Rights, as amended) (ECHR) arts 10–11. 
8 Women on Waves (n 2) [23]–[24]. 
9 ibid [25]. 
10 ibid [26]. 
11 ibid) [44]. 
12 Drieman and Others v Norway (Admissibility) App no 33678/96 (ECtHR, 4 
May 2000). The decision is not paginated or paragraph-numbered. 
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in response to two specific incidents in which one of the Greenpeace ships, the 
MS Solo, attempted to prevent the harpooning of whales by a Norwegian 
vessel, the Senet. In the first incident, the Solo deployed dinghies, which 
manoeuvred across the bows of the Senet, forcing it to change course, as well 
as scaring away the whale being pursued by the Senet with the sound of their 
engines. The Norwegian coastguard intervened, forcing one dinghy away and 
seizing another, but failing to prevent a third from successfully disrupting the 
Senet’s activities. Three days later, the Solo again interfered with the Senet, on 
this occasion itself manoeuvring to force the Senet to change course, as well as 
using its water cannon to impair the Senet’s visibility of the whale. This, again, 
had the effect of preventing the Senet catching the whale it had been 
pursuing.13 
Four individuals from the Solo were arrested: three members of the crew, 
including two who had operated dinghies during the first incident, along with the 
Greenpeace campaign director. They were prosecuted under the Norwegian 
Sea-Water Fisheries Act, domestic legislation prohibiting manoeuvring in fishing 
zones so as to endanger fishing gear or reduce the opportunity of fishing 
vessels to catch fish. Each was convicted and fined; in addition, the dinghy 
seized during the first incident was confiscated. Subsequent appeals to higher 
Norwegian courts, including arguments that the convictions were incompatible 
with Articles 10 and 11 ECHR, failed.14 The individuals complained to the 
ECtHR that their rights under Article 10 and 11 ECHR had been violated, 
claiming that their activities were protected by those articles and that Norway’s 
interference with them was unlawful. Ultimately, however, as discussed below, 
the ECtHR determined that the government’s actions were within its margin of 
appreciation; it found that ‘the interference complained of was supported by 
relevant and sufficient reasons, was proportionate…and could reasonably be 
viewed as necessary in a democratic society.’15 
The final notable case touching on the application of human rights law to the 
regulation of protest at sea is that of the Arctic Sunrise arbitration between the 
                                            
13 ibid. 
14 ibid. 
15 ibid. 
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Netherlands and the Russian Federation. 16  This concerned the arrest in 
September 2013 by the Russian authorities of the Arctic Sunrise, a Dutch-
flagged Greenpeace vessel, and its crew of thirty, in response to a protest 
mounted by the Arctic Sunrise in the vicinity of a Russian oil platform located in 
the Barents Sea, within Russia’s EEZ.17 Surrounding the installation was a 500 
metre zone in which the Russian authorities purported to prohibit navigation, 
together with a 3nm zone in which a danger to navigation was declared.18 The 
protest, which was intended to highlight the environmental risks associated with 
oil-drilling in the Arctic, was planned to involve protestors scaling the oil platform 
and establishing a camp within a ‘survival capsule’ attached to the structure. A 
Russian Coast Guard vessel, the Ladoga, intervened, deploying boats in an 
attempt to disrupt those launched by the Arctic Sunrise carrying protestors and 
their equipment. This was claimed to have involved ramming the Greenpeace 
boats, as well as attempting to slash their inflatable hulls and aiming weapons 
at the occupants. Two protestors managed to begin climbing the structure, but 
were forced to retreat as a result of water cannon being directed at them from 
the platform. They were taken aboard one of the Russian boats and detained.19 
Over the next few hours the Ladoga pursued the Arctic Sunrise, demanding that 
it stop and allow itself to be boarded. The Ladoga threatened, then fired, flares 
and warning shots. Eventually a Russian helicopter was deployed, from which a 
special forces team descended onto the Arctic Sunrise and arrested the 
vessel.20 The crew of the Arctic Sunrise were charged with various offences and 
held in custody until their release on bail in November 2013, followed by a 
subsequent grant of amnesty in December 2013. The ship itself was held under 
arrest until June 2014.21 
The measures taken against the Arctic Sunrise and its crew were the subject of 
a claim by Netherlands to the ITLOS, alleging various violations on the part of 
Russia of various obligations under UNCLOS and customary international law. 
The claim eventually became the subject of arbitration, albeit without Russian 
                                            
16  The Arctic Sunrise Arbitration (The Kingdom of the Netherlands v The 
Russian Federation) (Merits) PCA Case No 2014-02 (14 August 2015). 
17 ibid [4]–[20]. 
18 ibid [199]–[220]. 
19 ibid [81]–[92]. 
20 ibid [93]–[102]. 
21 ibid [3]. 
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participation.22 Nevertheless, the matter proceeded to an award on the merits, 
dealing with a number of specific complaints on the part of the Netherlands. In 
support of this, a detailed amicus brief, submitted on behalf of Greenpeace, 
focused on the application of human rights law in the case. This included the 
argument that Russia’s activities amounted to infringements of the protestors’ 
freedoms of expression and assembly,23 that these were justiciable within the 
arbitral process,24 and that the infringement of those rights by the Russian 
authorities were disproportionate.25 
In the course of the proceedings the Netherlands clarified that it was not 
seeking a finding on the part of the arbitral tribunal that provisions of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 26  had, in 
themselves, been breached. Rather, it argued that the applicable provisions of 
UNCLOS, in particular the reasonableness of Russia’s actions, fell to be 
interpreted in light of relevant human rights law.27 The arbitral tribunal accepted 
this to the extent that it was permitted to have regard to rules of customary 
international law, and therefore customary human rights law, but not directly to 
the treaty provisions themselves.28 Nevertheless, the case remains a relevant 
point of reference for the present enquiry. 
8.3. Regulation of protest under the law of the sea 
UNCLOS does not directly address the subject of protest or its policing. 
Nevertheless, it contains numerous provisions of relevance. First of all, as 
recognised in Article 2, the coastal State has sovereignty over its territorial sea 
and internal waters and therefore has jurisdiction to enact and enforce laws 
                                            
22 ibid [4]–[20]. 
23 ‘Memorial of the Kingdom of the Netherlands’ (The Arctic Sunrise Arbitration, 
PCA Case No 2014-02, 31 August 2014) (Memorial of the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands) paras 210–24; ‘Amicus Curiae Submission by Stichting 
Greenpeace Council (Greenpeace International)’ (The Arctic Sunrise 
Arbitration, PCA Case No 2014-02, 15 September 2014) (Greenpeace amicus 
brief) paras 53–123. 
24  Memorial of the Kingdom of the Netherlands (n 23) paras 129–35; 
Greenpeace amicus brief (n 23) paras 18–27. 
25 Memorial of the Kingdom of the Netherlands (n 23) para 249. 
26 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 
1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR). 
27 Arctic Sunrise (n 16) [195]. 
28 ibid [197]–[198]. 
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concerning vessels in those zones, including laws regulating activities related to 
protest. 29  Importantly, this is subject to the right of innocent passage, 30 
according to which the coastal State is largely precluded from exercising its 
jurisdiction over vessels abiding by the regime.31 However, protest related 
activities are likely to violate one or more of the requirements of innocent 
passage, most notably the general requirement that passage be continuous and 
expeditious;32 the requirement that innocent passage not be ‘prejudicial to the 
peace, good order or security of the coastal State’;33 and the prohibition of 
‘activity not having a direct bearing on passage.’34 Within the innocent passage 
regime, the coastal State is also entitled to adopt laws and regulations that 
relate to specific matters that may be of relevance to protest, including ‘the 
safety of navigation and the regulation of maritime traffic’.35 Where a vessel is in 
violation of the innocent passage regime, so long as it does not enjoy immunity, 
the coastal State is entitled to take necessary steps to prevent its passage.36 
Furthermore, while the coastal State should not enforce its criminal jurisdiction 
on a ship passing through its territorial sea except in specific circumstances,37 
one of these is where ‘the crime is of a kind to disturb the peace of the country 
or the good order of the territorial sea’.38 Consequently, the law of the sea 
provides substantial scope for the coastal State to regulate protest in its 
territorial sea. 
The rights of the coastal State diminish beyond the territorial sea. Nevertheless, 
the law of the sea allows for the exercise of jurisdiction in several situations of 
relevance to protest. In the contiguous zone the coastal State is permitted to 
prevent and punish infringements of laws and regulations relating to ‘customs, 
fiscal, immigration or sanitary’ matters.39 In the EEZ, the coastal State has 
jurisdiction over activities that infringe its sovereign rights over living resources, 
                                            
29 UNCLOS (n 1) art 2. 
30 ibid arts 18, 19. 
31 ibid arts 21, 25, 27, 28. 
32 ibid art 18(2). 
33 ibid art 19(1). 
34 ibid art 19(2)(l). 
35 ibid art 21(1). 
36 ibid art 25(1). 
37 ibid art 27. This rule is ultimately hortatory in nature. See above s 2.3. 
38 UNCLOS (n 1) art 27(1)(b). 
39 ibid art 33(1). 
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including rights to board and inspect vessels suspected of being in violation of 
the laws or regulations it creates to protect those rights, and to arrest the vessel 
and its crew.40 In addition, the coastal State is entitled to establish safety zones 
around artificial islands and other structures in its EEZ, ‘in which it may take 
appropriate measures to ensure the safety both of navigation and of the artificial 
islands, installations and structures.’41 
The rights of States to regulate protest on the high seas, beyond areas 
throughout which it is permitted to protect its rights, is much more limited. While 
States generally have exclusive jurisdiction over their own flagged vessels,42 
with respect to other vessels they may exercise jurisdiction only in limited 
circumstances. Most importantly, a right of visit exists with respect to vessels 
reasonably suspected of: being engaged in piracy; being engaged in the slave 
trade; unauthorised broadcasting; or being stateless. 43  Of these, both 
unauthorized broadcasting and, potentially, piracy, may be particularly relevant 
to protest. The right to visit vessels engaged in unauthorised broadcasting is 
only available in certain circumstances, but includes the situation where the 
unauthorised transmissions can be received in the State concerned.44 Hence, 
where a protest is conducted by means of broadcasts made from a vessel 
located on the high seas, a State in which those broadcasts are received may 
exercise its jurisdiction over the vessel. 
With respect to piracy, an act of protest may meet the definition of piracy, 
thereby permitting a foreign State to exercise its jurisdiction over the vessel 
concerned. Piracy is defined by Art 101 UNCLOS as 
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, 
committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private 
ship or a private aircraft, and directed: 
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against 
persons or property on board such ship or aircraft;  
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside 
the jurisdiction of any State; 
                                            
40 ibid art 73. 
41 ibid art 60. 
42 ibid art 92. 
43 ibid art 110.  
44 ibid art 109. 
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(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an 
aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft; 
(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in 
subparagraph (a) or (b).45 
Where, therefore, an act of protest involves the use of unlawful violence by 
individuals on board one ship, against those on another,46 it may amount to 
piracy. However, the requirement that acts of piracy be ‘committed for private 
ends’ has proved controversial, specifically in the context of acts undertaken for 
a political purpose, rather than for material gain, as is likely to be the case for 
protest.47 However, although some authors have argued that acts taken for 
political reasons are excluded,48 Guilfoyle argues persuasively that the private 
ends requirement excludes only acts with ‘State sanction or authority’, possibly 
as well as the acts of ‘insurgencies attacking the government vessels of their 
state of nationality.’49 Consistent with this view, an opinion of the United States 
Court of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit concluded that violent acts by anti-whaling 
protestors were committed for private ends and therefore amounted to piracy.50 
                                            
45 Although the definition refers to the high seas, the definition of piracy extends 
to other maritime zones seaward of the territorial sea. ibid arts 58, 78. See also 
Robin Geiß and Anna Petrig, Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea (OUP 2011) 
63–64. 
46 There must be two ships involved. See, for example, Douglas Guilfoyle, 
Shipping Interdiction and the Law of the Sea (CUP 2009) 40; Geiß and Petrig (n 
45) 62–63. 
47 See, for example, Guilfoyle (n 46) 32–42; Geiß and Petrig (n 45) 61–62; 
Clyde H Crockett, ‘Toward a Revision of the International Law of Piracy (1976) 
26(1) DePaul Law Review 78, 84–87; Efthymios Papastavridis, Interception of 
Vessels on the High Seas: Contemporary Challenges to the Legal Order of the 
Oceans (Hart 2013) 163–64. 
48 See, for example, Crockett (n 47) 87; Kevin Jon Heller, ‘Judge Kozinski’s 
“Rich History” of Piracy’ (Opinio Juris, 27 February 2013) <http://opiniojuris. 
org/2013/02/27/judge-kozinskis-rich-history-of-piracy/> accessed 6 July 2018. 
See also Robin Churchill, ‘The Piracy Provisions of the UN Convention on the 
Law of the Sea—Fit for Purpose?’ in Panos Koutrakos and Achilles Skordas 
(eds), The Law and Practice of Piracy at Sea: European and International 
Perspectives (Bloomsbury 2014) 16–18. Churchill argues that acts of terrorism 
that might be hard to distinguish from other acts of piracy ought not to be 
excluded, but that environmental protest, clearly aimed at a specific target, 
ought to be. 
49 Guilfoyle (n 46) 42. 
50 Institute of Cetacean Research and Others v Sea Shepherd Conservation 
Society and Watson (US, 9th Circuit, Court of Appeal) 725 F3d 940 (2013) 5–6. 
In that case the acts of violence included: ‘Ramming ships, fouling propellers 
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Chief Judge Kozinski stated that: ‘We conclude that “private ends” include those 
pursued on personal, moral or philosophical grounds, such as Sea Shepherd’s 
professed environmental goals. That the perpetrators believe themselves to be 
serving the public good does not render their ends public.’51 Similarly, the 
Belgian Court of Cassation held that the subjective motives of Greenpeace 
protestors taking violent action against another vessel as part of a protest about 
polluting activities were irrelevant to the characterisation of the acts as piracy.52 
Therefore, although a detailed analysis of the question of ‘private ends’ is 
beyond the scope of this thesis, these authorities, together with persuasive 
commentary, suggest that acts of protest may well be capable of amounting to 
piracy, and thus subject to the associated right on the part of other States to 
enforce their jurisdiction.  
Taken as a whole, the law of the sea contains broad powers for States to 
exercise jurisdiction with respect to protest. As is generally the case under the 
law of the sea, these powers are greatest at the State’s own coast and 
attenuate towards the high seas. While the provisions in question do not deal 
explicitly with protest, they are broad enough in their drafting for States to argue 
a wide range of activities related to protest to be covered. 
8.4. Protest at sea under IHRL 
Before considering the relevant rights under IHRL, and their application to 
MSOs, it is important first to briefly acknowledge the pervasive issue of the 
spatial scope of applicability of the instruments in question. Protests may occur 
throughout the maritime domain, as illustrated by the three cases outlined 
above. Women on Waves concerned action taken by the Portuguese authorities 
to prevent protest within Portugal’s territorial sea and internal waters. Drieman 
concerned protests against Norwegian fishing vessels; on the facts of the case, 
the protest occurred within Norway’s EEZ, but was of a kind that could take 
place anywhere where fishing occurs, including on the high seas. Meanwhile, 
                                                                                                                                
and hurling fiery and acid-filled projectiles easily qualify as violent activities, 
even if they could somehow be directed only at inanimate objects.’ ibid 6. 
51 ibid 5. 
52 Castle John and Nederlandse Stichting Sirius v NV Mabeco and NV Parfin 
(Belgium, Court of Cassation) (1986) 77 ILR 537. 
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Arctic Sunrise concerned a protest at least partly within a declared safety zone, 
in waters forming part of Russia’s EEZ. 
Chapters Two and Three examined the territorial and extraterritorial 
applicability, respectively, of the treaties under consideration. The conclusions 
reached therein are as applicable in the context of protest as in any other. In 
summary, outside of a State’s territorial sea, and internal and archipelagic 
waters, throughout which the treaties apply as part of a State’s territory, 
applicability depends on the existence of a jurisdictional link between the State 
and the individual in question. With respect to protest, actions taken by a State 
to limit rights connected with protest, such as the arrest of individuals, or the 
use of force, are likely to amount to the exercise of authority and control such as 
to engage the rights in question. Within the maritime domain, as explained in 
Chapter Three, the argument for applicability on this basis is likely to be more 
persuasive than the alternative suggestion that a State’s obligations are 
engaged through its effective control of an area outside of its territory.53 
8.4.1. Relevant rights 
The rights most relevant to protest at sea are the freedoms of expression and of 
assembly.54 Indeed, as illustrated by the cases outlined above, where a State 
takes action against a protest, this can often be framed both as a violation of 
the freedom of the protestors to assemble, as well their freedom to express their 
views. With respect to the freedom of expression, Article 19(2) ICCPR states 
that, ‘Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall 
include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, 
regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or 
through any other media of his choice.’ Article 10(1) ECHR states that, 
                                            
53  See above s 3.3.4. Notably, however, the amicus brief submitted by 
Greenpeace in Arctic Sunrise argued for the applicability of the ICCPR on the 
basis of Russia’s effective control over the safety zone surrounding the oil 
platform. Greenpeace amicus brief (n 23) para 47. This was, however, only one 
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54 On the freedom of expression, generally, see Kevin Boyle and Sangeeta 
Shah, ‘Thought, Expression, Association, and Assembly’ in Daniel Moeckli, 
Sangeeta Shah and Sandesh Sivakumaran (eds), International Human Rights 
Law (2nd edn, OUP 2014) 225–31; Walter Kälin and Jörg Künzli, The Law of 
International Human Rights Protection (OUP 2009) 467–74. On the freedom of 
assembly, generally, see Boyle and Shah (n 54) 234–235; Kälin and Künzli (n 
54) 474–80. 
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‘Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include 
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas 
without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article 
shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television 
or cinema enterprises.’ Article 13(1) of the American Convention on Human 
Rights (ACHR) states that, ‘Everyone has the right to freedom of thought and 
expression. This right includes freedom to seek, receive, and impart information 
and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing, in print, in 
the form of art, or through any other medium of one's choice.’55 Finally, Article 9 
of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) states simply 
that: 
1. Every individual shall have the right to receive information. 
2. Every individual shall have the right to express and disseminate his 
opinions within the law.56 
Turning to freedom of assembly, under Article 21 ICCPR, ‘The right of peaceful 
assembly shall be recognized.’ Similarly, under Article 11(1) ECHR, ‘Everyone 
has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly’, and, under Article 15 ACHR, 
‘The right of peaceful assembly, without arms, is recognized.’ Finally, under 
Article 11 ACHPR, ‘Every individual shall have the right to assemble freely with 
others.’ As discussed below, however, the protection of both freedoms is 
subject to lawful limitation according to certain criteria defined in the treaties 
themselves, and as developed through subsequent jurisprudence. 
8.4.2. Activity engaging freedoms of expression and of assembly 
There is a considerable overlap between the freedoms of expression and of 
assembly, particularly where individuals gather to express ideas and opinions, 
as is often the case with respect to acts of protest. As a result, the policing of a 
particular incident will often be alleged to breach of both the freedom of 
assembly and the freedom of expression, and it may be difficult to separate the 
two. This is reflected in the practice of courts and treaty bodies. For example, in 
                                            
55 American Convention on Human Rights: ‘Pact of San José, Costa Rica’ 
(signed 22 November 1969, entered into force 18 July 1978) 1144 UNTS 144 
(ACHR) art 13(1). 
56 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (adopted 27 June 1981, 
entered into force 21 October 1986) (1982) 21 ILM 58 (ACHPR) art 9. 
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Women on Waves, the ECtHR decided to approach the matter from the 
perspective of Article 10 alone, while reserving to itself the right to consider 
Article 11 in its interpretation of the alleged violation of Article 10.57 In Drieman, 
the Court dealt with the alleged violations of Articles 10 and 11 together.58 
Moreover, the two rights have each been interpreted broadly. With respect to 
freedom of expression, it is clear from the texts of the relevant provisions that it 
entails the rights both to impart and to receive information, that is, for it to be 
heard by its intended audience. It also encompasses, in the view of the Human 
Rights Committee (HRC), ‘every form of idea and opinion capable of 
transmission to others’,59 and is capable of application to acts of protest taking 
many forms, limited not just to the written or spoken word, but also to more 
abstract modes of expression.60 Hence, the ECtHR has, for example, concluded 
that blowing horns to disrupt fox hunting, 61  physically impeding a grouse 
shoot, 62  and occupying trees to prevent their felling as part of road 
construction63 are all protected forms of expression. Practice under the ACHPR 
is less developed, although, as noted below, the freedom of assembly has been 
interpreted by the African Commission so as to recognise the right to participate 
in similar activities. Notably, however, practice in connection with Article 13 
ACHR ‘has not yet reached diverse forms of expression’, and has focused 
instead on ‘information and speech concerning typical public affairs’.64 Given, 
as noted below, the particularly onerous criteria for limitations to the freedom of 
expression under Article 13 ACHR it is perhaps likely that it will not be applied 
so broadly as its counterparts under the other instruments. 
Considering freedom of assembly, the term ‘assembly’ has been interpreted 
widely, including gatherings of more than one person that take place in either 
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public or private; those that are static or mobile; and those that are restricted in 
their participation or open to all.65 The term is qualified in the ICCPR, ECHR 
and ACHR by the requirement that the assembly be ‘peaceful’; and, although 
Article 10 ACHPR does not contain the same caveat, the African Commission 
has stated that ‘The right to freedom of assembly extends to peaceful 
assembly.’ However, although the requirement that assembly, and hence 
protest, be peaceful certainly excludes the protection of individuals who are 
violent, as well as, according to the ECtHR, those who have violent intentions, 
this limitation should not be read too strictly. The fact that a protest involves 
isolated acts of violence, because of the participation in it of extremist elements, 
does not necessarily extinguish the right of assembly of peaceful participants.66 
As the African Commission notes, ‘An assembly should be deemed peaceful if 
its organizers have expressed peaceful intentions, and if the conduct of the 
assembly participants is generally peaceful.’ 67  Furthermore, acts of civil 
disobedience, in themselves, do not extinguish the right, so long as they are not 
violent.68 Consistent with the practice of the ECtHR noted above with respect to 
freedom of expression, the African Commission has stated that ‘peaceful’ 
assembly includes ‘conduct that annoys or gives offence as well as conduct that 
temporarily hinders, impedes or obstructs the activities of third parties.’69 
It is clear that a wide range of activities are capable of engaging one or both of 
the freedoms of expression and assembly in the context of maritime protest. 
This is not limited to the mere dissemination of information; conduct, including 
that which may impact on the rights of others, may also be protected. Hence, in 
Women on Waves, the ECtHR had little difficulty in finding Article 10 to have 
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been engaged, noting that it protects both ideas and their mode of expression. 
It considered that the rights of the applicants extended not just to 
communicating their views on reproductive rights, but also to the means by 
which they wished to do so, including the symbolic act of sailing their ship into 
Portuguese waters. Denying the entry of the Borndiep into the Portuguese 
territorial sea prevented the applicants from using the mode of expression they 
considered most effective (noting that the Court’s reasoning implies that the 
actual effectiveness of the chosen mode is immaterial).70 
In Driemann, the ECtHR accepted that the Greenpeace campaign was intended 
as a protest against whaling, and that ‘restrictions on conduct’ could amount to 
an infringement of the freedom of expression, although declined to determine 
whether the particular activities in question were protected under Articles 10 or 
11, instead, proceeding on the assumption that they were.71 Nevertheless, it is 
submitted that the actions of the type used by protestors in Driemann and Arctic 
Sunrise, which have the effect of disrupting fishing or other, apparently lawful, 
activities, are analogous to those which have been found by the ECtHR to 
engage the freedom of expression in cases involving, for example, the 
disruption of hunts on land. Arguably they ought, therefore, to be similarly 
eligible for protection. 
In sum, there is no sensible reason why the broad scope of the freedoms of 
expression and assembly, as applied on land, should not apply equally in the 
maritime domain. Differences between the treaties under consideration may 
arise with respect to the freedom or freedoms considered to be engaged by a 
particular activity; however, it is nevertheless likely that one or both freedoms 
will be engaged by a wide range of activities involved in protest at sea. These 
are not limited just to those activities intended to impart information, but also 
include acts that interfere with navigation or other lawful uses of the oceans, 
including fishing and the exploitation of other resources. Of course, the fact that 
a particular activity is protected under one or both freedoms does not mean that 
it cannot be lawfully curtailed. Instead, it means that the focus will be on the 
lawfulness of measures taken to limit those freedoms, rather than whether the 
freedoms are engaged at all. 
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8.4.3. Lawful interference with maritime protest 
The freedoms of expression and assembly are not absolute and may be subject 
to lawful limitation, which must conform to certain criteria. As set out below, 
these are largely framed, or have subsequently been interpreted, in similar 
terms. The notable exception to this is Article 13 ACHR, which, so far as it is 
relevant, states: 
2. The exercise of the right [to freedom of thought and expression] shall 
not be subject to prior censorship but shall be subject to subsequent 
imposition of liability, which shall be expressly established by law to 
the extent necessary to ensure 
a. respect for the rights or reputations of others; or 
b. the protection of national security, public order, or public health 
or morals. 
3. The right of expression may not be restricted by indirect methods or 
means, such as the abuse of government or private controls over 
newsprint, radio broadcasting frequencies, or equipment used in the 
dissemination of information, or by any other means tending to 
impede the communication and circulation of ideas and opinions. 
Article 13(4) goes on to allow ‘prior censorship’ for certain public 
entertainments, while Article 13(5) states that ‘propaganda for war’, along with 
certain categories of hate speech, ‘shall be considered as offenses punishable 
by law.’ These narrow exceptions aside, and although Antkowiak and Gonza 
note that the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) has relaxed its 
approach, leading to an increased discretion and ‘lack of rigor’ in applying 
Article 13,72 limitations to the freedom of expression are available in a narrower 
set of circumstances than is the case under the other provisions set out below. 
In the context of protest, action taken to halt a protest, or prevent it from taking 
place, is likely to amount to either prior censorship or an indirect limitation. 
Therefore, unless the protest concerns one of the narrow categories covered in 
Article 13(5), such actions are likely to be prohibited. Were a case similar to 
Women on Waves to be dealt with under the ACHR, the actions of the 
authorities would arguably be in clear breach of Article 13, without the 
requirement for any assessment, as discussed below, as to their proportionality. 
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Notably, as explained above, the forms of expression that have been 
recognised to date under the ACHR are narrower than those recognised under, 
for example, the ECHR. In particular, they have not included acts of a nature to 
disrupt the activities of third parties. Although it is conceivable that practice 
under the ACHR will develop in this regard, the narrow scope of limitations 
under Article 13 provides a persuasive policy reason why this might not happen, 
given that there is no mechanism on the face of Article 13 by which the rights of 
a third party could be balanced, except through the imposition of subsequent 
liability. This, arguably, would be the case with respect to the type of maritime 
protest, such as that in Drieman, which chiefly comprises an attempt to halt an 
activity of which the protestors disapprove. For the same reason, if practice 
under the ACHR does develop, it is conceivable that a mechanism matching 
that found in the other instruments, as explained below, would be read into 
Article 13. 
Turning to limitations to the freedom of expression under the other instruments, 
Article 19(3) ICCPR states that: 
The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries 
with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to 
certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law 
and are necessary: 
(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others; 
(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), 
or of public health or morals. 
Similarly, Article 10(2) ECHR states that: 
The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and 
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions 
or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic 
society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public 
safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health 
or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for 
preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for 
maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. 
In contrast to the detail of the ECHR and ICCPR, Article 9(2) ACHPR simply 
caveats the right to freedom of expression by the requirement that it must be 
‘within the law’, but is also subject to the common duty under Article 27(2), 
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which states that: ‘The rights and freedoms of each individual shall be exercised 
with due regard to the rights of others, collective security, morality and common 
interest.’ Although this is formulated in different terms to the ECHR and ICCPR, 
the African Commission, as Olaniyan notes, attempted to harmonise the 
provisions,73 including the statement in its Declaration of Principles on Freedom 
of Expression in Africa that, ‘Any restrictions on freedom of expression shall be 
provided by law, serve a legitimate interest and be necessary in a democratic 
society.’74 
Turning to freedom of assembly, Article 21 ICCPR contains the following: 
No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those 
imposed in conformity with the law and which are necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, 
public order (ordre public), the protection of public health or morals or the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
Similarly, Article 11(2) ECHR states: 
No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than 
such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society 
in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of 
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This Article shall not 
prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights 
by members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of 
the State.  
With respect to the ACHR, Article 15 contains the following: 
No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those 
imposed in conformity with the law and necessary in a democratic society 
in the interest of national security, public safety or public order, or to 
protect public health or morals or the rights or freedom of others. 
Finally, under Article 11 ACHPR, ‘The exercise of [the right to freedom of 
assembly] shall be subject only to necessary restrictions provided for by law, in 
                                            
73 Kolawole Olaniyan, ‘Civil and Political Rights in the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights: Articles 8–14’ in Malcolm Evans and Rachel Murray (eds), 
The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (2nd edn, CUP 2008) 221–
25. 
74  African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, ‘Declaration of 
Principles on Freedom of Expression in Africa’ (adopted during the 32nd 
Ordinary Session in Banjul, Gambia, 17–23 October 2002) para II(2). 
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particular those enacted in the interest of national security, the safety, health, 
ethics and rights and freedoms of others.’  
Putting aside limitations to the freedom of expression under the ACHR, 
discussed above, it is clear from the text of the relevant provisions (and the 
subsequent interpretation of Article 9 ACHPR by the African Commission) that 
limitations to either the freedom of expression or the freedom of assembly under 
each instrument must meet three common criteria: legality, necessity and 
legitimate purpose. 
8.4.3.1. Legality 
Considering, first, the requirement of legality, any limitation must be provided 
(for) by law (Article 19 ICCPR, Article 11 ACHPR and Article 9 ACHPR as 
subsequently interpreted by the African Commission), prescribed by law 
(Articles 10 and 11 ECHR), or imposed in conformity with the law (Article 21 
ICCPR and Article 15 ACHR). While the law in question may be written or 
unwritten, it must be accessible and formulated with sufficient precision such 
that individuals can predict its application to their conduct and act accordingly.75 
Beyond these general criteria, Schabas identifies the requirement that, under 
the ECHR, the limitation must be found in domestic law,76 a conclusion broadly 
consistent with the ECtHR’s jurisprudence.77 This was the situation in Drieman, 
in which the actions of the Norwegian authorities were founded in an Act of the 
Norwegian parliament, as extended by a Royal Decree, as well as in the 
Norwegian Penal Code.78 At least so far as its decision on admissibility was 
concerned, the Court saw ‘no reason to question that the measures had a legal 
basis in national law…as interpreted on its own or in the light of international 
law.’79 
The requirement of legality was, however, subject to analysis in both Chapters 
Four and Five,80 the conclusions of which are also valid here. In summary, there 
is a reasonable argument that the legal basis for the limitation to a right may be 
                                            
75 HRC General Comment 34 (n 59) para 25; Schabas (n 59) 469–70. 
76 Schabas (n 59) 469. 
77 See, for example, Leyla Şahin v Turkey ECHR 2005-XI 173 [84]. 
78 Drieman (n 12). 
79 ibid. 
80 See above ss 4.4.2.2, 5.4.4. 
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derived from international law, potentially including even that which is not 
formally incorporated according to the particular State’s own constitutional 
arrangements, so long as it is sufficiently foreseeable and precise in its 
application. In the context of the policing of protest at sea, an obvious potential 
source of legal authority comes from the law of the sea, and UNCLOS in 
particular.  
Notably, in Women on Waves, it was agreed by the parties, and accepted by 
the Court, that the limitation on Article 10 ECHR had been prescribed by law,81 
specifically Articles 19(2) and 25 UNCLOS.82 Although in this case there was 
domestic law that did apply, namely a decree of the Portuguese government, 
coupled with the legislation containing maritime enforcement powers, it is 
significant that it was the provisions of UNCLOS on which the parties, and 
Court, appear to have relied. The provisions in question permit a coastal State 
to ‘take the necessary steps in its territorial sea to prevent passage which is not 
innocent’,83 which includes ‘embarkation or disembarkation of goods, funds or 
persons in violation of customs, fiscal, sanitary or immigration laws and 
regulations of the coastal State’ and ‘any other activity not directly related to the 
crossing’.84 
In light of the discussion in Chapters Four and Five, the key question is whether 
the law in question is sufficiently precise and foreseeable in its application. In 
this case, it is difficult to reconcile the broad terms in which the cited provisions 
of UNCLOS are framed, indeed referring to coastal State laws and regulations, 
with that standard. In light of the agreement by the parties on the point, it may 
be that the ECtHR in Women on Waves gave little attention to the legality of the 
measures taken, choosing instead to focus on their disputed necessity. If, 
however, the court had considered the question of legality more closely, it might 
have been less willing to recognise the sufficiency of the UNCLOS provisions 
and might instead have paid closer attention to the position under Portuguese 
law.  
                                            
81 Women on Waves (n 2) [32]. 
82 UNCLOS (n 1) arts 19(2), 25. 
83 ibid art 25(1). 
84 ibid arts 19(2)(g), 19(2)(l). These are the particular provisions referred to by 
the ECtHR in Women on Waves. Women on Waves (n 2) [16]. 
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8.4.3.2. Legitimate aim 
Taking the other requirements out of order, under each of the instruments 
(again excepting Article 13 ACHR), limitations to freedom of expression must be 
for a legitimate aim, which are usually enumerated exhaustively.85 With respect 
to freedom of expression, under Article 19(3) ICCPR, these are: respect of the 
rights or reputations of others; protection of national security; protection of 
public order; and protection of public health or morals. Under Article 10(2) 
ECHR, the aims recognised as legitimate are: national security; territorial 
integrity; public safety; the prevention of disorder or crime; the protection of 
health or morals; the protection of the reputation or rights of others; preventing 
the disclosure of information received in confidence; and maintaining the 
authority and impartiality of the judiciary. In contrast, Article 9 ACHPR, as 
interpreted in the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression in Africa, 
requires simply that ‘any restrictions…serve a legitimate interest’; however, 
noting the efforts of the African Commission to achieve harmony in 
interpretation,86 it is likely that limitations under Article 9 will be subject to the 
same requirements as for the corresponding provisions under the other 
instruments. 
Legitimate purposes for limiting the freedom of assembly are framed in similar, 
though not identical, terms. Article 21 ICCPR adds ‘public safety’ to the 
legitimate aims listed under Article 19(3) ICCPR, presumably contemplating 
dangers attached to large gatherings of people, and replaces the protection of 
the ‘reputation of others’ with the ‘freedoms of others’, again tailored to reflect 
the particular impact of the freedom in question. Article 11(2) ECHR replaces 
protection of the ‘reputation’ of others with protection of their ‘freedoms’; omits 
references to the disclosure of confidential material and protection of the 
judiciary; and adds a clause excluding measures that apply to the armed forces 
and other agents of the State. Article 15, which has no equivalent in connection 
with freedom of expression, lists national security; public safety; public order; 
protection of public health or morals; and protection of the rights or freedom of 
others, as legitimate grounds for restrictions. Finally, the legitimate purposes for 
                                            
85 HRC General Comment 34 (n 59) para 22. 
86 Olaniyan (n 73) 221. 
 310 
limitation to Article 11 ACHPR are national security; safety; health; ethics; and 
the rights and freedoms of others. 
These legitimate aims are exhaustive; however, despite some minor 
differences, the instruments share a number of grounds, such as national 
security, protection of public order or safety, and the protection of the rights of 
others, that are framed broadly enough that States are likely to be able to frame 
almost any conceivable measure taken to police protest in compatible terms. 
Indeed, as Schabas notes, the practice of the ECtHR is often to place little or no 
emphasis on identifying the legitimate aim of a particular limitation to the 
freedoms of expression or assembly, focusing instead on the necessity of the 
measures.87 
The difficulty of arguing that a limitation is not for a legitimate purpose is borne 
out by both Women on Waves and Drieman. In the former, the applicants 
argued that the claimed legitimate grounds—protection of public order or 
health—did not arise because they never intended to violate Portuguese health 
laws. However, the Court agreed with the government, albeit without further 
explanation, that its aims were legitimate because they were directed towards 
those ends.88 This is undoubtedly correct; the legitimacy of a limitation’s aims 
are a question solely related to the limitation itself, while the necessity of 
applying the limitation in any given situation is a separate question, to which the 
ECtHR typically focuses the bulk of its analysis. 
In Drieman, the applicants claimed that Norway’s actions were not in pursuit of 
a legitimate aim, because Norway’s resumption of commercial whaling was 
contrary to international law.89 However, the Court was satisfied that Norway 
had pursued a legitimate aim, namely the prevention of disorder and the 
protection of the rights of others. The question of the compatibility of the 
relevant domestic law with Norway’s other commitments in international law, 
and the legitimacy of the aim in that sense, was a matter for Norway’s own 
national Courts.90 
                                            
87 Schabas (n 59) 471, 512. 
88 Women on Waves (n 2) [34]–[35]. 
89 Drieman (n 12). 
90 ibid. 
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In sum, the requirement for a legitimate purpose is unlikely to present a 
significant hurdle in the regulation of protest at sea. In almost any conceivable 
situation of protest, the State concerned is likely to be able to argue that its 
purpose in interfering falls in one of the broadly framed categories, particularly 
the prevention of disorder or the protection of the rights of others. The latter 
purpose will be particularly relevant where the actions of protests interrupt 
lawful activity, including fishing and other similar activity, such as whaling, as 
was the case in Driemann. It is important to recognise that there may be a 
legitimate purpose even in the case of a grossly disproportionate infringement 
of the rights in question. When a protest is expected to result in any level of 
disruption whatsoever, the State will have a legitimate purpose in preventing 
disorder and protecting the rights of others. Indeed, even where a State may 
have some other motive, such as the suppression of particular political views, 
which does not amount to a legitimate purpose, it is likely to be able to identify a 
plausible, legitimate, alternative behind which to conceal its real motives. 
8.4.3.3. Necessity 
Turning, finally, to the requirement of necessity, Article 19(3) ICCPR requires 
that limitations to freedom of expression must be ‘necessary’. Limitations to the 
equivalent rights under the other instruments must be ‘necessary in a 
democratic society’. This means that the legitimate aim being pursued cannot 
be achieved by means that do not impair the right in question.91 Furthermore, 
the requirement of necessity has been interpreted as requiring conformity with 
the principle of proportionality.92 In the language of the HRC this means that 
limitations ‘must be appropriate to achieve their protective function; they must 
be the least intrusive instrument amongst those which might achieve their 
protective function; [and] they must be proportionate to the interest to be 
protected’.93 Furthermore, the ECtHR has interpreted the ECHR’s reference to 
necessity specifically ‘in a democratic society’ as permitting only those 
                                            
91 See, for example, HRC General Comment 34 (n 59) para 33; Schabas (n 59) 
469–70. 
92 See, for a reiteration of extensive ECtHR practice on this point, Pentikäinen v 
Finland App no 11882/10 (ECtHR, 20 October 2015) [87]. 
93 HRC General Comment 34 (n 59) para 34 (quoting UN Human Rights 
Committee, ‘General Comment No 27’ (2 November 1999) UN Doc 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9 para 14). See also Schabas (n 59) 474–75. 
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limitations that address a ‘pressing social need’.94 Of relevance to protest, this 
is likely to represent a high barrier to restrictions to political speech. 
Illustrating the application of these concepts, in Women on Waves, the Court 
noted the requirement for limitations both to address a ‘pressing social need’ 
and to be proportionate,95 though its analysis did not clearly separate the two 
criteria. It re-emphasised that the mode of expression, as well as the content, 
was protected by Article 10, particularly in the case of symbolic activities 
intended to challenge perceived injustice, such as the use of the ship in the 
present case.96 This was not affected by an earlier ECtHR decision, in which no 
violation was found where the prohibited means of expression would have 
required granting the applicants a right to enter private property, thereby 
interfering with the rights of the property owner.97 While, in that case, the 
availability of alternative means was relevant in reconciling the rights of the 
protestors with those of the property owners, in Women on Waves there were 
no competing rights against which to balance the applicants’ desired mode of 
expression. Of note, in the course of its reasoning, the Court emphasised that 
the territorial sea is ‘un espace public et ouvert de par sa nature même’,98 which 
could not, therefore, be equated with private property. 
Considering, more squarely, the question of proportionality, the Court found that 
there had been no intention on the part of the applicants to violate domestic 
law; if prohibited drugs were on board, there was no indication that they were 
actually to be administered. In any case, means less prejudicial to freedom of 
expression, such as seizure of the drugs, could have been used to address that 
particular concern. 99  There were other ways for the State to achieve its 
legitimate aims, without banning the entry of the Borndiep and deploying a 
warship to enforce the decree. The Court noted that such a radical measure 
was also likely to deter others from challenging the established order, in which 
the freedom of expression was at its most valuable. As a result the actions of 
                                            
94 See, for example, Pentikäinen v Finland (n 92) [87]. See also Schabas (n 59) 
474. 
95 Women on Waves (n 2) [36]. 
96 ibid [39]. 
97 Appleby and Others v the United Kingdom ECHR 2003-VI 185. 
98 ‘A public space, open by its very nature’. Women on Waves (n 2) [40]. 
99 ibid [41]. 
 313 
the Portuguese authorities were disproportionate and there had been a violation 
of Article 10.100 
The decision in Drieman provides an informative counterpoint. Considering the 
question of necessity in a democratic society, the Court noted that the 
applicants had been permitted to mount their protest, and had done so for a 
month without restraint. The Norwegian government had intervened only with 
respect to the two specific incidents, in which the actions of the Solo had 
interfered directly with lawful whaling, to the extent that abandoning the hunt 
was left as the ‘only real option for the whalers.’101 Such interference ‘could not 
enjoy the same privileged protection under the Convention as political speech 
or debate on questions of public interests or the peaceful demonstration of 
opinions’, and thus must be subject to a wide margin of appreciation on the part 
of States in their restriction of such conduct.102 The applicants’ behaviour was 
not merely an incident of navigation; indeed, ‘the Court attache[d] weight to the 
fact that the purpose of the measures was…to ensure the efficient 
implementation of the legal protection of lawful exploitation of the living 
resources in the respondent State’s exclusive economic zone.’103 The Court 
considered that Norway’s actions fell within its margin of appreciation; they were 
proportionate and could reasonably be considered as necessary in a 
democratic society. Consequently, the application was declared inadmissible on 
account of its being manifestly ill-founded. 104 
The cases, taken together, suggest that limitations to the freedoms of 
expression and assembly will be subject to a high barrier, particularly where a 
protest does not directly impact on the rights of others. However, where protest 
does interfere with the rights of others, such as where it prevents the lawful 
exploitation of marine resources, States will enjoy a much wider margin of 
appreciation in deciding whether and how to take action against protestors. 
However, States will have to gauge carefully the point at which to intervene, 
and potentially exercise restraint, as the Norwegian authorities did in Drieman 
                                            
100 ibid [42]–[44]. 
101 Drieman (n 12). 
102 ibid. 
103 ibid. 
104 ibid. 
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by allowing the protest to continue up until the point that the protestors’ actions 
would have forced the whalers to halt their lawful activity. 
8.5. Conclusion 
This chapter has departed from those that preceded it by focusing on rights that 
primarily affect the lawfulness of a MSO as a whole, rather than the manner in 
which it is conducted or specific actions undertaken in the course of its 
execution. Important issues of applicability aside, and notwithstanding some 
differences between the instruments under consideration, a wide range of 
activities related to protest at sea are likely to engage the rights to freedom of 
expression and assembly. State action that curtailed these rights is permitted, 
but only where it meets the requirements of legality, necessity and legitimate 
aim. 
The two cases of Women on Waves and Driemann illustrate how these 
principles are likely to be applied in practice. In light of how broadly the two 
freedoms are construed, a wide range of conduct is likely to engage one or both 
rights, and the more pertinent issue will relate to the lawfulness of interference 
with those rights. In turn, the focus in determining that question is likely to be on 
the necessity, including proportionality, of the measures taken. As Women on 
Waves demonstrates, where a protest is peaceful and does not directly impact 
on the rights of others, including safety of navigation, the bar for demonstrating 
that interference is necessary or proportionate is likely to be set very high. 
Although Driemann demonstrates that interference with protest at sea certainly 
may be permitted in some circumstances, on the facts of that case, it was only 
where the actions of the protestors interfered directly with the lawful use of the 
oceans to the extent that such use was no longer possible. Indeed, the fact that 
less intrusive protest had already been tolerated for some time was relied upon, 
in that case, as evidence of the necessity of interfering. 
In any case, however, these cases, and the wider analysis, demonstrate how 
IHRL can act as a significant restraint on what States are otherwise permitted to 
do under the law of the sea. As reflected in the provisions of UNCLOS set out 
above, the law of the sea contains provisions ostensibly authorising States to 
take action against those protesting at sea in a variety of circumstances. 
However, those authorisations do not, in themselves, justify limitations to the 
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freedoms of expression and assembly, even if they might possibly be relied 
upon to meet the legality requirement under IHRL. 
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9. Conclusion 
This thesis argues that international human rights law (IHRL), as represented by 
the selection of universal and regional treaties that have been considered, 
provides an important normative framework within which maritime security 
operations (MSOs) are to be conducted. To do so, it has presented research 
intended to address a number of specific questions, which were set out in 
Chapter One. This final chapter draws together the results of that research in 
order to provide answers to those questions, thereby explaining and justifying 
the proposition set out above. 
9.1 What are the activities undertaken in the course of MSOs that are most 
likely to engage IHRL obligations? 
A broad range of activities that comprise MSOs have been presented in the 
course of the thesis that may engage IHRL obligations. The survey has not 
been exhaustive, but rather was intended to examine those on which the impact 
of IHRL may be most significant. These include some activities that have 
already been the result of litigation under IHRL treaties, specifically in the 
context of MSOs. In particular, deprivation of liberty, discussed in Chapter Five, 
and non-refoulement, discussed in Chapter Seven, have both been the subject 
of cases under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Similarly, 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has also heard cases where the 
freedoms of expression and assembly have been engaged in the context of 
protest at sea, discussed in Chapter Eight. 
Notably, however, the thesis has also examined activities to which the 
application of IHRL in the context of MSOs is less well-established, but arguably 
justified. Perhaps most importantly, the use of force, discussed in Chapter Four, 
is a key feature of many MSOs, particularly those that involve interdiction, 
where force is an important means of coercion. In addition, in Chapter Six, the 
thesis examined the response to situations where vessels are in distress. Both 
of these areas of activity are analogous to their land-based equivalents, to 
which the application of IHRL is well-established. As a result, they are obvious 
candidates for its application in the context of MSOs. 
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9.2. How are those activities regulated by other bodies of international 
law, especially the law of the sea? 
Other bodies of law, notably the law of the sea, do, undoubtedly, play a role in 
regulating the activities that have been examined. With respect to the use of 
force, although the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) does not provide regulation, obligations on the part of States using 
force in the course of MSOs have been read into the law of the sea by a 
number of tribunals. The same, or similar, regulation has been written into a 
number of agreements dealing with particular situations in which the interdiction 
of vessels is authorised. However, these obligations are usually limited to the 
use of force itself, authorising only that which is reasonable and necessary, and 
requiring a process of escalation in the means employed. 
Considering the provision of assistance to those in distress at sea, the law of 
the sea contains a number of obligations on the part of States, both to require 
masters of ships flying their flags to assist vessels in distress, as well as to 
make provision for search and rescue facilities. Non-refoulement, on the other 
hand, does not feature in the law of the sea, but does represent the cornerstone 
of refugee law, albeit restricted, under that body of law, exclusively to refugees. 
The other activities considered, detention and the policing of protest, are largely 
unregulated by any other body of international law, though both may be the 
subject of regulation under domestic law. Although the law of the sea may 
provide authorisation, in some circumstances, for such activities, it provides little 
or no detail as to how those activities are to be carried out. 
9.3. In what circumstances can IHRL apply to those activities, if at all? 
The applicability of IHRL to MSOs, both within and beyond a State’s territory, is 
of fundamental importance to the central argument of this thesis. It is only if 
IHRL applies consistently to a broad range of activities comprising MSOs, 
wherever they are conducted, that it can sensibly be considered as an 
important normative framework for their execution. Moreover, the extraterritorial 
applicability of IHRL, in particular, is both controversial and an area in which the 
treaties under consideration potentially differ. 
 318 
Chapter Two considered the territorial applicability of the treaties under 
consideration, which, at least in a land-based context, is not normally in dispute. 
However, in spite of a common assumption that this translates inevitably to the 
maritime domain, the unique features of a State’s maritime territory arguably 
necessitate closer scrutiny of the issue. When that analysis is done, it can be 
persuasively argued that the IHRL instruments under question do, in fact, apply 
with a State’s territorial sea, as well as its internal and archipelagic waters (if 
any), although potentially modified by conflicting rules of the law of the sea. 
The more vexed question of the extraterritorial applicability of the instruments 
under consideration was the subject of Chapter Three. Notwithstanding 
differences in the law and practice between the instrument between them, each 
treaty is capable of extraterritorial application in some circumstances. For the 
main treaties—the ECHR, as well as the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR), American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) and 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR)—this depends on the 
existence of a jurisdiction link with the individual concerned. Notably in the case 
of MSOs, that jurisdictional link can be established in a number of 
circumstances, including, at least for some instruments, flag-State jurisdiction 
over ships, as well as some limited situations in which a State exercises 
effective control over an area of the sea outside its territory. More importantly, 
however, it can be established where a State, through its agents, exercises 
authority or control over individuals. 
Drawing on practice relating directly to MSOs, as well as on principles derived 
from analogous situations on land, it was argued that this latter form of 
jurisdiction will arise consistently in connection with the execution of MSOs. 
Although this proposition is, in some circumstances, controversial, a convincing 
argument can be made for the applicability of the treaties under consideration 
on this basis to the use of force against interdicted vessels. Less 
controversially, the jurisdictional link can be established through control of an 
interdicted vessel, such as by directing its course or speed, or directly over 
those on board through detention. Although there are limits to extraterritorial 
applicability on the basis of authority and control over individuals, particularly in 
connection with the obligation to rescue vessels in distress discussed in 
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Chapter Six, it arguably provides the necessary support for the underlying 
premise on which this thesis is based. 
9.4. What are the relevant IHRL rules and norms, and how do they apply to 
the specific activities that comprise MSOs? 
A broad range of rights are engaged by the activities that have been examined 
in the course of the thesis. These include not only those that relate directly to 
the effects of actions undertaken in the course MSOs, including the right to life, 
and the right to liberty and security of the person, but also those that may be 
engaged by the MSO as a whole, such as the freedoms of expression and 
assembly. The thesis has not attempted to consider, in detail, all of the potential 
rights engaged in the course of MSOs, but has instead examined the 
application of those for which their application in a maritime context raises 
specific issues. 
Without rehearsing the detail of the application of every right that has been 
considered, what is particularly notable is the range of obligations that can flow 
from a particular right. Taking the right to life, for example, it not only acts to 
limit the use of force to only that which is lawful, necessary and proportionate, 
but extends to obligations relating to the training of those using force, the 
development and procurement of equipment, the planning and control of 
operations, and ensuring accountability for violations. It can also apply, in a 
different context, to require the establishment of search and rescue services. 
Similarly, while the right to liberty prohibits unlawful or arbitrary detention, it also 
carries specific procedural obligations even in the case of lawful and non-
arbitrary deprivation of liberty. Although these obligations have been applied in 
a way that recognises the specific challenges State face in the course of MSOs, 
they do, nevertheless, apply. 
Another notable theme is that IHRL does not generally prohibit activities 
involved in MSOs, or MSOs themselves outright, except in the case of certain 
rights, such as the prohibition of torture. Instead, IHRL generally imposes 
requirements, with which States must comply if a particular activity is not to 
violate the right in question. These requirements vary between rights, but some 
common principles can clearly be identified. Most consistently, a measure that 
limits the enjoyment of a particular right must generally have a basis in law, and 
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must usually amount to a necessary and proportionate means to achieve a 
legitimate objective. In some cases, such as in the policing of protest, the 
margin of appreciation given to States is relatively wide, notwithstanding that 
their actions must nevertheless comply with these requirements. 
9.5. How does the regulation of MSOs by IHRL compare to its regulation 
by other bodies of law, and what are the links between the different legal 
regimes? 
The predominant conclusion, comparing the regulation of MSOs by IHRL, to its 
regulation under other bodies of international law, is that IHRL contains a much 
more comprehensive framework of obligations. Although, as specific examples 
have demonstrated, MSOs may be regulated under domestic law, this is entirely 
dependent on the State in question. Activities that are largely untouched by 
other bodies of international law, such as deprivation of liberty, or the policing of 
protest, are subject to detailed and specific requirements under IHRL. 
Furthermore, other areas that are regulated by other bodies of law are subject 
to either more comprehensive, or more detailed, regulation by IHRL. With 
respect to the former, the principle of non-refoulement, although prominent in 
refugee law, manifests itself in a far wider range of circumstances under IHRL. 
Turning to the latter, the regulation of the use of force under IHRL entails a 
much larger set of obligations than arise under the law of the sea. 
Notwithstanding the general conclusion that regulation of MSOs is more 
comprehensive than under other bodies of international law, there are some 
narrow areas where other bodies of law go further than IHRL in certain 
respects. Notably, the obligation to assist those in distress, although argued to 
arise in some circumstances under IHRL, is limited by the applicability of the 
IHRL instruments in question. Under the law of the sea, on the other hand, the 
obligation is more clearly defined and, in some respects, more extensively 
applicable than under IHRL. However, this is a notable exception with respect 
to the activities and the rights that have been examined. 
Irrespective of the specific rule concerned, a key difference between IHRL and 
other bodies of international law is the availability of individual complaint 
procedures. While enforcement mechanisms may exist with respect to other 
bodies of international law, including the law of the sea, these do not generally 
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allow for individuals complaints. Although dependent on the State concerned 
being party to the relevant treaty or protocol, each of the IHRL treaties under 
consideration is subject to the jurisdiction of a court or treaty body before which 
individuals can claim alleged violations against States parties. 
Turning to the links with other bodies of law, three main points can be made. 
First, as alluded to above, IHRL provides the regulatory regime for activities that 
find their authorisation in other bodies of law including, most notably in the 
context of MSOs, the law of the sea. UNCLOS, for example, authorises States 
to exercise jurisdiction over foreign ships in limited circumstances on the high 
seas, or which are in violation of a coastal State’s lawful regulations in maritime 
zones to which its sovereignty extends, or in which it enjoys sovereign rights. 
However, it says little or nothing about how that jurisdiction is to be enforced, an 
area where it has been shown that IHRL provides comprehensive regulation. 
Second, the compatibility of a particular measure with relevant rules of IHRL 
may depend on it having a basis in law, which, least controversially, may be 
found in the domestic law of the State concerned. However, as has been 
discussed in several contexts though the thesis, that basis arguably may also 
be found in international law, so long as the relevant provision is sufficiently 
precise and foreseeable in its application. As a result, rules of the law of the sea 
may, for example, provide the legal basis for the limitation of rights under IHRL. 
Finally, IHRL may be complementary to other bodies of law. This is the case for 
the assistance of those in distress at sea, with respect to which both IHRL and 
the law of the sea contain similar obligations, albeit with differing content scope 
of application, and very different options for raising alleged violations. Similarly, 
protection from refoulement under IHRL can be considered complementary to 
its overlapping, but narrower, protection under refugee law. 
9.6. Final remarks 
As noted above, the applicability of the instruments under consideration to a 
wide variety of MSOs, conducted both within and beyond a State’s territory, is 
central to the central proposition of this thesis, and was therefore addressed 
first. Although the topic remains controversial in many respects, and some of 
the analysis is unavoidably tentative as a result, the conclusions reached 
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provide the necessary foundation for the subsequent discussion of substantive 
IHRL rules and norms. That discussion covered a broad spectrum of the 
activities that comprise MSOs and the issues they raise. Within each area, IHRL 
contains obligations over and above those found in other bodies of international 
law. Even where activities are regulated elsewhere, the depth and breadth of 
regulation under IHRL is almost always greater. Moreover, although differences 
arise between IHRL treaties, and practice under some is more developed than 
under other, including in connection with MSOs, there is a significant degree of 
commonality between the regional treaties and with the ICCPR. It is submitted 
that, in light of these conclusions, obligations under IHRL amount to an 
important framework of regulation within which MSOs must be conducted. 
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